

## *War-related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-2014*

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### **Summary**

This report summarizes the separate toll of war on civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan and describes some of the ways the wars in each of those countries, while still having distinct features and dynamics, have become one larger conflict.<sup>2</sup> The two wars are linked in several ways. Afghan civilians have fled the war to neighboring states, including Pakistan, in large numbers. United States drone strikes in Pakistan are in service of both the larger war on terror and aimed to kill anti-government militants in Pakistan who have fled from Afghanistan or who are attempting to destabilize and overthrow Afghanistan's government. Drone strikes kill Pakistani civilians as well as their intended targets. The US also supports Pakistan's ground and air war against militant organizations, such as the Pakistani Taliban, which has led to growing numbers of civilian casualties in Pakistan. Pakistan's attacks on militants have also included cross-border shelling into Afghanistan, which has led to displacement and caused some deaths and injuries in Afghanistan. Finally, international military forces have transported food, fuel, and equipment through Pakistan to Afghanistan, and militants have repeatedly attacked the vehicles, leading to civilian deaths.

This report describes the two kinds of war-related death and injury: direct deaths due to violence, and deaths caused indirectly due to the effects of the destruction of infrastructure and displacement. The focus is on direct deaths since it is very difficult to estimate the toll of indirect death in Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak).

Although the US stated in December 2014 that it would soon withdraw from Afghanistan, the war there has grown in destructiveness over the past year and the Obama administration announced on 24 March 2015 that it would keep the same level of troops in Afghanistan through 2015. By contrast, the war in Pakistan has seen decreased intensity in recent years, though it is still a very hot conflict in the northwest region of the country.

Since the start of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, about 26,270 civilians have been killed by direct war-related violence and more than 29,900 civilians have been injured. The health care system remains burdened by war and stressed due to the destruction of Afghan infrastructure and the inability to rebuild in some regions. Afghans continue to experience a humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian workers still face attacks from militants and a generally unsafe environment. The total for all categories of direct war violence in the Afghanistan war approaches 92,000 people. In Pakistan about 21,500 civilians have been killed as a result of direct violence as the war in Afghanistan spilled into Pakistan and as the US and the Pakistani military have intensified their assaults on insurgents. In addition, about 29,000 militants and more than 6,000 Pakistani security forces have been killed. When all categories of direct violence are added, nearly 57,000 people have been killed and more than 60,000 have been

counted seriously wounded. *The combined toll in direct war-related violence in the AfPak region is about 149,000 people. An additional 162,000 injured have been identified by local and international sources.*


## Afghanistan, 2001-2014

*"Persistent and fierce fighting, including serious violations of the rules of war, continue to have a deplorable impact on the Afghan population. For the victims of the conflict, the situation might deteriorate even further as the funding of humanitarian aid dwindles in the country."* Nicolas Marti, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation in Afghanistan<sup>3</sup>

While the US formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan in December 2014, US uniformed troops remain advising the Afghan security forces and engaging in combat. The war has not diminished in intensity. Rather, in several ways, most notably, in the numbers of civilians and Afghan military and police killed, the war has escalated. In late March 2015, the US indicated it would slow the pace of its withdrawal.

The toll of service members killed and wounded in the Afghanistan war is known with some precision: 2,357 US and 1,130 allied military personnel were killed in Afghanistan from 2001 through March 2015. But, as in other wars, the exact number of civilians killed and injured is unknown. In the first years of the Afghanistan war, there were a few counts and estimates, but there was no comprehensive and detailed account of civilian deaths caused by the various parties in the war. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) began to make systematic counts of war-related injury and death in Afghanistan in 2008 and their reports are both detailed and thorough. Using the UNAMA data and other sources for the earlier years, I estimate that more than 26,270 civilians have been killed by direct war violence in Afghanistan from late 2001 through 2014 (Figure 1).<sup>4</sup> While the violence has diminished in some regions, it has intensified in other areas of Afghanistan. Most civilian deaths occurred after 2007; UNAMA records more than 17,700 civilian deaths from 2009 to 2014.


**Figure 1. Afghanistan Direct Civilian War Deaths, 2001-2014**



In one sense, it does not matter who has killed Afghan civilians; it matters only that they are dead. But in another sense, it matters to the families of the victims that the killing has come at the hands of a particular armed group — whether it is a militant organization (e.g. Taliban, Al Qaeda), which UNAMA describes as “Anti-Government Elements,” or whether the responsible party is what UNAMA calls “Pro-government Forces (PGF),” the Afghan security forces (national or local police or the army) and the international forces of the US and its coalition partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Figure 2 illustrates the trends in the attribution of civilian deaths since 2007, showing a steady rise in numbers of civilians killed in the war by all parties over the last seven years. Militants kill many more civilians than Afghan and international military forces. Yet Figure 2 also highlights the fact that starting in 2012, the downward trend in harm to civilians by Pro-government Forces (Afghan and international forces) that began in 2008 has reversed. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that 2014 “witnessed a continuing trend of fighting parties failing to distinguish between civilians and combatants.”<sup>5</sup> Finally, civilian deaths which UNAMA is unable to attribute to a responsible party have also begun to climb.

**Figure 2. Attributing Civilian War Deaths in Afghanistan, 2007-2014<sup>6</sup>**



The attribution of the cause of harm to civilians is important because understanding the causes can help focus efforts to reduce risks to civilians. Figure 3 highlights some good news, specifically that after accounting for a significant portion of civilians killed by pro-government forces, many fewer civilians are being killed in the course of international military forces’ or government aerial operations. This shift occurred in response to public and NGO concerns about civilian casualties caused by air attacks; ISAF and the US changed their procedures for air strikes in mid-2009 — reducing their number and making the criteria for a strike more restrictive — and the number of civilian deaths due to air strikes gradually decreased.<sup>7</sup> In 2014, 2 percent of all casualties were caused by pro-government air strikes.<sup>8</sup>

**Figure 3. Civilians Killed by Air Operations, 2008-2014<sup>9</sup>**





Figure 4 highlights other trends. As the US withdrew, and the Afghan military and police forces took over more of the war on the ground, ground engagements have become a more significant source of harm to civilians. In addition, the number of civilian casualties caused by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has grown since 2009, as has the number of targeted killings by the Taliban of Afghan officials.<sup>10</sup>

**Figure 4. Causes and Numbers of Direct Civilian Death in Afghanistan in 2009-2014<sup>11</sup>**



Most concerning is the fact that militants are clearly targeting civilians, despite the proclamations of Taliban leaders that civilians should not be harmed. According to UNAMA, of the 382 targeted killing attacks in 2014 for which the Taliban claimed responsibility, 143 were deliberate attacks on civilians.<sup>12</sup>


Finally, cross border shelling from Pakistan has emerged in recent years as a cause of Afghan civilian casualties and displacement. UNAMA noted that there were more than 40 such incidents in 2014 which led to civilian deaths and injuries. While the total numbers killed (11) and injured (71) in 2014 were comparatively small, this was an increase over the

# COSTS OF WAR

previous year, when 9 were killed and 28 injured by cross-border shelling from Pakistan. There have been nearly 300 armed clashes at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border since 2007.<sup>13</sup>

While the total number of war-related injuries from 2001-2014 is difficult to know with precision, UNAMA has documented more than 29,970 injuries in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2014. During that same period, 17,774 civilians were killed in the war. Figure 5 illustrates the steadily increasing number of direct war-caused injuries, another sign that the war has intensified.

