

**MODELING INTERNET-BASED CITIZEN ACTIVISM
AND FOREIGN POLICY:**

The Islands Dispute between China and Japan

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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

How can citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign policymaking? Optimists emphasize the Internet's great potential to empower citizens, while pessimists underscore the persistent dominance of conventional actors in shaping diplomacy. These conceptual debates fail to build analytical models that theorize the mechanisms through which citizen activism impacts foreign policymaking in the Internet era. Focusing on the interactions between "old" institutions and new practices enabled by technology, I argue that Internet-based citizen activists are using multiple and evolving strategies to engage with the conventional media and policymakers. My Hybrid Model provides an analytical framework with which scholars can describe new forms of non-electoral representation by citizen movements, while challenging foreign policy decision making theories established before the social media. My model traces the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan, in which nationalist campaigns online and offline have fueled a series of confrontations since 2005. Presenting practical implications for foreign policymakers and the conventional media to respond to the transformation, this Hybrid Model also helps citizens play a more active role in international relations. In conclusion, I explore the analogy between the Internet and past innovations in communication technologies to shed light on the future of the Internet and politics.

Keywords: the Internet and politics, citizen activism, political representation, media, nationalism in East Asia

To My Grandfather, Hajime Kumahira
in gratitude for teaching me the joy of thinking and writing.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE INTERNET ERA

Politicians became exposed as corrupt and as liars. Governments were denounced. Media were suspected. Trust vanished... Yet... individuals did come together again to find new forms of being us, the people.

— Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*

To what extent does the rise of the Internet influence politics? Starting from Gutenberg's printing press, innovations in communication technology have transformed human behaviors, and thus altered the landscapes of domestic and international politics. In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson illustrates the process through which the technological innovation of printing press empowered the mass by accelerating low-cost distribution of knowledge in vernacular languages, which eventually created the basis for today's nation state system.¹ While the Internet is expanding at an unprecedented rate, much faster than Anderson's case of printing press, its actual consequences to politics have yet to be fully analyzed. To what extent and how does the Internet transform citizens' behaviors and capacity² to participate in foreign policymaking? Does the Internet really empower people?³

¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006).

² By capacity, I refer to the power and ability of an actor to execute certain activities. In other words, if citizens have the capacity to monitor the government, citizens are equipped with skills necessary for the task and also have the sufficient resources to execute the monitoring.

Just as the mass printing spread rapidly centuries ago, the Internet continues to expand worldwide. By the end of 2014, the number of Internet users was expected to reach 3 billion people, or roughly 40 percent of the global population.⁴ The three billion users mark 67 percent growth compared with 2009, seven times larger than the figure in 2000.⁵ Among global online networks, the user number in developing countries is dramatically increasing, accounting for two-thirds of the total Internet users and half of mobile phone users.⁶ In Africa, for example, Internet users have doubled to 20 percent over the past four years since 2010, marking the world's highest compound annual growth.⁷ China has the largest Internet base, whose 600 million users represent about a fifth of global Internet users.⁸ As these figures indicate, the expansion of the Internet is prominent all over the world.

While the Internet expands its coverage, mobile devices continue to improve its capacity and accessibility. Equipped with built-in cameras and high-speed Internet connections, mobile phones essentially become small computers that allow users to constantly access the Internet. Furthermore, technological innovation also lowers the cost of manufacturing these devices, making them increasingly affordable for many. In the

³ Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013).

⁴ "ITU Releases 2014 ICT Figures," *International Telecommunication Union*, May 5, 2014, http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2014/23.aspx#.VFRP3b6mDd.

⁵ "Number of Internet Users," *Internet Live Stats*, July 1, 2014, <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/#trend>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Internet Users by Country (2014)," *Internet Live Stats*, July 1, 2014, <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/>.

Arab Spring, for example, mobile phones allowed activists to collect, organize, and spread information on Twitter and Facebook with videos, images, and text.⁹ Although these new devices are likely to enhance people's capacity to organize citizen activism, whether they strengthen citizens' power in policymaking still remains uncertain.

Recent events in international affairs suggest that the Internet has the potential to facilitate public mobilization, while at the same time transforming state systems. From the Arab Spring of 2011 in the Middle East to the Umbrella Revolution of 2014 in East Asia,¹⁰ the Internet has played a central role in mobilizing those seeking to have their voices heard.¹¹ In the Middle East, protestors utilized Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to share information and to collaborate as a movement among a large number of strangers. Attracting over three million views per day, HKGolden.com became the central online forum to share protest tactics and encourage readers to join the Occupy Central movement in 2014.¹² These online platforms provided citizens with a new channel of communication while transforming the balance of power between citizens and the government. Moreover, the use of the Internet is also evident in democratic regimes. The Obama presidential campaign against Mitt Romney in 2012 utilized social media as a

⁹ Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (2011): 35–48.

¹⁰ Phila Siu, "How Social Media Shapes Occupy: Web Forum HKGolden.com Takes off," *South China Morning Post*, October 31, 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1628549/how-social-media-shapes-occupy-web-forum-hkgoldencom-takes>; Danny Lee, "The Role of Social Media in Occupy Protests, on the Ground and around the World," *South China Morning Post*, October 31, 2014, <http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1628305/role-social-media-occupy-protests-ground-and-around-world>.

¹¹ Enrico De Angelis, "Broken Promises: New Media Revolution in the Arab World," *Al Jazeera*, February 3, 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/broken-promises-new-media-revolu-20141146138839881.html>.

¹² Siu, "How Social Media Shapes Occupy."

new communication platform with voters.¹³ Regardless of political regimes, these new media appear to help unite people to form a larger social movement.

Governments also react to the rise of the Internet as a new political platform while incorporating new media into their policy. In Estonia, the e-government policy allows citizens to access various online public services from voting to business registration.¹⁴ In contrast, China's "Golden Shield" policy monitors and blocks inappropriate postings, imposing a limit on freedom of expression. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guard tracked down webpages to arrest online activists who shared information about political prisoners on Facebook.¹⁵ These policies indicate that the Internet is a tool not only for citizens but also for governments.

The Internet appears to bring a global transformation of citizens' political activities, marking unprecedented speeds and scale. The steadily growing Internet coverage and technological innovations indicate this transformation is still far from over. The current state of scholarly knowledge, however, fails to fully explain how exactly this transformation in communication technology affects people's roles and power in politics.¹⁶ Although a series of mobilizations including the Arab Spring, the Occupy Movement, and the Umbrella Revolution suggest that the Internet potentially creates a

¹³ Jenna Wortham, "Presidential Campaign on Social Media," *The New York Times*, October 8, 2012, sec. Technology, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/08/technology/campaign-social-media.html?_r=0.

¹⁴ See more information about Estonia's vision of digital society from the official website. From voting, to tax procedure, to citizenship, Estonia digitalizes many of conventional government procedures: <http://e-estonia.com/the-story/digital-society/>.

¹⁵ Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Arrest Internet Activists," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/05/iran-revolutionary-guards-arrest-internet-activists>.

¹⁶ Beth Simmons, "Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (2013): 1.

new political space in which people share their opinions and create a movement, it is still unclear how such a new political space transforms the way people relate to other citizens, interact with conventional political institutions, and influence the policymaking process. My thesis aims to bridge this gap between the high visibility of this transformation and the scarce knowledge of its implications by explaining the mechanisms through which people use cyberspace, the new political field created by the Internet, to influence policymaking.

In the study of international relations, few theoretical frameworks exist to explain the mechanisms through which the Internet influences international politics. This thesis examines the following questions: *To what extent has the increased use of the Internet among citizens affected foreign policymaking? If so, through what mechanisms and to what extent do citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign policymaking? How responsive¹⁷ are governments to the new public demand expressed online concerning foreign policymaking?* I answer these questions through a case study that focuses on the Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial disputes between China and Japan, in which citizen activists in Japan used the Internet and escalated diplomatic confrontation.

My thesis develops a new analytical model that explains the mechanisms through which citizens participate in international politics in the Internet era. As a theoretical study, this research builds a framework that allows scholars to illustrate the link between online-based citizen activism and foreign policymaking. In doing so, my thesis bridges

¹⁷ By responsiveness in foreign policymaking, I refer to the degree of alignment between citizens' expressed collective preferences and actual policy decisions made by the government.

the latest study of the Internet and citizen behaviors,¹⁸ the established scholarship on political representation¹⁹ and foreign policy decision making.²⁰ In particular, I combine older theoretical models and recent scholarly debates over the role of the Internet in transforming people's political activities. Based on this model, my case study specifically deals with the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands through the lens of the Boat Collision Incident in 2010, where the citizen movements actively used the Internet for whistleblowing and protesting to redirect foreign policy. In conclusion, I integrate my theoretical and empirical insights gained in my research to further articulate my model. Moreover, the conclusion also underlines theoretical implications of my analytical model, while explaining how each key actor can incorporate the new technology to achieve their political goals. My thesis also contributes to the general debates over how the Internet both influences people's political behaviors and transforms the role of media in politics.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE INTERNET AND PRINTING PRESS

This section presents my hypothesis on the relationship between technology and politics, which underlies my thesis questions. In a broad sense, my research questions are built upon a hypothesis that the Internet, as a new technology, affects people's behavior and capacity to influence foreign policymaking. Inspired by Benedict Anderson's

¹⁸ The research on the Internet and citizen behaviors considers how the emergence of the Internet affects the process of foreign policy decision making and political representation

¹⁹ Political representation theories specifically examine the process through which people express their collective preference and ensure the responsiveness of governments to their demands.

²⁰ Foreign policy decision making, as a subfield of international relations, explains how key actors such as the public and the media influence foreign policymaking at the operational level.


groundbreaking work *Imagined Communities*,²¹ I construct an analytical model, which I call Communication Technology and Political Transformation Model as illustrated in Figure 1.1. In the book, Anderson examines process through which the invention of printing press, an innovation in communication technology just like the Internet in the contemporary world, facilitated the birth of the imagined solidarity within a “nation.” As a consequence, people outside the aristocracy started to claim equal political status with the establishment, ending the era of aristocracy in Europe. In this respect, *Imagined Communities* illustrates the process through which a new technology gradually changes the structure of politics by empowering certain groups of people. Despite the difference in timeframe, the analogy between the printing press and the Internet as technological breakthroughs in communication offers meaningful insights to my research puzzles on how a new technology affects politics.

The printing press and the Internet as communication technologies are quite similar to each other. Just as mass printing made books, and thus the knowledge recorded inside, affordable and accessible to many, the Internet allows people to access the extended library of human knowledge with minimum costs. Beside recording human wisdom, these technologies enable people to express their ideas more efficiently, just as the printing press created pamphlets and the Internet creates webpages to convey one’s idea to a mass audience. While creating new methods to record and express information, the two technologies accelerated the process in which people access, create, and share information. This technological resemblance between the printing press and the Internet strongly suggests that their influence in politics may also yield comparable outcomes. In fact, scholars have debated the Internet in the context of comparable innovations in

²¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

communication technologies from the invention of alphabet to the spread of mass printing.²² Thus, although it is imperative to study the Internet itself, the analogy with historical examples also help us find clues to predict the future implications of the Internet in politics.

Figure 1.1: Communication Technologies and Political Transformation Model



This analytical model presents four steps through which the Internet transforms the foreign policymaking process. First, technological innovation spreads to the hands of citizens, driven by economic incentives. In the case of the Internet, for-profit corporations, just like publishers in the case of printing press, take a major role in expanding the global coverage of the Internet and in providing affordable devices and services for mass consumers. Second, supported by the new communication technology, people increase their capacity to access and share information. While mass printing made knowledge recorded in books affordable and readable for the ordinary people, the Internet allows people to access overwhelming amount of knowledge with little financial costs. Third, with the reinforced capacity to communicate with one another, people shape new forms of political activities to create pressure for policymakers. Much as printing presses lowered the costs of spreading political ideas in pamphlets and booklets, the Internet offers a new method to share and exchange ideas among people. Thus,

²² Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, *A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002); Ronald J. Deibert, *Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication and World Order Transformation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Anderson's illustrations of the printing revolution and the contemporary situations of the Information Technology Revolution seem to resonate with each other.

The research puzzle is in the last step in Anderson's model. Given the new forms of pressure, policymakers initiate policy change, which gradually facilitates structural transformation of politics. According to Anderson, the mass printing shared the new concept of national identity among the bourgeois class who increased their political presence using the innovation, which created pressure for the aristocratic establishment community in governments. In response, governments internalized the idea of nation in policies such as literacy education, census, and map.²³ In this manner, political pressure by the beneficiaries of the new technology ignited a political reform in governments. However, it is still not obvious to what extent the Internet creates a comparable pressure for policymakers in today's world. Do policymakers perceive such pressure? How do they react to the new forms of activism? And finally, does the Internet lead to any similar scale of political transformation as the creation of nation state? My thesis aims to examine to what extent the Internet help people create new pressure in the process of policymaking, while paying attention to structural transformations of society.

SIGNIFICANCE

My thesis contributes to both the theoretical and practical debates that examine the Internet's consequences in foreign policymaking.


²³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In the conventional scholarship, the majority of research on the Internet and politics has focused on *intra-state* conflicts, such as the Arab Spring, with little study of *inter-state* conflict. The theoretical significance of my case study is that it contributes a new aspect to the study of the Internet and foreign policymaking. It complements the lack of research on how the Internet influences foreign policymaking, while bridging the gap between the latest studies on the Internet and conventional scholarship on political representation and foreign policymaking. I categorize the conventional scholarship into three paradigms: foreign policy decision making, the Internet and citizen behavior, and political representation, as shown in Figure 1.2.

My research is located in the linkage between these three bodies of literature. Foreign policy decision making illustrates how key variables such as other countries' diplomacy and domestic politics determine foreign policy. Meanwhile, the other two bodies explain transformation that the Internet brings to domestic politics. While the Internet and citizen behavior paradigm offers a bottom-up approach by focusing on individual actors such as citizens, political representation paradigm provides a top-down approach that highlights structural transformations incorporating all relevant actors. Hence, my research relates and contributes to these fields of the conventional scholarship by addressing their intersection.

Figure 1.2: Three Bodies of Literature



Foreign Policy Decision Making and the Media

Defined as “the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage,”²⁴ foreign policy decision making analyzes policymaking as an accumulation of human decision making. In this subfield, despite the traditional skepticism that individual citizens are too uninformed and inconsistent to influence foreign policymaking,²⁵ many scholars point to the importance of public opinion and the media in shaping foreign policy decisions especially after the Vietnam War.²⁶ Yet, the emergence of the Internet and online media is as yet not at all incorporated into the existing literature. While aware of the transforming role of citizens,

²⁴ Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.

²⁵ Ole Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, vol. 31 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

²⁶ Bruce Jentleson and Rebecca Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 4 (1998): 395–417; Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

conventional scholarly discussion in foreign policy decision making does barely go beyond the CNN effect, which theorizes 24-hour cable news era.²⁷ By combining the established scholarship on foreign policy decision making and the new theories on the Internet and politics, my thesis proposes a new theoretical model that explains how the Internet affects individual citizens' preferences and aggregated public opinion, and how online public opinion influences foreign policymaking.

My thesis also responds to one of the key discussions regarding the role of the media in creating public opinion. Scholars argue that political elites²⁸ choose to disclose particular information in order to manipulate public opinion through the media²⁹ because policymakers can hide confidential information over foreign policy agendas.³⁰ Other scholars claim that the media possesses independent power to set prioritized agendas, which empowers citizens to represent their wishes in foreign policy.³¹ However, the majority of these discussions occurred prior to the rise of the Internet. Although the interrogative journalism published in individual citizens' blogs and leaks of confidential information by WikiLeaks appear to transform the power balance between citizens and policymakers, the actual impact of this change in foreign policy decision making remains

²⁷ Eytan Gilboa, "Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 3 (2005): 325–41.

²⁸ By political elites, I mean a group of political actors who possess professional expertise in policymaking inside and outside the government office. They are better informed of government policies than the general public, and thus more influential.

²⁹ Lance Bennett and Regina Lawrence, *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

³⁰ Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

³¹ Stephen Ansolabehere et al., "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 4 (1994): 829–38.

largely unexamined. My thesis responds to the question of who controls public opinion and shapes foreign policy, by focusing on the change in actors' capacities and behaviors.

The Internet and Citizen Behavior Paradigm

The political consequences of the Internet on the citizen-government relationship still remain uncertain and yet to be theorized. According to Beth Simmons, the president of the International Studies Association in 2013, social media has “arguably transformed the potential for individual citizens to organize for political action,” while the governments are also in the adaptation process to utilize the new technology.³² Although political scientists notice the transformation in citizen behavior, they are also aware that the Internet potentially empowers both citizens and governments, keeping their power relationship unchanged.

Political scientists began to examine the particular influences and mechanisms of this transformation only recently.³³ Moreover, Archon Fung et al. suggest that the multiple-level discussions over varying actors' identities, behaviors and capacities make it difficult to create a simple chain of mechanisms that connect citizens and policymaking.³⁴ Moreover, few scholars have examined the reactions of non-citizen actors, such as policymakers and the conventional media, to the new citizen behaviors enabled by the Internet.³⁵ Despite the theoretical challenge to develop a new theory from

³² Beth Simmons, “Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age.”

³³ Henry Farrell, “The Consequences of the Internet for Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 36.

³⁴ Archon Fung, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Jennifer Shkabatur, “Six Models for the Internet + Politics,” *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 34.

the chaotic and rapidly transforming reality, my thesis synthesizes established frameworks from other fields of international relations and political science and applies them to explain new online political phenomena. By bridging conventional frameworks and the observed influence of the Internet, my thesis aims to develop a new model that is theoretically well grounded and responsive to the new political contexts observed in my case study. This thesis not only examines the Internet's influence on citizen behaviors but also the way in which these new citizen behaviors influence their role in foreign policymaking by unveiling their interactions with other actors.

Political Representation

Defined as “the political process by which the making of government policy is related to the wants, needs, and demands of the public,”³⁶ political representation theorizes how the actions of policymakers respond and are kept responsive to the wishes of their constituencies. Traditionally, scholars consider electoral system as the centerpiece for political representation,³⁷ which Bingham Powell describes as “the chain of responsiveness model.”³⁸ Meanwhile, more recent work by Nadia Urbinati and Mark

³⁵ Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Fung, Russon Gilman, and Shkabatur, “Six Models for the Internet + Politics.”

³⁶ Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4.

³⁷ Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1991); Bingham Powell, “Political Representation in Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (2004): 273–96.

³⁸ Bingham Powell, “The Chain of Responsiveness,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 91–105.

Warren underlines the “rapidly evolving”³⁹ domains outside conventional electoral representation. Foreign policymaking is less influenced by electoral cycles because they need to make decisions in response to other countries. Since large part of diplomacy is negotiated and determined among policy professionals without citizens, the role of elections in foreign policymaking is less significant than that in domestic policymaking. Moreover, recent examples of mass-mobilizations suggest that the Internet strengthens people’s capacity in initiating their political projects outside election campaigns.

My thesis explores non-electoral linkages between citizens and policymakers. Given the supreme importance of free and fair elections in democracy, many scholars of political representation focus on the electoral representation system as the pillar of political representation,⁴⁰ although “procedural and substantive connections between citizens and policy makers do not exhaust the representation.”⁴¹ In this respect, my thesis contributes to the understudied non-electoral linkages that allow citizens to represent their collective will to policymaking. Since these non-electoral linkages do not necessarily require democratic institutions, my thesis can also apply to non-democratic regimes. Specifically, I develop a new mechanical explanation of the representation process that reflects the recent political mobilization coinciding with the rise of social media. Therefore, this thesis illustrates the implication of the Internet for political representation beyond the limit of democratic regimes.

³⁹ Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 387–412.

⁴⁰ Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Powell, “Political Representation in Comparative Politics”; Urbinati and Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory.”

⁴¹ Powell, “The Chain of Responsiveness,” 274.

Scholarship⁴² debates the implications of the Internet on the political representation since the early 2000s, observing the actual transformation in citizens' participation in the deliberation process. However, most of these theoretical works do not incorporate the widespread use of Social Networking Services (SNS) while discussing webpage-based media such as blogs and online discussion forums. Given the primary role of SNS in the latest mass protests, these theories cannot fully explain the current situation where individuals increasingly collaborate through diverse online platforms. Furthermore, recent research on the Internet and citizen behavior indicates that these earlier studies tended to overestimate the direct impact of the Internet, while neglecting the nuanced, interdependent relationship between online and offline political activities.⁴³ My thesis aids to this debates over the relations between conventional political institutions and the cyberspace as a new political field in the context of political representation. While presenting a new conceptual model of political representation, my thesis also creates a new case study, which has been scarcely examined in conventional scholarship.

My case study also adds geographical diversity to the empirical and theoretical research in each paradigm of the existing scholarship. Theories of foreign policy decision making have focused narrowly on American diplomacy and its process of international

⁴² Brian S. Krueger, "Assessing the Potential of Internet Political Participation in the United States A Resource Approach," *American Politics Research* 30, no. 5 (September 1, 2002): 476–98; Samuel J. Best and Brian S. Krueger, "Analyzing the Representativeness of Internet Political Participation," *Political Behavior* 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 183–216; Stephen Coleman, "New Mediation and Direct Representation: Reconceptualizing Representation in the Digital Age," *New Media & Society* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 177–98; Peter Dahlgren, "The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation," *Political Communication* 22, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 147–62.

⁴³ Fung, Russon Gilman, and Shkabatur, "Six Models for the Internet + Politics"; Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*.

military interventions.⁴⁴ Furthermore, despite comparative studies on public opinion and foreign policy in Europe and Japan,⁴⁵ Scholars on non-US foreign policy fail to develop a comprehensive model of decision making as scholars on the US diplomacy did.⁴⁶ Thus, my thesis aims to theorize a model of diplomatic decision making, involving non-American actors, Japan and China. Likewise, my case on the Japanese citizen grassroots movements reinforces the diversity of the research on the Internet and domestic politics. Although existing literature on the Chinese citizen protests, the Arab Spring, and US and European political movements appears to represent diverse geographical settings,⁴⁷ these empirical studies are concentrated on authoritarian regimes and western democracies. In contrast, my case study on Japan contributes to the diversity by presenting an example of how the Internet influences non-western democracy, which the conventional scholarship has overlooked.

⁴⁴ Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (May 1, 1998): 29–61; Robert Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 415–32; Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 1–30; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Matthew Baum and Philip Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 39–65.

⁴⁵ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512; Bernard Cohen, *Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the Netherlands* (Mishawaka: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); Pierangelo Isernia, Zoltan Juhasz, and Hans Rattinger, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 2 (2002): 201–24.

⁴⁶ Powlick and Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus"; Entman, "Cascading Activation"; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy."

⁴⁷ Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*; Guobin Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Andrew Chadwick, *Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

My case study focusing on Japan and the PRC (People's Republic of China) expands the application of the existing scholarship to inter-state conflicts beyond intra-state mobilization. Although many scholars study the mobilization and democratization facilitated by the Internet, studies on the Arab Spring and political contestation in China are confined to the domestic level. My thesis, however, considers the development of bilateral relations while investigating both domestic and international interactions that lead to particular foreign policy decisions.

PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

My thesis helps policymakers incorporate citizens' demands into foreign policy. Although the Internet has opened up new political platforms for citizens to express their preferences, governments have not yet reached a consensus regarding how to understand and respond to these examples of citizen activism. The implications of the Internet can be underestimated if policymakers do not consider the new activism in foreign policy decisions. Otherwise, they can be overestimated if a handful of activists create an overwhelming volume of online-based movements. Knowing the mechanism and strategy of online activism enables policymakers to weigh the significance of such movements. Meanwhile, policymakers also need to monitor these voices of activists who promote violence on the Internet, as several international media outlets problematized the Japanese racist group Zaitoku-Kai for organizing hostile demonstrations against alien residents in Japan.⁴⁸ My thesis, therefore, creates a new way of evaluating and responding to public opinion, signified through online and offline citizen activities.

⁴⁸ Yuka Hayashi, "Anti-Korean Voices Grow in Japan," *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2013, sec. World, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324031404578482570250163826>.

This study also helps citizens better represent their collective will in foreign policymaking, which is often referred to as the “black box” in the government. The Internet allows individual citizens to access information that used to be confidential before the 1990s, therefore enhancing citizens’ monitoring capacity over foreign policy. Our current scholarly understanding, however, fails to explain how citizens can monitor the acts and decisions of foreign policymakers by utilizing online media. By presenting a new mechanism of representation, my thesis proposes a new way for citizens to effectively monitor the government and convey their collective wishes.

Finally, this thesis provides practical insights into the ongoing diplomatic standoff between the PRC and Japan. The diplomatic confrontation between the PRC and Japan suggests that the rise of online nationalism escalates with inter-state conflicts. In fact, scholars⁴⁹ have described online nationalism in China and Japan not only as new kinds of exclusionist movements but also as an underlying cause of diplomatic rows between China and Japan. In this Sino-Japanese conflict, citizens on both sides are mobilized to resort to violent protest, mediated through Internet platforms. Simon Shen suggests that the Chinese online platforms present persistent nationalist discourse against Japan, which even evolved into violent street protests on Japanese stores in 2012.⁵⁰ In Japan, Tsuji’s statistical research observes positive correlations between the use of online discussion forum, “2-Channel,”⁵¹ and ultra-nationalist sentiment online and offline.⁵² As these

⁴⁹ Kazuko Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ) (Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami Shinsho, 2006); Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations* (Lexington Books, 2010); Ryosei Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations* (日中関係史) (Tokyo, Japan: Yuhikaku, 2013).

⁵⁰ Shen and Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations*.

examples show, the Internet functions as a mediator of hatred and anger toward others nations beyond the domestic level, which increases the risk of diplomatic confrontation. Therefore, by explaining the mechanism behind these online citizen movements, my thesis highlights practical implications for both policymakers and ordinary citizens to prevent the escalation of Sino-Japanese conflict.

RESEARCH DESIGN

CASE SELECTION: SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE

My empirical research considers the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes between the PRC and Japan in order to model the process through which citizens affect international relations. This case selection has three major benefits to my research.

First, the case provides an ideal setting for a comparative study between the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras. Both China and Japan have publicly claimed their territorial sovereignty over the islands since the 1970s, if not earlier, and thus prior to the emergence of the Internet. While the conflict started as an interstate dispute, it has also fueled nationalist movements in both countries. Since the 2000s, nationalist groups have used the Internet to initiate large-scale projects such as nationwide demonstrations, invoking the escalation of aggressive foreign policy between China and Japan. Given the presence of rising online nationalism and deteriorating diplomatic relations, this

⁵¹ Founded in 1999 by Hiroyuki Nishimura, “2ちゃんねる” has served as the largest Japanese online platform that organizes numerous bulletin boards inside. The discussion topics vary from pop culture to politics, some of which includes ultranationalist content. The link to the website: <http://www.2ch.net>.

⁵² Daisuke Tsuji, *Empirical Research on the “Right-Swing” on the Internet (インターネットにおける『右傾化』現象に関する実証研究 調査結果概要報告書)*, Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation Research Sponsorship Program Report, September 10, 2008, <http://d-tsuji.com/paper/r04/>.

territorial dispute provides strong case studies to trace the mechanism through which the Internet affects foreign policymaking through citizen movements.

Second, the issue of territorial dispute offers more sources of information than other topics in conflict. Although the majority of foreign policy issues are discussed confidentially among high-ranking officials, territorial disputes by nature encourage states to disclose information in order to defend their future arguments in the International Court of Justice. Since the chronological record of a state's action reinforces its legal claim to the disputed territory, the Chinese and Japanese governments have released abundant documents and statements on the Internet, which provide ample datasets for my research. It is essential to access these official statements, because the content analysis of them allows my research to examine whether policymakers actually recognize and respond to public opinion in policymaking. The nature of territorial disputes improves accessibility to key evidence.

Finally, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute crystalizes the central issues shaping today's Sino-Japanese diplomatic confrontation, including postwar reconciliation and the rise of China. The debates over territorial sovereignty entail three of the most important historical moments in the bilateral relations: Japan's Imperialism in the 19th century; colonialist policy in the early 20th century; and postwar reconciliation after the San Francisco Treaty of 1953. Moreover, nationalist movements led by citizens on and off the Internet have increased their presence in both countries, shaping new ideologies based on the long history of the interstate dispute. Hence, analyzing this territorial dispute sheds lights on inherent issues in the two-state diplomacy, as well as emerging nationalist sentiment that presents great uncertainty in the future of East Asia.

TIMEFRAME: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND LATEST CASE STUDY

My case draws a comparison between foreign policymaking before and after the spread of the Internet in order to assess the influence of the Internet. Chapter Three illustrates the historical background of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute from the 1300s century to the 2000s, mostly dealing with the evolution of this interstate dispute in the pre-Internet era. In particular, I focus on the three periods divided by 1971 and 1990s. 1971 marks one of the first moments when all three parties, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan), and Japan, filed official protests against each other over the territorial sovereignty. The 1990s began a period of more active citizen participations in the dispute.

The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands started in the 1970s. In 1971, when the Okinawa Reversion Agreement officially transferred the control of Okinawa back to Japan, Japan and the U.S. claimed that the islands were returned to Japan according to "Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands,"⁵³ while China protested against the bilateral "backward deal."⁵⁴ Since then, China has claimed invalidity and illegality of the bilateral treaty between Japan and the U.S., which is the starting point of this dispute. Meanwhile, the last part of Chapter Three highlights the

⁵³ "Senkaku Islands Q&A," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed February 5, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

⁵⁴ "Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China," *The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China*, accessed February 4, 2015, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19520428.T1J.html>.

increasing use of the Internet by the Chinese and Japanese citizen activists in the 2000s, establishing the transition to my case study of the Boat Collision Incident in 2010.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six altogether examine the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Boat Collision Incident in 2010.⁵⁵ On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japan Coast Guard vessels on the disputed waters near the islands. As soon as Japan arrested the crewmembers on the Chinese vessel, China protested vigorously, claiming that Japan acted illegally. In the following months, the two states went through a diplomatic row, accompanied by mass-protests in China and Japan. In November, video footage of the collision filmed by the Japan Coast Guard was leaked on YouTube, fueling nationalist movements in Japan. While a series of mass-demonstrations hampered diplomatic negotiations between the PRC and Japan, the Internet played a significant role in providing a new political space for the public to share information and organize collective actions. Thus, the Boat Collision Incident showcases the rise of the Internet-based citizen activism, as well as the diplomatic tension between China and Japan.

