“Good governance” has become the new mantra of development studies and practice. But we believe the governance literature suffers from at least four problems. First, it is overly Weberianized, paying too much attention to the formal attributes of modern states and not enough attention to their actors and operations. The modern state is defined by rule-bound functions and formal relations of authority. But the actual efficacy of the state also depends on the “non-bureaucratic elements of bureaucracy” (Rueschemeyer, *Power and the Division of Labor*, 1986: 59) including the extent to which agencies achieve a degree of corporate cohesion and the patterns of interaction between their superiors and subordinates. A particularly vexing problem involves the inherent tension between the discretion and autonomy needed by “frontline” state agents, if they are to adapt to ever-changing challenges and circumstances, and the control needed by their superiors, if they are to prevent corruption and incompetence. The Weberian literature tends to assume this problem away, however, by invoking the *deus ex machina* of the division of labor, which allows for specialization and supervision, without realizing that specialization comes with costs as well as benefits, and that the boundaries of the specialties need to be explained, rather than simply invoked, in any event.

Second, much of the good governance literature sidesteps politics, more or less assuming that institutional design is—and should be—insulated from normative and distributional considerations. We therefore need to confront two specific problems. On the one hand, there is the origins problem. Insofar as new institutions instantiate new distributions of power and resources, their makings are necessarily political and their consequences unavoidably politicized. On the other hand, there is the balance problem. While we know that both ‘too much politics’ (e.g. systemic rent-seeking) and ‘too little politics’ (e.g. autonomous but unaccountable Central Banks) can be bad for governance, we have little idea how to balance these considerations in the interests of good governance. An earlier European literature addressed this question and produced concepts like “corporatism,” “private interest governance,” “associational intermediation,” and more recently the “varieties of capitalism” paradigm that pointed to the ways in which mobilized interests were managed within a certain set of established practices. By way of contrast, the literature on the Global South has assumed either capture or demand-overload, with little attention to more successful cases of intermediation in the developing world.

Third, the literature tends to treat governance as a form of power *over* society, and largely neglects the extent to which state agency can be a form of collective power. Many governance problems are indeed a result of the state’s effort to exert power over people, getting individuals or groups to do what they otherwise might not do. But we need to distinguish
conventional forms of power over society, or distributive power, from collective power, “whereby persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature” (Mann, The Sources of Social Power Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760, 1986:6). Collective power can take at least two forms: public officials working closely with specific groups to help them overcome their own collective action problems, as in theories of the developmental state or arguments about co-production; and government efforts to coordinate actions across sectors or between otherwise conflicted interests. An example of the former is building an effective and integrated public transportation system, which requires coordination across agencies, the public-private divide, and various scales of government, and an example of the latter would be the development of mechanisms and institutions to foster collective bargaining or to enforce supply chain standards. Whereas the exercise or presence of distributive power can be explained by means of basic concepts like infrastructural and authoritative capacity, we are at present ill-equipped to understand the complex relations and hybrid institutional forms that underwrite collective power. In particular, we think, we need to pay more attention to how states learn, develop feedback loops, experiment, and adjust to new information.

Finally, we pay too little attention to the ways in which the challenges of governance vary across settings, scales, and sectors. Too often, state capacity or governance is treated as an aggregated and measurable degree of power that can be exerted across a range of fields. Yet effective governance requires enabling action through a long and complex chain of command and can require mobilizing resources and authority of different kinds for different tasks in different settings. How this is actually done is more a matter of “instituted process” than “degree of governance” and can only be revealed through careful process-tracing and situated analysis.

This workshop will be the first in what we hope will be a series on governance in the Global South. Our hope is to explore situated forms of governance across a range of sectors and cases to develop more grounded and comparative insights into the challenges and opportunities of governance in the Global South.

For this workshop we ask that participants write a brief 4-5 page memo highlighting key themes and findings from their research on governance. The memo can be accompanied by a draft or finished paper, but the workshop sessions will focus on the memos. Our hope is that through these engagements we can developed more grounded, situated, and relational understandings of governance in the Global South.
Going Beyond Governance: 
New Research Directions on States and Citizens in the Global South

March 18-19 
Watson Institute 
Brown University

Draft Schedule

Friday March 18

9:00-9:30 – Breakfast

9:30-10:00 – Introduction – Patrick Heller and Andrew Shrank

10:00-12:00 – Inside the State

Diana Graizbord (Brown) 
Salo Coslovsky (NYU) 
Jamie McPike (Brown) 
Rajesh Veeraraghavan (Brown)

12:00 -1:30 Lunch in the Koo Library [joint with Participants in Good Governance conference]

1:30-3:00 – Taxation

Yuen Yuen Ang (University of Michigan) 
Yingyao Wang (Brown) 
Aaron Schneider (University of Denver)

3:15 – 5:15 Joint session with Governance Conference Making the law work 
Harsh Mander (Centre for Equity Studies, New Delhi) 
Cesar Rodriguez (Dejusticia, Bogota)
[Combining presentations by participants in conference on “Going Beyond Governance: New Research Directions on States and Citizens in the Global South” with presentations by participants from the State Capacity Workshop]

5:15 – 6:30 Reception in Watson Lobby [joint with Participants in Good Governance conference]

7:00 – Dinner

**Saturday March 19**

9:00-9:30 Breakfast

9:30-11:00 - The front-line state
   Andrew Schrank (Brown)
   Michael Piore (Brown)
   Akshay Mangla (Harvard Business School)
   Kiran Bhatty (Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi)

11:00-12:30 Engaging with citizens
   Chris Gibson (Simon Frazier University, Canada)
   Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (Brown)
   Lucas Gonzalez (UnSAM – Argentina)
   Poulomi Roychoudhury (McGill University, Canada)

12:30-1:00 – Closing Remarks
   Andrew Schrank
   Patrick Heller

1:00 - Lunch