**Figure 5. Afghan Civilian War Injuries and Direct Deaths, 2009-2014<sup>14</sup>**



Many of the war-injured are amputees. In 2014, the International Committee of the Red Cross registered 1,318 new patients who were amputees.<sup>15</sup>

## Refugees and Internal Displacement in Afghanistan

Afghans have been on the move to escape war almost continuously since 1979. The intensifying war in recent years has led to displacement as people flee violence or are unable to return home. As of mid-2014, there were nearly 2.7 million Afghan refugees. While Afghan refugees can be found all over the world, most Afghans have sought refuge in Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> Displacement continues in areas of ongoing fighting. There were also more than 701,900 internally displaced people in Afghanistan in late 2014, an increase of nearly 20,000 people since July 2014 when UNHCR noted approximately 683,300 people were internally displaced.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, more than 5.8 million Afghans have been able to return to Afghanistan since March 2002, in what is the largest ongoing repatriation operation in the world. More than 3.8 million of those who have returned have come from Pakistan, where they had taken refuge. The UNHCR noted in January 2015 that shelter remains a problem for returnees.<sup>18</sup>

Pakistani refugees are also flowing into southern Afghanistan from northwest Pakistan, as fighting has intensified there. The UN notes that in June 2014, for example,

13,000 people fleeing the Pakistani military Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan, Pakistan, (discussed below) crossed into Afghanistan to escape violence.

## Afghan Public Health and Indirect Death Due to War

War stresses public health systems when medical, water treatment, and sanitation infrastructure is destroyed, when the remaining health systems are deluged with the injured, and when basic preventive medical care, such as vaccinations, cannot occur. Further, cluster bombs, land mines, and improvised explosive devices may destroy livestock, make gathering wood dangerous, and keep farmers out of fields. Internally displaced people and refugees are more vulnerable to malnutrition and disease, and often less able to access medical care. These health effects of war may lead to indirect death and illness. War-related indirect deaths in Afghanistan, as with any war, are thus caused by many factors, including disease due lack of access to safe drinking water, malnutrition, and reduced access to health care. Environmental disasters such as landslides, drought, and floods make living in war zones more difficult, and create what the humanitarian relief community calls "complex emergencies."

Afghanistan started the twenty-first century as one of the least healthy places in the world to live, with a legacy of landmines, drought, and malnutrition. Poverty has been exacerbated by war and poverty negatively affects public health. Afghanistan has been at war nearly continuously since 1979 and it is thus extremely difficult to disentangle the long-term health effects of previous wars as compared to the current on-going war. Any assessment and apportionment of the effects of the current war is also made more difficult by the dearth of pre-war data on even basic health indicators. Further, it is difficult to get data in areas of active fighting.

Despite ongoing armed conflict, public health has gradually improved in some indicators. The Afghanistan Ministry of Health, the ICRC, the United Nations, and many donor nations and small non-governmental organizations have attempted to assess the state of Afghan health and have made a major effort to improve it. The most important change was the development and introduction of a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) by the Ministry of Health, working in conjunction with the World Health Organization in 2002, and the gradual implementation of BPHS since 2003.<sup>19</sup> Access to health care, facilities, personnel, and medicine have dramatically expanded since 2004.<sup>20</sup>

A main focus of the public health care effort has been increasing resources available to Afghan women and children. Data published by the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health suggests some improvement in basic health indicators. They report for example that maternal, infant and child mortality rates have declined since 2002. While World Bank data does not report the same numbers, these two sources do agree that the trend is positive, with declines in maternal, infant and child mortality in Afghanistan.

**Table 1. Afghanistan Maternal, Infant and Mortality Rates: 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2013<sup>21</sup>**

	2002	2006	2010	2013
Maternal, per 100,000 live births	1,600		327	400
Infant, per 1,000 live births		129	77	70
Child (under 5), per 1,000 live births		191	97	97

But health has not improved across the board. For example, tuberculosis is endemic in Afghanistan and the prevalence of tuberculosis has increased, from 231 per 100,000 people in 2008 to 358 per 100,000 in 2013.<sup>22</sup> The 2005 National Disability Survey in Afghanistan (NDSA) conducted from 21 December 2004 to 20 August 2005 found that war-related disabilities accounted for 17 percent of all disabilities in Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> While the ICRC runs the majority of orthopedic facilities, Afghanistan's Ministry of Public Health also treats the war-injured. Yet, even with the infusion of resources, Afghanistan's public health sector has been inadequate to meet the needs of all those with disabilities.

The US has funded some improvements in Afghanistan's public health infrastructure, including the construction and maintenance of hospitals. Some of the US investment in health care has been wasted according to the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). For example, SIGAR found that the US funded Salang Hospital in Parwan Province, which cost about \$600,000, was opened in January 2013 despite the fact that construction was incomplete, inadequate, unsafe and unhealthy.<sup>24</sup>

## Mental Health

Mental health remains a significant concern in Afghanistan.<sup>25</sup> Psychological wounds are pervasive and undertreated, and mental illness in Afghanistan has been high in comparison to other war-affected populations.<sup>26</sup> While the experience of political violence has not been the only cause of emotional suffering in Afghanistan, many of its other causes, such as displacement, family violence, food insecurity, and poverty are indirectly and directly related to war. The impact of these stressors, including war-related violence, varies depending on the community and family support systems.<sup>27</sup>

Surveys have found a range of mental health problems among Afghan adults, including depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder in the post-2001 era. A survey of Afghans over 15 years old in 2002 found that about 70 percent of respondents had depression and anxiety symptoms, while a 2003 survey that inquired about traumatic events over a 10-year period found symptoms of depression (39 percent), anxiety (52 percent), and post-traumatic stress disorder (20 percent).<sup>28</sup> In 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health cited statistics that 66 percent of Afghans suffer mental health problems.<sup>29</sup> Those who lost limbs or suffer other disfiguring injuries were more prone to anxiety and depression.

The Ministry of Public Health, with the support of non-governmental organizations, has tried to build capacity to address mental health needs. These groups started with almost nothing — the main psychiatric hospital was destroyed in 2001 and the country had two

psychiatrists for 25 million people.<sup>30</sup> Mental health was included in the BPHS in 2003, and the focus has been on providing mental health care by integrating it with primary care. While there have been some improvements in access to mental health care, psychiatric services remain inadequate throughout the country.<sup>31</sup> Mental health training has been added to medical training for health care providers, but there are very few health care providers. In 2011, there were 0.2 physicians per 1,000 people. By comparison, in the same year, the US and UK respectively had, according to the World Bank, 2.5 and 2.8 physicians per 1,000 people.

## Afghan Military and Police Fatalities

Although the members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are not civilians, their injuries and deaths affect the larger civilian society. Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are technically civilians, but they deal directly with militants and have a role in counterinsurgency. Since their formation after the US invasion, the ANA, ANP, and ALP have been increasingly engaged in fighting militants and have been targeted by them. While there is concern that the Afghan military and police have been underestimating both the size of their forces actually deployed and their casualties, there is a consensus that the past several years have seen a dramatic increase in the numbers of Afghan military and police killed and injured.