This time frame also allows my research to include both the influence of the latest communication technologies and the gradual integration of these technologies into citizen activism. Japan launched its first Internet in 1984 as an inter-university network. In 1996, the number of webpages with “.jp” in the domain address was in the tens of thousands. China established its first connection to the Internet in 1994, and further opened three major networks, ChinaNet, GB Network, and CERNet in 1996. In this respect, 1996 marks the starting point in the Chinese and Japanese history of the Internet. Meanwhile, 1996 was yet too early for the public to utilize this new technology for their grassroots

⁵⁵ This incident is known as “中国渔船与日本巡逻船钓鱼岛相撞事件” in Chinese and “尖閣諸島中国漁船衝突事件” in Japanese.

movements. It was not until 2005 that activists orchestrated an online movement in Sino-Japanese relations, when Chinese activists gathered millions of online signatures to protest against Japan's attempt to join the UN Security Council. Since then, the Internet has become a platform for citizen activists as Social Networking Services (SNS) spread in the mid-2000s, which allowed ordinary people to share and exchange information more easily. In this respect, the case in 2010 provides an ideal setting for my research in that the newest Internet tools such as Twitter were already prevalent among the public and were used as key parts of their activism. Moreover, the historical background in Chapter Three also illustrates the gradual process in which people came to utilize the Internet to address the territorial dispute. Therefore, this research offers a historical overview of the Internet's integration into citizen activism, and a specific examination on the Internet's influence in recent citizen activism.

APPROACH AND SOURCES

I employ the process tracing approach in order to theorize the process through which citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign policymaking. In doing so, I conduct discourse analyses to identify significant actors in the chain model I develop, while using content analysis of the online data to statistically understand overall trends in online discourse. Furthermore, in order to elaborate on the conditional differences between successful and unsuccessful cases, I examine several examples of citizen activism that employ diverse strategies.

In examining the effect of online public opinion on foreign policy decisions, process tracing in causal and backward orders allows my research to identify antecedent

conditions other than citizen activism.⁵⁶ Moreover, given that my research aims to assess the role of the Internet, the results of process tracing clarifies not only intervening variables, such as major actors and their interactions, in the process of citizens' influence on foreign policymaking, but also the extent to which the Internet affects this process. Finally, although the large-n analysis offers a quantitative understanding of people's online behavior, statistical data alone cannot explain how such a trend was perceived and evaluated by other actors such as policymakers. The process tracing approach is better fitted to analyze complicated issues by enabling me to observe a number of variables within a case.⁵⁷ Hence, while conducting content analysis of the mass online postings to understand the public's collective online discourse, I use the results of this content analysis as a quantitative indicator of my process tracing. In this manner, I integrate qualitative and quantitative perspectives to measure the impact of each actor. Grounded in this process tracing, the conclusion aims to identify the nexus between people's activism and policymakers' reactions.

Although "a thorough process-trace of a single case can provide a strong test of a theory,"⁵⁸ my thesis has three potential weaknesses. First, my case study cannot examine *all* relevant events and factors in the world. Thus, in tracing the process of citizen's influence in policymaking, I prioritize the most evident examples among numerous actors, based on their scale of impact and visibility. At the same time, the three empirical chapters also draw comparison between different styles of citizen activism within the

⁵⁶ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 72.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

same event to illustrate diverse aspects of the role of the Internet in citizen activism. The empirical chapters examine the same event from different angles in order to minimize “the effects of third variables by holding the constant” within the uniform background conditions.⁵⁹ Second, the volume of online content that I can analyze is limited by my computational capacity and data availability. In order to overcome this difficulty, I employ online databases such as Topsy.com and archive.org to access the Internet content that has been deleted from the original webpages. In case I find important webpages that have been deleted during the period between my research timeframe in 2010 and March 2015, I add notes on the gap and state its implication to my research. Third, information regarding foreign policy decisions often remains confidential, while disclosed documents do not necessarily reveal everything. In order to gain first-hand information, I conduct interviews with relevant officials and experts, while assessing diplomatic cables leaked in WikiLeaks. Hence, my empirical research utilizes different tools and resources to overcome the potential limitations.

Unit of Analysis and Measurements

This thesis mainly deals with individuals and groups as the unit of analysis. As background conditions, I also refer to connections between these actors and larger social contexts at the state and interstate level. In order to identify relevant actors, my empirical research observes both qualitative and quantitative variables. The study of each actor demands qualitative analyses on variables represented in texts, video, and audio formats in order to understand their activities, while statistical reports and key activity indicators

⁵⁹ Ibid., 52.

(such as numbers of tweets and shares online, and numbers of participants offline) provide quantitative evidence that justifies the relevance of qualitative factors. Using these methods, my unit of analysis concerns the individual level, because the Internet users and foreign policymakers, as individual actors play significant roles in utilizing the Internet as a new tool and making policy decisions. At the same time, I also consider the group level analysis, given the presence of groups such as political parties, media outlets, and citizen grassroots organizations in the process of policymaking and lobbying.

Sources and Analytic Tools

This research deals with various qualitative and quantitative sources and analytical tools. As illustrated in Table 1.1, I particularly study policymakers, the news media, public opinion, and citizen activists. Government publications, National Diet records and official speeches provide evidence of whether or the extent to which foreign policymakers are aware of online activism in forming their policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Premier and PRC Office, and Prime Minister's Cabinet Office are the primary focus in this research. In order to complement these publicized sources, I also examine leaked diplomatic cables from WikiLeaks and newspaper reports. Meanwhile, I conduct expert interviews to gain as much first-hand information from within the government as possible.

Online content produced by individual citizens is central to my research. By employing content analysis and text mining,⁶⁰ I examine how foreign policy issues are framed and discussed, as well as how these online discussions encourage mass-

⁶⁰ By text mining, I refer to a computational method to retrieve text data from webpages to conduct content analysis.

mobilizations. This thesis utilizes various computational and online tools to access sources and analyzes data. When certain web content is deleted from the Internet, I use the nonprofit web archive hosted by Internet Archive project.⁶¹ Data analytics firm, Topsy,⁶² offers an archive of all tweets since 2006, which makes it possible to examine influential tweets during the time frame of this research. Unless otherwise noted, I use the incognito mode of Google Search in order to avoid searching biases based on my search history. Based on the sources accessed through these tools, I use Voyant⁶³ for text content analysis, Python⁶⁴ for scraping and analyzing tweets, and Google Spreadsheets for data organization and analyses.

Newspapers and online news media are primarily used to observe Internet-based citizen activism and movements. The coverage by the mainstream media is itself an indicator of the impact of online political activism in society. While discourse analyses on media reporting indicate their evaluation of various topics, I use these sources to understand the general situations of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In order to measure public opinion on certain issues, I examine survey results published by government, news media, and international NGOs.

⁶¹ I specifically use their waybackmachine function to search the history of over 456 billion webpages (<https://archive.org/>).

⁶² Their online analytics tool allows searching for Twitter posts related to certain keywords and accounts during the specified time period (<http://topsy.com/>).

⁶³ Voyant is an online tool to analyze text data with word frequencies, distributions, and patterns (<http://voyant-tools.org/>).

⁶⁴ Python is a programming language that is widely used for text data organization and analysis. While mainly using Topsy.com to identify influential data, this research employs Python as a supplementary tool to access raw tweets data.

Table 1.1: Actors, Variables, and Sources

Actors	Variables Observed	Sources
Policymakers	National Diet Debates	- National Diet Library Records of Japan
	Government Webpages	- Government Websites (Japan) - Government Websites (the PRC)
	Treaties and Diplomatic Documents	- Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World
	WikiLeaks Diplomatic Cables	- WikiLeak.org
	Expert Interviews	- Former/Current Government Officials
	Mass-Media Interviews	- Newspaper Articles
The Media	Printed Newspaper Articles	- Asahi Shimbun Archive (聞蔵 II ビジュアル) - Nikkei Shimbun Archive (Nikkei Telecom 21) - Yomiuri Shimbun Archive (ヨミダス歴史館)
	Online Newspaper Articles	- Japanese Newspapers (Sankei Shimbun, Kyodo News, Nikkei Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun) - Chinese Newspapers (Mostly from People Daily and South China Morning Post) - International Media (Only English Media)
	Expert Interviews	- Newspaper and Television Station Journalists
	SNS Records	- Data Mining of Twitter - Twitter Archive (Topsy.com)
	Statistics Reports	- Reports on Media Usage
	Public Opinion	Public Opinion Polls
Citizen Activism	SNS Records	- Data Mining of Twitter - Twitter Archive (Topsy.com)
	Video Footages	- YouTube - Niconico Douga
	Blogs / Webpages	- Blogs of Activist Leaders - Activity Reports and Webpages of Citizen Groups
	Statistical Reports	- Reports on Information Technology Use
	Press Conferences / Speeches	- Press Conference and Speeches of Activists
	Publications	- Books Authored by Prominent Activists

Analysis and Interpretation of Sources

I refer to direct reference, frequency and use of specific language to assess the content and influence of online citizen activism. In assessing events and factors within my case, I pay close attention to their relative significance compared to other phenomena within the same case. For example, I compare the number of mentions to identify significant webpages shared on Twitter, while my analyses of video postings rank the significance according to view counts. Meanwhile, I am also aware of signals that may negate my hypothesis that citizen activism can influence foreign policymaking. If the study's timeline shows that public opinion and citizen activism are influenced by the policymakers and not vice versa, my explanation of causality needs to be rejected. Another possible case is when foreign policymakers scarcely mention citizen activism and only discuss external factors such as the US intervention and counterpart's actions.

LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Several factors may introduce limitations to my thesis. First, the necessity to complete my research in one year does not allow me to conduct extensive field research in China and Japan. Given my focus in the Internet, however, I am able to retrieve and analyze a large body of evidence online, while phone interviews to media and foreign policy experts also increase my ability to attain first-hand information.

Second, access to internal government documents and policymakers' decision-making process presents another difficulty. Unlike domestic policy, foreign policy is often negotiated bilaterally with foreign governments without disclosing the details, just as the majority of diplomatic cables and internal guidelines remain confidential. Although

official statements do document each government's political stance and response to the voices of their constituencies, part of the evidence of how policy is made remains within the black box. In order to overcome this hardship, I conduct an extensive research on the National Diet records for general assemblies and committee meetings, which, I argue, are revealing of policymakers' attitudes toward particular issues. Offer efforts to deal with this limitation include conducting interviews with government officials and examining investigative articles in newspapers.

Third, some of the web content associated with the case study has been deleted since it was first posted in 2010. Such content can be deleted by users, website administrators, and governments. In order to retrieve these lost records, I use various online archives and tools as mentioned in the methodology. For instance, in identifying links to key webpages cited broadly on Twitter, I use a Twitter archive to identify the most influential tweets and retrieve such webpages archived in another the Internet archival project. Although this allows me to recover many of the important links my research encounters, it is impossible to retrieve the deleted content without knowing the web address.

Although my research primarily examines Japanese webpages, it is also the case that tight censorship in China limits the availability of Chinese webpages. Since the Golden Shield Project by the PRC government monitors and eliminates inappropriate posts online, it is likely that the data collected as of March 2015 misses part of the original postings, especially outliers with radical content. However, recent research by

King et al.⁶⁵ argues that this censorship program targets primarily domestic issues such as democratization and minority conflicts, while Sino-Japanese relations remain a low priority. This suggests that my Chinese online content analysis is likely to yield much fewer censored results than other popular online contestation agendas. Furthermore, the research also indicates that the Chinese government does not censor most critiques against policymaking, which provides sufficient text content to be analyzed. Therefore, the influence of China's censorship is limited to my research topic, compared with more heavily censored ones including democratization and corruption.

Finally, my Japanese background may influence my judgments. Despite the fact that I have learned Chinese for four years and studied abroad in Beijing, Mandarin is not my native language, which limits my ability to search and analyze Chinese materials.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter Two summarizes and critiques conventional scholarship relevant for my research question, while highlighting three bodies of literature: the Internet and citizen behavior, political representation, and foreign policy decision making. Chapter Three outlines the historical development of the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and explores the increasing presence of citizen activism in Japan and the PRC. Chapters Four, Five, and Six altogether deal in depth with the Boat Collision Incident in 2010, examining the role of the Internet in shaping citizen activism. Chapter Four specifically studies the leak of the government's confidential video record by an individual whistleblower, based on which I construct a theoretical model. Chapter

⁶⁵ Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 02 (May 2013): 326–43.

Five considers the reactions of citizen grassroots groups and online activists to the collision incident, focusing on their strategies to influence foreign policymaking. Chapter Six measures the actual impact of the activism illustrated in Chapter Five and completes the theorization of my analytical model. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes this study, and allows me to reintroduce my model and empirical research, while connecting my research with greater theoretical and practical contexts.

CHAPTER TWO: DEBATES ON THE INTERNET AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

Communication technologies have repeatedly impacted a broad range of human relationships in ways great and small. Nowhere has this been more the case within the past decade than in relationships between governments and the governed.


— Beth Simmons, “Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age,” *International Studies Review*

This chapter frames and synthesizes three bodies of literature that help us examine whether and how the rise of the Internet influences the government’s responsiveness to the public in foreign policymaking. First, foreign policy decision making explains how key actors such as the public and the media influence foreign policymaking. Second, political representation theories more specifically study the process through which people express their collective preference and ensure the responsiveness of governments to their demands. Finally, the recent research on the Internet and citizen behaviors considers how the emergence of the Internet affects the process of foreign policy decision making and political representation. Despite the significant contributions of these bodies of literature, none of them fully explains the mechanism through which citizens can influence foreign policymaking by utilizing the Internet. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the clue to answer my research questions lie at the intersection of these categories.

This chapter summarizes major discussions in each body of literature, critique their shortcomings, and explain the needs for my theoretical model that illustrates the

process through which citizens use the Internet to influence foreign policymaking. Grounded in these three bodies of literature, I develop an integrated overview that explains how foreign policy is determined, citizens' will is represented, and the Internet influences this process.

Figure 2.1: Three Groups of Literature Relevant for My Research



FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PARADIGM

Defined as “the choices individuals, groups and coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage,”¹ foreign policy decision making theories explain both internal and external factors that influence foreign policymakers in shaping their decisions. Although scholars agree that public opinion possesses significant impact on foreign policymaking,² few of them have constructed comprehensive models that explain how the public influences foreign policymaking along with other actors.

¹ Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.

² Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (May 1, 1998): 29–61; Robert Entman, “Cascading

Foreign policy decision making as a subfield of international relations started to evolve since the 1950s, when Snyder et al. criticized the assumption of the state as “a metaphysical abstraction,” and sought for detailed analysis of foreign policy as a product of group decision making.³ Their work paved way for later scholars such as James Rosenau to focus on the process of foreign policymaking rather than the outcomes.⁴

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION

The role and relevance of public opinion is central to the understanding of foreign policy decision making. Scholars agree that public opinion provides foreign policymakers with a reliable basis for decision making.⁵ Although the Almond-Lippmann Consensus presented lasting skepticism toward ordinary citizens’ ability to understand and direct foreign policy until the 1960s,⁶ scholars turned their views in the 1970s and 1980s to

Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 415–32; Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 1–30; Matthew Baum and Philip Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 39–65; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*, ed. George Edwards III, Lawrence Jacobs, and Robert Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³ Snyder Richard and Bruck Henry, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

⁴ Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis.”

⁵ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Entman, “Cascading Activation”; Ole Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, vol. 31 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis”; Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy”; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*.

⁶ Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* Ole R. Holsti Ann Arbor.

argue that citizens maintain stable political standpoints and respond to foreign affairs.⁷ Despite the increasing attention to public opinion, scholars do not consider elections` as a major driver for foreign policy.⁸ Rather they generally identify the electoral cycle as one of many conditional variables that influence decision making unless it becomes a hot issue for policy debates. Given that foreign policy measures, especially military interventions, are proposed in reaction to external events regardless of domestic election cycles, politicians are likely to make decisions based on public opinion polls at the point of such crisis. Therefore, even though the expected repercussion in a future election does pressure politicians, elections fit into the model as one of many conditional variables.

As a pioneering effort to examine the linkage between domestic and international politics, Robert Putnam proposes the Two Level Games theory, which defines an international agreement with foreign counterparts as Level I and persuasion of the domestic public as Level II.⁹ By theorizing the domestic pressure toward diplomats` decision making observed in many diplomatic contexts from the Versailles treaty to the European Community negotiations, Putnam argues the “win-set” exists only when the public regards the negotiator’s alternatives as acceptable. Yet, despite his emphasis on public approval, Putnam fails to explain the mechanisms that bring public support for diplomatic negotiation.

⁷ Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁸ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Entman, “Cascading Activation”; Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy Ole R. Holsti Ann Arbor*; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis”; Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy”; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*.

⁹ Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60.

DEMAND FOR INTEGRATED MODELS

Despite the multidisciplinary literature on foreign policy decision making, very few models exist to synthesize the interactions between relevant actors such as the public, the media, and policymakers.¹⁰ In particular, in the study of public opinion and foreign policy, “no one approach has emerged to dominate the field.”¹¹ In this section, I make a chronological review of major scholarly works that theorize a chain of mechanisms, and critique them both individually and collectively in order to establish the demand for my research. In the following sections, I chronologically review the existing models, focusing on their treatment of public opinion in foreign policymaking.

THE OPINION MAKER MODEL AND MARGINALIZED CITIZENS

According to Powlick and Katz,¹² James Rosenau¹³ was one of the first scholars who built a comprehensive model that explains causal mechanisms between public opinion and foreign policy. He defines decision makers and elites as “opinion makers,” whose views are to be transmitted to the public via major media outlets along with news. Even though Rosenau does recognize the role of citizens to set “the outer limits” for decision makers and opinion makers,¹⁴ he mostly regards ordinary citizens as emotional, and thus incapable of productive participation in foreign affairs. For Rosenau, the public

¹⁰ James Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; an Operational Formulation* (New York: Random House, 1961); Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Entman, “Cascading Activation”; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy.”

¹¹ Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*, 669.

¹² Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 29.

¹³ James Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; an Operational Formulation*.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

can only “sit in stony silence or applaud impetuously” if not protesting against an extreme policy.¹⁵ Hence, despite his pioneering role in constructing a comprehensive model, the current state of knowledge indicates that Rosenau, like many scholars prior to the 1970s, underestimates the rationality of citizens in dealing with foreign affairs.¹⁶

THE PUBLIC OPINION/FOREIGN POLICY NEXUS

The “Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus” model by Powlick and Katz proposes a particular chain of causal mechanisms as shown in Figure 2.2.¹⁷ Building upon the “public deliberation” theory by Benjamin Page, they argue that the activation of public opinion is the key to policy change.¹⁸ According to Powlick and Katz, citizens may react to foreign policy twice. The first opportunity is during the period between the policy decision and policy implementation. During this period, “strong public opposition” can compel the decision maker to alter or abandon the policy. The second opportunity for citizens’ participation is when intense debates emerge among foreign policy elites and the media cover these discussions. Assuming that public opinion would never rise without foreign policy elite discussions, they argue that the media publicize elite discussions to activate public opinion.¹⁹ Once public opinion is activated, it eventually determines whether the policymakers continue or abandon their foreign policy.

¹⁵ Ibid., 34.

¹⁶ Ibid., Bruce Jentleson and Rebecca Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 4 (1998): 395–417.

¹⁷ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 32.

¹⁸ Benjamin Page, *Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

¹⁹ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 34.

Unlike other models that emphasize the information gap between citizens and governments,²⁰ Powlick and Katz focus on the conditions that enable policy change. The model clearly outlines how the key stakeholders, the policymakers, elites, the media, and the public, react to given conditions. Compared with other frameworks,²¹ this model presents elaborated scenarios for citizens to intervene foreign policy decision making.

The trade-off, however, exists in this neatly defined model. First, the model oversimplifies the media as a neutral distribution channel of elite opinion, and does not consider of the independent role of investigative journalism. Although this assumption certainly reduces the complexity of the model, in reality, no evidence presented in the article suggests that media journalism relies solely on inputs from policy elite debates. This further questions whether public opinion is really activated *only* by foreign policy elites. Second, the model also fails to capture the constant interactions between actors. By defining a linear causal mechanism, this model assumes that no spontaneous external interventions such as a new crisis happen in the process, omitting the interactions and contestations between key actors. Although Powlick and Katz present a rigorous model to explain the mechanism of public opinion and policy change, it yet relies on heavy assumptions that do not match the reality.

²⁰ Entman, "Cascading Activation"; Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* *Ole R. Holsti Ann Arbor*; Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy"; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*; Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis."

²¹ Ibid.

THE CASCADING NETWORK ACTIVATION MODEL

Depicted in Figure 2.3, Robert Entman proposes the Cascading Network Activation Model that theorizes the complex interactions between the government, elites, the media, and the public.²² In this model, the public is marginalized as a passive actor. While citizens may influence policymakers and elite by interacting with the media, Entman argues that the public typically remains a dependent variable.²³ Furthermore, through the empirical study of the Bush Administration's reactions to 9/11, Entman exemplifies the significance of framing, the policymakers' ability in "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solutions."²⁴ In this light, the policymakers stand at the top of the "cascade" to provide flow of frames into other elites, the media, and eventually the public. Hence, the public has limited power to influence actors in the upper stream, and even is prone to be unconsciously influenced by the frames used by policymakers.²⁵

By tracing interactions between the administrator, policy elites, the media, and the public, Entman develops the model by Powlick and Katz into a more complicated and interactive model. However, there is also a limit to its framework, for it assumes the media as conventional journalism such as newspapers and television without considering the Internet as a new media.²⁶ This is especially problematic, when the Internet is

²² Entman, "Cascading Activation," 419.

²³ Ibid., 420.


²⁴ Ibid., 417.

²⁵ Ibid., 418-9.

²⁶ Ibid., 420.

arguably enabling citizens to access information, express opinion, and participate in movements without relying on conventional media as the only source of information. The possibilities for new linkages between the public and the administrators, elites, the media need to be re-examined.

Figure 2.3: Cascading Network Activation.



Source: Data from Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 419.

THE ADVOCACY CONTESTATION MODEL

Jon Western proposes an advocacy contestation model of foreign policy decision making, grounded in the extensive case studies of US military interventions from Dienbienphu in 1954 to Iraq in 2003.²⁷ According to Western, whenever a crisis occurs, “advocacy communities,” groups of foreign policy elites, shape preferences and promote foreign policy they prefer.²⁸ Soon, fierce competitions rise between advocacy communities with different opinions until the policymakers make the final decision. The outcomes of this competition depend on each group’s access to information regarding the crisis. On the other hand, Western views public opinion as one of the conditional variables for American military interventions. That is, the president cannot determine foreign policy without the public’s approval, although public opinion remains as the observer of foreign policy. Western is one of few scholars who theorize the often-unelaborated role of foreign policy elites. Although Western does not indicate active interactions between public opinion and the elites in creating political movements, his model also suggests that elites can dominate policy debates, especially when certain expertise, such as local socio-political contexts and military strategy, is required.

THE MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

Criticizing the narrow applicability of Powlick and Katz’s “standard linear model,”²⁹ Matthew Baum and Philip Potter propose the “market equilibrium model.”³⁰

²⁷ Western, *Selling Intervention and War*, 24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁹ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus.”

³⁰ Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy.”

According to Baum and Potter, the standard linear model assumes that decision making follows the exact same process in the exact same order without considering any feedback loop, while the market equilibrium model is better fitted to analyze the interactive process of foreign policymaking.³¹ In their view, foreign policymaking does not follow a particular causal process. Instead, decision making is understood as the equilibrium in the “Foreign Policy Marketplace,” where the public, the media, and policymakers exchange information and provide feedback to one another for their individual interests.³²

In this model, the leaders and the public share the interest of selecting the best policy for themselves. When the best option for them diverges, however, the leaders enjoy the advantage in determining foreign policy because they have better access and control of relevant information than the public does. Although the electoral power of the public may pressure the leaders to align with people’s interest, the public is unlikely to influence policy decisions, unless the media effectively resolve the information asymmetry as “a trader of information.”³³ Following Baum and Potter, a foreign policy decision is never a result of a single chain of mechanisms, but equilibrium outcomes of power balance between the public, the media and the leaders.

The Foreign Policy Market model offers a more applicable framework than the standard linear model. Although the predetermined decision process allows not only to analyze but also to predict foreign policy decisions, the linear approach lacks flexibility to capture the complexity of international relations. Particularly, the linear theories do not

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 56.

consider the influence of international events or opponent's foreign policy, which may cause sudden changes in actors' positions and behaviors, independent from the domestic decision process that the linear approach explains. In this respect, the assumption that foreign policy decision making always follows specific steps is far from the reality of international relations. Meanwhile, thanks to its loosely defined character, the Foreign Policy Market model allows researchers to incorporate external interventions to the domestic decision making process, depending on each scenario. Furthermore, the Foreign Policy Market model is flexible enough to be synthesized with other models and empirical studies. Hence, I adopt the Foreign Policy Market model as the basis of my theoretical framework.

The market model fits well with political theories on the rise of the Internet with its focus on information. Baum and Potter regard information as the central source of influence in foreign policy decision making, while defining it as the "primary market commodity."³⁴ Access to information is the source of power for the government as well as the essential ground for the public to participate in foreign policymaking. Moreover, the media, as the middleman of information, is also under pressure between the public and the government, since they need to pay "enough deference to elite frames to maintain access, while deviating enough to generate and maintain public interest in the news."³⁵ Given that the balance of power is determined by the distribution of information, the recent innovations in the Internet-based media are likely to transform this market structure. For instance, citizens can access confidential information by WikiLeaks,³⁶

³⁴ Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy."

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

while actively participating in the creation and distribution of information by posting texts and videos via SNS.³⁷ Building upon the conceptual framework by Baum and Potter, this thesis aims to clarify the roles of both conventional and new media, as well as the new media's implication to the leaders and the public in determining the equilibrium.

However, the Foreign Policy Market Model also has its theoretical limits. The model does not explain the causal linkages that drive policy decision. While the Market Model illustrates the rule that governs the competitive relationship between citizens and policymakers, it fails to examine the actual process of decision making. Furthermore, Baum and Potter do not present any empirical case study that elaborates their model. Along with the loosely defined model, the lack of empirical case weakens theoretical validity. By elaborating further on possible scenarios of the market model through case study, my thesis reinforces its applicability and synthesizes it with theories in political representation.

³⁶ See <https://wikileaks.org> for examples of leaked diplomatic confidential documents.

³⁷ Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (2011): 35–48.

Table 2.1: Models of Public Opinion in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Author	Role of Information	Citizens' Influence	Scope	Empirical Study
Rosenau (1961)	Critical. Media outlets dominate news flow, while policymakers and elites work as "opinion makers" to spread their views.	Weak, irrational, and incapable. Public opinion functions only as the limit-setter to extreme policy.	US Presidency	N.A.
Powlick and Katz (1998)	Relevant, yet not critical. The wide media coverage of elite debate only activates public opinion.	Powerful. Activated public opinion can compel decision makers alter policy	US Presidency	N.A.
Entman (2003)	Relevant, yet not critical. Framing is more important than information.	Passive followers of policymakers' frames. Limited ability to influence policy, if not none.	US Presidency on military intervention	White House framing after 9/11
Western (2005)	Critical. Major determinant of competitions between advocacy communities.	Conditional variables. Competing foreign policy elites determine the outcome.	US Presidency on military intervention	US History of military intervention in Pre-Cold War, Cold War, an Post-Cold War periods
Baum and Potter (2008)	Critical as "market commodity." The degree of citizens' access to information determines the responsiveness of the government.	Competitor of governments. Citizens acquire information through media and gain power to affect foreign policy.	US Presidency	N.A.

PROBLEMS WITH CONVENTIONAL APPROACH

Despite their emphasis on government's domination of information, scholars³⁸ have failed to examine the information revolution caused by the Internet in foreign policy decision making. These models share the view that the government enjoys an advantageous position in accessing information and leading policy discussion. The conventional literature aims to examine to what extent ordinary citizens can influence policymaking despite the inherent disadvantage in participating in foreign policy decision making with public opinion and the media. However, they do not consider the implication of the Internet as a new medium that enhances the citizen's capacity to be involved with international affairs. According to James Rosenau and J.P. Singh, the Internet brings "the skill revolution" to ordinary citizens, who increasingly become "more skillful in linking themselves to world affairs, in tracing distant event through complex sequences back into their homes and pocketbooks."³⁹ While being aware of the transforming role of citizens, conventional scholarly discussion in foreign policy decision making does barely go beyond the CNN effect, which is a result of the 24-hour cable news before the Internet spread.⁴⁰ Moreover, Baum and Potter also criticize "the unitary assumption" of scholars to disregard different types of the media.⁴¹ My thesis, therefore,

³⁸ James Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; an Operational Formulation*; Powlick and Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus"; Entman, "Cascading Activation"; Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy Ole R. Holsti Ann Arbor*; Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis"; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy"; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*.

³⁹ James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh, *Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 278.

⁴⁰ Eytan Gilboa, "Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 3 (2005): 325-41.

⁴¹ Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," 58.

fills this gap by incorporating the implication of the Internet into foreign policy decision making, while categorizing different functions of the new media such as blogs as well as older media like newspapers.

American scholars have dominated the subfield of foreign policy decision making since its earliest origin.⁴² One of the earliest work on foreign policy decision making dates back to the late 19th century, when Woodrow Wilson published his study on decision making and policy implementation.⁴³ Positioned as a part of “management science,” more scholars proposed rational choice theories in order to cope with the risk of nuclear war following the W.W.II.⁴⁴ The US government also promoted cross-disciplinary research by establishing the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior (CAPPB) in the late 1960s.⁴⁵ Confronted by criticism against the Vietnam War, researchers shifted their focus toward bureaucracy, organizational culture and socialization as the drivers of foreign policy failure.⁴⁶

The scholarly debates on foreign policy decision making have focused very narrowly on American diplomacy, especially on the US military interventions.⁴⁷ As

⁴² Douglas Stuart, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 578.

⁴³ Woodrow Wilson, *Study of Administration* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1887).

⁴⁴ Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Bernard Brodie and Frederick Sherwood Dunn, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Brace and Harcourt, 1946).

⁴⁵ Jerrold M. Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 51–61.

⁴⁶ Douglas Stuart, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, 590.

⁴⁷ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Entman, “Cascading Activation”; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis”; Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy”; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*.

Risse-Kappen recognizes the regional difference in the relevance of public opinion across the US, France, West Germany and Japan in the 1980s, the skewed regional focus damages the validity of conventional scholarship.⁴⁸ Furthermore, despite comparative studies on public opinion and foreign policy in Europe,⁴⁹ they fail to develop a comprehensive framework as American scholars.⁵⁰ Thus, the lack of non-American, especially Asian, research damages the universality of the existing scholarship. Through the case studies in East Asia, my thesis tests and modifies the validity of *western* foreign policy decision making theories.