An Afghan Ministry of Defense spokesman reported that 1,392 soldiers were killed fighting the Taliban in 2013.<sup>32</sup> *The New York Times* reported in March 2014 that the Karzai government had counted more than 13,729 Afghan security forces (army and police) killed since 2001 and that 16,511 Afghan soldiers and police had been wounded to date.<sup>33</sup> But even more Afghan National Security Forces — 1,868 soldiers and 3,720 police — were killed in 2014.<sup>34</sup> In late 2014, Lt. General Joseph Allen called Afghan combat deaths unsustainable.<sup>35</sup> The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has suggested Afghan National Security Forces attrition may be underreported by Afghan officials.<sup>36</sup> I estimate that about 7,750 ANA have been killed and almost twice as many Afghan National Police, about 14,200 police, have been killed as of late December 2014, when the US combat mission ended.<sup>37</sup>

There are other armed groups, besides Afghan national police and army forces, which are engaged in fighting militants. These include private security companies as well local militias known as "uprisers" who have taken it upon themselves to combat the Taliban; these groups may or may not have formal ties to Afghan local police.<sup>38</sup> Although there are some reports of Afghan militia members being killed and injured, I am unable to estimate private security force and militia force deaths and injuries.<sup>39</sup>

## US and Other International Military Forces

At the peak in May 2011, the US had 100,000 uniformed troops deployed in Afghanistan. Since then, the US has gradually turned military operations over to Afghan National Security Forces (the army, air force and police). In early 2015, the US had 9,800 uniformed troops deployed in Afghanistan, with the expectation that the number of troops

would continue to decline in early 2016 to about 4,900 and to a much smaller "embassy presence" of about 1,000 by January 2017.<sup>40</sup> On 24 March 2015, President Obama said the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan would continue, but at a slower pace; 9,800 troops would remain through 2015.

From 2001 to April 2015, there were 2,357 US military fatalities with Operation Enduring Freedom and more than 20,000 service members wounded, including more than 770 major limb amputations.<sup>41</sup> The number of US military fatalities and major injuries peaked with the US presence in 2011.

The US has worked with more than 25 coalition partners, including NATO. Of these US partners, the United Kingdom deployed the largest total number from 2001 to its final withdrawal of uniformed troops in October 2014. The majority of allied fatalities have been service members in the militaries of four countries: the UK had 453 fatalities; Canada had 158 fatalities; and France and Germany had 86 and 54 fatalities respectively as of early 2015.<sup>42</sup> Thousands of additional allied service members have been seriously wounded.<sup>43</sup>

US and allied military forces have been supplemented in Afghanistan and Pakistan by private contractors who do everything from providing security to driving trucks and cooking meals. Some of these contractors have been injured and killed. The US Department of Labor reports 1,582 deaths of contractors in Afghanistan, these numbers reported by contracting companies themselves; the actual number is estimated to be much higher at around 3,400.<sup>44</sup>

## Militant Fatalities

Several organizations that oppose the current government of Afghanistan operate in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, Hizb-I Islami, and Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar e-Taiba. The Taliban, which has a political, military and religious presence, are the most numerous; their numbers have increased from a few hundred in 2002 to more than 60,000 in 2014.<sup>45</sup> According to US estimates, very few al Qaeda remain in Afghanistan. Major General Joseph Osterman told Reuters in 2013 that "less than 100" al Qaeda, who are "just trying to survive at this point," were living in the mountains of Nuristan.<sup>46</sup>

There are no systematic estimates of the total number of Taliban or other opposition forces, including Al Qaeda, killed from 2001 through 2014. There are sometimes published estimates and counts for Taliban or members of other militant organizations killed in a single incident and some estimates for the numbers killed in a season of fighting. For example, a report in the *Voice of America* in early 2014 said that Afghan army and police forces had killed 720 Taliban during January and February 2014.<sup>47</sup> If that rate of killing Taliban were sustained, more than 4,300 militants may have been killed last year. This would not be an unusually high figure. Earlier in the war, Afghanistan Rights Monitor noted that neither the US or NATO have released figures on the exact number of anti-government insurgents that have been killed, but notes that for 2010, their estimates "suggest over 5,000 combatants and 'suspected' fighters were killed" in Afghanistan.<sup>48</sup> Another report in early 2011 quoted an Afghan Interior Ministry spokesperson as saying 5,225 Taliban were killed in 2010.<sup>49</sup> If 2010, as we know, was a more intense period of ISAF and US force engagement in

Afghanistan, we can presume that Taliban deaths were lower in 2009 and perhaps lower still in the period 2002-2008. The total number of Taliban killed from 2002 to 2009 may be as low as 5,000, which is surely an underestimate, or as high as 10,000 to 15,000. The US began a surge of its forces in Afghanistan in 2010. If more than 5,200 Taliban were killed in 2010, as many as 5,000 Taliban may have been killed each year from 2011 to 2013. Thus, an estimate for the number of insurgent forces, mainly Taliban, killed would be between 29,500 and 39,500. My estimate is 35,000 militants killed, a midpoint between the two figures.<sup>50</sup>

## Pakistan, 2001 to Early 2015

*"Pakistan's war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the northwest is taking a tremendous toll on the local population. The military's killing of civilians, collective punishment of locals, and continued detention of thousands has produced an unprecedented level of animosity toward the federal government and security forces."<sup>51</sup>*

Pakistan is at war. On 16 December 2014, members of the Pakistani Taliban stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar, Pakistan. The attackers wore suicide vests, and carried guns, which they fired, often at short range, on children and staff. They killed 132 children and 9 adults. The militants claimed that their attack was revenge for Pakistani military operations in Waziristan, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and for US drone strikes.<sup>52</sup>

This attack, and the Taliban's claims about their motives, illustrate that there are several interrelated armed conflicts between the militants and the government, and between militants and international forces, underway in Pakistan. Most of this fighting is concentrated in the northwest, but the bloodshed not infrequently affects civilians throughout the rest of the country. Thus, although the US drone strikes are widely discussed in Western media, drone strikes are not the only, or even largest, source of war-related civilian death, injury and displacement in Pakistan. The Taliban, al Qaeda, and members of other militant organizations have killed thousands of civilians in Pakistan using suicide attacks, assassination, and ambushes. The Pakistani Security Forces have also killed civilians with mortars, direct fire, and bombs as they target militants and fight to support a precarious government.

The war in Pakistan escalated after 2004 for three fundamental reasons. First, the US war in Afghanistan pushed some Afghanistan Taliban and al Qaeda into Pakistan after 2001. Taliban and al Qaeda subsequently used Pakistan as a base to plan and conduct insurgency in Afghanistan. The US then began to directly attack militants associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda in the northwest region of Pakistan using drones and special operations forces. Pakistan deployed its army into the northwest of the country in December 2001 to support US operations, specifically by capturing fleeing Taliban and al Qaeda. Pakistan still keeps more than 100,000 troops in the region.<sup>53</sup> Second, the international military forces operating in Afghanistan have used Pakistan as a route to bring weapons, fuel and equipment into Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup> The supply lines traverse the country and insurgents have attacked the convoys as they move north with supplies or as they return to Karachi. Third, Pakistan's military has increasingly attacked militants who oppose their regime or who are members of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban or other groups. The US has equipped, funded, and


trained Pakistani Security Forces to attack militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Balochistan. On the other hand, the intelligence services of Pakistan have supported militants who have sought to destabilize the Afghan government, reasoning that the Karzai government was tilting toward Pakistan's enemy, India.

## The US War on Terror in Pakistan

The US fights the militant organizations in Pakistan including al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), and the Haqqani Network directly through drone and other airstrikes, cross-border raids, occasional Special Forces attacks, and CIA assassinations of terrorists. The US also supports the Pakistani government's attacks on militants.