The conventional scholarship on foreign policy decision making does not consider the consequences of the Internet on the role of citizens in foreign policy. The traditional assumption that citizens thus are incapable of exercising direct influence in foreign policy does not necessarily hold, when citizens can bypass the government and directly participate in foreign policy through the Internet. For example, organized independently from states' power, groups such as WikiLeaks and Anonymous⁵¹ allow citizens with high computational ability to directly intervene in foreign policy, just as WikiLeaks revealed

⁴⁸ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512.

⁴⁹ Bernard Cohen, *Democracies and Foreign Policy: Public Participation in the United States and the Netherlands* (Mishawaka: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); Pierangelo Isernia, Zoltan Juhasz, and Hans Rattinger, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 2 (2002): 201–24.

⁵⁰ Powlick and Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus"; Entman, "Cascading Activation"; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Baum and Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy."

⁵¹ As of December 15, 2014, this citizen group does not have an official webpage other than Twitter account. There, the organization posts tweets on the government violence, corruption, and citizen activism. As seen in their organization name, the group members are kept anonymous. <https://twitter.com/youranonnews>.

the US's suspected spying on Germany chancellor's office to cause a diplomatic crisis.⁵²

In this respect, conventional scholarship has not yet examined whether and how the Internet affects citizens' ability to influence foreign policymaking.

In summary, the current state of scholarship indicates the need for a theoretical model that incorporates the Internet's effect on the performance of public opinion and citizens' direct involvement with foreign policy. At the same time, in order to counter the disproportionate focus on the US presidency, my thesis conducts case study on an international conflict between the authoritarian regime of PRC and the parliamentary democracy in Japan, two countries which operate in different political contexts from the US. Building upon conventional scholarly accounts on major drivers of foreign policy decision making, my thesis aims to present a more concrete framework by combining theories of political representation and the Internet's effects on domestic politics.

INTERNET AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Many scholars⁵³ studying the Internet and politics agree that they have not paid sufficient attention to the Internet's role in political activism until the recent years.

According to Henry Farrell, the Internet has not emerged as a main topic of scholarly discussions until the mid-2000s.⁵⁴ In this chapter, I categorize the broad scholarly field on

⁵² "Merkel Calls for 'Sensible Talks' over Alleged US Spying on Germany," *The Guardian*, July 18, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/merkel-sensible-talks-alleged-us-spying-germany-nsa-snoweden>.

⁵³ Henry Farrell, "The Consequences of the Internet for Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 35–52; Beth Simmons, "Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (2013): 1; Archon Fung, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Jennifer Shkabatur, "Six Models for the Internet + Politics," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 30–47.

⁵⁴ Henry Farrell, "The Consequences of the Internet for Politics."

the Internet and politics into two paradigms. The Internet and Citizen's Behavior Paradigm, the first body of literature, deals with the debates over the extent to which the Internet empowers citizen activism. This body studies citizens' behavioral changes perceived empirically after the spread of the Internet, and critiques their theoretical explanations disputed by scholars. Building upon the behavioral analyses of citizens in the post-Internet world, the Internet and Political Representation Paradigm, the second body of literature, focuses on conceptual debates over the consequences of the Internet in light of political representation and social institutions. In other words, the Citizen's Behavior Paradigm takes the bottom-up approach from the empirical cases of citizen grassroots movements, while the Political Representation Paradigm presents the top-down view of this transformation from conceptual frameworks of responsive government.

INTERNET AND CITIZENS' BEHAVIOR PARADIGM

The Early Research

According to Bruce Bimber,⁵⁵ some of the earliest scholars including Robert Dahl in the late 1980s to early 1990s predict the emergence of new telecommunication technology to bring "advanced democratic country" by preparing citizens for the next level of participation.⁵⁶ Such optimism by political scientists goes along with the view of Nicholas Negroponte, the founder of the MIT Media Lab, who suggests that people learn

⁵⁵ Bruce Bimber, "The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accelerated Pluralism," *Polity* 31, no. 1 (1998): 133.

⁵⁶ Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Lawrence Grossman, *The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age* (New York: Viking, 1995); Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993).

to use personalized information sources that are harder for the government to control.⁵⁷

Although these scholars vaguely recognized the potential of the new media to transform the political behavior of people, these accounts cannot fully evaluate the current online activism after the appearance of the Facebook in 2004 and Twitter in 2006.

Empowered Citizen Model and Decentralization

Just as Benedict Anderson illustrates that printing press empowered new reading class as the emerging players to establish a new nation state system,⁵⁸ technological breakthroughs in communication have altered the political landscape of society before the rise of the Internet. Likewise, scholarly debates have generally focused on the extent to which the Internet empowers citizens as a political agency. The logic behind this “empowered citizen” model is twofold. That is, this transformation decentralizes the domestic political structure by depriving the conventional elites of their power, while reinforcing citizens’ political capacity to influence policymaking.

The decentralization effect of the Internet presents a dichotomy between optimists and pessimists. Since the 1990s, the optimists claim that the lower costs of communication allow citizens to participate in political process more directly, which undermines the traditional political intermediaries such parties, interest groups, legislatures, and bureaucracies.⁵⁹ Eventually, such a transformation realizes “active cyber

⁵⁷ Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital* (New York: Knopf, 1995).

⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006).

⁵⁹ Philip Agre, “Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process,” *Information Society* 18, no. 5 (2002): 312.

civil society”⁶⁰ with their reinforced capacity to directly reflect their collective preferences, while “elite political gatekeepers”⁶¹ in policymaking. Clay Shirky, a prominent contemporary writer on the socioeconomic effects of technology, advocates for this view that innovations in communication technology facilitate collective action organized by citizens, and therefore contribute to democratization.

Meanwhile, pessimistic scholars⁶² support the “Reinforcement Model,” arguing that the Internet is also adopted by political elites and the inequality of power is reinforced rather than diminished. For example, examining the US elections in 2000, Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis illuminate the resilience of conventional political power structure after the spread of the Internet use in campaign.⁶³ As opposed to a decentralized, open image of cyberspace, Matthew Hindman indicates the elitist hierarchy is still present on the Internet, underlining that successful political blogs tend to be written disproportionately by white, male authors with elite academic degrees.⁶⁴

Despite the dichotomy between optimists and pessimists, many scholars⁶⁵ share the consensus that significant reduction in cost of communication and interaction is the key starting point in understanding the consequences of the Internet on politics,

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² James Danziger, *Computers and Politics: High Technology in American Local Governments* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis, *Campaigning Online the Internet in U.S. Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁶³ Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis, *Campaigning Online the Internet in U.S. Elections*.

⁶⁴ Matthew Hindman, *The Myth of Digital Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁶⁵ Philip Agre, “Real-Time Politics: The Internet and the Political Process”; Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 1, 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media>; Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Henry Farrell, “The Consequences of the Internet for Politics,” 39.

especially its effect on citizen behavior. While the optimists associate reduced costs directly with increased participation, pessimists pause to rebut that the increased “participation” does not mean increased political influence. Comparing costs of conventional advertisements and publications with those of blogs and webpages, Jennifer Stromer-Galley highlights the lower cost of public expression required for citizens, which is likely to undermine the dominance of elite media and propaganda.⁶⁶ Evgeny Morozov argues that the new forms of participation, such as joining groups on SNS, are nothing but a showy gesture of political activism, rather than an effective commitment to political participation.⁶⁷ Although this controversy over the effect of communication costs suggests the necessity to measure *both* changes in citizens’ behavior and its effectiveness of causing policy change, the conventional scholarship has not yet addressed this point.

Does the Internet Unite People?

In measuring the Internet’s capacity to facilitate collective actions by citizens, scholars generally examine two levels of behavior: opinion making and mobilization. In discussing opinion making, scholars are split between whether the online space fosters polarization and isolation in public opinion.

Scholars agree that cyberspace provides a global platform where people can interact with others who have both similar and different opinions, allowing different opinions on various topics to coexist. Scholarly debates arise when they discuss whether such diverse opinion platforms bridge or deepen the gaps between citizens’ individual

⁶⁶ Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Democratizing Democracy: Strong Democracy, US Political Campaigns and the Internet,” *Democratization* 50, no. 4 (2000): 36–58.

⁶⁷ Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*.

preferences. Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman identify the Internet as a new “civic commons,” where numerous exchanges of citizens’ opinions lead to democratic consensus building.⁶⁸ On the other hand, some political communication scholars claim that the exposure to different views does not necessarily promote adoption of these views. Bimber⁶⁹ predicts “accelerated pluralism” and fragmentation of American political views as a result of the new media. Cass Sunstein proposes the concept of “echo chambers,” arguing that the Internet only facilitates fragmentation of people’s opinion.⁷⁰ Yochai Benkler attributes the cause of fragmentation to the Internet’s search capacity, which allows people with narrow interests to find those with similar minority views.⁷¹ Empirically, scholars observe pluralization of political opinions by identifying the partisan elective exposure in the US National Election Survey⁷² and analyzing campaign ads and online messaging.⁷³ Although these researchers primarily examine the US, the fragmentation theories question the assumption that the open cyberspace immediately leads to mutual understanding and unity creation.

⁶⁸ Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman, *Realising Democracy Online: A Civic Commons in Cyberspace* (London: IPPR, 2001).

⁶⁹ Bruce Bimber, “The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accelerated Pluralism.”

⁷⁰ Cass Sunstein, *Echo Chambers: Bush v. Gore, Impeachment, and beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁷¹ Yochai Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2006).

⁷² Natalie Jomini Stroud, “Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure,” *Journal of Communication* 60, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 556–76.

⁷³ Dhavan V. Shah et al., “Campaign Ads, Online Messaging, and Participation: Extending the Communication Mediation Model,” *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 4 (December 2007): 676–703.

Filling the gap between the “civic commons” model and fragmentation model, J.P. Singh’s concept of “meta-power”⁷⁴ suggests that people may have multiple, overarching identities beyond traditional borders. Pluralism does not necessarily mean divisionism or isolationism. According to Singh, pluralism simply indicates that people have learned to acquire more than one identity due to the increased online interactions with others beyond borders. This “Meta-Power” of the Internet facilitates “new meaning formation,” transforms the identity and capacity of actors and issues, and thus generates new international outcomes.

Does the Internet Mobilize People?

The second topic of academic debates lies in the mobilization that the Internet has been argued to enable. The new political identity and capacity created through online media also enable new political behaviors by the people. Especially after the Arab Spring of 2011, scholars have discussed the political mobilization accelerated by the Internet. According to Howard and Hussain, digital media allowed communities to “unite around shared grievances and nurture transportable strategies for mobilizing against dictators”⁷⁵ in the Arab Spring. In observing China’s online activism, Yang Guobing argues that the China’s online space provides Chinese citizens with a new channel of political contestation despite the strict government control over cyberspace at the domestic level.⁷⁶ In international affairs, Simon Shen analyzes varying nationalist discourses toward

⁷⁴ J.P. Singh, “Information Technologies, Meta-Power, and Transformations in Global Politics,” *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (2013): 5–29.

⁷⁵ Howard and Hussain, “The Role of Digital Media,” 35.

⁷⁶ Guobin Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

different states such as Japan, the US, Africa, and the EU.⁷⁷ Online activism in American election campaigns also contributes to the understanding of the digital media's impact on democratic process.⁷⁸ Finally, aggregating empirical studies on the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the *Indignadas* movement in Spain, and Occupy World Street in the US, Castells analyzes dynamic political shifts caused by the Internet.⁷⁹

Some scholars,⁸⁰ however, deny the causal linkage between the Internet and mobilization. Jeffrey Juris argues that mobilization in the “#Occupy Everywhere” movement occurred through face-to-face interactions rather than social media, whose organization was neither horizontal nor leaderless.⁸¹ These movements often have their leaders and reference points.⁸²

Despite the various examples of mobilization, few scholars⁸³ offer theoretical explanations as to how these people mobilized themselves to pursue their political goals. Covering from conventional interest group movements to “hacktivism” strategies, Andrew Chadwick reviews “E-mobilization” seen in the social movements before 2006.

⁷⁷ Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations* (Lexington Books, 2010).

⁷⁸ Daniel Kreiss, *Taking Our Country Back: The Crafting of Networked Politics from Howard Dean to Barack Obama* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁷⁹ Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013).

⁸⁰ Veronica Barassi and Emiliano Treré, “Does Web 3.0 Come after Web 2.0? Deconstructing Theoretical Assumptions through Practice,” *New Media & Society* 14, no. 8 (December 1, 2012): 1269–85.

⁸¹ Jeffrey S. Juris, “Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation,” *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 259–79.

⁸² Paolo Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets Social Media and Contemporary Activism* (London: Pluto, 2012).

⁸³ Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Andrew Chadwick, *Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded the New Mechanics of Change* (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2010).

In his new work published in 2013, Chadwick proposes a more comprehensive view of “E-mobilization” by arguing that the current politics increasingly becomes the hybrid mechanism of online and offline media interactions, signifying the political influence of old-style news media. In other words, both the new media and the old media utilize each other in political communication, denying a simplified view that one replaces the other. More specifically on the Internet-based mobilization tactics, Mary Joyce, a scholar and activist, compiles cases for mobilization tactics using the Internet and mobile phones.⁸⁴ Although these works provide theoretical analyses of empirical cases, the current state of this scholarly domain remains far from sufficient to reach a consensus.

Problems with Empowered Citizen Model

There are three challenges to the current state of scholarly knowledge in the Internet and Citizen Behavior Paradigm. The digital divide, the government’s countermeasure, and lack of systematic models undermine the validity of the citizen empowerment models on the Internet’s effect on citizens’ power to influence foreign policymaking.

The first problem is the so-called “digital divide,” the disproportionate access to and use of the Internet across different segments. The debates on the extent to which citizens are “empowered” by the Internet assume that “people” in general have access to the new media. However, the research suggests a significant gap in the access and use of the Internet, undermining the simplistic conclusion that the Internet is the driver of mobilizing people. Paul DiMaggio et al. alarm that the digital divide, the unequal access

⁸⁴ Mary Joyce, *Digital Activism Decoded the New Mechanics of Change*. See more information on her webpage: <http://www.meta-activism.org>.

to the Internet, also creates discrepancies in people's social perception as well as material well-being.⁸⁵ Howard and Hussain also acknowledge that the population who utilized the Internet in the Arab Spring was confined to 10-20 percent of the overall population.⁸⁶ In this regard, theories need to consider the disproportionate impact of the Internet across different segments of population in order to fully understand how and whom the Internet empowers.

The second problem with the citizen empowerment model is its lack of consideration in the state's countermeasures. Many scholars⁸⁷ point out that authoritarian regimes effectively prevent people's mobilization and freedom of expression with their extensive online censorship and manipulation. Gary King et al. present one of very few quantitative studies on China's censorship system,⁸⁸ and reveal that the PRC's censorship is stricter toward the posts that encourage collective action than those that simply criticize the government. Furthermore, Hindman⁸⁹ criticizes the advocates of empowered citizen model for ignoring cases in which the authoritarian regimes successfully manipulate the Internet to empower the government, not the people. Rather supportive of

⁸⁵ Paul DiMaggio et al., *From Unequal Access to Differentiated Use: A Literature Review and Agenda for Research on Digital Inequality* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).

⁸⁶ Howard and Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media."

⁸⁷ Stephen Coleman and Jay Blumler, *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China*; Shen and Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations*; Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*; Christian Fuchs, "Some Reflections on Manuel Castells' Book Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age," *Communication, Capitalism and Critique* 10, no. 2 (2012): 781; James Curran and Natalie Fenton, *Misunderstanding the Internet* (London: Routledge, 2012).

⁸⁸ Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 02 (May 2013): 326-43.

⁸⁹ Matthew Hindman, *The Myth of Digital Democracy*.

democratization, Howard and Hussain also acknowledge that the external factors such as political context and religion in Egypt and Tunisia were essential in the Arab Spring.⁹⁰ These scholars on government countermeasures to the Internet question the assumption of linear connection between the Internet access, transformation of political consciousness and contestation.

Finally, and most fundamentally, the empowered citizen model fails to consider the connection between citizens and other political players in shaping outcomes. If the Internet empowers citizens in policymaking, it must coincide with the change in relative power of the citizen vis-à-vis their other actors such as the elites, mainstream media, and the government. However, most of the literature focuses only on the Internet's effects on citizens and does not examine how it transforms the balance of power between citizens and their competitors. Moreover, this weakness also reflects the two challenges I mentioned previously. The conventional research does not consider the relative power change among people, between those with active Internet use and those without, while precluding the possibility that the government gains more power than citizens out of the Internet. In order to conquer this weakness, my thesis bridges the gap between the Internet's relative and absolute empowerment of citizens, while examining citizens' interactions with traditional political actors such as the government and political elites.

⁹⁰ Howard and Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media."

INTERNET AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION PARADIGM

Defined as “making present again” by Hanna Pitkin, representation is the act of “making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact.”⁹¹ According to Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, the concept of political representation generally refers to “the political process by which the making of government policy is related to the wants, needs, and demands of the public.”⁹²

As a political institution, political representation is composed of two channels: the electoral system and non-electoral citizen-government relations. Grounded in Robert Dahl’s frameworks, Bingham Powell⁹³ proposes “the chain of responsiveness model,” identifying the electoral system as the central institution of political representation. Specifically, this model illustrates the step-by-step mechanisms through which elections aggregate citizens’ individual preferences and creates a responsive government. Although Powell does recognize other non-electoral “forces that shape the making and implementation of public policies,”⁹⁴ he argues that elections offer the primary source of pressure for policymakers through “the systematic eviction of unresponsive or inept policy makers.”⁹⁵

⁹¹ Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 8.

⁹² Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁹³ Bingham Powell, “The Chain of Responsiveness,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004): 91–105.

⁹⁴ Bingham Powell, “Political Representation in Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, no. 1 (2004): 274.

⁹⁵ Powell, “The Chain of Responsiveness,” 92.

On the other hand, more recent work by Urbinati and Warren underlines the “rapidly evolving”⁹⁶ domains outside the conventional electoral representation. Criticizing that the electoral system only allows less-nuanced, long-term responsiveness, Urbinati and Warren claim the growing influence of “self-authorized representatives,” who “have always petitioned government and made representative claims on behalf of interests and values they believe should have an impact.”⁹⁷ Although they do not refer to the implication of the Internet, their focus on individual actors resonates with scholars⁹⁸ who suggest the linkage between recent public mobilizations such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Movement and the widespread use of the Internet. Moreover, most scholars⁹⁹ on foreign policy decision making identify the electoral cycles as conditional variables, not as independent variables. Therefore, in my thesis, I focus on this non-electoral channel, while identifying the election as a conditional variable that occasionally creates temporary pressure to policymakers.

Theoretical Background of Political Representation in the Internet Era

The conceptual debates on the Internet’s implication to political representation started with a hopeful speculation for the new technology in the 1970s. At the same time,

⁹⁶ Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 387–412.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 403.

⁹⁸ Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System*; Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*.

⁹⁹ Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus”; Entman, “Cascading Activation”; Western, *Selling Intervention and War*; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis”; Baum and Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy”; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; Douglas Foyle, *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*.

the 1970s also marked a “turn toward deliberative models of democracy,”¹⁰⁰ which emphasized the increasing role of citizens and their participations in political representation. Based on the hypothesis that cyberspace creates a new political platform open for the public, political scientists and sociologists¹⁰¹ expected the emergence of new communication channels between citizens and governments. Grossman, for example, presented such new vision of the citizen-government relations, stating that the new information technologies “extend government decision making from the few in the center of power to the many on the outside who may wish to participate.”¹⁰² Therefore, the idea of deliberation and participation plays a crucial role in understanding the scholarship on the mechanism through which citizens use the Internet to represent their collective preferences in policymaking.

The concept of deliberation specifies the act of collective decision making by citizens as an essential element of political representation. Starting from Habermas’s concept of the “public sphere,”¹⁰³ deliberation signifies citizens’ active role as evaluators who monitor the government’s responsiveness and contest if the policy fails to reflect people’s preferences. Deliberation is tightly connected with democracy, in that this idea presumes realization of citizens’ will as the ultimate goal of the government. According to the definition by Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson, in a deliberative democracy,

¹⁰⁰ Chadwick, *Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies*, 70.

¹⁰¹ Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*; Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989).

¹⁰² Lawrence Grossman, *The Electronic Republic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age*.

¹⁰³ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*.

“free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.”¹⁰⁴ In this view, deliberation relies on citizens’ ability to interact with each other and to form collective agreements. Because the Internet brings citizens a new tool of communication, the debates over the Internet and political representation question the extent to which this new tool enhances citizens’ capacity for deliberation. Therefore, deliberation establishes one of the most fundamental vocabularies in examining the effect of the Internet on political representation.

Dichotomy between Internet Deliberation Concepts and Reality

Scholars¹⁰⁵ debate the implications of the Internet on the political representation frameworks since the early 2000s, observing the actual transformation in citizens’ participation in the deliberation process. According to Coleman, the transformation starts with the increasing sense of disconnectedness between citizens and politicians. In particular, people shift away from “paternalistic representation,”¹⁰⁶ which is “manifested by seemingly remote politicians, parties and political institutions.”¹⁰⁷ At the same time,

¹⁰⁴ Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.

¹⁰⁵ Brian S. Krueger, “Assessing the Potential of Internet Political Participation in the United States A Resource Approach,” *American Politics Research* 30, no. 5 (September 1, 2002): 476–98; Samuel J. Best and Brian S. Krueger, “Analyzing the Representativeness of Internet Political Participation,” *Political Behavior* 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 183–216; Stephen Coleman, “New Mediation and Direct Representation: Reconceptualizing Representation in the Digital Age,” *New Media & Society* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 177–98; Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation,” *Political Communication* 22, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 147–62.

¹⁰⁶ Coleman, “New Mediation and Direct Representation,” 195.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

traditional media such as television and newspapers are becoming increasingly unpopular as a channel of virtual deliberation. Both citizens and politicians share the same sense of disconnectedness between each other, which drives them to pursue a new way of representation by using ICT (Information and Communication Technology).

Political representation is tightly connected with communication technology, which determines the quality of mediation between public opinion and policymakers. Coleman states, “To represent is to mediate between experience, voice and action; to mediate is to represent the absent in the present.”¹⁰⁸ Moreover, subjective judgments by people, policymakers, and mediators further complicate the mediation process, since no *objective* assessment of public opinion and responsiveness exist. In order for actors to interpret the “meaning and intention” of their actions, a more interactive, sensitive, and accessible mediation technology is essential.

The ICT plays a principal role in realizing the people’s demand for a new representation, especially, the shift from “contractual” to “permanent representation.”¹⁰⁹ The Internet significantly improves the mass-to-mass communication among people, which enables citizens to monitor government responsiveness constantly and to shape public consensus easily. Unlike the one-way “Megaphone” style communication of the traditional mass media, the Internet facilitates “inclusive, collaborative and interactive conception of representation”¹¹⁰ by encouraging “sensitive listening”¹¹¹ among citizens with varying political opinions. In this way, the Internet reestablishes the connectedness

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 180.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 181.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 180.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

between citizens and their representatives by allowing citizens “to have unmediated and undistorted access to the presented, to be better understood, to nurture public consent.”¹¹²

Based on Habermas’s concept of the public sphere, Dahlgren identifies the creation of “Net-based public spheres,”¹¹³ which air “social and cultural topics having to do with common interests and/or collective identities.”¹¹⁴ In particular, Peter Dahlgren names five fields as the center of this transformation: e-government; advocacy and activism; civic forums for opinion exchange and deliberation; culture and social settings; and journalism. Meanwhile, Dahlgren also criticizes conventional scholars of political communication for overemphasizing the rationality of political actors, while neglecting “procedural and contextual dimension,” stating that “[t]he political and politics are not simply given, but are constructed via word and deed.”¹¹⁵ Although Dahlgren shows the vast implications of the Internet on people’s participation in politics, this theory assumes that the creation of the new public sphere directly leads to increased citizen participation.

On the other hand, empirical research suggests the new technology does not naturally and equally train all citizens to effectively participate. Samuel Best and Brian Krueger¹¹⁶ claims that citizens need to acquire a new set of skills specifically for online political participation. Suggesting the potential advantage for younger citizens with higher computer skills, they argue “the Internet alters the types of resources necessary for

¹¹² Ibid., 189.

¹¹³ Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication.”

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 153.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 158.

¹¹⁶ Best and Krueger, “Analyzing the Representativeness of Internet Political Participation.”

political activity, potentially advantaging a new type of individual.”¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the traditional indicators of political participation, such as economic status and the level of civic skills,¹¹⁸ do not correspond with the level of online participation.¹¹⁹ In contrast to Coleman and Dahlgren, these statistical studies present a significant gap between the conceptual and empirical understandings of political representation in the Internet era.

Need for Integrated Frameworks

This dichotomy between conceptual and empirical study sheds light on the urgent demand for research that integrates empirical studies and concretely defined theoretical frameworks at the operational level. Although Coleman and Dahlgren incorporate the advancement in communication technology into the established theoretical ground of political representation, their arguments rely on conceptual speculation, rather than concrete empirical cases. Meanwhile, questioning the reality of conceptual debates, statistical study of this transforming representation process fails to explain the chain of mechanisms through which citizens use the new media to keep their governments responsive. Even though these works provide static snapshots of the Internet’s effects on politics, they cannot explain the dynamic interactions between actors. Therefore, the current state of scholarship is insufficient in offering theoretical frameworks that illustrate whether, how, and through which channels the Internet creates realize a new mode of representation.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 202.

¹¹⁸ By civic skills, I mean the basic skillset required to effectively participate in collective decision making process in society.

¹¹⁹ Krueger, “Assessing the Potential of Internet Political Participation in the United States A Resource Approach.”

Limited scholarly works exist to fill this gap, providing vaguely defined mechanisms through which citizens influence policymaking. Criticizing the direct participation theory supported by earlier scholars¹²⁰ for being "inattentive to individual incentives and institutional imperatives,"¹²¹ Fung et al. argue that politicians are unwilling to "share their decision-making power with their constituencies."¹²² Denying fundamental change in people's perception of political representation itself, they attribute the driver of transformation to the new political capacity that citizens acquire through the Internet to influence policymaking. In their "Six Models for the Internet + Politics,"¹²³ Fung et al. aggregate conventional scholarship to illustrate how the Internet affects the chain of representation mechanism at the operational level.

Fung's six models categorize into three patterns: reinforcement of existing channels, new connection building, and a combination of both. Three models, Muscular Public Sphere, Truth-Based Advocacy, and Constituent Mobilization Models, illustrate that the Internet strengthens the existing channels of representation. In these models, citizens increase their pressure over policymakers through more active public opinion shaping and expressions. Traditional advocacy groups also utilize the Internet to increase their influence over public opinion making. At the same time, the Internet also reinforces their capacity to involve citizens and to lobby for policy change. The Internet also creates a new connection between actors. In the Here Comes Everybody Model, citizens bypass

¹²⁰ Benjamin Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*; Stephen Coleman and Jay Blumler, *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy*.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Fung, Russon Gilman, and Shkabatur, "Six Models for the Internet + Politics," 37.

¹²³ Ibid., 30-33.

the government and directly provide public service, just as Wikipedia offers a free encyclopedia accessible all over the world. In the Direct Digital Democracy Model, the Internet eliminates political intermediaries and creates a new direct connection between citizens and their representatives. Finally, in the Crowd-Sourced Social Monitoring Model, citizens combine direct monitoring of their government and indirect lobbying through advocacy groups, by using the Internet as a platform to gather information, to lobby with advocacy groups and, to connect directly with policymakers.

Fung's models integrate existing scholarship to bridge the dichotomy between "starry-eyed technologists" and "hard-headed political analysts"¹²⁴ By combining political analysts' view of political systems and technologist view of empowered actors, these frameworks provide a comprehensive and balanced picture of the Internet's effects on politics. Meanwhile, as the authors "hope that others will take up these models, and the hypothesis"¹²⁵ for empirical tests and further conceptual debates, these models are nothing but the first step for more elaborated frameworks that explain linkage between citizens and policymaking in the Internet era. My thesis, therefore, aims to establish a more concrete framework by synthesizing conceptual and empirical research, specifically on citizens' influence over foreign policymaking.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 45.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Three bodies of literature are relevant in explaining whether and how citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign policymaking. The literature on foreign policy decision making offers various models explaining the process through which citizens through public opinion pressure policymakers, while completely lacking reference to the Internet. The vast literature on the Internet and domestic politics entails theories on citizen behaviors and political representation. The Internet and citizen behavior presents a bottom-up view of transforming political representation process in light of citizen participation. The Internet and political representation, in contrast, offers a top-down model of representation process through which people's collective preferences are reflected in policymaking at the conceptual level. Although these two approaches strongly indicate ongoing transformation of citizens' strategies to influence foreign policymaking, only limited literature exists to provide elaborated frameworks endorsed by empirical research. My thesis, hence, aims to establish a more concrete framework by synthesizing conceptual debates and case study on an international conflict between Japan and China, focusing on citizens' influence over foreign policymaking. The next chapter reviews current situations and the historical background of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute to contextualize my detailed case study in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.

CHAPTER THREE: THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE

Chinese people have hearts that are bigger than the oceans or the sky but we definitely cannot tolerate sand in our eyes.

— The PRC President Xi Jinping, “China and Japan, Eyes on a Compromise,” September 2014

There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Senkaku Islands,” April 2014

This chapter on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute serves to establish historical context for the following case study chapters, which provides the ground for the coming empirical chapters. As such, I divide this chapter into three sections. The first section introduces contradicting claims by relevant parties, while highlighting the focal points of the dispute. Based on this overview of the conflict, I proceed to outline the historical background of the dispute as one of the emerging issues in the long history of Sino-Japanese relations. Finally, I integrate the two sections on opposing claims and historical context to identify the factors that drove China and Japan to the moment of considerable diplomatic tension in 2014. In conclusion, I argue that this interstate conflict is increasingly driven by Internet-based citizen activism. Outlining the major sources of lingering Sino-Japanese tensions, this chapter highlights the process in which an interstate conflict transforms into a nationalist confrontation.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT

RISING DANGER OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION SINCE 2010

Since the 1970s, the People's Republic of the China (the PRC), the Republic of China (the ROC or Taiwan), and Japan have repeatedly confronted each other over the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While Japan argues that the Islands have belonged to Japan since 1894, China maintains that the islands have been an integral part of Taiwan since the Ming Dynasty (14-17c.) and that Japan unlawfully annexed the islands after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The growing tension between nations across the East China Sea is currently creating a political and security flashpoint in Asia, provoking numerous military incidents as well as surges of public anger. Furthermore, the US military presence in Asia and its rivalry with China add another layer of complexity, symbolizing the sensitive relationship between the two powers competing over the hegemony.