The first US drone strike in Pakistan took place in the Waziristan region, against a member of the Taliban, Nek Muhammad, on 18 June 2004.<sup>55</sup> The drone strike program escalated dramatically under the Obama administration, with the number of strikes peaking in 2010. Although the US Congress is briefed on the strikes, US officials do not consistently comment publicly on the strikes or their consequences, and analysts must therefore rely on local press reports and investigations by police and non-governmental organizations for their understanding of the strikes and their consequences.

**Figure 6. Counts of Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2014<sup>56</sup>**



TBIJ: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; LWJ: Long War Journal; NAF: New America Foundation; PBC: Pakistan Body Count.

US drone strikes appear to be coordinated with Pakistani military operations against militants. The US paused its drone strikes in Pakistan during the first half of 2014 while the

Pakistani government was negotiating with the Taliban. When those negotiations failed, the strikes resumed, and the Pakistani military began its Operation Zarb-e-Azb in Waziristan, the location of most (19 of 24) of the US drone strikes in 2014.

The number killed and injured in US drone strikes is disputed for two reasons: it is often unclear just how many were killed or injured, and just who those individuals were, whether civilian or militant. Table 2 illustrates how different analysts have estimated the civilian toll of drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004-2014.

**Table 2. Total Number and Percentage of Civilians Killed by US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Various Sources, 2004-2014<sup>57</sup>**

Source	Civilians Killed	Total Killed	% Civilians Killed
TBIJ Min	416	2,648	15.7
TBIJ Max	953	3,837	24.8
LWJ	156	2,883	5.4
NAF average	286	3,002	9.5
PBC Min	1,409	1,944	72.5

Pakistani civilians have also found the strikes disruptive to their livelihoods.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, to the extent that the strikes destroy infrastructure and make subsistence more difficult, like any other military tactic, the drone strikes contribute to problems of displacement, malnutrition, and disease.


## Pakistan is Highly Militarized

Pakistan has a history of direct overt military rule and military influence on politics. Indeed, military governments have ruled Pakistan for approximately half of its 68 years since independence. The intensity of Pakistan's internal war with militants and its ongoing border conflict with India is reflected in Pakistan's large and growing military budget.<sup>59</sup> US military assistance to Pakistan has also grown. US contributions to war-related spending in Pakistan are both covert and overt. US direct overt security aid and reimbursement to Pakistan since the 11 September 2001 attacks have totaled more than \$20 billion. US economic related assistance to Pakistan from FY2000 through FY2014 has totaled more than \$10 billion.

The \$20 billion in US military aid and reimbursement since late FY2001 includes about \$13 billion to Pakistan in Coalition Support Funds (CSF). The CSF reimburses Pakistan for its logistical and operational support of US operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. An important element of the CSF is reimbursement to Pakistan for the transportation route that Pakistan provides the ISAF forces into Afghanistan. Other US security assistance includes \$2.3 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, and another \$3.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing. The counterinsurgency funds directly support Pakistani military and paramilitary attacks on militants.


Figure 7 illustrates the growth of both Pakistan's military budget and overt US security related funding for Pakistan.

**Figure 7. Pakistan's Military Spending and US Aid and Reimbursement, 2000-2014<sup>60</sup>**



The \$20 billion in Coalition Support Funds and other military support, including the equipment and training provided by the US described below, have enabled Pakistan's attacks on militants in FATA and Balochistan. Figure 8 highlights the extent to which US security aid has essentially subsidized the Pakistani military budget since 2001.

**Figure 8. Percent of Pakistan's Military Budget from US Military Aid and Reimbursement<sup>61</sup>**



Pakistan also receives sophisticated military equipment and training from the US for counterterrorism through grants or purchases. For instance, since 2001 Pakistan has been granted more than 2,000 TOW anti-armor missiles, 121 TOW missile launchers, 20 Cobra attack helicopters, 550 armored personnel carriers, and 14 F-16 A/B attack helicopters. Pakistan's purchases from the US include: 115 M-109 Howitzers, 18 new F-16C/D combat


aircraft, 1,450 two thousand pound bombs, and 500 JDAM bombs to equip F-16 aircraft. Pakistan has purchased and received other US helicopters and surveillance aircraft as well.<sup>62</sup>

## Pakistani Military Operational Attacks

The Pakistani military, paramilitary Frontier Corp, and police have conducted more than 1,600 "operational attacks" on militants from 2007 through 2014. Like the US drone strikes, most Pakistani military strikes against militants occur in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). As Figure 9 illustrates, casualties from operational attacks peaked in 2009, and declined for some years. These attacks have killed more than 17,000 people, including civilians, militants, and Pakistani security forces.

Operational attacks are not simply one-off strikes. Rather, operational attacks are often part of long planned military operations, in which the government aims for and anticipates not only the killing and arrest of militants and the destruction of their military equipment, but also the displacement of civilians. For example, in May 2011, humanitarian agencies in the northwestern region of Pakistan were told to brace for up to 365,000 more displaced people in the area as Pakistani military officials alerted them of a planned offensive against Taliban and al Qaeda. Aid agencies were similarly alerted about five months in advance of an offensive in 2009.<sup>63</sup>

**Figure 9. Casualties in Operational Attacks by the Pakistani Military and Paramilitary, 2007-2014<sup>64</sup>**



On 15 June 2014, the Pakistani military initiated Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sharp and Cutting Strike) in North Waziristan. A Pakistani military spokesperson said the operation was "the beginning of the end of Terrorism in Pakistan."<sup>65</sup> Operation Zarb-e-Azb included strikes on militant hideouts which killed hundreds of people identified as militants and led to the displacement of over one million Pakistani civilians.<sup>66</sup> As military analyst Bill Roggio of the *Long War Journal* noted after the first week of the operation, "The military states that no civilians have been killed in the weeklong operation, a stunning claim given the historical lack of precision by Pakistani attack helicopters and strike aircraft, and the environment in

which groups such as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and other jihadist groups are operating. These groups often live in compounds that include women and children.<sup>67</sup> Figure 10 shows the Pakistani military assault on the town of Mir Ali. It is clear from the image that the town is devastated, though it is not clear, of course, who caused the damage.

On 9 December 2014, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that Operation Zarb-e-Azb had inflicted a fatal blow on militants, that the return of the internally displaced persons could begin, and that the area would be reconstructed. Sharif said, "Peace has been restored as a result of this operation and it'll contribute towards ensuring peace in the entire region."<sup>68</sup> Despite the claim that certain areas of Waziristan had been "cleared of militants," Pakistani aircraft and US drone strikes attacked these same areas later in the year.<sup>69</sup> On 16 December, the Pakistani Taliban attacked the school in Peshawar, claiming it was retaliation for Operation Zarb-e-Azb.<sup>70</sup>

**Figure 10. "Clearance of Mir Ali" July 2014 in "Operation Zarb-e-Azb" in North Waziristan<sup>71</sup>**




## Militant Attacks on ISAF Supply through Pakistan

As US and other international forces escalated their military presence in Afghanistan, and hence their needs for supply between 2010 and 2011, the number of attacks on NATO supply vehicles — e.g. equipment containers and fuel tankers — and the personnel who drive and protect them increased. After two attacks in October 2010, Azam Tariq, a Pakistani Taliban (TTP) spokesperson, took responsibility and said: "We will carry out more such attacks in future. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan. This is also to avenge drone attacks."<sup>72</sup> The attacks on supplies to Afghanistan did continue, only declining after the Pakistani government closed these ground lines of communication from November 2011 to July 2012 in response to a cross border attack by NATO forces that inadvertently killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. During that period, the US began to use other routes, most importantly, through Uzbekistan. As the US and allies gradually withdrew from Afghanistan starting in 2012, the need for supplies of food, fuel,

and weapons diminished. There has been a corresponding decline in the number of attacks. All told, the attacks have led to hundreds of civilian, military, and police casualties.