The disputed islands represent a new powder keg in Asia. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the alleged borders overlap near the disputed islands, creating an area where the Chinese and Japanese authorities can operate to secure their borders. In fact, as a result of the PRC and Japan's diplomatic failure in negotiating a conflict resolution framework, the disputed waters became a friction point of the two states' naval powers. According to Japan's 2014 Defense White Paper,¹ the number of Japan's scrambling² against Chinese airplanes has dramatically increased since 2010. In 2014, Japanese fighter jets confronted

¹ "The Defense Whitebook of 2014" (Ministry of Defense of Japan), accessed February 15, 2015, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2014/pc/2014/html/n3111000.html>.

² Scrambling is an emergency security response taken to protect state borders, when a state detects a potential intrusion into its territory by foreign vessels or airplanes. In this case specifically, Japanese fighter jets intercepted Chinese airplanes to protect the alleged Japanese borders from intrusions. This is especially problematic when China and Japan have overlapping "borders" to defend, because it increases the encounter between the two countries' military forces.

Chinese airplanes over 400 times. Although these incidents did not involve armed attacks, they indeed resulted in serious security crises. On May 25 and June 11, 2014, a Japanese surveillance airplane and Chinese a Su-27 fighter jet flew dangerously close to each other, and came within 100 feet (30 meters) away from each other.³ Likewise, the tension in the East China Sea has skyrocketed since 2012. In 2013, the PRC Navy reportedly targeted their arm control radar⁴ to the Japan Self Defense Force vessel and helicopter, stopping one step away from actual exchange of fire.⁵ These data certainly indicate the increasing number of dangerous encounters between China and Japan,⁶ thus crystalizing the emerging risks of armed conflict.

³ “Chinese Military Airplane Confronts Japanese Jetfighters Again on the East China Sea (中国軍機また異常接近 東シナ海 自衛隊2機、30～45メートル),” *Sankei Shimbun*, June 11, 2014, <http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/140611/pl1406110013-n1.html>; “Chinese Military Airplane Was Armed with Missiles, Minister of Defense Says(中国軍機はミサイルを搭載、防衛相が明らかに),” *Sankei Shimbun*, May 25, 2015, <http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/140525/pl1405250003-n2.html>.

⁴ Arm control radar is used to lock on a missile attack target. Many military vessels and airplanes maintain anti-missile defense systems to detect when someone directs arm control radar toward them in order to respond to the imminent threat.

⁵ Martin Fackler, “Japan Says China Aimed Weapons-Targeting Radar at Ship,” *The New York Times*, February 5, 2013, sec. World / Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/asia/japan-china-islands-dispute.html>.

⁶ My use of Japanese sources neither support nor justify Japan’s position. Although the PRC does not disclose the equivalent information, even Japan’s record alone highlights its numerous confrontations at the frontline between the disputed borders of the two states, and thus showcases high risks of armed conflict.

Figure 3.1: Alleged Borders by China and Japan



Source: Map from “How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties,” *BBC News*, November 10, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>.

The dispute is not limited to the state level, because it also influences public sentiment. Annual opinion surveys conducted in China and Japan mark rapidly deteriorating trust and soaring hatred between the two nations, as indicated in Figure 3.2. According to the Beijing-Tokyo Forum,⁷ public impressions vis-à-vis opposing nations have decayed significantly since 2006,⁸ following a series of large-scale protests in China against Japan’s campaign to attain regular membership on the UN Security Council. In a

⁷ Established in 2005, Tokyo-Beijing Forum is one of the largest collaborative dialogue platforms by Chinese and Japanese scholars, diplomats, and policymakers: <http://tokyo-beijingforum.net>.

⁸ “2014 China-Japan Collaborative Public Opinion Survey Results (「第10回日中共同世論調査」結果)” (Tokyo Beijing Forum, Genron NPO and China Daily, 2014), <http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5153.html>.

2014 survey,⁹ 93 percent of Japanese and 87 percent of Chinese citizens had a negative impression of the other. This result marked the highest score since the survey started in 2005, indicating that Japanese people with negative impression of China more than doubled in the past decade. The territorial dispute is central to this decline of trust, as 53 percent of Japanese and 78 percent of Chinese interviewees regarded the Islands issue as the source of this negative impression.¹⁰ Furthermore, the same survey¹¹ also indicates that 64 percent of the Chinese people support physical seizure of the islands as a solution to this conflict. As these surveys would predict, in 2010, the mass-protests across China caused Japanese factory shutdowns and damage to some Japanese property in Chinese cities,¹² requiring police intervention to soothe the angry public.¹³ Likewise, Japanese conservatives also organized protests against China's policy on the islands.¹⁴

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ “2013 China-Japan Collaborative Public Opinion Survey Results(「第9回日中共同世論調査」結果)” (Tokyo Beijing Forum, Genron NPO and China Daily, 2013), <http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/2013forum.pdf>.


¹¹ “2014 China-Japan Collaborative Public Opinion Survey Results (「第10回日中共同世論調査」結果).”

¹² Brian Spegele and Takashi Nakamichi, “Anti-Japan Protests Mount in China,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 16, 2012, sec. World News, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578000092842756154>.

¹³ Kentaro Koyama, “Police Had Hands Full Controlling Protesters in Shenzhen,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 17, 2012, <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201209170067>.

¹⁴ Seinosuke Iwasaki, “Contempt for China Leads to Insults, Conspiracy Theories against Okinawans,” *Asahi Shimbun*, April 30, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201304300107.

Figure 3.2: Deteriorating Impressions of Each Other in China and Japan



Source: Data from “2014 China-Japan Collaborative Public Opinion Survey Results (「第 10 回日中共同世論調査」結果).”

THE OPPOSING CLAIMS BY THE PRC, THE ROC, AND JAPAN

Located between Taiwan and Japan’s southern islands, the disputed islands¹⁵ in the East China Sea became one of the major flashpoints in Asia, once the UN research¹⁶ identified ample oil and natural gas deposits beneath the nearby ocean in the 1970s. Attracted by natural resources and driven by national pride, the PRC, the ROC (Taiwan), and Japan have fought a diplomatic struggle over the territorial sovereignty of the islands

¹⁵ A 3.6-square-kilometer unpopulated Diaoyu/Uotsuri Island and several smaller islands constitute the disputed islands.

¹⁶ “Committee for Development Planning Report on the Forth and Fifth Sessions” (United Nations, 1969), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_ecosoc/e_1969_4682.pdf.

for over four decades. In this section, I summarize opposing claims by Japan, the PRC, the ROC (Taiwan), and the US, while analyzing focal points of this controversy.

Japan's Claim of Terra Nullius and "Returned" Islands

Japan claims its legitimate ownership and valid control over the islands in light of history and international law. Moreover, Japan's Foreign Ministry denies the existence of such a "dispute" itself, asserting that "[t]here exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands."¹⁷ In 2012, the Japanese government announced the purchase of the territory from a Japanese civilian owner.

First, Japan asserts that it acquired the islands in 1895 in accordance with international law. In the 2012 UN General Assembly,¹⁸ Japan explained that the islands were legally incorporated as *terra nullius*¹⁹ into Japan based on a cabinet decision in 1895, separate from the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in which the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the islands around it were ceded to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. Japan emphasizes that the surveys on the islands "carefully ascertained"²⁰ the absence of the Qing Dynasty from 1885 to 1895 prior to the annexation, and the government confirmed

¹⁷ "Senkaku Islands," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed February 18, 2015, /region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html.

¹⁸ "Statements Made by H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN in Exercise of the Right of Reply, Following the Statement Made by H.E. Mr. Yang Jiechi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China at the General Debate of the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly on 27 September, 2012," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 27, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2012/un_0928.html.

¹⁹ The legal notion of terra nullius refers to the territory, over which no state has declared to exercise territorial sovereignty. Therefore, when a state discover a territory of terra nullius, the state can claim its territorial sovereignty, based on the legal ground that it is the first state to claim the title to the newly discovered territory.

²⁰ "Situation of the Senkaku Islands."

that the islands “had been not only uninhabited but had shown no trace of having been under the control of China.”²¹ According to the Japanese government, over 200 inhabitants resided on the islands, engaging in dried bonito and feather manufacturing until the later stage of WWII.²²

Second, Japan claims that it recovered its sovereignty over the islands even though the US once took over administrative control of Japan’s southern territory including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands following WWII. Japan argues that the islands were included in neither Taiwanese territory nor the Pescadores, where Japan lost its territorial sovereignty under Article 2 of San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952. Instead, the territory was placed under the US’s administrative control as part of Nansei Shoto according to Article 3, and returned to Japan along with Okinawa and numerous small islands nearby in the Okinawa Reversion Agreement between Japan and the US in 1972. Japan argues that it still maintains the effective control and territorial sovereignty of the islands despite temporal transfer of administrative rights to the US.

Finally, Japan criticizes China for remaining silent in the seven decades since the islands’ annexation, and for not protesting earlier against Japan and the US’s *de facto* control of the islands. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that China did not start active protest until the 1970s, when UN researchers discovered potential oil reserves beneath the East China Sea.²³ China did not express official protest against Japan’s annexation in the pre-war period, either when the US used the islands as firing ranges.

²¹ “Senkaku Islands Q&A,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed February 5, 2015, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

²² “Situation of the Senkaku Islands.”

²³ “Senkaku Islands Q&A.”

According to international law, Japan regards this long absence of protest as an indicator of tacit recognition²⁴ by China, which damages the legitimacy of the PRC's claim.

The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan)

On the other hand, the PRC argues that the territory has long belonged to China while Japan's imperialism and the US's "backdoor deal"²⁵ have violated China's territorial sovereignty over the region since the late 20th century.

In response to Japan's purchase of the islands, China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi underlined that the islands are no doubt an "integral part of China's territory since ancient times,"²⁶ based on "indisputable historical and legal evidence."²⁷ China criticized Japan's annexation of the islands in 1895 from a historical viewpoint, stating, "Japan seized these islands" and imposed the "unequal" Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895 following the First Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, after WWII, the islands were returned to China, consistent with international treaties such as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. Foreign

²⁴ "Tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct" can be a decisive factor to determine titles. In the *Palmas* case upheld that the continuous and peaceful display of effective control "may prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward by another State." In this case, Japan's defense is focused on the acquiescence of China after W.W. II, implying China's "absence of state activity, combined with an absence of protest." See more in James Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 232.

²⁵ "Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China," *The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China*, accessed February 4, 2015, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19520428.T1J.html>.

²⁶ "Yang Jiechi Expounds China's Solemn Position on the Diaoyu Islands Issue at the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, September 28, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t975814.shtml.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Minister Jiechi concluded that Japan's "so-called purchase" of the islands were nothing more than an "unilateral action"²⁸ and "grossly violated sovereignty."²⁹

"The Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,"³⁰ a diplomatic white paper published by the PRC immediately after the Japanese government's purchase of the islands, further elaborates the PRC's claim to territorial sovereignty. First, China refutes that Japan acquired the islands as *terra nullius*, stating the territory was first "discovered, named and exploited by China."³¹ Citing books and government publications during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, China argues that the old imperial governments discovered and ruled the islands since the 14th century. According to the White Paper, numerous official publications from the Ming Dynasty indicate that the islands were recognized on a route to the Ryukyu Kingdom, today's Okinawa. Moreover, the report also highlights that the Chinese population along the southeast coast travelled to the islands as fishing fields for generations. Dynasties also exercised jurisdiction over the territory, since Ming's piracy patrol included the islands and Qing Dynasty defined them as under the jurisdiction of Taiwanese local government. The PRC used such evidence to attack Japan's claim that it had acquired uninhabited, uncontrolled islands.

Second, China contends that Japan "grabbed"³² the islands from China as part of its imperialist expansion policy. According to the report, such tendency starts from the

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China."

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

annexation of the Okinawa Kingdom in 1879, and led Japan to impose the “unequal”³³ Shimonoseki Treaty on the Qing Dynasty following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. As a result of this treaty, China gave up "the island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa,"³⁴ which China claims include the disputed islands. Furthermore, the white paper argues that Japan’s government took ten years to examine the islands simply because its leaders were aware of China’s historical influence in the region.

Third, China argues that the US manipulated the postwar UN trusteeship to move the islands into its own control. Based on the understanding that the islands are part of Taiwan, China claims that the Cairo Declaration of 1943 returned the islands to China along with Taiwan. Furthermore, the San Francisco Peace Treaty is not valid because China was “excluded”³⁵ by the US, while the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971 is nothing but a bilateral “backdoor deal”³⁶ between the US and Japan. Therefore, China recognizes the islands as part of its recovered territory after WWII.

Finally, the PRC emphasizes its repeated protests against the status quo since the 1970s. For example, it protested against its exclusion from the San Francisco Peace Treaty by stating "If the People's Republic of China is excluded from the preparation, formulation and signing of the peace treaty with Japan, it will, no matter what its content and outcome are, be regarded as illegal and therefore invalid by the central people's

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

government."³⁷ In addition to such dissenting statement, in 1971 the PRC also rejected the Okinawa Reversion Agreement for its unfairness. In recent years, the PRC's legislature has ratified domestic laws to protect its own territory. While the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Law of 1992 governs "Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Dao,"³⁸ the Offshore Islands Protection Law of 2009 similarly incorporates the islands. In foreign policy, China announced the boundaries of the territorial sea, and filed the new border with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Finally, claims by the Republic of China (Taiwan) further complicate China's position, as an independent political entity from the PRC. In a milder tone than the PRC, Taiwan asserts that the islands originally belonged to China and were returned to the ROC as part of Formosa (Taiwan) after WWII.³⁹ Emphasizing the islands' historical linkage with the Chinese dynasties as well as local fishermen, the Taiwanese government criticizes Japan's purchase and China's naval expansionism.⁴⁰ Although this logic is similar to that of the PRC, Taiwan's position is based on the understanding that the ROC is the official representative government of "China" including the mainland since 1945. Despite the significance of the Taiwan-mainland conflict itself, this issue does not fall within the scope of my research.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ "Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992," *National Legislations - The United Nations*, accessed February 20, 2015, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf.

³⁹ "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China(Taiwan) (中華民國(台灣)外交部全球資訊網)," text/html, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, (April 18, 2014), <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/NewsNoHeadOnlyTitle.aspx?n=C641B6979A7897C0&sms=F9719E988D8675C>. C.

⁴⁰ "Those Islands Belong to Taiwan," *Foreign Policy*, accessed February 25, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/18/those-islands-belong-to-taiwan/>.

Moreover, except for the mainland-Taiwanese confrontation, the tensions between Taiwan and Japan are far less serious than those between the PRC and Japan. In fact, Taiwan and Japan have established cooperative initiatives for long-term resolution such as the fishery agreement of 2013. Although a few incidents are reported between Taiwanese activists and the Japan Coast Guards, the situation as of 2014 is much more peaceful and constructive than the deadlock between the PRC and Japan. As Taiwan's President Ma Ying-Jeou proposed in the East China Sea Peace Initiative (「東海和平倡議」), Taiwan consistently aligns with its principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development.”⁴¹ Therefore, my thesis focuses on the conflict between the PRC and Japan, for it presents a greater threat of armed conflict with full of provocative actions by both the governments and citizens.

The United States as an Ambivalent Ally of Japan

The US is also a key player in this dispute for the following three reasons: controversial US-Japanese bilateral treaties after WWII, the US's obligation to defend Japan against armed attack, and the rising military presence of China. In this territorial dispute, treaties between the US and Japan constitute a critical element of Japan's defense of the islands, while presenting China with the irritating history of what it considers to be “backdoor” deals. First of all, as mentioned in the previous section, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Okinawa Reversion Treaty are indispensable for Japan's claim that

⁴¹ “President Ma Proposes the East China Sea Peace Initiative, Calls on All Parties Concerned to Resolve Diaoyutai Dispute Peacefully,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)*(中華民國外交部 - 全球資訊網(行動版)), accessed February 25, 2015, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnMobile/News_Content.aspx?s=F8F127DA566DF364.

the islands were returned to Japan as part of the greater Okinawa region. Moreover, negotiated at the beginning of the Cold War, the Japan-US Security Treaty⁴² guarantees the US military protection of Japan, under the condition that Japan permits US military bases in Japan. In November 2012, upon Japan's purchase of the islands, the US Congress approved an amendment to this military alliance treaty, which explicitly included the protection of "the Senkaku islands" within the US defense obligation.⁴³ In other words, the US has made explicit that it is obliged to react to an armed attack by any threat to Japan's territory including the islands in accordance with the Security Council.

On the other hand, the US remains reluctant to be directly involved with the territorial dispute between China and Japan. An US Congressional issue summary indicates that the US's policy has been to remain neutral on the territorial sovereignty, while pressuring against China's naval ambition. This position is consistent since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1971, just as Secretary of State William Rogers stated "the US has no intention to prejudice either claim"⁴⁴ to deny the US interventions into the bilateral territorial conflict. Likewise, in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that "with respect to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty."⁴⁵ Hence, despite its embedded interests in East Asia, the US has refrained from direct intervention in the dispute.

⁴² "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed February 20, 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.

⁴³ "Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) S.AMDT.3275," Legislation, *Library of Congress of the United States*, (November 29, 2012), <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:sp3275>:

⁴⁴ Mark Manyin, "Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations," *U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Centers*, September 25, 2012, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/198821.pdf>.

Instead, as the conflict intensified in 2010, the US started to send warning messages to China. Secretary of State Clinton also clarified in 2010 that “the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, in 2014, President Barack Obama held joint press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Abe, emphasizing the “Article 5 [of the US-Japan Security Treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.”⁴⁷ Although the US has not taken a position in the dispute between Japan and China, the US policy is certainly shifting to counter China’s maritime expansion since the 2000s by implying US’s military intervention in the disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

This shift in the nuances of the US-Japan alliance suggests that the US recognizes the long-term implications of this dispute for Sino-US relations. Another leaked diplomatic cable in 2009⁴⁸ also suggests that the US recognizes the alliance as a tool to manage the rise of China. Conveying observations by Japan and US’s senior defense officials, the cable underlines China’s increasing confidence signified in its military transparency, patrolling activities near the disputed islands, and naval deployment to the Gulf of Aden. In conclusion, the report recommends that the US government “leverage this emerging Chinese confidence, so Beijing acts as a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ while at the same time having a way to alert China when it is going too far.”⁴⁹ This document

⁴⁵ Elise Labott, “Clinton Urges Japan and China to Return to Talks over Disputed Islands,” *The CNN*, October 31, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/30/vietnam.clinton.visit/>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan,” *The White House*, accessed March 3, 2015, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/node/273106>.

⁴⁸ “Senior Japanese Defense Official on China (09TOKYO939_a),” *Wikileaks: Public Library of US Diplomacy*, April 22, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TOKYO939_a.html.

indicates that this dispute weighs more for the US than a minor territorial dispute between China and Japan would. Rather, as China gains diplomatic confidence and power, US policy on the dispute has the potential to become a symbolic driver to manage the new balance of power in East Asia.

SYSTEM OF ESCALATION: LEGAL EXPLANATION AND ITS LIMIT

Territorial integrity is central to the state sovereignty in international politics. Therefore, notwithstanding the “size” of the islands seems marginal compared with the overall scale of China-Japan political and economic interdependency, defending the title to territory is critical to maintain the dignity and legitimacy of both sovereignties, as “state territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea), together with the government and population within its boundaries, constitute the physical and social base for the state.”⁵⁰ Regardless of the practical interests imbedded in the territory, this dispute presents a symbolic relevance to China and Japan as autonomous and integral sovereignties. Therefore, the islands dispute should not be seen as a minor conflict over natural resources, in the sense that its outcome may jeopardize the basis of sovereignty and statehood of China and Japan.

In general, the controversy over territorial sovereignty can be understood from two sides in its logic: *de jure* and *de facto*. That is, the *de jure* perspective examines to what extent parties in a dispute justly and lawfully acquired and administered the territory; while *de facto* control measures to what extent they exercise their territorial

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ James Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 204.

sovereignty through physical control and law enforcement in the disputed territory. In the case of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, both China and Japan act on these legal principles to reinforce their claims. In order to prove *de jure* title to the islands, they actively discuss the historical background of the islands, material evidence such as maps and official records, treaties concerning the islands, and diplomatic statements related to these treaties. In contrast to the *de jure* title, which is focused on the interpretation of relevant materials and legal legitimacy of claims, the *de facto* title is granted based on the effective control of the islands. Since the physical control of the islands and its evidence constitute *de facto* title, the claimants are compelled to take policy action such as sending surveillance ships, conducting naval or air force patrols, frequent visits to the territory, in order to strengthen their standing. Hence, the current escalation of China and Japan's activities in the disputed waters arguably reflects their ambition to improve their effective control status. In this manner, the legal criteria to determine territorial sovereignty systematically encourage risky, harder line attitudes between the two states.

The legal analysis presented above, however, offers only limited insight to the intensifying dispute. While the incentive structure behind their legal claims explains why the disputes continues for sake of the states' dignity, it overlooks why and how the dispute has intensified over time. The analysis of status quo cannot explain why the dispute itself did not emerge until the 1970s, despite its historical root from the 19th century. Furthermore, the repeated failures of collaborative resource development projects, as well as mass-protests occurred since the 2000s, suggest that this dispute also involves emotional factors rooted in Sino-Japanese history. Thus, in order to obtain a comprehensive overview of the dispute, it is crucial to consider its historical background.

Grounded in this section's analysis on opposing legal positions taken by China and Japan, the following section studies the historical evolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In doing so, I aim to identify drivers of soaring tensions beyond the scope of an international legal dispute over territorial sovereignty.

THE HISTORY OF THE ISLANDS DISPUTE

Although it began as a typical inter-state conflict over territorial sovereignty and natural resources, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute came to symbolize the history of war and humiliation in Sino-Japanese history. As a consequence, people in each state participate in the dispute in order to preserve their nation's interests and dignity.

In this section, I present a historical overview of the dispute in five distinct periods. The first period outlines the historical heritage associated with the islands from ancient times, the second period illuminates the process through which the discovery of natural resources in the late 1960s led to intensified confrontations between the PRC, the ROC, and Japan. In the third period, each player claims their territorial sovereignty based on contradicting interpretations of post-WWII treatment of Japan's territory, while the dispute appears to be "shelved" for greater benefits of recovering Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. However, in the fourth period in the 1990s, China and Japan saw an escalation of popular patriotism as a factor in state policy, which echoed with rising nationalist movements led by ordinary citizens. This trend continues to the fifth period in the 2000s, when citizen activists, utilizing support gained via the Internet, provoked inter-state confrontations by landing on and demonstrating near the disputed waters. Finally, the last period since 2010 to the present deals with the dangerous combination of

chauvinist citizen activism and inter-state military confrontation on the contested border. In guiding through the history of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, I highlight two major trends: the use of the Internet and the presence of citizen activists.

THE ORIGIN: -1971

Located between Taiwan and Okinawa, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands long served as a seamark along the trading route between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom (today's Okinawa). According to the PRC's website, the islands appear in a private copy of an early Ming period document.⁵¹ Another official record of the Ming Dynasty's tributary mission also refers to the islands on its voyage.⁵² By the early 17th century, the islands were situated right between three independent kingdoms: the Ming Dynasty, the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the Tokugawa Shogunate. While sending regular tributary missions to both the Ming Emperor and Tokugawa Shogunate, the Ryukyu Kingdom flourished as the trading center between China and Japan. Many of the earliest documents that mention the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands come from the records of this trade. In this respect, though acknowledged by a few, the political significance of the islands for its surrounding sovereignties was marginal at best.

While China claims it has legitimately ruled over the islands since the Ming Dynasty based on these historical records, Japan asserts that it "acquired" the territory as *terra nullius* and lent it out for a private business owner in 1895. In fact, over 200 Japanese inhabitants were reported to reside on the islands until their evacuation from

⁵¹ "'Diaoyu Islans Belong to China's Original Territory' White Book (September 2012) (《钓鱼岛是中国的固有领土》白皮书 (2012年9月)),” 钓鱼岛—中国的固有领土, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/2014-12/11/content_34291400.htm.

⁵² Ibid.

potential attacks by the Allies in 1940, living on dried bonito manufacturing and feather collecting.⁵³ Japan claims to have conducted over ten years of research before the acquisition in order to confirm the absence of the Qing Dynasty's rule over the islands.⁵⁴ Although the PRC criticizes the imperialist Japan for annexing the territory as a result of the Sino-Japanese War,⁵⁵ the Japanese government insists that the acquisition was processed merely as a domestic issue independent from the war. This distinction is important, because the transfer of the islands in the peace treaty contradicts with Japan's claim that it discovered and annexed the territory as terra nullius.

Japan's occupation of the islands ended in 1945, when Japan signed the Potsdam Declaration and accepted unconditional surrender to the Allies. Japan's territories and colonies were placed under the control of the Allies, which blurs jurisdiction over the islands during and after Japan's recovery of independence. China regards the islands as part of Taiwan following the Cairo and Potsdam Declaration, which guaranteed China's recovery of its territory. Meanwhile, Japan and the US claim that the islands were transferred as part of Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands to the US administration in the postwar US occupation of Japan's territory.⁵⁶ This controversy over postwar title to Senkaku/Diaoyu islands lasts until today, because the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 failed to establish a consensus between the two interpretations. Despite this disagreement, the bilateral relations between China and Japan proceeded. Japan and the ROC (Taiwan)

⁵³ "Situation of the Senkaku Islands."

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "'Diaoyu Islans Belong to China's Original Territory' White Book (September 2012) (《钓鱼岛是中国的固有领土》白皮书 (2012年9月))."

⁵⁶ H.W. Allen, "SCAPIN-677," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, January 20, 1946, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/pdfs/g_taisengo01.pdf.

normalized diplomatic relations in 1952,⁵⁷ and the PRC and Japan opened informal diplomatic channels through trading agreements.⁵⁸

This period prior to 1971 set the primary context for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute by leaving two complications. The first one is whether China or Japan discovered and ruled the islands before WWII, since the two states disagree on which states legitimately acquired the territory earlier than the other. The second is how this situation changed following WWII, when Japan was stripped of its old colonies and the US established administrative control over Japan's territory. Meanwhile, this period did not see active controversy over the territory, arguably because China and Japan had little interests in the remote, barren islands. It was after 1971 that these complications in territorial sovereignty over the islands evolved into the source of diplomatic standoff.

RETURNED ISLANDS, OIL FIELD, AND "SHELVED" DISPUTE: 1971-1989

The foreign policies in the 1970s present the standoff between claimants of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, while opening up a new page with the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

Japan and the US agreed that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were returned to Japan in 1971 together with Okinawa, when the Okinawa Reversion Agreement returned control of Okinawa from the US to Japan.⁵⁹ In response, China criticized this agreement

⁵⁷ "The Peace Treaty between Japan and Republic of China (日華平和条約 (日本国と中華民国との間の平和条約)),” *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, April 28, 1952, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19520428.T1J.html>.

⁵⁸ "The First Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement (第1次日中民間貿易協定),” *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, accessed February 4, 2015, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19520601.T1J.html>.

⁵⁹ "Senkaku Islands Q&A."

as “backward deal,”⁶⁰ and argued that this bilateral agreement between Japan and the US is invalid and illegal because it excluded China. Following China’s protest, the US expressed a nuanced standing that it did transfer the administrative rights to Japan, while evading the question of territorial sovereignty over the islands. According to this ambiguous principle, “the United States has made no claim to Diaoyu Dao and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.”⁶¹ Concerned about the implication of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, the ROC (Taiwan) asserted its claim to the islands one week after the signing, and so did the PRC (mainland) half a year later.⁶² Although this was the first setting where all parties expressed their claims on the dispute, the fundamental issues remained the same as before. In other words, the disagreement concerning Japan’s acquisition in 1895 and postwar transfer of the territory in 1945 became the recurring themes of discussion.

The discovery of oil and natural gas fields in the East China Ocean also contributed to the rise of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In 1969, a UN research project on mineral resources indicated a high possibility that oil and natural gas deposits exist beneath the ocean in the disputed waters.⁶³ Soon after the finding was announced, both Taipei and Beijing issued separate statements that claimed their right to develop the oil deposits. Although the PRC and the ROC asserted their territorial sovereignty over the

⁶⁰ “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China.”

⁶¹ Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations.”

⁶² Masahiko Asada, “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,” *Oxford Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, June 2007), <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2015?rskey=WGpspE&result=3&prd=EPIL>.

⁶³ Ryosei Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations (日中関係史)* (Tokyo, Japan: Yuhikaku, 2013), 128.

islands as a matter of principle, it is reasonable to interpret that the discovery of natural resources influenced their actions. In fact, according to Yusuke Anami,⁶⁴ Taiwan's claim was likely to be made in response to an American oil developer's proposal to conduct detailed research over the islands, for which the Okinawa government filed protests against Taiwan and the US.⁶⁵ Finally, the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai⁶⁶ is reported to have remarked that "the islands became a problem once we found the oil field."⁶⁷ Therefore, the islands acquired a new significance as the access key to oil and natural gas deposits, compelling the PRC and Japan to fight over their territorial sovereignty.

However, the diplomatic tension between the PRC and Japan dramatically shifted once the two states announced Joint Communiqué in 1972 to normalize diplomatic relations.⁶⁸ In the collective efforts by the PRC and Japan to establish a peace treaty, the territorial dispute was intentionally excluded from the agenda. In fact, an article on China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁶⁹ quotes the discussion between China's Premier

⁶⁴ Akio Takahara and Ryuji Hattori, eds., *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治) (Tokyo, Japan: Tokyo University Press, 2012).

⁶⁵ "The Senkaku Islands: Ryukyu Legislature Resolution and Ryukyu Government Statement (尖閣列島に関する琉球立法院決議および琉球政府声明)," *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, February 1984, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19700831.O1J.html>.

⁶⁶ The conversation was conducted between PRC's Premier Zhou Enlai and Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on the negotiation table for their Joint-Communiqué of 1971. Interestingly, this remark is replaced with "... " in China's published record. See the full quote in the next paragraph for this conversation.

⁶⁷ "Colloquy between Prime Minister Tanaka and Zhou Enlai (田中総理・周恩来総理会談記録)," *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, September 1972, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720925.O1J.html>.