**Figure 11. Militant Attacks on ISAF and US Supply Lines in Pakistan 2008 to 2014<sup>73</sup>**




## Militant Attacks on Civilians in Pakistan

Militants have deliberately attacked Pakistani civilians, or inadvertently injured and killed civilians in their attacks on the Pakistani military and police. While civilians are injured in attacks on NATO convoys, militants in Pakistan often use suicide attacks that are intended to harm civilians. Further, some militant attacks are "complex" — consisting of both suicide attacks and armed assaults with guns and other weapons. As is the case in Afghanistan, militants seem to be increasingly intent on targeting civilians.

For example, suicide bombings were comparatively rare in Pakistan from 2002 to 2006, with about 25 attacks killing approximately 430 people during that entire period.<sup>74</sup> In 2007, Pakistani militant organizations escalated suicide bombing attacks. There were more than 425 suicide attacks from 2007 through 2014, killing more than 7,500 people, and injuring almost 17,000.<sup>75</sup> Figure 12 illustrates the pattern of deaths and injuries caused by militant suicide attacks in Pakistan since 2002.

**Figure 12. Militant Suicide Attacks in Pakistan, 2002-2014<sup>76</sup>**



## Refugees, Internal Displacement, and Public Health in Pakistan

Millions of Pakistanis have been on the move, attempting to escape violence since 2004. In 2009, more than 3 million Pakistanis were internally displaced in the northwest region of Pakistan, many staying in approximately 30 camps for internally displaced people. The situation is little changed today. While some have returned home, millions are still displaced. In July 2014, before the peak of the flight due to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the UNHCR counted 1.2 million internally displaced persons in Pakistan. In addition, there were 1.6 million refugees from neighboring countries (mainly Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq) for a total of more than 2.8 million refugees and internally displaced persons inside Pakistan. Further, an additional 176,000 Pakistanis had fled the country and sought refuge elsewhere in mid-2014.<sup>77</sup> That displacement follows government offensives is foreseeable and foreseen in Pakistan. Just a week into the long offensive in Waziristan, on 22 June 2014, the Pakistani Military's Public Relations Service web site requested donations to help the internally displaced people of Waziristan.<sup>78</sup>

It is extremely difficult to gauge the impact of the fighting in Pakistan on public health. Most of the most intense fighting occurs in the FATA. The FATA is governed by restrictive laws and few outsiders, including the media, are allowed into the area. It is thus extremely difficult to estimate the indirect casualties of the fighting in the northwest of Pakistan.

## Summary of Human Costs of War in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, linked since 2001, have become increasingly entangled. The fighting is increasingly spilling across the "AfPak" border. While it is common to assess the human toll of these two wars as if they were completely separate, a more accurate assessment is gained by looking at the region as a whole. The combined total civilian and combatant deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost 149,000 people killed in direct war-related violence; an additional total 162,000 have been seriously injured.

The total number killed by direct war violence in Afghanistan from late 2001 through 2014 is estimated to be approximately 92,000 civilians and combatants. Table 4 shows the deaths by category. I estimate that about 100,000 people have been injured in the Afghanistan war. The steep increase in the number of individuals killed and injured in recent years, and the fact that the US has slowed its withdrawal, underscores the fact that the war in Afghanistan is not ending. It is getting worse.

**Table 3. Estimated Total Direct War Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan, 2001-2014<sup>79</sup>**

	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Wounded*</b>
Afghan Civilians	26,270	29,970
Afghan Military and Police	23,470	17,000
Taliban and Other Militants	35,000	15,000
US Forces	2,357	20,067
US Allies	1,139	3,800**
Civilian Contractors	3,401	13,480
NGO Humanitarian Workers	331	259
Journalists and Media Workers	25	unknown
<b>Total</b>	<b>91,991</b>	<b>99,576</b>

\*Incomplete and estimated

\*\* Only including UK, Canadian, French and German wounded<sup>80</sup>


The human toll of war in Afghanistan has been devastating. These numbers are of course only indicators of a much more dramatic story, where one in five people have been displaced and where mental and physical illness are undertreated. The human toll of war in neighboring Pakistan has also been devastating. Table 4 summarizes the human toll in Pakistan, where more than 60,000 civilians have been killed and injured in war-related violence. Moreover, more than 58,000 combatants (militants and Pakistani security forces) have been killed and injured.

**Table 4. Estimated Total Direct Death and Injury in Pakistan, 2001-March 2015<sup>81</sup>**

	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Wounded</b>
Pakistani Civilians	21,547	39,600
Pakistani Security Forces	6,216	11,581
Pakistani Taliban and Other Militants	28,954	11,245
Civilian Contractors	88	126
NGO Humanitarian Workers	91	86
Journalists and Media Workers	52	unknown
<b>Total</b>	<b>56,948</b>	<b>62,638</b>


In both countries, the cumulative toll of the most recent 6 years of fighting is much greater than the cumulative toll for the previous 9 years, from 2001 through 2008. Figure 13 illustrates the annual trends in civilian, military, and police deaths in Afghanistan.

**Figure 13. Trends in Direct War Death in Afghanistan from 2001-2015: Afghan Civilians, Afghan Military and Police, and US and Allied Military**



Unlike in Afghanistan, where the annual death and injury toll has risen in recent years, the annual number of injuries and deaths appears to have declined in Pakistan since 2009. However, since the negotiations between the Pakistani militants and military ended in mid-2014, violence seems to have reignited and the parties to the conflict are clearly engaged in a cycle of violence, which may lead to an upward spiral in injury and death, as each side takes revenge for attacks taken by the other.

**Figure 14. Trends in Combatant and Non-Combatant Killing in Pakistan, 2001-2014<sup>82</sup>**



Counting the dead and wounded in war is both a gruesome and imprecise activity, complicated not only by the difficulty of access to war zones for reporters and members of public health and non-governmental organizations, but also because some actors have

incentives to either exaggerate the numbers or to minimize them.<sup>83</sup> The Oxford Research Group is attempting, through its Every Casualty project, to standardize the counting of casualties.<sup>84</sup> Although it is not possible to give a precise number, as Table 5 shows, it appears that more than 311,000 people — dead and seriously wounded — have become casualties in the interrelated war zones of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although most of the direct war-caused casualties are combatants, more than 117,000 of these casualties are civilians.

**Table 5. Direct Death and Injury in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2001-early 2015<sup>85</sup>**

Afghanistan and Pakistan	Killed	Wounded	Total Casualties
Civilians	47,817	69,570	117,387
Combatants	97,135	78,693	175,828
Contractors	3,442	13,606	17,048
NGO humanitarian workers	423	345	768
Journalists	76	unknown	[76]
<b>Total</b>	<b>148,893</b>	<b>162,214</b>	<b>311,107</b>

These figures count direct death and injury due to war's immediate violent effects — deaths caused by bullets, bombs, fire and so on. But as discussed above, direct deaths and injuries are not the only ways that people are harmed in war. The indirect death toll — the people who die because of the negative effects of war, for example, on public health infrastructure and as a consequence of displacement and malnutrition, is difficult to estimate. Research on recent wars from the 1990s to the present, have yielded an extremely crude rule of thumb: "between three and 15 times as many people die indirectly for every person who dies violently."<sup>86</sup> The question is how to tell which conflicts are associated with which scale of indirect death. Further, the fact is that Afghanistan and Pakistan have long been sites of military conflict, which means that the indirect health effects of the war are in addition to the already existing indirect health effects of conflict. There is no peacetime baseline for Afghanistan. The Geneva Declaration Secretariat, which closely examined data from armed conflicts occurring in the period of 2004-2007, suggests that, "a reasonable average estimate would be a ratio of four indirect deaths to one direct death in contemporary conflicts."<sup>87</sup>

If we use this ratio, the ongoing war in Afghanistan is perhaps responsible for as many as an additional 360,000 indirect deaths. Using the same assumption, the current war in Pakistan may be responsible for an additional 200,000 indirect deaths. But, as I have emphasized, it is nearly impossible to know how many people have been made ill or have died as an indirect consequence of the fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What we do know is that the indirect health effects of war persist beyond the end of the fighting. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to need an infusion of aid for public health after these wars end, a prospect that does not appear imminent.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Neta C. Crawford is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Co-Director of the Costs of War Project.

<sup>2</sup> This updates Crawford, Neta C. (2011, September). "Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011." Retrieved from <http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/CrawfordAfghanistanCasualties.pdf>; and Crawford, Neta C. (2011, June)."War-related Death and Injury in Pakistan, 2004-2011." Retrieved from <http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/CrawfordPakistanCasualties1.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross. (2015, February 9). "Afghanistan: Escalating Violence Brings Increased Suffering to War Weary Afghans." Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-escalating-violence-brings-increased-suffering-war-weary-afghans#.VPDKuV5AiJc>.

<sup>4</sup> During some years, specifically 2003-2005, there were almost no estimates or counts made of the numbers of civilians killed or injured in the war. The international military forces of the US and International Security Assistance Force made some counts but those figures have been made public only intermittently. In 2008, when the war began to increase in intensity, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) began to publish counts and analyses of the killed and injured and made a systematic attempt to attribute the deaths to those who were directly responsible for them. UNAMA reports are the best and most comprehensive data on the impact of war on civilians in Afghanistan. My estimate for 2001-2007 of the total killed is explained in my previous work: see Crawford, Neta C. (2011, September). "Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011."

Retrieved from <http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/CrawfordAfghanistanCasualties.pdf>. I use UNAMA data for 2008-2014 from annual reports on Afghanistan: UNAMA (2009-2015). *Afghanistan Annual Reports, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved from <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/HRReports.aspx>.

<sup>5</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross. (2015, February 9). "Afghanistan: Escalating Violence Brings Increased Suffering to War Weary Afghans." Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-escalating-violence-brings-increased-suffering-war-weary-afghans#.VPDKuV5AiJc>.

<sup>6</sup> Source: UNAMA (2008-2015). *Afghanistan Annual Reports, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved from <http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13941&language=en-US>.

<sup>7</sup> Crawford, Neta C. (2013). *Accountability for Killing: Moral Responsibility for Collateral Damage in America's Post-9/11 Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>8</sup> UNAMA (2015, February). *Afghanistan Annual Report, 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, p. 8. Retrieved from <http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/2014-Annual-Report-on-Protection-of-Civilians-Final.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> UNAMA. (2008-2015). *Afghanistan Annual Reports, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved from <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13941&language=en-US>.

<sup>10</sup> While the total number killed each year is not high in comparison to those who are killed during ground engagements by all sides, the explosive remnants of war (unexploded and abandoned ordinance) are a growing problem in Afghanistan; UNAMA reports that civilian casualties have more than doubled from explosive remnants of war since 2012.

<sup>11</sup> Source: UNAMA (2009-2015). *Annual Reports* for 2008 through 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13941&language=en-US>.

<sup>12</sup> UNAMA (2015, February). *Afghanistan Annual Report 2014: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, p. 70. Retrieved from <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/2014-Annual-Report-on-Protection-of-Civilians-Final.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2015). "2014 Pakistan Security Report." Available from Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies database. Retrieved from <http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=tml3.satp.org/>.

<sup>14</sup> Source: UNAMA (2008-2015). *Afghanistan Annual Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. Retrieved from <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/2015/2014-Annual-Report-on-Protection-of-Civilians-Final.pdf>; UNAMA (2008-2015). *Annual Reports*. Retrieved from <http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13941&language=en-US>.

<sup>15</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross. (2015, February 9). "Afghanistan: Facts and Figures for 2014." Retrieved from <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-facts-and-figures-between-january-and-december-2014#.VPDHgV5AiJc>. The ICRC Orthopedic Centre also made 17,325 prostheses and orthoses in that year. While the ICRC notes an increase in double and even triple amputees in Afghanistan in 2014, prostheses and orthoses must also be replaced as they wear out or break; some of these are likely replacement equipment.

<sup>16</sup> UNHCR. (2015). *UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Afghanistan*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html>.

<sup>17</sup> UNHCR (2014, September). *Afghanistan Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/50002021b.html>.

<sup>18</sup> UNHCR (2015). *UNHCR Country Operations Profile – Afghanistan*. Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html>.

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Health, Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan. (2003, March). *A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan*. Retrieved from <http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21746en/s21746en.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> See Newbrander, William, Paul Ickx, Ferozuddin Feroz, and Hedayatullah Stanekzai. (2014, July). "Afghanistan's Basic Package of Health Services: Its Development and Effects on Rebuilding the Health System," *Global Public Health*, Supplement 1, pp. S6-28.

<sup>21</sup> These data are likely not extremely precise; the data should be taken as indicators of trends within Afghanistan and in comparison with other countries. World Bank and Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health data do not match each other. Sources: Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). (2008, August). "Maternal Mortality," *Afghanistan Health Indicators, Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from <http://moph.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/Afg-Health-Indicators-Factsheet-August20082812201014152812.pdf>; Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) (2014, March). "Infant and Child Mortality," *Afghanistan Health Indicators, Fact Sheet*. Retrieved from

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<http://moph.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/AfghanistanHealthIndicatorsFactsheetFeb2014612201410261651553325325.pdf>; Data for 2013 maternal mortality from the World Health Organization: [http://www.who.int/gho/maternal\\_health/countries/afg.pdf?ua=1](http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/afg.pdf?ua=1) and for infant and child mortality figures from the World Bank:

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN> and  
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>.

<sup>22</sup> Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). (2014, March and 2008, August).

*Afghanistan Health Indicators, Fact Sheet.* Retrieved from

<http://moph.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/AfghanistanHealthIndicatorsFactsheetFeb2014612201410261651553325325.pdf> and

<http://moph.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/Afg-Health-Indicators-Factsheet-August20082812201014152812.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> Trani, Jean F., Parul Bakshi, Ayan A. Noor, and Ashraf Mashkoor. (2009). "Lack of a Will or of a Way? Taking a Capability Approach for Analyzing Disability Policy Shortcomings and Ensuring Programme Impact in Afghanistan," *European Journal of Development Research* 21, pp. 297-319.

<sup>24</sup> Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). (2014, January). "Salang Hospital: Lack of Water and Power Severely Limits Hospital Services, and Major Construction Deficiencies Raise Safety Concerns," *SIGAR 14-31-IP/Salang Hospital*. Retrieved from [http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR\\_14-31-IP.pdf](http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR_14-31-IP.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> UNAMA reports do not count psychological injuries, nor do they distinguish in their reports between the types of injuries that individuals have sustained.