⁶⁸ "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, September 29, 1972, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>.

⁶⁹ Jiping Guo, "Ironclad Evidence Shows That Diaoyu Dao Is China's Territory," *Embassy of the People's Republic of China*, accessed February 4, 2015, <http://az.china-embassy.org/eng/xwtd/t981541.htm>.

Zhou Enlai and Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1972, in which China and Japan agreed not to address the territorial issues.

Prime Minister Tanaka: I wish to take this opportunity to ask about China's attitude towards the Senkaku Islands.

Premier Zhou: I do not want to discuss this issue this time. It is no good discussing it now.... This issue has been blown out of proportion.

Prime Minister Tanaka: All right. There is no need to discuss it then. Let's talk about it sometime in the future.⁷⁰

Moreover, in a preparatory session to the dialogue, Japan's representative clarifies that the island issue "does not need serious attention,"⁷¹ suggesting that this issue should not be pursued during the future negotiation. In this manner, the PRC and Japan intentionally postponed the discussion of the territorial dispute for sake of the greater goal of normalizing diplomatic relations. Shortly after these talks, the PRC and Japan announced the Joint Communiqué in 1972, which eventually led to the complete normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations in 1978.

The same principle is observed in the negotiation process of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. In the press conference held right after the signing, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping proposed "shelving" the issue until China and Japan can find a path for peaceful resolution, stating that,

Our generation does not have enough wisdom to solve this problem. I believe the next generation will be wiser than us, and surely find a good solution that is acceptable for everyone.⁷²

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations* (日中関係史), 127.

⁷² Xiaoping Deng, "The Future of Friendship between Japan and China (未来に目を向けた友好関係を)," *Japan National Press Club*, October 25, 1978, <http://www.jnpc.or.jp/files/opdf/117.pdf>.

Although there is no written agreement between the PRC and Japan regarding this “shelving,” these documents suggest that foreign policymakers in the 1970s consistently avoided raising the territorial dispute at negotiation tables.

However, their reluctance does not necessarily mean they were indifferent. For example, in 1978 right before the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, Japan’s majority party decided to construct a heliport on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In response, over one hundred armed Chinese fishing boats confronted Japan Coast Guard vessels for over a week near the islands.⁷³ Although Deng Xiaoping assured Japan that the incident happened outside the control of the party and the PRC would never allow a similar incident again,⁷⁴ some scholars⁷⁵ suspect that this incident was directed by other party leaders who opposed to Deng’s approach to Japan. Therefore, although the two states remained silent in order to achieve Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, tacit tensions between China and Japan did emerge.

Even though the concurrence of “shelving” and collisions seems somewhat self-contradictory, this situation crystalizes the practical interests behind the dispute in the 1970s. For Japan, the silence benefits its long-term standing because maintaining status quo meant allowing Japan’s administrative control of the territory. Meanwhile, though never giving up the title, the PRC also prioritized the enormous economic gain through Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA). Thus, the benefit of normalization

⁷³ Akiyuki Mukouda, “Supplementary Materials for Press Conference by Japan’s Coast Guard Vice Commander for Operations (向田昌幸・元海上保安庁警備救難監 会見の本資料について),” *Japan National Press Club*, n.d., <http://www.jnpc.or.jp/files/2013/06/0f7072ee55041ccfdc5c819fe1cb0821.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Deng, “The Future of Friendship between Japan and China (未来に目を向けた友好関係を).”

⁷⁵ Takahara and Hattori, *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治)*.

outweighed the cost of silence for both states. Although both states recognized the dispute as inevitable, it was simply less prioritized than the recovery of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and its subsequent merits to each state. In this respect, this balance of priority was nothing but a temporary equilibrium that both parties could settle.

Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s saw increasing mistrust and public resentment. As one of the symbolic incidents, the text book disputes in 1982 and 1986 pluralized the public sentiment between the Chinese and Japanese. On the one hand, China repeatedly criticized Japan's government for downplaying its imperialist aggression during the war such as the Nanjing Massacre in school textbooks. Echoed with this policy, groups of Chinese college students conducted the 9.18 Anti-Japan Protest against Japan's "economic invasion" and militarization.⁷⁶ Although China's authorities immediately responded to the protest, this demonstration certainly highlights the rise of public anger against the history of humiliation. On the other hand, Japanese conservative elites perceived this criticism as humiliating and unacceptable.⁷⁷ Moreover, taking this textbook dispute as a starting point, politicians and citizens initiated a new political movement to abandon what they saw as a self-humiliating view of history, one which treated Japan's pre-WWII policy as taboo. In 1985, Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates all the war victims including the war criminals, as a political gesture to express his commitment to this movement. Therefore, in the discussion of their shared history, the sense of humiliation drove the two countries toward two extreme directions, espousing

⁷⁶ Kazuko Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ) (Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami Shinsho, 2006), 125.

⁷⁷ Miwa Shimizu, *Why China Became Anti-Japan* (中国はなぜ反日になったか) (Tokyo, Japan: Bunshun Shinsho, 2006).

nationalist hostility among the policymakers and the public. Although the territorial dispute itself did not create political turbulence throughout the 1980s, this deteriorating trust created a ground for more direct confrontation between China and Japan in the coming decades.

1971 marked a turning point in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, because all three states officially claimed their territorial sovereignty over the islands. Although the discovery of natural resources accelerated the tension between the PRC, the ROC, and Japan, records indicate that the PRC and Japan intentionally avoided the discussion of the islands once the two states started negotiations for diplomatic normalization. In the 1980s, the two states still remained silent on the territorial dispute, while the new tension emerged between the two nations. This consistent silence toward the territorial dispute suggests the greater benefits gained through diplomatic normalization and its subsequent benefits. Hence, by the 1990s when China achieved recovery of diplomatic relations and economic growth, the territorial dispute evolved as the next core political goal for both states. It was silence not of compassion, but of convenience.

RESENTFUL CITIZENS AND HARDLINE FOREIGN POLICY: 1989-1999

In the 1990s, Chinese and Japanese citizens increased its presence in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute through active participation in patriotic movements. Demanding assertive foreign policy to preserve their national interests, the public started to limit the space for diplomatic negotiation and compromises by shaping public opinion pressure as well as by resorting to demonstrations. These movements steadily deepened the gap between the two nations, as their assertive foreign policy attitudes reflected

nationalistic sentiments. In order to explain this intertwined relationship between the public and policymakers, I structure this section into three steps; the first step consider the inter-state dispute continued from its preceding period; the second deals with transforming national narratives in China and Japan; and the last one incorporates the populist element of this territorial dispute.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in the 1990s saw only two notable inter-state confrontations over territorial jurisdiction. In 1992, on the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic normalization, China enacted a domestic maritime administration law called the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,⁷⁸ which explicitly defined the disputed islands as part of China's territory. Following the Tiananmen Square Incident, the power shifted from reformers to conservatives within the Communist Party while the collapse of the Soviet Union damaged the communist ideology. According to Ukeru Magosaki, these political instabilities in the early 1990s compelled Chinese leaders to adopt hardline policy in order to maintain their domestic legitimacy.⁷⁹ The second confrontation occurred in 1997 at the renewal of the Sino-Japanese fishery treaty.⁸⁰ Despite the long standoff regarding the legal jurisdiction over fishing rights near the islands, the two governments agreed upon a collaborative fishing administration policy

⁷⁸ "Foreign Ministry of the PRC Spokesperson's Statement on China's Territorial Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (中国外交部发言人发表谈话重申钓鱼岛属于中国)," *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, February 27, 1992, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19920227.O1C.html>.

⁷⁹ Ukeru Magosaki, *Japan's Border Disputes -- Senkaku, Takeshima, Northern Territories (日本の国境問題——尖閣・竹島・北方領土)* (Tokyo, Japan: Chikuma Shinsho, 2011), 85.

⁸⁰ Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations (日中関係史)*.

known as the “temporary measure.”⁸¹ As these cases show, the dispute in the 1990s presents limited tensions between the two governments.

In China, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 marked a clear turning point for the Chinese diplomatic position on the territorial dispute. Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, China also shifted its strategic focus from the mountain borders with the Soviet Union toward the coastal borders with Japan, while attempting to re-establish its ideological legitimacy of the Communist Party through nationalism.⁸² In 1992, China enacted the Territorial Sea Law as domestic law that directly referred to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as its inherent territory. Despite the fact that this is a domestic law without international binding power, this political performance indicates a clear escalation of China’s stance, distinct from China’s past narrative of “shelving” and cooperative development.⁸³ At the same time, China also dispatched resource surveillance and oil drilling ships to the waters since 1995 to exploit natural resources.⁸⁴ While China suggested the possibility of collaborative development with Japan, the PRC emphasized its territorial sovereignty, just as the *People’s Daily* stated, “whoever expects

⁸¹ “Fishery Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (漁業に関する日本国と中華人民共和国との間の協定),” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, accessed February 15, 2015, [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-H12-343.pdf#search=%27 漁業に関する日本と中国 %27](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/A-H12-343.pdf#search=%27%20漁業に関する日本と中国%27).

⁸² Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations (日中関係史)*, 178.

⁸³ “Foreign Minister Deputy Director Qi Huaiyuan’s Conversation with Japanese Ambassador to China Hashimoto on UNPKO Bill (釣魚島、国連平和協力法案についての斉懷遠外交部副部長の橋本駐中国大使に対する談話),” *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, October 27, 1990, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19901027.S1J.html>; “China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry States the Diaoyu Islands Originally Belonged to China’s Territory (中国外交部发言人重申钓鱼岛等岛屿自古是中国领土),” *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, May 11, 1989, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19890511.S1C.html>.

⁸⁴ Larry A. Niksch, “Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations,” *Crossroads - Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World* 7 (August 2, 2013): 59.

the 1.2 billion Chinese people to give up even one inch of their territory is only daydreaming.”⁸⁵ Hence, the PRC leaders shifted toward more assertive foreign policy that promotes China’s territorial sovereignty both in words and deeds.

On the other hand, the domestic political crisis in China urged the conservative elites of the Communist Party to promote patriotic education,⁸⁶ taking a step back from rapid political reform. Under the new leader Jiang Zemin, the Communist Party directed the Patriotic Education Campaign (爱国主义教育活动) to ensure the Chinese people’s unity under the party system. In 1994, the Propaganda Department issued an elaborated plan for patriotic education (爱国主义教育实施纲要), requiring local governments and schools to reinforce the unity of the people based on appropriate history curriculum.⁸⁷ At the same time, the Chinese public started to participate in the movement through independent initiatives pursuing justice in foreign policy. In 1996, a group of citizen activists led by Tong Zeng launched the China Diaoyu Protection Initiative (中国民间保钓联合会) in Beijing.⁸⁸ Aligned with the PRC’s foreign policy, the organization argued that Japan underplayed its imperialist history of aggression and urged Chinese citizens to protect the islands from Japan’s invasion by their own hands. The 1990s saw the escalation of the party propaganda and citizen activism created a nationwide wave of patriotism in China. Promotion of national interests united the Party elites and the general

⁸⁵ Robert D. Eldridge, *The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa’s Reversion and the Senkaku Islands* (Routledge, 2014), 5.

⁸⁶ Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations* (日中關係史), 165.

⁸⁷ “CCP Leadership Deliver Notes on ‘Patriotic Education Manual’ (中共中央关于印发《爱国主义教育实施纲要》的通知),” *People’s Republic of China Central Propaganda Department*, August 22, 1994, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/16/content_2705546.htm.

⁸⁸ “Introduction to China Private Association Network to Protect the Diaoyu Islands(中国民间保钓联合会简介),” 中国民间保钓联合会, November 8, 2007, <http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/6/n-6.html>.

public. While the party elites demanded patriotism as an alternative ideological tool to preserve their political legitimacy, the public also demanded a new source of solidarity in the rapidly transforming society following Deng Xiaoping's reform.

Scholars still disagree on whether the education *caused* the public's resentment remains unclear.⁸⁹ The citizens were activated before the patriotic education. In 1988, a group of peasants in Shandong Prefecture filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government, requiring financial compensation for the killing and destruction by Japanese military forces in their village.⁹⁰ Despite their loss in the court case, the citizen movement to ask for compensation for wartime damage expanded rapidly when Tong Zeng filed an even larger claim in the National People's Congress in 1991. This movement still continues as of 2014, while the patriot leader, Tong Zeng founded China's major Diaoyu Islands protection organization in 1996.⁹¹ The fact that these waves of citizen movements started as early as 1988 suggests that citizen became increasingly active prior to the introduction of patriotic education. In this viewpoint, the Tiananmen Square protest itself can also be viewed as one such public movement. Therefore, it is an overstatement to regard the patriotic education as the *cause* of nationalistic citizen movements against Japan. Although it is likely that the patriotic education program influenced the *direction* of people's perception of Japan and its history, citizens were politically awakened before the Party propaganda as an effort to reestablish its legitimacy.

⁸⁹ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ); Kokubun et al., *History of Sino-Japanese Relations* (日中関係史).

⁹⁰ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ), 148.

⁹¹ "Introduction to China Private Association Network to Protect the Diaoyu Islands(中国民间保钓联合会简介)."

On the other hand, Japan's attitude toward the PRC also deteriorated following the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989. While the violent image of the Tiananmen incident damaged Japan's public impression of China, a greater ideological shift proceeded among Japanese elites. Decades after the end of WWII, Japan's national identity especially concerning its Imperialist history became a popular topic of discussion among Japan's political elites and thought leaders. In 1993, the bestseller "Blueprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking of a Nation"⁹² written by Japan's leading policymaker Ichiro Ozawa proposed that Japan should return to a "normal state" from a "defeated state." However, it is worth noting that this ideological project to de-humiliate Japan's national history was initially targeted toward the US, not China. For example, the sensational bestseller written by conservative politician Shintaro Ishihara and SONY's founder Akio Morita, "The Japan that Can Say No,"⁹³ criticized the powerful US influence over Japan, and encouraged Japanese people to stand up against the US if necessary. Although these narratives initially targeted US-Japanese relations, Japan's efforts to redefine their national history and thereby to establish a new direction as the world's second largest economic power eventually transformed their attitude toward Sino-Japanese relations.

Reflecting this new identity, Japan's foreign policy presents a nuanced discourse in the 1990s. Despite the domestic elite's attempts to redefine Japan's post-post-war direction, Japan maintained its traditional attitudes emphasizing Japan's war guilt and its commitment to the global peace. In 1995, on the fifty year anniversary of Japan's

⁹² Ichiro Ozawa, *Reform Plan for Japan (日本改造計画)* (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 1993).

⁹³ Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals*, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

surrender, the Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama issued an official statement⁹⁴ that expressed Japan's reflection on the "irrefutable facts of history," and declared that Japan will "never repeat the errors in our history" again. According to Mouri,⁹⁵ this statement symbolizes Japan's dilemma between domestic and international policy attitudes: stressing apology for the "unfortunate past" in diplomatic terms while hiding frustration with self-humiliation in domestic politics. Although Japanese elites came to denounce past narratives of the nation's own history as humiliating, political leaders still felt reluctant to express that frustration outside Japan.

Although Mouri's argument clarifies the dilemma facing Japanese elites, this contradicting narrative does not mean that Japanese leaders returned to militarism and chauvinism of the pre-WWII period. As Prime Minister Murayama emphasized, "Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism." Even half a century after the war, Japanese political leaders were still aware of the dangers of chauvinism. At the same time, his speech signifies his determination that Japan should play greater a role to "promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community." Just as the Tiananmen Square protest became a political crisis in China, the 50th anniversary of WWII created a new political atmosphere among Japanese elites to revisit the national narrative in order to establish the country's new direction free from the inherited burden of WWII. Even though those commentators⁹⁶ often criticized Japan's diplomacy as

⁹⁴ "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 'On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End,'" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, August 15, 1995, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>.

⁹⁵ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ).

⁹⁶ Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals*; Ozawa, *Reform Plan for Japan* (日本改造計画).

excessively apologetic or self-humiliating, they promoted Japan's stronger commitment to peaceful economic growth and discouraged Japan's return to militarism. Hence, among elites, the discussion of national history did not directly lead to aggressive foreign policy. The actual tension between China and Japan, however, emerged when the Japanese public started to react to this ideological shift, provoked by the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.

The Japanese public also followed the shift of elite attitudes toward China. In particular, the violent response to the Tiananmen Square Protest eroded the public's largely favorable impression of China. According to Japan's Cabinet Office survey, the proportion of Japanese who felt positively toward China saw a significant decline by 10 percent from 62 percent to 52 percent following the incident.⁹⁷ Since this event, the popularity of China in Japan continued to decline, despite the historic visit of Japan's Emperor to Beijing in 1992. The PRC's aggressive foreign policy in the Taiwan Strait Crisis and its hard stance toward Japan's history issue also damaged the relations between the two nations. Thus, China's assertive diplomacy and Japan's transforming elite discourse in the 1990s damaged the public attitudes toward China.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in the late 1990s involved the active participation of Chinese and Japanese citizens. Adopting aggressive foreign policy, policymakers and opinion leaders in both states promoted nationalistic discourse and the public shared patriotic sentiment to reestablish their nation's legitimacy. In the following paragraphs, I specifically address how citizens came to initiate their projects to establish their claims.

Following the fiftieth anniversary of Japan's surrender in 1995, groups of Japanese citizen activists and local politicians landed on the islands to assert Japan's

⁹⁷ "Public Opinion Survey: Familiarity toward China (世論調査：中国に対する親近感)," *The Cabinet Office of Japan*, 2014, <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h25/h25-gaiko/zh/z10.html>.

legitimacy. In 1996, the Japan Youth Federation constructed a lighthouse on one of the islands, triggering large-scale protests in Hong Kong, the mainland, and Taiwan.

Although the Japanese government stopped the attempt soon after Chinese protests occurred during its Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda's visit to China, this incident marked one of the first national scale public protests against the islands dispute.⁹⁸

According to Japan's former Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa, the PRC's monitor ships started to appear regularly near the waters after this incident.⁹⁹ In the same year, Ishigaki City Council members founded a lobbying organization, Senkaku Shoto wo Mamoru Kai (Senkaku Islands Defense Association), to protect their local fishing grounds and political interests.¹⁰⁰ Although none of these incidents were direct reflections of Japan or China's foreign policy, they soon evolved into diplomatic conflicts.

Shortly after the visit by Japanese activists, Chinese activists also began to visit the islands. In defiance of Japanese citizen group's attempt to build a lighthouse, Chinese activists repeatedly sailed to the islands despite the blockade by Japan Coast Guard.¹⁰¹ In the most troubling case in 1996, Hong Kong activist leader David Chan died after he jumped into the sea near the islands, when he led thirteen activists and forty two journalists to build Chinese national flag poles on the islands.¹⁰² The absence of the Chinese authorities in these incidents reflects the tacit approval of such activism by the

⁹⁸ Uichiro Niwa, *China's Big Problems (中国の大問題)* (Tokyo, Japan: PHP Research Institute, 2014), 155.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ)*, 140.

¹⁰¹ "Timeline: The Diaoyu-Senkaku Islands Dispute," *South China Morning Post*, accessed March 25, 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039204/timeline-diaoyu-senkaku-islands-dispute>.

¹⁰² Maggie Farley, "Hong Kong Activist Drowns During Protest," *Los Angeles Times*, September 27, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-27/news/mn-48165_1_hong-kong.

PRC to assert China's position without creating direct confrontation with the Japan Coast Guard. In this respect, the role of citizens was no longer confined to that of observer of inter-state conflict, but had been transformed into that of active participants claiming their nation's territorial sovereignty.

THE ESCALATING PUBLIC PROTESTS: 2000-2009

Typically characterized as “Cold Politics Hot Economy,”¹⁰³ the political tensions between the PRC and Japan continued to escalate in the 2000s despite their increasing economic interdependence. Two major confrontations in 2004 and 2008 not only intensified security concerns over the islands, but also resonated with public protests against each nation.

While the Japanese government reinforced its control over all islands in the disputed waters to respond to intrusions by Chinese activists in 2002,¹⁰⁴ two boats organized by the Chinese Federation for the Diaoyu Islands Defense (中国民间保卫钓鱼台联合会) attempted to land on the islands in 2004.¹⁰⁵ Japan's Coast Guard apprehended the seven activists and turned them over to the custody of Japan's local police.¹⁰⁶ Although Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi denied any political motives for the arrest, the intensified pressure from China eventually compelled Japan to

¹⁰³ Takahara and Hattori, *History of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治), 215.

¹⁰⁴ Mure Dickie, “Tokyo Governor in Bid to Buy Disputed Islands,” *Financial Times*, April 17, 2012, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c992fcc4-8880-11e1-a727-00144feab49a.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Eldridge, *The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute*, 9.

¹⁰⁶ “7 Chinese Landed on Senkaku, Uotsuri Islands, Arrested by the Okinawa Police(尖閣諸島・魚釣島に中国人7人が上陸、沖縄県警が逮捕),” *Asahi Shimbun*, March 25, 2004, <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/OSK200403240036.html>.

deport the crews.¹⁰⁷ The *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan's leading newspaper, argued that these arrests were in stark contrast to the similar incident in 1996, when the government followed a "no arrest, just pushback" principle.¹⁰⁸ Alarmed by the potential revenge by China to Japan's apprehension of activists, US State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli clarified that the disputed islands fell within the scope of its security alliance with Japan in 2004.¹⁰⁹ Soon, the incident provoked harder-line foreign policy on the both sides. While almost 60 diet members formed the "Cross-Party Commission to Defend Japan's Territory" (日本の領土を守るため行動する議員連盟), China sent out an ocean research vessel in the disputed waters, breaking the mutual agreement in 2001.¹¹⁰ In November of the same year, one of the PRC's nuclear submarines intruded into Japan's territorial waters "by accident due to technological problems" according to the Chinese Navy officials¹¹¹

Since the 2000s, anti-Japan upheavals have become frequent occurrences in China. In 2003, Chinese students in China's Northwest University attacked Japanese students who performed offensive skits in the college festival.¹¹² In the following year, a mass

¹⁰⁷ "Escalating Territorial Dispute Japan's Response to the Landing on the Senkaku Islands (先鋭化する領有争い 尖閣上陸事件巡る日本の対応)," *Asahi Shimbun*, March 31, 2004, Morning Edition edition, sec. Opinion.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ "U.S. Fudges Senkaku Security Pact Status," *The Japan Times Online*, August 17, 2010, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/08/17/national/u-s-fudges-senkaku-security-pact-status/>.

¹¹⁰ "Chinese Oceanic Research Vessel Active near the Senkaku Islands without Japan's Permission (中国海洋調査船が申請なしに活動 尖閣諸島)," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 8, 2004, Morning edition.

¹¹¹ "The PRC Admits Intrusion to Japan's Territorial Waters and Expresses Regret, 'Mistakenly Intruded' (中国、領海侵犯認める 「誤って入った」 原潜事件で遺憾表明)," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 17, 2004, Morning edition.

¹¹² Jonathan Watts, "Student Prank That Gave the Chinese a Fit of the Willies," *The Guardian*, accessed March 25, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/01/highereducation.china>.

protest occurred after a China-Japan Asia Cup soccer match against the Japanese supporters.¹¹³ Finally, China saw the largest violence in 2005, when a surge of protest occurred against Japan's bid to join the UN Security Council, gathering over 22 million online signatures from Chinese communities across the globe.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, over fifty thousand people participated in anti-Japan protests in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, and attacked Japanese stores and the embassy.¹¹⁵ Although scholars still debate whether these mass protests of 2005 were natural phenomena¹¹⁶ or an outcome of domestic political rivalry within the Communist Party,¹¹⁷ these large-scale protests exemplify the unprecedented scale of anti-Japan sentiment shared among the public and policy elites.

In the surge of public dissent, the Chinese government started to increase its presence in the disputed waters. Compelled by the need to address the confrontations between Chinese citizen protestors and Japan's administrative apparatus, the Chinese authorities dispatched ocean research vessels to operate within Japan's alleged borders near the disputed islands for the second time since 2004.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the PRC's State Oceanic Administration declared that China aimed to accumulate evidence of effective

¹¹³ Takahara and Hattori, *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治), 215.

¹¹⁴ Joseph Kahn, "22 Million Chinese Seek to Block Japan's Bid to Join U.N. Council," *The New York Times*, March 31, 2005, sec. International / Asia Pacific, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/international/asia/31cnd-china.html>.

¹¹⁵ Takahara and Hattori, *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治), 220.

¹¹⁶ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ).

¹¹⁷ Miwa Shimizu, *Scenes behind the "China Problems"* (「中国問題」の内幕) (Tokyo, Japan: Chikuma Shobou, 2008), 208.

¹¹⁸ "Chinese Vessels in Territorial Waters: Coast Guard Warned to Leave the Area off the Senkaku Islands (領海に中国船 海保が警告、退去 尖閣諸島沖)," *Asahi Shimbun*, December 8, 2008.

control¹¹⁹ within its territorial sovereignty, while a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized that the oceanic research was “purely domestic issue” of the PRC.¹²⁰ In response to China’s efforts to increase its presence in the disputed waters, Japanese foreign policy workers were urged to reinforce its naval security.

The 1990s and the 2000s saw a series of anti-Japan protests in China as well as collisions between Chinese activists and Japan Coast Guard. These frictions eventually compelled the two states to adopt more assertive foreign policy.

ASIA’S NEW FLASHPOINT: 2010-

On September 7th, 2010, Japan seized a Chinese trawler that had collided with Japan’s coast guard vessels near the islands. A serious diplomatic row followed. While the Chinese and Japanese governments were negotiating the release of arrested crews, anti-Japan protests spread to several cities in China and continued until Japan released the entire crew of the trawler a few days later. The arrests of citizen activists have provoked even larger public attention, and the rising tensions between the two nations soon developed into a concern of international community. The dispute gradually transformed into chauvinistic movements through propaganda in each country. In Japan, an indignant Coast Guard officer posted the classified video clip of this collision on YouTube, creating a political turbulence for the newly born Kan Cabinet. Supported by over 80 percent of

¹¹⁹ Effective control is a legal idea that the *de facto* control of the territory justifies title to territorial sovereignty. Effective control is expressed through military control, performance of legal authorities, and other administrative actions by a state. See more in the first section of this chapter.

¹²⁰ Masayasu Hosaka and Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan’s Territorial Disputes: The Northern Islands, Takeshima Island, and the Senkaku Islands* (日本の領土問題 北方四島、竹島、尖閣諸島) (Tokyo, Japan: Kadokawa Shinsho, 2012), 138; “The Senkaku Islands: China’s Assertive Attitudes Influence Gas Exploitation Agreement Negotiation (尖閣諸島、中国が強硬姿勢 ガス田条約協議に影響も),” *Asahi Shimbun*, December 14, 2008.

the public, the whistleblower damaged the Cabinet's credibility as well as Sino-Japanese diplomacy.¹²¹ On this incident, I conduct a more detailed case study in Chapter Four.

Nationalism in China and Japan soon evolved into the state-level confrontation. In 2012, the Governor of Tokyo City, Shintaro Ishihara, announced that his metropolitan government planned to purchase the islands from its Japanese private owner to preserve national security and protect the nation's interests.¹²² Known as a right-wing populist, Governor Ishihara had provoked China's attention regarding sensitive issues such as national security and the understanding of history during WWII. Eventually, Japan's central government purchased the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands instead of the city government of Tokyo in order to control the situation created by a populist local politician. Perceived as an act of aggression by the PRC,¹²³ this policy provoked even more violent anti-Japanese protests in China as well as regular military confrontations near the disputed waters. Driven by patriotic sentiment to defend their sovereignty from invasion, Chinese and Japanese activists landed on the island to demonstrate several times without the permission of either side.¹²⁴ Although the PRC and Japan both underlined "the overall

¹²¹ "The Video of Collision: 88% Support Disclosure, 81% Believe 'Nonconfidential' (衝突映像、88%が公開すべき「国家秘密でない」81%)," *Kyodo News*, November 13, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-181.html>.

¹²² Justin McCurry, "Tokyo's Rightwing Governor Plans to Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands," *The Guardian*, accessed March 25, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/tokyo-governor-senkaku-islands-china>.

¹²³ "Hu Jintao States China's Position on Relations with Japan, Diaoyu Islands," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, October 19, 2012, <https://web.archive.org/web/20121019205148/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/diaodao/t969863.htm>.

¹²⁴ "10 Japanese Landed on the Senkakus: Prefectural Council Members Interrogated by Coastguard (日本人10人が尖閣上陸 都議や県議ら、海保が事情聴取)," *Kyodo News*, August 19, 2012, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2012/08/post-302.html>; "Japan Deports 14 Chinese Activists Landing on the Senkakus (尖閣上陸活動家ら14人強制送還 逮捕から2日、早期決着)," *Kyodo News*, August 17, 2012, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2012/08/post-295.html>.

development of the two countries' relations,"¹²⁵ heated nationalism in domestic politics prevented the two states from making any actual compromises for the long-term resolution of this dispute. As introduced in the opening of this chapter, public opinion surveys indicate rising antagonism between the two nations, while military confrontations on the waters and in the air showed a sharp increase since 2012.

Following the confrontation in 2012, maritime tensions between the two countries kept escalating. In November 2013, China announced plans to expand the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) beyond the disputed islands, requiring all flights entering the zone to file documentation and communicate with Chinese territory control.¹²⁶ In response, two US bomber jets flew over the islands as part of a "normal exercise."¹²⁷ Moreover, the number of Japan's fighter jets scrambling against Chinese airplanes has increased since 2010, and recorded over 400 times in 2014.¹²⁸ In order to address this diplomatic tension, the PRC's President Xi Jinping and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held a meeting in November 2014. Stating "[b]oth sides recognized that they had different views as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea,"¹²⁹ the two states propose a new collaborative project to establish a crisis management mechanism, while leaving out the question of territorial sovereignty.

Although this mutual agreement serves as the first step for reconciliation, it does not

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ "Regional Turbulence," *The Economist*, November 30, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21590974-china-escalates-dispute-angering-japan-and-unnerving-its-neighbours-regional-turbulence>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ "The Defense Whitebook of 2014."

¹²⁹ "Regarding Discussions toward Improving Japan-China Relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)," *Tokyo University Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia Database: Japan and the World*, n.d., <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/20141107.O1E.html>.

address anything beyond creating a crisis management system to avoid military conflict. That is, the fundamental mistrust between both governments as well as peoples still remains and is even increasing. Now, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is one of the most worrisome flashpoints in Asia.

CITIZENS AS A GAME CHANGER, THE INTERNET AS A PLATFORM

Citizens have become an active participant of the territorial dispute through their online and offline grassroots movements since the 2000s. Even in the era of globalization, nationalism maintains significant influence over Sino-Japanese relations. Scholars agree that the history of war and humiliation offers a topic of popular nationalist discussions in China and Japan. While the Chinese public emphasizes the history of humiliation caused by Japan's invasion,¹³⁰ Japanese elites also have attempted to denounce overly apologetic narrative on its national history.¹³¹ Furthermore, scholars note that recent nationalist movements have shifted from conventional, elitist political project to a grassroots-style community movement.¹³² Citizens, as a horizontal network of patriotic sentiment, surpass the conventional undertaker of nationalism, such as states, political elites, and political organizations.

¹³⁰ John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

¹³¹ Mouri, *The Sino-Japanese Relations: Postwar to a New Era* (日中関係一戦後から新時代へ); Shimizu, *Scenes behind the "China Problems"* (「中国問題」の内幕); Takahara and Hattori, *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治).

¹³² Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, *Online Chinese Nationalism and China's Bilateral Relations* (Lexington Books, 2010); Eiji Oguma and Yoko Ueno, *Nationalism for "Comfort"* (<癒し>のナショナリズム) (Tokyo, Japan: Keio University Press, 2003).

These new kind of nationalisms extensively leverage the Internet as a new tool to sustain the horizontal networks of patriotic citizens. Scholars¹³³ on China claim that the Internet has opened up a new political space for citizens to convey their collective will, though sometimes restricted by the censorship. Noting that the Internet alone cannot induce democratization, Yongnian Zheng claims that information technology contributes to “competitive liberalization,” in which citizens initiate Internet-based collective actions to promote “political openness, transparency and accountability.”¹³⁴ Guobin Yang emphasizes the rise of “citizen’s unofficial democracy,” stating, “Online activism is a microcosm of China’s new citizen activism, and it is one of its most vibrant currents.”¹³⁵ Although Japan is a democratic state, the Internet in Japan also constructs a new space for those who were excluded from conventional political movements. Eiji Oguma¹³⁶ argues that the Internet allowed ordinary citizens to create a horizontal community outside the elite debates, studying a case of Japan’s nationalist grassroots groups surrounding the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会). Thus, the Internet not only provides a new way of communication, but also unfolds a new political space for ordinary citizens.

As this academic literature would predict, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute showcases the close connection between the Internet and citizen grassroots movements.

¹³³ Guobin Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Yongnian Zheng, *Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

¹³⁴ Zheng, *Technological Empowerment*, 186.

¹³⁵ Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China*, 223.

¹³⁶ Oguma and Ueno, *Nationalism for “Comfort” (<癒し>のナショナリズム)*, 192–214.

In China, anti-Japanese movements¹³⁷ gathered over 22 million signatures through an online platform in 2005, while thousands of citizen protestors were mobilized by using the bulletin board systems (BBS) and social networking services (SNS) in 2005, 2010, and 2012.¹³⁸ Similarly, Japanese nationalist groups, such as “Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee” (頑張れ日本！全国行動委員会) and “the Zaitoku-Kai”(在日特権を許さない市民の会), use the Internet to attract participants, live-cast demonstrations, and share articles.¹³⁹ Hence, the increasing number of public demonstrations and citizen activism on the Sino-Japanese dispute indicates that the territorial dispute is no longer the dominant field of foreign policy specialists. Furthermore, their active use of the Internet suggests blurred boundary between the online and offline political space in their grassroots nationalism.

UNEXAMINED MECHANISM: ONLINE CITIZEN ACTIVISM AND POLICY

The historical overview of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sheds a new light on the scholarly debates mentioned in Chapter Two. Although the literature on the foreign policy decision making¹⁴⁰ highlights submissive roles of citizens in shaping foreign policy, the citizen protests and its subsequent diplomatic crisis indicate people are capable of acting to escalate diplomatic tensions by mass-protests in cities and intrusions

¹³⁷ Established in the patriotic movement of the 1990s, “China 918 Patriot Web” (中国 918 爱国网) is one of the most reputed centers of nationalist grassroots movements in China.

¹³⁸ Takahara and Hattori, *Hisotry of Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-2012 I Politics* (日中関係史 1972-2012 I 政治), 220; Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China*; Zheng, *Technological Empowerment*; Koichi Yasuda, *The Internet and Patritoisim* (ネットと愛国) (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 2012).

¹³⁹ “Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee,” *Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee*, n.d., <http://www.ganbare-nippon.net/>; Yasuda, *The Internet and Patritoisim* (ネットと愛国).

¹⁴⁰ Refer to Chapter Two, the foreign policy decision making section in literature review.

to the disputed waters. Regardless of milder foreign policy attitudes by governments, citizen activism since the early 1990s has evolved to act independently to defend their perceived national interests by organizing protests in cities and landing on the islands. Likewise, these phenomena support the nuanced views in the Internet and politics literature¹⁴¹ that the Internet creates a new political space for the public yet does need to collaborate with offline activism to influence policymaking.¹⁴² As of January 2015, most of activist organizations as well as all governments in dispute maintain their own webpages to appeal their claim in different languages.¹⁴³ In summary, the historical trend toward citizen participation in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute questions conventional scholarly consensus that citizens only possess limited power to influence foreign policymaking, while the widespread use of the Internet by activists connotes with scholarly debates over the Internet and politics.

Yet, these observations do not entirely answer my research question. Although the recent incidents somewhat suggest the common use of the Internet among citizen activists and the public pressure in addressing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, it still remains unclear whether the increase of the Internet use among citizens *caused* foreign policy change. Moreover, even if so, it makes researchers wonder, *with what political intent, through what mechanisms, and to what extent* the citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign policymaking. And finally, *how responsive* governments are to the new public demand expressed online concerning foreign policymaking? In order to answer

¹⁴¹ Refer to Chapter Two.

¹⁴² Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Archon Fung, Hollie Russon Gilman, and Jennifer Shkabatur, "Six Models for the Internet + Politics," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 30–47.

¹⁴³ "Situation of the Senkaku Islands"; "Diaoyu Dao: Inherent Territory of China," *People's Republic of China*, n.d., <http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/>.

these questions and reach to a conditional generalization, I conduct comparative case studies of successful and unsuccessful citizen activism in 2010.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides an overview of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between the PRC and Japan in three sections. The first section outlines the conflicting claims by the PRC, the ROC (Taiwan), and Japan regarding territorial sovereignty over the islands. The current positions of these stakeholders reflect the deep-rooted issues in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Given the relevance of history, the second section illustrates the historical evolution of the territorial dispute from the 1300s to the 2000s, while underlining its transition from inter-state to popular nationalist conflict. Finally, the last section focuses on the most recent events since the Boat Collision Incident in 2010, in which citizen activists initiate online and offline projects to defend the islands while fueling diplomatic confrontations between China and Japan. In conclusion, I highlight the urgent demand for further investigation on Internet-based citizen activism in order to explain how and why citizens increasingly use the Internet to achieve their political goals in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In the following chapters, I conduct a detailed case study on the Boat Collision Incident in order to explain the mechanism through which citizen activism incorporates the Internet to affect foreign policy.

CHAPTER FOUR: A YOUTUBE POST THAT SHOCKED FOREIGN POLICY

I just wanted as many people as possible to see what happened in the far-away marine border. And then, I hoped to encourage each one of the viewers to think, judge, and act on their own conscience.

—Japan Coast Guard Officer Masaharu Isshiki, “Why I leaked the video”

Watching the leaked video felt just like watching a movie. Although it was the first time we watched the full version, we were already familiar with the storyline because we saw the trailers over and over on the news.

— House of Councillors Member Jiro Ono, “The 176th National Diet,
Budget Committee No.5”

On September 7th, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with the Japan Coast Guard patrol ships in disputed waters near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While China protested against Japan’s “illegal interception,”¹ Japan’s Coast Guard arrested the captain of the boat for intentionally attacking the Japanese patrol vessels. The diplomatic tensions between the two countries rose sharply, since past fishery agreements ruled that patrolling vessels on both sides should only warn fishing boats to leave the area instead of capturing their crews. Although Japan initially emphasized that the incident was a domestic crime case, Japan gradually cooled down its stance, especially following

¹ “Boat Collisions Spark Japan-China Diplomatic Row,” *BBC News*, accessed March 26, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11225522>.

China's political pressures such as its apprehension of Japanese construction workers² and reported suspension of mineral exports to Japan.³ On September 24th, Japan's Okinawa Prefectural Court decided to release the captain, concerned with the case's implications on their tense Sino-Japanese relations.⁴ Compelled by the potential danger of public upheavals, China's President Hu Jintao and Japan's Prime Minister Naoto Kan held several meetings to confirm their return to strategic partnership.⁵ Despite lingering tensions regarding the co-development of natural resource deposits and the US' support of Japan, the bilateral confrontation returned under control once Japan's court dismissed the charge against the Chinese captain in January 2011.

Meanwhile, even though the Japanese government maintained close communications with the PRC to prevent the escalation of this international dispute, at the domestic level, the Kan Cabinet faced political turbulence. Many in Japan criticized Japan's release of the Chinese captain. Requested by opposition parties to review the video recording of the incident, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihito Sengoku limited the disclosure of the classified video only to a handful of Diet members, warning that the public disclosure of the video was highly likely to provoke China.⁶ A couple of days later,

² "China Investigates Four Japanese Fujita Employees in Custody, Starting from the 20th (中国拘束の日本人4人はフジタ社員、20日から取り調べ)," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 24, 2010, <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY201009240176.html>.

³ Keith Bradsher, "Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan," *The New York Times*, September 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>.

⁴ "Release Is a Political Decision: (釈放は事実上の政治決着 対応、説得力欠く)," *Kyodo News*, September 24, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/09/post-6.html>.

⁵ "Prime Minister Deals with the Senkaku Boat Collision Incident from a Broader Context (首相、大局的観点で冷静対応 中国漁船衝突事件)," *Kyodo News*, October 5, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/10/post-74.html>.

however, an indignant Coast Guard officer posted the video clip of the collision on YouTube. Immediately shared and copied by numerous web users, the video spread overnight to create political nightmare for the Kan cabinet and foreign policymakers. The protest movement against the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government involved not only opposition party members and the mass media, but also a number of citizen initiatives, on which I elaborate in Chapter Five.

In this chapter, I conduct an empirical study on the video leak incident in order to trace the mechanisms through which citizens can leverage the Internet to influence foreign policymaking. In doing so, I proceed with the following steps. First, I detail the process of the confidentiality breach by Japan Coast Guard officer Masaharu Isshiki, who selected the Internet platform, YouTube, for his whistleblowing instead of the conventional news media.⁷ Second, I examine the policy implications of Isshiki's action by studying diplomatic documents and the National Diet records. Finally, I highlight the role of the conventional media as a translator of significance between the online and offline political spaces. In conclusion, I theorize my Media-as-Translators Model that articulates interactions between key actors identified in my case study.

⁶ “Collision Incident Video Submitted to the Diet, Discuss the Disclosure Methods in the Afternoon (中国漁船衝突ビデオを国会提出 開示方法を午後協議),” *Kyodo News*, October 27, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/10/post-123.html>.

⁷ By the conventional media, I refer to the media that started and developed before the Internet media, such as newspapers, television broadcasts, radio, and magazines. Although several of these media have launched online programs, I generally categorize them as the conventional media because their organizational, operational, and historical bases are still heavily based in the offline world. Unlike Social Networking Service (SNS), blog posts, and video sharing platforms, where content is created primarily through online interactions, the conventional media take inputs mostly from the offline world, organize and frame information in the same manner as their traditional offline publications.

POSTING CLASSIFIED VIDEO: A HERO OR A TRAITOR?

This section examines the process of the video leak, based on the primary sources, including the press conference and publication by the Coast Guard officer who posted the video. At the same time, I specifically analyze his rationale for the leak, and the reason why he turned to YouTube instead of conventional media such as newspapers.

VIDEO LEAKED ON YOUTUBE: HOW AND WHY?

The Process of Video Leak

The leaked video is about 40 minutes in length, and it consists of six clips edited by the Japan Coast Guard. The video records the overall process from monitoring to collision, to chase after the collision, while editing out the scene of arresting crewmembers.⁸ In the first three videos, two Coast Guard ships, *Yonakuni* and *Mizuki*, start to monitor the Chinese fishing boat, *Minjinyu 5179*, operating against warnings to leave the territory.⁹ And the fourth, fifth, and sixth videos record the collision between the Coast Guard vessels and a Chinese fishery boat after the chase. Although the videos do not include capturing of the crews, the Japanese government claimed that these videos were the critical criminal evidence against the Chinese fishers. Concerned by the diplomatic tensions with China, the Kan Cabinet initially disclosed the video to only

⁸ “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.1 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.1 - YouTube),” accessed March 26, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCSqZ2tK2xQ>; “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.2 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.2 - YouTube),” accessed March 26, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IU_aXcmV-lQ; “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.3 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.3 - YouTube),” accessed March 26, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTguzW2FzaY>; “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.4 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.4 - YouTube),” accessed March 26, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbTHgsSOsoM>.

⁹ “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.1 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.1 - YouTube);” “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.2 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.2 - YouTube);” “Senkaku Video Disclosed by the LDP: No.3 (尖閣ビデオ 自民党が公開 44 分版 No.3 - YouTube).”

thirty Diet members and refused to make the evidence public.¹⁰ In contrast, once the leak occurred, several versions of copied videos spread on various online platforms, such as YouTube, by numerous anonymous users.¹¹ Uploaded on the same night as the leak, one of the summary videos claimed over 2.5 million views as of March 25, 2015.¹²

The whistleblower, known as “Sengoku38,” first uploaded the video on YouTube from an Internet café on the evening of November 4th and deleted the account by the next morning. Having no way to prevent the spread of the video, the government soon launched an investigation to identify the source of this security breach. On November 10th, less than one week after the leak, a Japan Coast Guard officer, Masaharu Isshiki, turned himself in, claiming that he was responsible for the video post.¹³ Apologizing to his colleagues for creating trouble and recognizing his violation of the code of public servant, Isshiki emphasized that he had no regret.¹⁴

¹⁰ “Senkaku Video Disclosed on November 1st, Shared Only among Budget Committee Boards (11月1日に尖閣ビデオ開示 予算委理事らで視聴),” *Kyodo News*, October 29, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/10/post-129.html>.

¹¹ raito haina, *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.1* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 1), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZzR02rD7S0>; *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.2* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 2), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2qq-mDV1CY>; *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.3* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 3), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5W510xkRsE>; *ibid.*; *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.4* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 4), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k5IgLp2YY>; *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.5* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 5), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXI0DwLxOhA>; *Real Senkakus Coast Guard ver.6* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 6), 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPMM6GHWRfw>.

¹² *Senkaku Collision Video A* (尖閣衝突ビデオ A), 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PO3icKluj7o&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

¹³ “Metropolitan Police Department Considers Arbitrary Investigation, Prosecutors Debate Arrest (警視庁、保安官の任意捜査も検討 逮捕の可否、検察も割れる),” *Kyodo News*, November 12, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-175.html>.

¹⁴ “Full Comments by the Coast Guard Officer (海上保安官のコメント全文),” *Kyodo News*, November 16, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-190.html>.

Isshiki's book published in 2011, *For the Sake of Something*, explains how and why he decided to upload the video for the public. Simply put, his goal was to “make a big showcase and attract as much public attention as possible.”¹⁵ From the beginning of the collision, Isshiki had no doubt of Japan's justice against aggressive Chinese fishing crews. When Isshiki found the video clips in a shared folder of the Japan Coast Guard on September 16th, he still had faith in the government to prosecute the captain of the Chinese fishing boat, through which process the video was likely to be publicized.¹⁶ While he was aware of the government's tacit intention to avoid escalation of diplomatic tensions with China, he believed that the prosecutors would take the necessary steps to deliver justice.¹⁷ Yet, his hopeful view was betrayed when the prosecutor ordered the captain released. Isshiki hesitated to direct his anger toward the prosecutor, for he believed that the prosecutors were also the victim of the government's misguided leadership and political pressure.¹⁸

Isshiki's sense of crisis grew stronger day by day. As the mass protests in China and the Chinese government's aggressive revenge measures were reported, he felt urged to respond to this political crisis, where “China's deceptive foreign policy” prevailed over Japan's hesitant diplomacy.¹⁹ On October 18th, the government's decision to disclose the video only to limited Diet members struck him with disappointment. He states in his book that it was this moment when he made up mind to disclose the video by himself, no

¹⁵ Isshiki Masaharu, *For the Sake of Something: sengoku38's Confession (何かのために: sengoku38 の告白)* (Tokyo, Japan: Asahi Shimbun Press, 2011), 45–46, Kindle.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 499-501.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 514-517.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 615-616.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 858-862.

longer waiting for the government's action.²⁰ Although he initially trusted the government for taking appropriate measures, Isshiki's disappointment in the government gradually turned into his determination to take actions by himself, as he perceived the escalating aggression by China.

His explanation of his motives is contradictory. In his public statement issued a week after his apprehension, he underlines that his action was "based neither on a particular political claim, nor on my personal interests."²¹ Denying egoistic motives in his whistleblowing, he stated, "I just wanted as many people as possible to see what happened in the far-away marine border. And then, I hoped to encourage each viewer to think, judge, and act by themselves."²² Although he emphasizes the leak was a selfless action without any political intent, his narrative also highlights the political and performative nature of his action. First of all, his primary purpose to raise public awareness on the evidence of the collision is inevitably political, in that he distributed the video *against* the government policy not to disclose them. Furthermore, his statement also calls for individual viewers to become active participants in this social issue, which implicitly encourages more people to think and act independently from social restrictions just as he breached confidentiality as a civil servant to do what he believed served greater good of society. While admitting that his action was "impermissible as a civil servant,"²³ this statement rather self-justifies his heroic decision to prioritize his personal belief over the social constraint. Therefore, it is too simplistic to accept his claim that the

²⁰ Ibid., 1077-1079.

²¹ Ibid., 499-501.

²² "Full Comments by the Coast Guard Officer (海上保安官のコメント全文)."

²³ Ibid.

whistleblowing was completely selfless and apolitical. Rather, the leak was arguably a demonstration of his social awareness as a moral person who can “think, judge, and act”²⁴ independently. In fact, as Isshiki later started to work closely with conservative political leaders such as Toshio Tamogami and Shintaro Ishihara, his narrative resembles those of the Japanese nationalist movements. I discuss these movements and narratives more in detail in Chapter Five.

Denounced Japanese Media and Channels for Leak

He downloaded the video clips from a shared folder to his SD card and uploaded them in the night of November 4th from an Internet cafe. During the period from his decision to leak in the late October to the actual leak on November 4th, he also contacted conventional media outlets such as CNN.²⁵ Two questions rise regarding Isshiki’s leak strategy. First, why did he send the SD card to CNN, not to the Japanese media? Second, why did he choose to upload the videos to YouTube, rather than using “traditional” channels such as newspapers and the TV media?

Isshiki offers three reasons why he trusted CNN. First, he doubted that the Japanese media were willing to broadcast the controversial video, classified as a matter of “national security” by the government. Even if they did, he expected the full video was too long to be shared on television and the interpretation was likely to be “biased” against

²⁴ “Full Comments by the Coast Guard Officer (海上保安官のコメント全文).”

²⁵ “Senkaku Collision Video Mailed to the CNN, Coast Guard Officer States (尖閣衝突映像CNNに郵送、海上保安官供述),” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 25, 2010, <http://wayback.archive.org/web/20101127080550/http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20101124-OYT1T01260.htm>.

his intent.²⁶ In this respect, he feared that the government might step in just as he perceived it had done with the prosecutors. Second, Isshiki hoped that the coverage by non-Japanese and non-Chinese media would increase the international credibility of the video, allowing Japan to claim its legitimacy over China's criticism.²⁷ Finally, he specifically reached out to CNN because he was personally impressed by CNN's brave reporting in the Gulf War, which he watched during his career as a commercial sailor.²⁸ This plan, however, turned out to be a failure, since CNN ignored the video after he sent the package. Irritated by the silence of the media he trusted, Isshiki sought for a new channel for the leak.

Disappointed by the conventional media, Isshiki turned his eyes to the Internet as a direct platform to share the video. As mentioned earlier, his goal was to spread the video as far as possible and maintain the attention as long as possible. The Internet does not only allow ordinary citizens like him to access and share the video as an open platform, but also help him protect his anonymity. Although he was aware that the investigators would identify the Internet user eventually, the anonymity of the Internet gained him about a week before he was identified, which was enough time to ensure the proliferation of the videos and re-post the videos if necessary.²⁹ On November 10th, about a week after the leak, he confessed to his supervisor. During the time between the leak and exposure, he contacted a Japanese mass media, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, to provide an exclusive interview despite his initial distrust of the Japanese media.

²⁶ Isshiki, *For the Sake of Something: sengoku38's Confession* (何かのために: sengoku38 の告白), 1156-64, Kindle.

²⁷ Ibid., 1221.

²⁸ Ibid., 1229.

²⁹ Ibid., 1324-47.

Roles of the Internet in Isshiki's Leak

Technically speaking, the Internet provided Isshiki with an ideal channel to share the government secret with the rest of society, as well as prominent political figures and representatives of the international media. The Internet allowed him to share the file with anyone, regardless of their social status and political power, and eventually compelled the mainstream media and politicians to respond to what Isshiki defined as a national security crisis. Furthermore, protecting the anonymity of its users, the open cyberspace also encouraged people to shelter “Sengoku38” from elimination by copying and reposting the videos inside and outside YouTube. In this respect, the Internet and numerous users who shared the videos offered Isshiki not only a platform to expand his movement, but also a shelter to protect his movement from being forgotten. Hence, by the time the police investigated the actual identity of anonymous Internet accounts, it was too late to stop the spread of the video clips. Although the Internet could not ensure complete security and anonymity, the platform functioned just well enough for Isshiki to achieve his goal.

The Internet was crucial for Isshiki's project. As a counterfactual hypothesis, what would likely have happened if Isshiki had no access to the Internet? First of all, Isshiki was unlikely to access the video without the Internet, because he was working over 700 miles away from the Coast Guard base, which managed the hard copy of the video. Without the online file sharing system of the Japan Coast Guard, he could never find and download the video from the beginning. Second, even if he could attain the video file, he, as an ordinary public servant, had few channels to share the file without the Internet. Despite Isshiki's distrust of the Japanese media, these media often provide a

common outlet for whistleblowers. The problem with this approach is, as he was concerned, that the media self-censored the video because of its highly sensitive and confidential nature. Otherwise, another option for him was to spread the video through grassroots movements, which was also unlikely to effectively influence policymaking given the limited presence of Japanese conservative citizen groups in politics.³⁰ In this respect, the Internet was an ideal platform for Isshiki to simply share the file and let other users react to it. Unlike the media channel and a grassroots movement, he could at least achieve his goal to let people watch the video by uploading the video to YouTube. Therefore, the Internet played an indispensable role in Isshiki's attempted to inform "all looking to true, correct, accurate information,"³¹ free from the arbitrary media manipulation he perceived.

VIDEO LEAK'S IMPACT ON POLITICS

THE IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY: APEC SUMMIT IN CRISIS

The video leak presented a new diplomatic crisis for both Japan and the PRC. Suffering from diplomatic distrust and domestic nationalism, the two states struggled to continue dialogue in formal and informal settings. Although the bilateral efforts produced a summit meeting between the PRC President Hu and Japan Prime Minister Kan, the unexpected video leak created obstacles for the two leaders to move on to the next step. Japan's foreign policymakers lost control over the controversial video as strategic leverage, while the Chinese policymakers became concerned by the escalation of

³⁰ I discuss the absence of these nationalist grassroots movements in policymaking process at the end of this chapter.

³¹ *Lecture by Former Coastguard Officer, Masaharu Isshiki No.1* (元海上保安官、一色正春氏講演その1), 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enbk7z8xJIQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

nationalist protests in domestic politics.

The video leak directly threatened Japan's diplomacy. The greatest concern after the leak was Japan's leadership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, which the country was planning to host in Yokohama and scheduling bilateral summit with China to repair their relations.³² Since the collision in September, both Japan and the PRC had sought informal dialogues to ease the diplomatic tensions, while paying close attention to the rise of nationalism in each country. For example, once Japan released the Chinese captain, China welcomed the "unofficial" visit of a leading party member, Goshi Hosono, and arranged extensive sessions with senior officials in order to rebuild diplomatic trust.³³ Within a few days, Japan's Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and the PRC's counterpart Dai Bingguo talked via phone to strengthen inter-government communication,³⁴ leading to an official meeting between the Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministers in Hanoi.³⁵ These events signal China and Japan's collaborative efforts to pave the way for bilateral summit meeting between President Hu and Prime Minister Kan. However, in spite of such efforts on both sides, the actual bilateral summit bore little fruit, arguably due to the leak that occurred just one week before the summit. The bilateral summit meeting on November 13 lasted only for 22 minutes, and both sides

³² "Japan Coast Guard Official Admits China Video Leak," *BBC News*, accessed March 26, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11724318>.

³³ "DPJ Hosono Visit China to Fix Diplomatic Relations (民主・細野氏が訪中＝関係修復狙う)," *Wall Street Journal Japan Edition*, September 30, 2010, <http://jp.wsj.com/layout/set/article/content/view/full/110218>.

³⁴ Sunohara Tsuyoshi, *Struggles behind Senkaku's Nationalization (暗闘尖閣国有化)* (Tokyo, Japan: Shinchosha, 2013).

³⁵ "Foreign Affairs Minister Press Conference Record (Summary) (November 2010) (外務大臣会見記録 (要旨) (平成 22 年 11 月)), " *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, November 30, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_1011.html#1-C.

failed to propose any further steps to resolve the dispute.³⁶

Furthermore, the leak not only ruined Japan's diplomatic efforts to recover stable relationship with China, but also deprived the Japanese government of the opportunity to use the video as its strategic leverage. That is, due to the video leak, Japan could no longer release the video as leverage against China. Likewise, if Japan's reluctance to disclose the video was based on a secret agreement with China, Japan broke its promise, though not intentionally. In fact, the *Mainichi Shimbun*, one of Japan's mainstream newspapers, reported that Japan informally agreed not to disclose the video clips as a condition to resume diplomatic dialogues with China during DPJ member Goshi Hosono's visit.³⁷ On the other hand, in domestic politics, the video leak accelerated anti-China sentiment in Japan,³⁸ which limited Japanese policymakers space for negotiation with China. The unexpected leak by Isshiki deprived the Japanese policymakers of their own choice to bury or disclose the video and therefore diminished the merits of these strategic tactics. Hence, despite the domestic popularity of the leak, the leak imposed various limitations on Japan's foreign policy.

On the other hand, the PRC also did not welcome the leak. Alerted to the potential

³⁶ "Sino-Japanese Summit, Both Claim Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkakus (日中首脳、互いに尖閣領有を主張 「戦略的互惠」は確認)," *Kyodo News*, November 13, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-180.html>.

³⁷ The details of this "secret visit" still remain controversial. Although Prime Minister Kan denied his involvement in sending Hosono to China, Sunohara introduces *Mainichi Shimbun's* reporting that this informal negotiation between Japan and China discussed conditions to stop the escalation of naval tensions. Sunohara also acknowledges that the two sides were likely to agree not to disclose the video. Sunohara, *Struggles behind Senkaku's Nationalization (暗闘尖閣国有化)*, 564-8, Kindle; "PM Kan Denied His Involvement in Former Deputy Party Secretary Hosono's Visit to China (菅首相：細野前民主幹事長代理の訪中はまったく承知してない)," *Bloomberg*, September 29, 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/123-L9I2Q76TTDS001.html>.

³⁸ "On the Senkaku Dispute, 4 Thousand Protest in Ginza against the DPJ Government and China (尖閣、4千人が銀座で抗議デモ 民主党政権や中国に)," *Kyodo News*, November 6, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-159.html>.

danger of fueling anti-Japan protests in China, the government was compelled to adopt the double standard: claim for China's legitimacy toward its nation domestically, while avoiding escalation of the diplomatic rows internationally. For example, as soon as the video footage was posted online, China's Foreign Ministry stated in a press conference that "The so-called video cannot change the fact and cannot conceal the unlawfulness of the Japanese action,"³⁹ assuring the Chinese public of its unbending position. At the same time, Japan's Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara told the press that the PRC conveyed its "interest and concern" over the aftermath of the leak through diplomatic channels,⁴⁰ in contrast to the fierce protests filed after the arrest of crewmembers. Furthermore, in press conferences following the leak, the PRC spokesman stated, "China hopes that the so-called video problem will not continue to interfere with Sino-Japanese relations,"⁴¹ while President Hu never even mentioned the islands dispute in his APEC report.⁴² These milder statements marked a shift in China's foreign policy, in that it did not indicate further investigation of the video and instead choose to place the video leak off the discussion table. Although this did not mean that the leaked video made China admit its fault, the leak was likely to affect China's attitudes toward the collision incident by presenting an unexpected fuel for nationalist upheavals to the Chinese public.

³⁹ "China Reiterates Video Cannot Conceal Japan's Illegal Actions near Diaoyu Islands," *Xinhua News*, November 5, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/05/c_13593254.htm.

⁴⁰ "Foreign Affairs Minister Press Conference Record (Summary) (November 2010) (外務大臣会見記録 (要旨) (平成 22 年 11 月))."

⁴¹ "2010/11/18 MOFA Spokesman Hong Lei Conducts Regular Press Meeting (2010 年 11 月 18 日外交部发言人洪磊举行例行记者会)," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, November 18, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t770294.shtml.

⁴² "Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Talks about President Hu Jintao's Participation in G20 Summit and APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, November 14, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/hujintaoG20di5cifenghuiheAPEC18cihuiyi_665776/t769540.shtml.

Interestingly, Chinese foreign policy was more attentive to its own domestic public opinion than the Japanese, which prioritized the recovery of diplomatic trust over buying popular support with aggressive policy. While ferociously protesting against Japan's arrest and honoring the arrested captain as the true defender of China's sovereignty,⁴³ China reinforced its online and offline restrictions to control the escalation of anti-Japan sentiments by censorship and police patrols to prevent violence.⁴⁴ The Internet sphere was not exceptional to this control, as a Chinese woman was sentenced to labor education because of her Twitter post that encouraged violent protestors to attack Japan's pavilion in the Shanghai Expo.⁴⁵ Similarly, after the video leak, Japan's *Kyodo News* reported that the Chinese government limited media coverage of the video leak, Xinhua, the government-run media outlet, was not allowed to broadcast the topic.⁴⁶ Although these stories on China's censorship were covered by the foreign media, it still suggests that the PRC government treated the video leak as a sensitive topic because of its implication for Chinese nationalism.