<sup>26</sup> Crawford, Neta C. (2011, September). "Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011." Retrieved from

<http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/CrawfordAfghanistanCasualties.pdf>; Cardozo, Barbara Lopes, Oleg Bilukha, Carol Gotway Crawford, Irshad Shaikh, Mitchell I. Wolfe, Michael L. Gerber, and Mark Anderson (2004, August 4). "Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Disability in Postwar Afghanistan," *JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association* 292(5), 575-584. p. 583; Patience, Martin (2009, January 20). "Coping with a Traumatised Nation," *BBC News*. Retrieved from

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<sup>27</sup> See Panter-Brick, Catherine, Anna Goodman, Weitse Tol, and Mark Engerman (2011, April). "Mental Health and Childhood Adversities: A Longitudinal Study in Kabul, Afghanistan," *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* 50(4): 349-363. Also see Miller, Kenneth E., Patricia Omidian, Andrew Rasmussen, Aziz Yaqubi, and Haqmal Daudzai (2008). "Daily Stressors, War Experiences, and Mental Health in Afghanistan," *Transcultural Psychiatry*, 45(4): 611-638.

<sup>28</sup> Cardozo, Barbara Lopes, Oleg Bilukha, Carol Gotway Crawford, Irshad Shaikh, Mitchell I. Wolfe, Michael L. Gerber, and Mark Anderson (2004, August 4). "Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Disability in Postwar Afghanistan," *JAMA: Journal of the American Medical*

Association 292(5), 575-584. p. 580.; Sholte, Willem F., Miranda Olffe, Peter Ventevogal, Giel-Jan de Vries, Eveline Jansveld, Barbara Lopes Cardozo, Carol A. Gotway Crawford (2004, August 4). "Mental Health Symptoms Following War and Repression in Eastern Afghanistan," *JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association* 292(5):585-593. P. 589.

<sup>29</sup> Patience, Martin (2009, January 20). "Coping with a Traumatised Nation," *BBC News*. Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7838270.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7838270.stm).

<sup>30</sup> See Ventevogel, Peter, Willem van de Put, Hafizula Faiz, Bibiane van Mierlo, Majeed Siddiqi, and Ivan H. Kompro (2012, May 29). "Improving Access to Mental Health Care and Psychosocial Support Within a Fragile Context: A Case Study From Afghanistan," *PLOS Medicine*.

<sup>31</sup> Salahi, Zarghona (2010, November 23). "Afghan Health System Failing People with Mental Illness," *Pajhwak News*. Retrieved from <http://www.pajhwok.com/ps/node/127127>.

<sup>32</sup> AT Monitoring Desk. (2014, October 22)."2,853 ANA troops killed in Action Since 2003," *Afghanistan Times*. Retrieved from [http://old.afghanistantimes.af/news\\_details.php?id=9352](http://old.afghanistantimes.af/news_details.php?id=9352).

<sup>33</sup> Nordland, Rod. (2014, March 3). "War Deaths Top 13,000 in Afghan Security Forces," *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/afghan-cabinet-releases-data-on-deaths-of-security-personnel.html?r=0>.

<sup>34</sup> Ahmed, Azam. (2015, March 4). "The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan," *The New York Times Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/magazine/the-hardest-job-in-afghanistan.html?emc=eta1&r=0>. This is somewhat higher than the numbers of ANA and ANP killed in 2014, as reported by Associated Press in Kabul (2014, December 28). "Record Number of Afghan Police Deaths in 13-Year War as International Combat Mission Prepares to Leave," *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1670284/record-number-afghan-police-deaths-13-year-war-international-combat>.

<sup>35</sup> Rosenberg, Matthew and Azam Ahmed (2015, March 3). "Figures from U.S.-Led Coalition Show Heavy 2014 Losses for Afghan Army," *The New York Times*, p. A12.

<sup>36</sup> SIGAR also reported "between October 2013 and September 2014, more than 1,300 ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 6,200 were wounded in action (WIA)" and 2,683 ANP were killed in action during that same period. See Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2015, January 30). *Supplement to SIGAR's January 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*. SIGAR, <https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/>, pp. 11 and 18.

<sup>37</sup> Army deaths, 2003-2013: Livingston, Using S. and Michael O'Hanlon (2015, February 10). *Afghanistan Index*. Brookings. Retrieved from

<http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index>; AT Monitoring Desk (2015). "2,853 ANA troops killed in Action Since 2003," *Afghanistan Times*. Retrieved from [http://old.afghanistantimes.af/news\\_details.php?id=9352](http://old.afghanistantimes.af/news_details.php?id=9352); Nordland, Rod (2014)."War Deaths Top 13,000 in Afghan Security Forces," *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/asia/afghan-cabinet-releases-data-on-deaths-of-security-personnel.html?r=0>.

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Afghan National Police deaths, 2014: Ahmed, Azam. (2015, March 4). "The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan," *The New York Times Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/magazine/the-hardest-job-in-afghanistan.html?emc=eta1&r=0>.

Police deaths: Livingston, Using S. and Michael O'Hanlon (2015, February 10). *Afghanistan Index*. Brookings. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index/index20150210.pdf?la=en>; Ahmed, Azam (2015, March 4). "The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan," *The New York Times Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/magazine/the-hardest-job-in-afghanistan.html?emc=eta1&r=0>.

<sup>38</sup> See Gistozzi, Antonio (2012). "Taliban Networks in Afghanistan." *CIWAG Case Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups*. Newport: U.S. Naval War College. p. 61. Also see Ahmed, Azam. (2015, March 4). "The Hardest (and Most Important) Job in Afghanistan," *The New York Times Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/magazine/the-hardest-job-in-afghanistan.html?emc=eta1&r=0>.

<sup>39</sup> See, for instance, "11 Anti-Taliban Uprising Members killed in Ghazni." (2015, January 29). *Afghanistan Times*. Retrieved from <http://afghanistantimes.af/11-anti-taliban-uprising-members-killed-in-ghazni/>.

<sup>40</sup> Some additional number of US troops would also remain in the region to provide support. See Belasco, Amy. (2014, December 8). *The Costs of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Service, RL33110.

<sup>41</sup> For US uniformed troops killed and wounded, see Department of Defense. (2015). DOD Casualty Report. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from

<http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>; Icasualties. (2015). Operation Enduring Freedom. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.

This does not include the more than 100 US troops serving in Afghanistan who have died of self-inflicted wounds. On number of US wounded amputations, see Fischer, Hannah. (2014, November 20). "A Guide to U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom." Congressional Research Service Report, RS22452.

<sup>42</sup> See Icasualties. (2015). Operation Enduring Freedom. Retrieved April 24, 2015 from <http://icasualties.org/oef/>.

<sup>43</sup> The UK Ministry of Defense reports more than 7,400 UK soldiers were treated in field hospitals for battlefield injuries, non-combat wounds, or disease through the end of 2014; UK Ministry of Defence. Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables. Retrieved from [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/394808/20150114\\_ENCLOSURE1\\_British\\_casualties\\_in\\_Afghanistan\\_7\\_Oct\\_01\\_to\\_31\\_Dec\\_14.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/394808/20150114_ENCLOSURE1_British_casualties_in_Afghanistan_7_Oct_01_to_31_Dec_14.pdf).