⁴³ "I Strongly Express My Disappointment and Protest against Japan's Decision to Apply So-Called Legal Procedure to Chinese Boat Captain (我对日方执意决定对中国船长履行所谓司法程序表示强烈不满和严重抗议)," *Xinhua News*, September 11, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-09/11/c_12540993.htm; "Xinhua's Viewpoint: Territorial Sovereignty Must Not Be Violated: Our Nation Appreciate Warmheartedness -- China Deals with Japan's Illegal Apprehension of Chinese Fishing Crews (新华视点:领土主权不容侵犯 祖国关怀温暖人心--中国处理渔民渔船被日非法抓扣事件始末)," *Xinhua News*, September 25, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-09/25/c_12604824_3.htm.

⁴⁴ "China on Alert against Anti-Japanese Protests, Japanese Journalists Held in Temporary Custody (中国、反日デモ警戒で嚴重警備 邦人記者一時拘束)," *Kyodo News*, October 30, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/10/post-134.html>.

⁴⁵ "Chinese Woman Sentenced to a Year in Labour Camp over Tweet," *Amnesty International*, September 17, 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/chinese-woman-sentenced-year-labour-camp-over-tweet-2010-11-17>.

⁴⁶ "Collision Video Copied to Chinese Video Posting Webpages, Some Comments 'Japan's Conspiracy' (中国動画サイトにも衝突映像転載 「日本の陰謀」書き込みも)," *Kyodo News*, November 5, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-154.html>.

A single YouTube post spread like a wildfire beyond borders to trap Japan and China in political turmoil. As Isshiki planned, the video was shared by the media from various countries including China.⁴⁷ Surges of nationalist sentiments in both countries interrupted foreign policy efforts to resume dialogue, leaving little space for negotiation. Even though China and Japan avoided direct confrontation in APEC a week after the leak, diplomatic distrust and domestic pressure did not allow two leaders to address the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Therefore, this case indicates that a video sharing on the Internet can allow an individual actor to influence foreign policy outcomes. Furthermore, the impact of the online video leak was not confined to international relations. In the next section, I elaborate on the mechanism through which the leak was politicized to attack the government's foreign policy in Japan.

IMPACT ON DOMESTIC POLITICS: LEAK AS SYMBOL OF PUBLIC ANGER

The Kan Cabinet in Crisis

The goal of Isshiki's leak was to raise public awareness of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Conducted independently from existing political groups, the leak created political turmoil at both the foreign policy and domestic policy levels. Although Isshiki's project was successful in highlighting the dispute as a key political agenda, whether the direction of policy discussions matched his aim remains uncertain. In this section, I first

⁴⁷ "Japan Collision Footage Leak Probe Gets under Way," *BBC News*, accessed March 27, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11716813>; "China-Japan Boat Crash Video Posted," *Al Jazeera*, November 5, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2010/11/201011562855161225.html>; Kyung Lah, "Lawmaker: Leaked Video Shows Crash That Led to China-Japan Dispute," *The CNN*, November 5, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/05/japan.china.island.dispute/>; "Frequently Watched: China-Japan Boat Collision in Our Territory Diaoyu Islands Apparently Leaked (视频: 疑似我国钓鱼岛海域中日撞船录像曝光)," *Sina.com*, November 5, 2010, <http://video.sina.com.cn/p/news/c/v/2010-11-05/152161175683.html>.

outline the political crises in international and domestic politics that followed the leak. Then, I examine in detail how policymakers evaluated and dealt with the leak in shaping foreign policy by closely looking at records from Japan's National Diet Library.⁴⁸

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute became a popular topic of parliamentary discussions in Japan, as the DPJ government's incoherent foreign policy faced criticism after the release of the Chinese captain in late September. Soon, the National Diet members started to debate the disclosure of the video clip, in which the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute was mentioned in almost 90 committees and plenary sessions in October and November 2010 combined.⁴⁹ This is over ten times greater than the average number of references during the previous 24 months,⁵⁰ when the same topic was mentioned only in 2.5 meetings per month on average. Moreover, during the following 24 months after December 2010,⁵¹ the frequency of reference to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute quadrupled from 2.5 to 10.4 meetings per month, indicating that the Diet members debated the dispute more frequently after the video leak in 2010. Although the escalating diplomatic tension with China generally attracted attentions of policymakers after 2010, the Diet members spent the longest time in discussing the dispute following the incident in

⁴⁸ "National Diet Records Search System (国会会議録検索システム)," *National Diet Library*, accessed March 20, 2015, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

⁴⁹ Meetings examined here include all committee gatherings and plenary assemblies held by the members of House of Councilors and the House of Representatives. The congressional record is accessed through the Parliamentary Records Archive of Japan by using its filtering search functions. In specifying the search conditions, I used the keyword "Senkaku," a Japanese term that refers only to the islands, to identify the discussions given the limited period of time. In order to check the validity of this search, I also reviewed each record to examine whether it actually discusses the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. The digital archive URL: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_logout.cgi?SESSION=42850.

⁵⁰ This research timeframe is between October 2008 and September 2010.

⁵¹ The period is from December, 2010 to November, 2012.

September 2010. These statistics underline that politicians did pay attention to the islands dispute following the incident.

The existence of the video was known to many before the leak on November 4th. In September, a few weeks after the collision, Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara stated that the video was evidence of the Chinese fishing boat's malicious intent, but he also refused to disclose the video. One of the ruling parties as well as opposition parties⁵² soon allied against the DPJ government to request the disclosure of the video, asserting that the disclosure would allow Japan to reinforce its legitimacy in the international community. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the largest opposition party, led this criticism, calling the government's slow and passive reaction to the collision "the greatest diplomatic failure after WWII."⁵³ As Teiichi Tanigaki, the head of the LDP, emphasized "it was crucial for the Japanese government to disclose the video at the early stage in order to attain international support and to hamper anti-Japan sentiment among the Chinese public,"⁵⁴. However, when China demanded Japan's official apology and allowed violent mass protests in Chinese cities, the Diet members' disappointment and frustrations toward the government's passive attitudes only grew. Eventually, the parliamentary debates turned from the request of video disclosure into non-confidence motions, even after the limited disclosure of the video at the end of October.

⁵² People's Party as one of the two ruling parties addressed the issue against the DPJ government. The opposition parties include New Party Nippon, Your Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Komei Party.

⁵³ "The 175th National Diet, Budget Committee No.4 (第175回国会 予算委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, September 30, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/175/0018/17509300018004a.html>.

⁵⁴ "The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.2 (第176回国会 本会議 第2号)," *National Diet Library*, October 6, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0001/17610060001002a.html>.

The debate continued even after the disclosure of the video. After a month of discussion, the government finally allowed a limited number of the parliament members to watch the edited version of the video. However, opposition parties still remained unsatisfied because the video was only about 7 minutes in length, far shorter than the original.⁵⁵ Moreover, confirming the importance of the video, the LDP again argued that the government should publicize the video in order to counter China's statement that the Japan Coast Guard was responsible for the incident.⁵⁶ On the same day, Isshiki leaked the full-length video of 45 minutes, which even parliamentary members could not access after two months of their efforts. Although Prime Minister Naoto Kan officially apologized for his mishandling of the crisis,⁵⁷ the opposition parties were never satisfied and requested resignations of his Cabinet members. Finally, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) faced no-confidence and censure motions filed against cabinet ministers.

The video leak by Masaharu Isshiki provided opposition parties with a powerful tool to attack the Cabinet members. While the debates prior to the leak focused on requesting the full disclosure of the video, once leaked on YouTube, the video became a symbol of the Kan Cabinet's diplomatic failure as well as crisis mismanagement. On the day following the leak, the LDP attacked the government by stating, "The leak conveys the message that the DPJ government completely lacks the will and ability to defend

⁵⁵ "The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No. 7 (第176回国会 本会議 第7号)," *National Diet Library*, November 4, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0001/17611040001007a.html>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No.6 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第6号)," *National Diet Library*, November 8, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0018/17611080018006a.html>.

Japan's territory and people."⁵⁸ Alluding to the historical examples such as the Soviet Union's shooting of a Korean airliner in 1983 and the sinking of North Korean armed vessel in 2001,⁵⁹ the LDP members criticized the government for failing to leverage the video as a strategic policy tool.⁶⁰ At the same time, once the investigation revealed that the video was kept in a shared online database without any security measures,⁶¹ some questioned not only the government's intelligence management, but also whether the video should be considered as confidential from the beginning.⁶² Even though the government underlined that the leak was nothing but a criminal offense,⁶³ a coalition of opposition parties targeted Cabinet Secretary Yoshihito Sengoku and Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism Minister Sumio Mabuchi to file non-confidence motions.⁶⁴ Hence,

⁵⁸ "The 176th National Diet, Land and Transportation Committee No.4 (第176回国会 国土交通委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, November 5, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0099/17611050099004a.html>.

⁵⁹ In 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 007 mistakenly flew into the Soviet aerospace and was shot down by Soviet Air Force. In response to the missing of Flight 007, the Japanese government disclosed the intercepted communication records between Soviet fighter jet pilots and their commander to expose the Soviet Union's action. In 2001, a North Korean spy ship and the Japan Coast Guard vessels exchanged fire within Japan's EEZ, sinking the spy ship with its crewmembers. In order to explain the situation, the Japanese government publicized the video recording of the Japan Coast Guard's chase, warning, and attack.

⁶⁰ "The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.4 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, November 12, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0004/17611120004004a.html>; "The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.9 (第176回国会 本会議 第9号)," *National Diet Library*, November 17, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0001/17611170001009a.html>.

⁶¹ "Collision Video Left Undeleted for Several Days, Coast Guard College Uploaded without Access Limit (衝突映像は数日間消去されず 海保大、アクセス制限なし)," *Kyodo News*, November 14, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-186.html>.

⁶² "The 176th National Diet, Cabinet Committee No. 4 (第176回国会 内閣委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, November 12, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0002/17611120002004a.html>.

⁶³ "The 176th National Diet, Land and Transportation Committee No.4 (第176回国会 国土交通委員会 第4号)."

⁶⁴ "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No.9 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第9号)," *National Diet Library*, November 25, 2010,

the video leak by the Coast Guard officer certainly impacted domestic politics by creating a political nightmare for the government.

Many members of the Diet reacted to the whistleblower with sympathy. Even though understanding the confidentiality breach as a serious problem, opposition party members praised Isshiki's contribution to society by unveiling the classified video, which they viewed as the evidence of Japan's legitimacy for arresting the Chinese crews.⁶⁵ More importantly, public opinion strongly backed his action. According to an opinion poll, 83.2 percent of the public supported the leak, while 81.1 percent answered that the leaked video should not be classified.⁶⁶ As Isshiki reflects that he had a number of cheering messages after the leak,⁶⁷ many people sympathized with his belief to "let as many people as possible see what happened in the far-away marine border."⁶⁸ Kazuya Maruyama, a lawyer by profession and also one LDP member, even remarked that the leak was "a riot against the government's terrible policy."⁶⁹ Therefore, the video leak was never discarded as a simple information security breach. The Japanese society, both the Parliament and

<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0014/17611250014009a.html>; "The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.8 (第176回国会 本会議 第8号)," *National Diet Library*, November 15, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0001/17611150001008a.html>.

⁶⁵ "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No.7 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第7号)," *National Diet Library*, November 19, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0014/17611190014007a.html>.

⁶⁶ "The Video of Collision: 88% Support Disclosure, 81% Believe 'Nonconfidential' (衝突映像、88%が公開すべき 「国家秘密でない」 81%)," *Kyodo News*, November 13, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-181.html>.

⁶⁷ *Lecture by Former Coastguard Officer, Masaharu Isshiki No.1* (元海上保安官、一色正春氏講演その1).

⁶⁸ "Full Comments by the Coast Guard Officer (海上保安官のコメント全文)."

⁶⁹ "The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.5 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第5号)," *National Diet Library*, November 11, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0003/17611110003005a.html>.

the public, perceived that the leak crystalized the widespread anger of the people. In fact, as one member observed, “investigators’ decision to postpone the arrest of Isshiki reflected the people’s support of his action.”⁷⁰ The prosecutor dismissed the case in the following January, commenting “the former Coast Guard officer took no illegal measure to access the video file and leaked it for his personal interests.”⁷¹

These sympathetic views toward Isshiki coincided with criticism against the government. LDP members argued that “the government committed a greater crime of limiting the people’s right to know” than sharing confidential information.⁷² In direct response to the Prime Minister’s annual speech, LDP member Yuriko Koike also underlined that the government’s foreign policy failure “created the crime of video leak,” while “citizens are trying to hold the government accountable for the government.”⁷³ These critical narratives shared a common theme; the government is the enemy of the public, and the people are undoubtedly good because they are only doing what they expect the government to do. Led primarily by members of the LDP, the largest opposition party and formerly the ruling party, these condemnations allegedly endorsed by “the rising voices of the people”⁷⁴ signify a structure of party politics between the

⁷⁰ “The 176th National Diet, National Security Committee No.4 (第 1 7 6 回国会 安全保障委員会 第 4 号),” *National Diet Library*, November 16, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0015/17611160015004a.html>.

⁷¹ “Senkaku Cases against Former Coast Guard Officer and Chinese Captain Both Dismissed (尖閣事件の元海上保安官起訴猶予 衝突の中国人船長も),” *Kyodo News*, January 21, 2011, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2011/01/post-236.html>.

⁷² “The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.8 (第 1 7 6 回国会 本会議 第 8 号).”

⁷³ “The 177th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.2 (第 1 7 7 回国会 本会議 第 2 号),” *National Diet Library*, January 26, 2011, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/177/0001/17701260001002a.html>.

⁷⁴ “The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No.9 (第 1 7 6 回国会 本会議 第 9 号).”

ruling and opposition parties. Furthermore, this narrative inflated the opposition parties' position by portraying themselves as supporters of the people. As more and more phone calls and messages were delivered to the Japan Coast Guard to cheer up Isshiki,⁷⁵ the opposition parties emphasized their legitimacy over the government to marginalize the ruling parties.

The video leak provided the opposition parties with an ideal topic to attack the government's foreign policy mismanagement. While the public was generally sympathetic toward the leaker, the opponents of the government shaped a narrative that described the sympathetic public opinion as the representation of people's anger. Facing two censure motions filed against incumbent ministers, the Kan Cabinet indeed suffered from declining popularity. A monthly poll by NHK, Japan's public-owned broadcasting corporation, indicated that the Kan Cabinet's popularity fell by half from September's 65 percent to November's 31 percent.⁷⁶ The criticism against the government and this falling popularity suggest two insights. First, the Isshiki's leak actually created a more significant impact in politics than spreading the video. Second, sustained by public support of the leak, the debate on foreign policy gradually acquired a populist nature in party politics between the ruling and opposition parties. In the next section, I conduct statistical analyses to see the degree of party politics' influence on the censure motions that condemned the government responsibility of foreign policy mishandling.

⁷⁵ "Controversy over Senkaku Video Leak: People Calling to Ask, 'Don't Search for the Leaker' (尖閣ビデオ投稿は是か非か 「犯人捜ししないで」電話も)," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 9, 2010, <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY201011080447.html>.

⁷⁶ "2010 Monthly Political Opinion Survey (2010年政治意識月例調査)," *NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)*, December 2010, <http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/yoron/political/2010.html>.

Party Politics behind the Debates

Party politics within the parliament played a critical role in shaping these narratives toward Isshiki's leak. In this section, I examine the voting behaviors of individual party members of the House of Councillors⁷⁷ during the 176th session from October to December 2010, when members debated the collision incident and leak. The session⁷⁸ includes 37 voting subjects, two of which are the censure motions against the Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Mabuchi. Based on the voting records, I calculate the ratio of party line alignment in voting,⁷⁹ the probability of opposition parties' agreement with the DPJ,⁸⁰ and the percentage of agreement across opposition parties.⁸¹ Although the scope of this analysis is confined to the House of Councillors due to lack of records for the House of Representatives, these statistics highlight the stronger party line alignment and opposition against the ruling parties in discussing the parliament and controversial nature of the video leak, compared with other topics.

The party line is likely to have influenced the opinions of each parliamentary

⁷⁷ In the General Election of June 2010, the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) lost its majority control in the House of Councils (upper), while maintaining the majority in the House of Representatives (lower house). The opposition parties, led by the former ruling party, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), sought opportunities to recover its political grip after it lost its government office for the first time since 1994.

⁷⁸ "The 176th National Diet Plenary Assembly Voting Results (第176回国会本会議投票結果)," *House of Councillors*, December 2010, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/vote/176/vote_ind.htm.

⁷⁹ The ratio of party line alignment is calculated as the percentage of party members who vote for the majority opinion of their party. I define party opinion as the majority opinion within each party, and consider any voting behavior different from the majority including no vote as disagreement. In concrete, I use binary system to count agreement as 1, and disagreement as 0. The calculation is conducted as follows: $\{(\text{number of agreement}) * 1 + (\text{number of disagreement}) * 0\} / (\text{total number of votes and no-votes})$.

⁸⁰ The probability of opposition parties' agreement with DPJ indicates the probabilities that each party vote in agreement with the ruling party, DPJ.

⁸¹ The percentage of agreement across opposition parties indicates how many of the seven opposition groups agree with the ruling parties' votes in each voting session. I also count no vote as disagreement.

member. Japan's National Diet has the tradition of strong party line alignment in individual voting behavior.⁸² Just as this scholarly consensus predicts, the average percentage of party line alignment remained very high during the 176th session, 90 percent across all parties and other independent parliament members. Figure 4.1 below also indicates that seven out of nine political parties voted with over 96 percent alignment rates, meaning that every member of a party vote in harmony with the party line in 35.5 meetings out of the all 37. Among them, the censure motions against the two Cabinet ministers marked even higher alignment; seven parties recorded 100 percent alignment in the motion against the Cabinet Secretary, while six parties did in the one against the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Mabuchi. These statistics indicate strong presence of party politics operating behind the debates in the parliament. The party line possessed a consistent hold on the voting behaviors of individual members regarding the video leak and the responsibility for the diplomatic failure.

The statistics also underscore that the censure motions created a greater dichotomy between the ruling parties and the opponents. Across all committees and plenary assemblies in the National Diet 176th session, approximately 5 out of 7 opposing parties voted in support of the ruling parties' position on average.⁸³ That is, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, the majority of opposition parties mostly favored the ruling parties in voting. In contrast, the voting on the censure motions against the two incumbent


⁸² Iio Jun, *Japan's Government Structure: From Bureaucrat-Cabinet System to Parliament-Cabinet System* (日本の統治構造: 官僚内閣制から議院内閣制へ) (Tokyo, Japan: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2007).

⁸³ Thanks to the strong alignment within each party, the discrepancy in voting behavior between the ruling and opposition parties offers a reasonable indicator of the degree of controversy in each discussion theme. That is, if fewer parties support the ruling side's vote, the topic is more controversial than those topics with larger support.

ministers saw little support for the ruling parties; 6 out of 7 parties, except for Social Democratic Party, voted to reprimand the ministers. Of all voting meetings, these two motions record the minimum support for the ruling parties.⁸⁴ As the video leak created a political crisis for the government, the voting record indicates that more parties voted against the ruling parties to condemn the ministers for their foreign policy failure.


In summary, I draw two insights from the statistical analyses of the parliamentary record. First, the party line played a central role throughout the session, and it influenced even more powerfully on the voting of the censure motions regarding the video leak. That is, most parliamentary members voted in accordance with the party's opinion. Second, the vote on censure movements marked the lowest support by the opposition parties, indicating that most opposition parties avoided standing side by side with the government. Therefore, the video leak not only created a shock to policymakers but also influenced their party positioning and voting behaviors.

Figure 4.1: Average Party Alignment Rates in the Japanese National Diet



⁸⁴ There are five meetings in which 6 out of 7 parties voted against the ruling parties. Two of them concern the censure motions on the video leak, and the others debate the annual budget plans.

Figure 4.2: Shift in the Level of Agreement with the Ruling Parties



Potentials and Limits of the Internet in Politics

The combined sections of Internet activism and policymakers' reaction signify a strong presence of the Internet platforms in allowing the successful whistleblowing, as well as its devastating impact to domestic politics and foreign policy negotiations. Meanwhile, this evidence still do not fully explain the part of the mechanism between the leak and policy change. Based on the observed impact of the leak, I conduct backward tracing in order to study the mechanism through which the leak influenced policymaking by creating a political pressure.

ROLE OF THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA

The conventional media such as newspapers and television play a significant role in informing citizens and framing agendas including the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In discussing the collision incident and the video leak, members of parliament quote the conventional media, especially newspapers, for several purposes.

First, newspapers provide policymakers with reliable sources of information to understand the situation and build their arguments. For example, the very first parliamentary discussion of the video leak started with a reference to the media report on November 5th.⁸⁵ Answering questions by an opposition party member, the Chief of the Japan Coast Guard stated that his office learned about the leak from the newspapers' inquiries and their reporting.⁸⁶ Utilizing independent sources within government offices, the media reported the progress of investigation such as the Internet café where the files were uploaded, the summary of Isshiki's initial confession to his supervisor, and the management of video files before the leak.⁸⁷ As the parliamentary records indicate, the media played a significant role as the informer of policymakers.

Second, supported by the news reports, the Diet members queried ministers. Quoting ministers' interview comments on mainstream newspapers, parliament member Yasuo Tanaka criticized the two cabinet ministers for failing to take necessary measures.⁸⁸ Moreover, the media also reported internal information on the video leak's

⁸⁵ ““The 176th National Diet, Foreign Affairs Committee No.3, (第 1 7 6 回国会 外務委員会 第 3 号),” *National Diet Library*, November 5, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0005/17611050005003a.html>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ “The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No. 6 (第 1 7 6 回国会 予算委員会 第 6 号).”

⁸⁸ “The 175th National Diet, Budget Committee No.4 (第 1 7 5 回国会 予算委員会 第 4 号).”

investigation and Japan's secret diplomatic negotiation with China, which even government officials could not know without these news reports. Citing the headlines reporting that the leaked video was loosely kept in a shared folder without any password,⁸⁹ opposition party members question the minister in charge of Coast Guard regarding the information security of the government system.⁹⁰ Hence, politicians shaped their own narratives around media reporting to attack the government's policy mismanagement.

Third, public opinion polls by television and newspapers offered a critical source for the parliament members to establish their legitimacy by underlining that their claims represented the people's collective will. For example, a LDP member, Hidenao Nakagawa, reaffirmed the public's distrust against the Kan Cabinet's foreign policy, quoting that over 90 percent of Japanese citizens felt uncertain about the government's diplomacy and that 83 percent of them answered that the government should disclose the video.⁹¹ Generally, opposition party members referred to the falling public support of the Kan Cabinet, blaming the diplomatic crisis for the lack of government leadership.⁹² As an indicator of the government's performance on various issues, the media polls maintained

⁸⁹ "Leaked Senkaku Video Edited by Coast Guard for Training Programs Submitted to Naha Local Prosecutors Office(流出の尖閣ビデオ、海保が研修用に編集 那覇地検の要請で提供)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, November 8, 2010, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG0700X_X01C10A1MM8000/.

⁹⁰ "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No. 6 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第6号)."

⁹¹ "The 176th National Diet, Cabinet Committee No.4 (第176回国会 内閣委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, November 12, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0002/17611120002004a.html>.

⁹² "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No. 7 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第7号)"; "The 176th National Diet, Plenary Assembly No. 7 (第176回国会 本会議 第7号)"; "The 176th National Diet, Health, Labour and Welfare Committee No.2 (第176回国会 厚生労働委員会 第2号)," *National Diet Library*, October 21, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0062/17610210062002a.html>.

their presence in politics by shaping the impression toward the government policy.

These remarks indicate that the conventional media provide policymakers with a useful tool to establish credibility in building their arguments and evaluate policy performances. Taking advantage of their independent channels to contact sources within the government, the conventional media informed policymakers of the video leak, offered materials to attack the government, and presented public opinion polls as an indicator of a foreign policy failure.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA

The conventional media in Japan has stronger market penetration and credibility as an established source of information than the Internet-based media. In Japan, three major media conglomerates dominate newspaper and television service. Asahi Shimbun Group, Yomiuri Shimbun Group, and Sankei Shimbun Group own newspaper, television broadcasting, and publishing apparatuses to cover everyday news. Through the combined channels of television broadcasting and newspapers, these media share the news source within each company to dominate the commercial media market in Japan. In addition, established as the public television company, NHK has the greatest credibility amongst the media users, compared with other commercial television stations, radio, newspapers and Internet webpages.⁹³

Meanwhile, the massive media outlets are also superior to the Internet in terms of scale. Both television broadcasting and newspapers remain as the key source of

⁹³ Akihiro Hirata, Kumiko Nishi, and Tomoe Sekine, *Televisions as Powerful Information Tool and Portal Websites in the Rise* (情報ツールとして根強いテレビと存在感を増すポータルサイト), Broadcasting Research and Survey (Tokyo, Japan: NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), July 2012), 52, http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/research/report/2012_07/20120703.pdf.

information for most Japanese people. Statistically speaking, 88 percent of Japanese households had flat-screen television as of early 2011,⁹⁴ while newspapers were selling over 60 million copies annually in 2010.⁹⁵ A survey by Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications indicates that approximately 80 percent of Japanese citizens used television and newspapers as the most frequently used media to know about domestic and global news.⁹⁶ Hence, although citizens widely acknowledge the Internet as a useful search tool, they still rely heavily on conventional media reporting to access world news. While only 10 percent of citizens trust the Internet media, they evaluate television broadcasting, newspapers and other published content as the most credible source of information.⁹⁷ Although younger generations tend to use and trust the Internet sources more, the general public has yet to shift their source of news away from the conventional media.⁹⁸ Hence, the high penetration rate and social credibility reinforces the presence of the conventional media, even in the rise of the online media.

THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA AS A TOOL FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

The conventional media such as newspapers in Japan also conducted so-called

⁹⁴ *Consumer Trend Survey (Nationwide, Monthly) Results for March 2011*(消費動向調査(全国、月次)平成23年3月実施調査結果), Consumer Trend Survey (Tokyo, Japan: Cabinet Office of Japan, April 2011), <http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/stat/shouhi/2011/1103honbun.pdf>.

⁹⁵ "Newspaper Sales and Market Penetration (新聞の発行部数と普及度)," *Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association*, n.d., <http://www.pressnet.or.jp/data/circulation/circulation05.php>.

⁹⁶ *2012 Information Communication Whitebook (平成24年版 情報通信白書)*, Information Communication Whitebook (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan, July 2012), 240, <http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/whitepaper/h24.html>.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 241.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 230-241.

investigative journalism in reporting the collision incident and video leak. Although the video leak was made in an unprecedented way through YouTube, Japanese newspapers maintained their own connections with whistleblowers inside the government office, and eventually published reports on Isshiki's interrogation and on the mismanagement of the confidential video files by the Coast Guard. While Isshiki did not trust the conventional media and was pleasantly amazed by the speed of information sharing online,⁹⁹ the conventional media did provide outlets for insiders of government institutions.

Furthermore, Isshiki's leak also indicates that the Internet is not necessarily the safest platform for whistleblowers. In fact, in the video leak case, investigators requested and seized account data from Google Japan Inc.,¹⁰⁰ leading to identification of the leaker. Earning over 30,000 views on a Twitter curation platform,¹⁰¹ one *Asahi Shimbun* journalist¹⁰² in an investigative reporting team tweeted a series of posts that encouraged whistleblowers to use the conventional media instead of the Internet to protect their identity.¹⁰³ In one of these tweets, the journalist states, "journalists and the media consider the confidentiality of source as the absolute code, and we all are trained to do so...we

⁹⁹ Isshiki, *何かのために*, 1324–31, Kindle.

¹⁰⁰ "Senkaku Video Leaker's Account Record Seized from Google (グーグルから投稿者の記録押収 尖閣映像流出)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, November 9, 2010, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASDG09039_Z01C10A1000001/.

¹⁰¹ This platform, Togetter, allows Twitter users to list relevant tweets and replies to build an archive of debates on Twitter. Digitally archived, the data last even if the quoted Twitter user erases his/her post.

¹⁰² As an investigative journalist in one of Japan's largest newspapers, Daisuke Kanda tweeted about the video leak on November 5th, the next morning of the leak. His twitter account is still active as of February, 2015. https://twitter.com/kanda_daisuke.

¹⁰³ "Whistleblowing Is Welcomed by Journalists' *Asahi Shimbun* Nagoya Headquarter Investigative Journalist Tells Tips for Whistleblowing (『内部告発はぜひ報道機関へ』 朝日新聞名古屋本社調査報道班記者が語る、タレ込みのススメ)," *Togetter*, 2010, <http://togetter.com/li/67923>.

also know how to avoid leaving evidence that can be tracked by investigators.”¹⁰⁴

According to his account, the conventional media provide better anonymity than the Internet thanks to their expertise in managing sensitive information. While alarming that investigators might seize the digital communication data from the server, the journalist further recommend not to use electronic communications such as emails but to use telephone or postal mail for whistleblowing. Although these remarks do not necessarily prove the advantage of the conventional media, they do offer a counterintuitive insight that the Internet’s anonymity may not be as guaranteed as many expect when the authorities conduct a formal investigation. Meanwhile, the conventional media have accumulated their expertise in handling sensitive information through their practical experiences to protect whistleblowers.

The discussion of whether the conventional media are allies or enemies of whistleblowers points to a trade-off between using the Internet and the conventional media. While the Internet allows whistleblowers to publicize sensitive information, it is not completely safe in that the authorities can trace their identity with warrants just as they did in exposing Isshiki. Meanwhile, the media may offer a safer, more systematically organized outlet for whistleblowers, although the direction of media reporting does not necessarily match with the original intent of a leaker. That is, just as Isshiki felt frustrated about their arbitrary editing policy, the media may create their own narrative, using materials that whistleblowers provide. As a result, whistleblowers can spread the sensitive information, but cannot control the discourse of media reporting.