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<sup>44</sup> The data on contractors is reported quarterly at: United States Department of Labor. (2015). *Office of Workers' Compensation Program*. These numbers include reports through the end of 2014. Retrieved March 20, 2015 from [dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm](http://dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm).

The higher estimate takes into account that underreporting is common: while non-US citizen workers represented 60 percent of the contractor work force, they made only 14 percent of claims for death or injury in the period 2003 to 2007. Other reported deaths are likely connected to the campaigns in Afghanistan, including contractor deaths in Kuwait (n=76), Pakistan (n=41), and Qatar (n=13), and elsewhere.

<sup>45</sup> As estimated by Matthew Waldman and cited in Dawi, Akmai. (2014, March 6). "Despite Massive Taliban Death Toll No Drop in Insurgency," *Voice of America*. Retrieved from <http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-massive-taliban-death-toll-no-drop-in-insurgency/1866009.html>.

<sup>46</sup> Taylor, Rob. (2013, July 26). "Interview — U.S. General says al Qaeda Just Surviving in Pakistan," *Reuters*. Retrieved from <http://www.trust.org/item/20130726080544-ipi72/?source=search>.

<sup>47</sup> Dawi, Akmai. (2014, March 6). "Despite Massive Taliban Death Toll No Drop in Insurgency," *Voice of America*. Retrieved from <http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-massive-taliban-death-toll-no-drop-in-insurgency/1866009.html>.

<sup>48</sup> Afghanistan Rights Monitor. (2011, February). *ARM Annual Report, Civilian Casualties of War, January – December 2010*. Kabul. Retrieved from [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4F00E4279B04731A4925782A00212588-Full\\_Report.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4F00E4279B04731A4925782A00212588-Full_Report.pdf), p. 12n.

<sup>49</sup> Agence France Presse. (2011, January 2). "Over 10,000 Died in Afghan Violence in 2010." Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/over-10000-died-afghan-violence-2010>; Afghan Ministry of Interior quoted in IRIN. (2011, April). "Analysis: Afghan Police — Civilians or Combatants," *Humanitarian News and Analysis*. Retrieved from <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=92405>.

<sup>50</sup> Dawi notes that, "It's unclear how many Taliban have been killed over the past 13 years but estimates vary from 20,000 to 35,000." Dawi, Akmai. (2014, March 6). "Despite Massive Taliban Death Toll No Drop in Insurgency," *Voice of America*. Retrieved from <http://www.voanews.com/content/despite-massive-taliban-death-toll-no-drop-in-insurgency/1866009.html>.

<sup>51</sup> Farooq, Umar. (2013, February 11). "Civilians Bear Brunt of Pakistan's War in the Northwest," *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/11/civilians-bear-brunt-of-pakistans-war-in-the-northwest/>.

<sup>52</sup> Nauman, Qasim, Safdar Dawar and Saeed Shah. (2014, December 17). "Taliban Militants Attack Pakistan School," *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-militants-attack-pakistan-school-1418716418>; Hussain, Tom. (2014, December 16). "In Revenge, Pakistani Taliban Strike School, Killing at Least 141." *McLatchy DC*. Retrieved from [http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/12/16/250222\\_in-revenge-pakistani-taliban-strike.html?rh=1](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/12/16/250222_in-revenge-pakistani-taliban-strike.html?rh=1).

<sup>53</sup> Epstein, Susan B. and K. Alan Kronstadt. (2013, July 1). "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance." Congressional Research Service, R41856. p. 17.

<sup>54</sup> Other countries in the region have roles the combat or direct combat support: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan including transit of troops and fuel.

<sup>55</sup> This was the first use of US drones to kill people in Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The US also used a drone missile strike to kill a member of Al Qaeda in November 2002 in Yemen; that strike killed five other men as well.

<sup>56</sup> The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) (2014). "All Estimated Casualties in Pakistan by Year (correct as of 26/11/14)." Retrieved from [www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/All-Totals-Dash67.jpg](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/All-Totals-Dash67.jpg); Long War Journal (LWJ). (2015). "Pakistan Strikes." Retrieved from [www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes](http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes); New America Foundation (NAF) (2015) "Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis."

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<sup>57</sup> The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) (2014). "All Estimated Casualties in Pakistan by Year (correct as of 26/11/14)." Retrieved from [www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/All-Totals-Dash67.jpg](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/All-Totals-Dash67.jpg); Long War Journal (LWJ). (2015). "Pakistan Strikes." Retrieved from [www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes](http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes); New America Foundation (NAF) (2015) "Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis."

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<sup>58</sup> On the effects of drone strikes on civilians, see: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law. (September 2012). "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan." Retrieved from <http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf>; Center for Civilians in Conflict and Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School. (2012). "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions." Retrieved from <http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone-strikes/civilian-impact-drone-strikes-unexamined-costs-unanswered-questions>.

<sup>59</sup> Fazl-e-Haider, Syed. (2010, June 9). "Security Dominates Pakistan's Budget," *Asia Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/LF09Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LF09Df01.html).

<sup>60</sup> Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014). "US Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursement to Pakistan, FY2000-FY2014."; [Kronstadt, K. Alan](#) and [Epstein, Susan B.](#) (2015, February 10). "Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2016," Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=762435>.

<sup>61</sup> Calculated from SIPRI and CRS data: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014). "US Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursement to Pakistan, FY2000-FY2014."; [Kronstadt, K. Alan](#) and [Epstein, Susan B.](#) (2015, February 10). "Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2016," Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=762435>. CSF are Coalition Support Funds.

<sup>62</sup> Epstein, Susan B. and K. Alan Kronstadt (2013, July 1). "Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance," Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf>, pp. 19-20.

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<sup>67</sup> Roggio, Bill. (2014, June 22). "Pakistani Military Claims 257 'Terrorists', no Civilians Killed in North Waziristan Offensive," *The Long War Journal*. Retrieved from [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/pakistani\\_military\\_c\\_4.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/pakistani_military_c_4.php).

<sup>68</sup> Manan, Abdul. (2014, December 10). "Zarb-e-Azb Inflicted a Fatal Blow on Terrorists," *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <http://tribune.com.pk/story/804568/zarb-e-azb-inflicted-fatal-blow-on-terrorists-pm/>.

<sup>69</sup> Roggio, Bill. (2014, December 20). "U.S. Drone Strike in Jihadist Stronghold in North Waziristan," *The Long War Journal*. Retrieved from [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/us\\_drones\\_strike\\_in\\_7.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/us_drones_strike_in_7.php).

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<sup>71</sup> Pakistan Inter Services Public Relations. (2015). *Operation Zarb-e-Azb*. Retrieved from [https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/image\\_viewer.asp?o=6298.jpg](https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/image_viewer.asp?o=6298.jpg).

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<sup>73</sup> Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2015). "2014 Pakistan Security Report." Retrieved from <http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=tml3.satp.org/>.

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<sup>80</sup> The UK Ministry of Defense reports more than 7,400 UK soldiers were treated in field hospitals for battlefield injuries, non-combat wounds, or disease through the end of 2014; UK Ministry of Defence. Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables. Retrieved from [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/394808/20150114\\_ENCLOSURE1\\_British\\_casualties\\_in\\_Afghanistan\\_7\\_Oct\\_01\\_to\\_31\\_Dec\\_14.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/394808/20150114_ENCLOSURE1_British_casualties_in_Afghanistan_7_Oct_01_to_31_Dec_14.pdf).

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<sup>86</sup> Geneva Declaration Secretariat. (2008). *Global Burden of Armed Conflict*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, pp. 4 and 32.

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