Therefore, it is an overstatement to assert that the broad public support for Isshiki’s whistleblowing *created* the political narratives against the Kan Cabinet. Rather,

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

the opposition parties took advantage of the leak as new evidence of government failure in order to attack the government, backed by the public support of the leak. It was politicians who had the capacity to *frame* the incident and *proliferate* their interpretations so that they would fit their political goals. In doing so, this case was particularly convenient, in that Isshiki was under investigation and could not freely criticize politicians' arbitrary interpretations. Hence, politics did play a central role in initiating this political crisis, while the video leak by Isshiki arguably *ignited* the debate.


THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA AS A TRANSLATOR

Drawing from this empirical study, this section generalizes the mechanism through which citizens affect foreign and domestic policymaking. First, ordinary citizens with political intent launch a project, utilizing the Internet for its low communication costs, accessibility, anonymity and other benefits as a channel. The citizen action online is shared by numerous Internet users and creates rapidly spreading online movements, which engages conventional news media's attention. Second, in the rise of new online movements, the conventional media play the role of translator between online political phenomena and the offline world. The conventional media find potential news sources on the Internet, just as they do traditionally in the offline world. After their investigation independent from opinions posted online, they frame these events and publish the news through both online and offline channels. While informing the general public of the world events through their news outlets, the conventional media also present public opinion indicators on specific issues in their opinion columns and surveys. Through these functions, the conventional media translate the significance of what is happening in

cyberspace into that in the offline political space. While the Internet has the potential to promote and crystalize a certain political movement online, that movement alone does not have a direct impact in policymaking process in the real world. Hence, the conventional media need to *interpret* and *re-position* this online movement to give real-world significance in forms of public opinions and investigative journalism. Without this process of translation by the conventional news media, online political movements cannot effectively relate to actual policy implications at present.

Informed by the conventional media as a credible source of information, policymakers face pressures for foreign and domestic policy change. By invoking lingering domestic political controversy, citizen activism can intervene into foreign policy although citizen activists have no way to control the outcomes of such controversy. In the video leak case, the media reported the whistleblowing and caused unanticipated damage to China and Japan's bilateral efforts to rebuild diplomatic trust. News media reporting also provided opposition parties with an ideal tool to attack the government's policy failure. Grounded in credible reporting by the conventional news media, politicians carefully evaluate the government policy and shape their narratives in policy debates. Meanwhile, politicians also take advantage of scandalous news, such as the leak of confidential video clip, for the benefit of their political interests. Especially when the government leadership is directly in question, media reporting can be politicized. In this manner, the government and policymakers perceive pressure, based on conventional media reporting. Outlined in Figure 4.3, this model theorizes the mechanism through which citizen activism can influence both domestic and foreign policymaking.

Figure 4.3: Hybrid Model: The Conventional Media as a Translator



CONCLUSION

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Boat Collision Incident in September 2010 caused a foreign policy crisis between the PRC and Japan. While foreign policymakers on the both sides sought to recover their diplomatic relations, the confidential video leak on YouTube further deteriorated the situations by publicizing the video footage of the collision. Shared by numerous Internet users as well as the conventional news media, the video leak immediately led to a fierce criticism toward the Kan Cabinet's foreign policy mismanagement. Through the process tracing of this case, this chapter proposes an analytical model that theorizes a mechanism through which online citizen activism influences foreign policymaking. In this Hybrid Model, the Internet allows citizen activists to organize online movements to spread sensitive policy information. Observing such online citizen activism, the conventional news media evaluate the significance and problematize the topic to inform the public as well as policymakers. Based on these news

reports, policymakers shape their narratives toward the government policy in order to achieve their political goals. Meanwhile, the model indicates that whistleblowers can influence foreign policy by sharing confidential information and by creating domestic policy debates, mediated by the conventional newsmakers.

In the next chapter, I conduct another case study on unsuccessful popular movements that emerged following the Boat Collision Incident in September 2010. Through the comparative study of successful and unsuccessful citizen activism, the chapter provides a more complete picture of the collision incident and its political implications, while adding further details to my Hybrid Model.

CHAPTER FIVE: NEGLECTED CITIZEN GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM

Without the Internet, it was impossible to connect with those who share the frustration and the sense of crisis...but we are never satisfied with staying on the Internet. We start from there to go outside and protest on the streets.

— Zaitoku-Kai Branch Leader, *The Internet and Patriotism*

The previous chapter on the video leak highlights the central role of the conventional media in creating pressure on policymakers, while the Internet played a key role in spreading the confidential video clips beyond borders. That chapter also indicates that policy debates and news media reporting focused on the video leak itself as a political scandal without acknowledging the online movements to spread the leak. Despite the lack of attention, the Internet also served as a platform for people to exchange information, debate the territorial dispute, and organize these citizen demonstrations in response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. And yet, these grassroots efforts were barely acknowledged by policymakers. Unlike Isshiki's whistleblowing, these movements failed to impact foreign policy, even though thousands of people organized mass-protests and publicized their activities on the Internet. Why did those citizen grassroots groups fail? In order to answer this question, this chapter examines how Internet users responded to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in 2010, and how these grassroots movements integrated online space into their strategies. The next chapter builds on the results to study how the conventional media and policymakers reacted to

these movements, and why they paid limited attention to these forms of citizen activism. Drawing contrasts between the Isshiki's success and grassroots group's failures, Chapters Four, Five, and Six aim to theorize the conditions for successful citizen activism.

This chapter begins with an examination of people's reaction to the Boat Collision Incident in September 2010 by analyzing Social Networking Service (SNS) and video sharing services. By measuring the number of views, shares, and mentions on popular web platforms, I identify two prominent citizen movements that problematized the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, but with completely different approaches. In conclusion, I integrate the insights from this empirical study with the model constructed in the previous chapter while evaluating their strategies to influence foreign policymaking.

WHAT WAS HAPPENING ONLINE?

While conveying resentment against Japanese media's reserved coverage on protests in Japan, online platforms such as Twitter and YouTube became alternative outlets of opinion for activists. In order to understand what, how, and who participated in such online activism, this section examines the content and discourses shared in these prominent Internet platforms. I specifically study Twitter as one of the major social networking services (SNS) in Japan, while investigating YouTube¹ and Niconico Douga,² the two most popular online video platforms,³ also in light of the influence of these platforms in the video leak.

¹ Visit the website: <https://www.youtube.com/>.

² Visit the website: <http://www.nicovideo.jp/>.

³ 2013 *Research on Information Communication Media Usage and Information Behavior* (平成 25 年 情報通信メディアの利用時間と情報行動に関する調査<速報>) (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal

SHARING, INVESTIGATING, AND MONITORING ON TWITTER

Twitter offers an ideal SNS platform to spread information on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Defining its mission as “To give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly, without barriers,”⁴ Twitter circulates 500 million Tweets globally every day. Thanks to its interface design that focuses on posting, commenting, and sharing, its users post over 2,000 tweets containing “尖閣” (a unique term for Senkaku in Japanese) every day on average, and reaches up to 9,000 when a controversial event occurs during March 2015.⁵ Although Twitter is the fourth most popular SNS platforms in Japan as of 2013,⁶ it presents far more activities on the dispute than other platforms. In fact, the first three platforms, LINE, Google +, and Facebook, are not widely used to discuss the topic, although they each have larger user bases. LINE did not exist until 2011, and only provides messaging function that is unfit for spreading information to a large number of people. Hence, this research excludes LINE from its scope. Google + and Facebook have limited activities related to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. As of March 2015, the keyword search with “尖閣” (a unique term for Senkaku in Japanese) on Google + shows only 10 communities, the majority of which are actually operated by the conventional mass-media. Despite the broad use of “groups” and

Affairs and Communications of Japan, April 2014), 13, http://www.soumu.go.jp/iicp/chousakenkyu/data/research/survey/telecom/2014/h25mediariyou_1sokuhou.pdf.

⁴ “About Twitter, Inc. | About,” *Twitter About*, accessed April 2, 2015, <https://about.twitter.com/company>.

⁵ I analyzed the tweet records between February 15th and March 17th, 2015 to calculate the average. For this analysis, I used Topsy.com to access the record and calculate the average. The number of tweets skyrocketed on March 14, when the media reported that the PRC denied the legitimacy of Japan’s map as evidence of territorial sovereignty.

⁶ *2013 Research on Information Communication Media Usage and Information Behavior* (平成 25 年 情報通信メディアの利用時間と情報行動に関する調査<速報>), 6.


“pages,” a Facebook search with the same term leads only to 12 relevant feature pages, and 3 relevant groups. Therefore, I exclude these less relevant social networking services, LINE, Google +, and Facebook. Instead, my research focuses on Twitter, one of the largest and most active SNS platforms in Japan to debate the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute on the Internet.

In analyzing Twitter, I employ an online Twitter data archive, Topsy.com,⁷ to conduct filtered searches on old tweet posts. Unless noted otherwise, the number of “mentions” refers to the number of original Tweets, excluding the number of “Retweets.”⁸ By not counting “Retweets,” this research measures how many accounts actively spread the links by creating their own posts beyond just sharing the existing tweets. Furthermore, this method benefits my research by illuminating links and references that are shared and commented on by a large number of users. My analysis only examines tweets posted in the Japanese language without restricting the geographic locations of the users.

⁷ Topsy.com archives all tweets from 2006 to the present. It allows its users to search for specific terms and accounts , filtering the results by its level of influence.

⁸ For example, if I state the link was mentioned 50,000 times, far more than 50,000 Twitter posts must have been shared by retweets of these original posts.

Figure 5.1: SNS Usage in Japan (2014)⁹



Source: Data from 2013 Research on Information Communication Media Usage and Information Behavior, (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan, April 2014), 11, http://www.soumu.go.jp/iicp/chousakenkyu/data/research/survey/telecom/2014/h25media_riyou_1sokuhou.pdf.

First 48 Hours after the Leak

The Internet immediately responded to the video leak. As soon as Masaharu Isshiki, disguised on YouTube as “sengoku38,” uploaded the confidential videos around 9 p.m. on November 4th, Internet users started to spread the link. In 48 hours, over ten thousand original tweets cited the link to the YouTube video, implying that far more people saw the link in retweeted posts than had seen the original. Accompanied by text content that urges viewers to spread, save, and repost, Twitter users shared the video to protect the video from the authorities. By the midnight, online popular media, *Hamster*

⁹ Using 1,500 samples from 13-year-old to 69-year-old population living in Japan.

News (ハムスター速報)¹⁰ and *Gigazine*¹¹ reported the news with mirror versions of the leaked videos.¹² Meanwhile, the most widely cited conventional media, *Sankei Shimbun*, did not publish its first online article until 8 a.m. the next morning. Immediately after the leak, the Internet shared the leaked videos by spreading links, copying video files, and creating mirror videos. Moreover, the Internet-based popular websites such as *Hamster News* in fact covered the news much faster than the conventional media. However, it is also important to note that these online media platforms failed to supply additional information, while the *Sankei* article confirmed the authenticity of the video from its source in the Coast Guard. Therefore, the Internet media and conventional media complement each other in that the former provides timely reporting while the latter offers its additional information from credible sources.

Long Term Monitoring from September 2010 to February 2011

While Twitter rapidly diffused the leaked video before mainstream media broadcasts, long-term monitoring of Twitter feeds highlights people's frustrations against the conventional media's reporting. Mentioned in over 7,400 tweets, an influential news curation blog summarized the angry voices of net users.¹³ The article discussed that

¹⁰ According to its Twitter account (@hamusoku), the platform earns over 100 million views every month. Although this is not a trusted media source, the webpage is known for curating popular topics online mostly from the Bulletin Board System 2 Channel.

¹¹ Gigazine is known as one of the most popular news blog in Japan, attracting over 10 million views per month as of 2015 (<http://gigazine.net/news/about/>). In 2008, *The Guardian* nominated this webpage as one of the top 50 influential blogs in the world: <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/mar/09/blogs>.

¹² “【Breaking News】 Senkaku Video Leaked!! (【速報】 尖閣ビデオ流出!!),” *Hamster News*, November 5, 2010, <http://web.archive.org/web/20101106230741/http://hamusoku.com/archives/3735949.html>; *ibid.*

Japanese mainstream media's failure to report mass-protests despite the extensive coverage by the western media such as the *CNN*.¹⁴ As one of the quotes states, people "reconfirmed the terrible quality of the Japanese media, which ignored such an important event"¹⁵ by comparing responses by Japanese and foreign conventional media. In fact, Twitter users shared the reporting of foreign media thousands of times in the Japanese language. The *Wall Street Journal* article, "Tokyo Protests Blast China's Response to Collision," attracted 2,500 mentions, while the *CNN*'s "China Accused of Invading Disputed Islands" were cited in 4,800 tweets.¹⁶ Analogous to the situation where Twitter spread the leaked video to share "the truth," it also conveyed the distrust among Internet users toward coverage by the conventional media.

At the same time, Twitter reflects two opposite attitudes toward the conventional media coverage of mass-demonstrations. For some activists, online news articles by the conventional media became a battlefield, for their comment sections enabled serious debates between Japanese and Chinese supporters. Citing the *Wall Street Journal* article, a popular Twitter user and journalist with over 35,000 followers,¹⁷ Kohyu Nishimura (@kohyu1952) tweeted to encourage his followers to rebut anti-Japanese comments by

¹³ "2600 People Protests on Senkakus Issue in Shibuya' While the CNN Report, the Japanese Mass-Media....(「尖閣、渋谷 2600 人デモ」 CNN が報道する一方、日本のマスコミは...: 痛いニュース(/V`))," 痛いニュース(/V`), accessed April 2, 2015, <http://blog.livedoor.jp/dqnplus/archives/1550289.html>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "China Accused of Invading Disputed Islands - CNN.com," accessed April 2, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/02/japan.anti.china.protest/>; Yoree Koh, "Tokyo Protests Blast China's Response to Collision," *Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 2010, sec. World News, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704419504575527664218726440>.

¹⁷ As of March 22, 2015.

Chinese readers on the article webpage.¹⁸ In contrast to these attentive activists, the majority of users seem indifferent to the actual Japanese media spotlights on mass-demonstrations. While web users criticized the conventional media for its silence, they were also reluctant to share such reporting. Even when an online article by the *Sankei Shimbun* reported a demonstration on November 13th, only 154 tweets cited the link.¹⁹ Despite the web users' fierce response toward the arbitrary news selection, it does not necessarily mean that they are equally attentive to the mass-demonstrations. They paid significantly more attention to the suspected distortion of news reporting than they did to the general news on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. This gap suggests those Twitter users' general interests in monitoring the conventional media and policy failures. Arguably, their focus lied not only in sharing information, but also monitoring the failures of the conventional media.

Implications of Twitter Analysis

The analysis of Twitter illustrates how people reacted to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Rapidly spreading the leaked videos, Twitter encouraged the users to respond to the potential threat to the government's elimination of such content by copying, saving and reposting the videos. As the leak became publicized, the news media reported the incident. The Internet-based popular media immediately covered the news within just a few hours, while the conventional media reporting took longer in verifying

¹⁸ Kohyu Nishimura, Twitter post, October 6, 2010 (8:26 p.m.), accessed March 20, 2015, <https://twitter.com/kohyu1952>.

¹⁹ "APEC: 'Defend Senkaku!' 4000 Protest in Yokohama (【A P E C】「尖閣を守れ！」 4000人が横浜市内でデモ - MSN 産経ニュース)," *Sankei Shimbun*, November 14, 2010, <http://web.archive.org/web/20101114130741/http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/101113/plc1011132156023-n1.htm>.

information about the leak. Beside the video sharing movements, the analysis of Twitter data also underlines the mass-demonstrations neglected by the conventional media. By citing foreign media coverage and videos of protests, people expressed their frustrations against the media's underreporting of citizen protests against China and the government. In the next section, I proceed to study the videos posted on the Internet to problematize not only the government's policy but also the Japanese conventional media.

VIDEO PLATFORMS ANALYSES

Online video sharing webpages provide another important platform for citizen protestors and activists. The analysis of Twitter highlights the popularity of videos in sharing personal opinions, demonstrations, and the collision incident. Among a variety of the online video sharing services, YouTube and Niconico Douga, Japan's localized service similar to YouTube, are the top two most widely used services in Japan, with visits from over 50 percent of the Japanese population as of December 2013.²⁰ Thus, the analyses of YouTube and Niconico Douga offer indispensable clues to unveil online citizen activism on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Specifically, I measure the relative influence of posts in terms of view counts within a confined time period. Using the most general keyword "Senkaku" (尖閣), I examine videos posted during the six-month period between September 1st, 2010 and February 28th, 2011. Although the view counts are recorded as of March 22th, 2015, I eliminate posts that gained the majority of view counts outside this time frame by observing their statistics webpages. All these counts are measured as of March 22, 2015.

²⁰ 2013 *Research on Information Communication Media Usage and Information Behavior* (平成25年情報通信メディアの利用時間と情報行動に関する調査<速報>).

YouTube Discourse Analysis

The view counts of YouTube posts reflect the interests of the general Internet users regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. First, earning over 2.5 million views, a mirror version of the leaked video stands out as the most popular content.²¹ Several other versions also are ranked highly, signifying the public's interest in watching the original video content.²² Second, other well-watched videos present summaries of the collision incident, video leak, and reactions in China.²³ Several anonymous web users combined and edited reporting by various mainstream television channels in order to create a brief summary on each topic. Finally, the conventional media posted some of the most popular videos, showing their presence extended outside television and print media.²⁴ These trends indicate that web viewers are interested in watching the original sources such as

²¹ *Senkaku Collision Video A (尖閣衝突ビデオ A)*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PO3icKluj7o&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

²² *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.3 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 3)*, 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5W5I0xkRsE>; *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.4 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 4)*, 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k5IgLyp2YY>; *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.5 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 5)*, 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hXI0DwLxOhA>.

²³ **【Senkaku】 Evidence Discovered in China Supports Japan's Territorial Sovereignty (【尖閣】 中国から日本の領土という資料が発見)**, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bFgg_n20c1k&feature=youtube_gdata_player; *Summary of Chinese People's Reaction to the Senkaku Video (尖閣ビデオを見た中国人の反応 簡易まとめ)*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Xw1sQ35IW8&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

²⁴ *Senkaku Video Leak: Collision Seen from Another Coastguard Vessel (尖閣ビデオ流出 別の巡視船からも衝突確認 Senkaku)*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5QIMswbRRFs&feature=youtube_gdata_player; *Intense Patrol in the Disputed Waters: Coastguard Vessel Operates Side by Side with Chinese Monitoring Ships (緊迫の尖閣沖 海保巡視船、中国漁業監視船にピタリ)*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EEVDjNaPHFs&feature=youtube_gdata_player; *Senkaku Video Leaked: Chinese Fishing Boat Collision in Film (尖閣ビデオが流出か 中国漁船が衝突の映像 Senkaku)*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVVM2AmvD5U&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

the leaked video, while they are at the same time eager to access credible summary of overall situations.

However, most of these videos are either copied or recreated from already existing content. Few popular posts are independently filmed and created by YouTube posters. Earning over 390,000 views, one Chinese user posted a video clip on his comments to the leaked video.²⁵ Titled as “I, as a Chinese, comment on the Senkaku issue” (中国人の僕が尖閣について発言する), one post films a young male Chinese figure speaking to the Japanese viewers in the Japanese language. On the other hand, several videos depicted anti-China and anti-government demonstrations. Created by Ganbare Nippon members and affiliated media channel, those videos filmed their protests against the government and China’s aggression, which earned over 300,000 views.²⁶ While the posters did not film most of the popular videos, several activists created their original videos to convey their message. Among them, rallies and demonstrations by Ganbare Nippon attract significant attention on YouTube as well as on Twitter.

Niconico Douga Discourse Analysis

On Niconico Douga, just like on YouTube, online activists cited foreign media reporting to compare with the Japanese news reports,²⁷ while sharing the leaked video of

²⁵ *I, as a Chinese, Comment on the Senkaku Issue* (中国人の僕が尖閣について発言する), 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07nmE2Nm7tk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

²⁶ *10.2 Condemn China’s Aggression on the Senkaku Islands! National Action! (10/2) Tokyo, Shibuya (10. 2 中国の尖閣諸島侵略糾弾！全国国民統一行動 (10/2) 東京・渋谷)*, 2010, 2, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrrYUDqrjkb&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

²⁷ “How Were China’s Anti-Japanese Riots Reported by International Media? (中国の反日暴動を海外メディアは?)”, *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm18913639>.

the collision incident.²⁸ The films of mass-demonstrations also attracted many views, as Ganbare Nippon's demonstration in Shibuya attracted over 100,000 views and 30,000 comments.²⁹ A series of posts emphasized how Japanese conventional media underreported the protests by titling "Amazing Scale of Protests!"³⁰ At the same time, widely commented videos on Nico Nico Douga often present sensational content to attract attention. Mainly organized by an ultra-nationalist group Zaitoku-Kai (在日特権を許さない市民の会), one video portrayed attacks against Japanese electronic shops that allegedly favored Chinese customers.³¹ While Zaitoku-Kai's posts once dominated Nico Nico Douga for its radicalized racist content, all of these videos were removed in March 2015 in the group's new policy to establish their own media channel.

While Nico Nico Douga shows results similar to YouTube, it also signifies the popularity of more sensational, radicalized videos. Also known as the platform for popular culture, Nico Nico Douga also features parody videos for entertainment, rather than seriously discussing the social issue.³² In this respect, Nico Nico Douga provides

²⁸ "Collision! Gourmet Race (衝突! グルメレース)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12652306>; "【Copied From YouTube】 The Senkaku Islands Fishing Boat Collision Incident Video Full Version (【YouTube 転載】 尖閣諸島漁船衝突事件ビデオ 全編バージョン)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12650848>; "Real Senkaku Coastguard ver.1 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁1)," *Niconico Video*, 1, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12648731>.

²⁹ "10.2 Condemn China's Aggression on the Senkaku Islands! National Action! (10/2) Tokyo, Shibuya (10. 2 中国の尖閣諸島侵略糾弾! 全国国民統一行動 (10/2) 東京・渋谷)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12302918>.

³⁰ "【Senkaku Protest in Yokohama】 Amazing Scale of the Protest! (【尖閣デモ in 横浜】 参加人数にビックリ!)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12736621>; "【Senkaku Protest in Shibuya】 Amazing Scale of the Protest! (【尖閣デモ in 渋谷】 参加した人数にビックリ!)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12310081>.

³¹ "Condemn Sofmap to Protect the Senkakus!! (尖閣諸島を守るためにソフマップに突撃!!)," *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12478093>.

online activists with a new channel to raise awareness of those who are not necessarily politically active.

CYBERSPACE: SHARE, MONITOR, AND SELF-PROMOTE

This case study on Twitter, YouTube, and Niconico Douga sheds lights on three characteristics of web users' response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. First, the Internet platforms exercised their ability to diffuse digital materials and protect the sensitive files from being deleted by the authorities. Second, those platforms helped people monitor the conventional media reporting as well as policymakers. While criticizing the government's handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, web users also attacked the conventional media when they perceived unfair treatment of mass-demonstrations. Finally, although many popular videos turned out to be recreations of existing materials, some citizen grassroots groups utilized the video sharing platforms to promote their demonstrations, targeting broader audiences. In particular, two organizations stand out in their online presence: Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai. Ganbare Nippon earns the highest view counts on both YouTube and Niconico Douga as a mass-demonstration organizer, while Zaitoku-Kai's violent, sensational videos provoke discussion on

³² “【Summary】 Senkaku Video Leaked. What Happened in the 2 Channel.....(【まとめ】尖閣動画流出。その時、2ちゃんねるは・・・),” *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12665079>; “【Anime Parody】 This Is Senkaku Kume Island Police Box (【こち亀】こちら尖閣諸島久場島沖派出所【BGM】),” *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12650841>; “【Copied From YouTube】 The Senkaku Islands Fishing Boat Collision Incident Video Full Version (【YouTube 転載】尖閣諸島漁船衝突事件ビデオ全編バージョン),” “Chinese Fishing Boat Got Mad (中国漁船が吹っ切れた),” *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12654318>; “【Hardcore】 Leaked Senkaku Video: REMIX Version(【Hardcore】尖閣諸島流出動画をREMIXしてみた),” *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/sm12651170>; “The Music When Suneo Crashes Boats near the Senkaku Islands (Full Version) (スネ夫が尖閣諸島で船を衝突させるときに流れている曲(フル),” *Niconico Video*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.nicovideo.jp/watch/nm12653180>.

Niconico Douga. Filming offline events, these videos highlight self-promotion efforts by citizen grassroots movements, which use online and offline spaces for their activism.

Therefore, in order to examine how these groups use the Internet as part of their political activities, the next section investigates these two groups' strategies.

Table 5.1: “Senkaku” Search Result Rank on YouTube

Rank	Video Title	View Counts	Content
1	Senkaku Collision Video A (尖閣衝突ビデオ A) ³³	2.5 Million	Summary of leaked video reposted after the original versions were deleted.
2	Senkaku Video Leak: Collision Seen from Another Coastguard Vessel (尖閣ビデオ流出 別の巡視船からも衝突確認 Senkaku) ³⁴	801K	Uploaded on November 4 th by Sankei News.
3	Real Senkaku Coastguard ver.4 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 4) ³⁵	649K	Repost of the leaked video.
4	Real Senkaku Coastguard ver.5 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 5) ³⁶	540K	Repost of the leaked video.
5	Intense Patrol in the Disputed Waters: Coastguard Vessel Operates Side by Side with Chinese Monitoring Ships (緊迫の尖閣沖 海保巡視船、中国漁業監視船にピタリ) ³⁷	518K	Videos of the Japanese coastguard patrolling near Chinese monitor boat, posted on September 28 th by Asahi Shimbun.

³³ *Senkaku Collision Video A (尖閣衝突ビデオ A)*.

³⁴ *Senkaku Video Leak: Collision Seen from Another Coastguard Vessel (尖閣ビデオ流出 別の巡視船からも衝突確認 Senkaku)*.

³⁵ *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.4 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 4)*.

³⁶ *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.5 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 5)*.

³⁷ *Intense Patrol in the Disputed Waters: Coastguard Vessel Operates Side by Side with Chinese Monitoring Ships (緊迫の尖閣沖 海保巡視船、中国漁業監視船にピタリ)*.

6	Senkaku Video Leaked: Chinese Fishing Boat Collision in Film (尖閣ビデオが流出か 中国漁船が衝突の映像 Senkaku) ³⁸	516K	Summary video of the collision, posted on November 4 th by Sankei News.
7	Real Senkaku Coastguard ver.3 (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 3) ³⁹	514K	Video 3 of the leaked file.
8	【Fake Subtitles】 German Television Broadcasts Anti-Chinese Senkaku Invasion Demonstrations in Shibuya 【MAD】 (【嘘字幕】ドイツのテレビが中国の尖閣侵略抗議・渋谷デモを【MAD】) ⁴⁰	488K	Parody movie to make fun of Japanese media for ignoring large scale protests in Japan, while covering those in China.
9	【Senkaku】 Evidence Discovered in China Supports Japan's Territorial Sovereignty (【尖閣】 中国から日本の領土という資料が発見) ⁴¹	467K	Summary video of different television reporting on the territorial dispute.
10	Summary of Chinese People's Reaction to the Senkaku Video (尖閣ビデオを見た中国人の反応 簡易まとめ) ⁴²	413K	Summary video of different television coverage on Chinese public reaction to the video leak. The clip includes interviews in China.

³⁸ *Senkaku Video Leaked: Chinese Fishing Boat Collision in Film* (尖閣ビデオが流出か 中国漁船が衝突の映像 Senkaku).

³⁹ *Real Senkakus Coastguard ver.3* (本当の尖閣 海上保安庁 3).

⁴⁰ *【Fake Subtitles】 German Television Broadcasts Anti-Chinese Senkaku Invasion Demonstrations in Shibuya* (【嘘字幕】ドイツのテレビが中国の尖閣侵略抗議・渋谷デモを【MAD】), 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmJYZvaXamk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

⁴¹ *【Senkaku】 Evidence Discovered in China Supports Japan's Territorial Sovereignty* (【尖閣】 中国から日本の領土という資料が発見).

⁴² *Summary of Chinese People's Reaction to the Senkaku Video* (尖閣ビデオを見た中国人の反応 簡易まとめ).

Table 5.2: “Senkaku” Search Results Rank on Niconico Douga

Rank	Video Title	View Counts	Content
1	Collision! Gourmet Race (衝突！グルメレース)	866K	A parodied one-minute summary film of the leaked video.
2	【Summary】 Senkaku Video Leaked. What Happened in the 2 Channel..... (【まとめ】尖閣動画流出。その時、2ちゃんねるは・・・)	470K	Parody video posted two days after the video leak. It features how Japanese BBS website 2 Channel users reacted to the whistleblowing. Posted by an anonymous user.
3	The Music when Suneo Crashes Boats near the Senkaku Islands (Full Version) (スネ夫が尖閣諸島で船を衝突させるときに流れている曲(フル))	353K	Parody movie based on the leaked video and popular Japanese anime.
4	【Anime Parody】 This is Senkaku Kume Island Police Box (【こち亀】こちら尖閣諸島久場島沖派出所【BGM】)	243K	Parody movie based on the leaked video and popular Japanese anime.
5	The Senkaku Islands Fishing Boat Collision Incident (「せんかくしょとうぎょせんしょうとつじけん」)	219K	Parody movie based on the leaked video.
6	Chinese Fishing Boat God Mad! (中国漁船が吹っ切れた)	201K	Parody movie based on the leaked video.
7	【Hardcore】 Leaked Senkaku Video: REMIX Version (【Hardcore】尖閣諸島流出動画をREMIXしてみた)	162K	Parody movie based on the leaked video.
8	Real Senkaku Coastguard ver.1 (本当の尖閣海上保安庁1)	155K	Mirror video of the leaked video 1.
9	【Copied From YouTube】 The Senkaku Islands Fishing Boat Collision Incident Video Full Version (【YouTube 転載】尖閣諸島漁船衝突事件ビデオ全編バージョン)	150K	Full-version of leaked video, uploaded by an anonymous user.
10	How Foreign Media Reacted to Anti-Japanese Protests in China? (中国の反日暴動を海外メディアは?)	145K	Edited television news reporting by British, French, German, Australian, Russian, Singaporean, and Hong Kong media. Posted by an anonymous user.

CITIZEN GRASSROOTS GROUPS AND THE NEW MEDIA

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute created a battlefield for diverse nationalist, conservative citizen organizations with different political agendas. The analysis of Twitter content underscores the peoples' support in mass-demonstrations and their anger against the media's underreporting. In this section, I specifically study two influential grassroots groups: Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee (頑張れ日本！全国行動委員会) and Citizens against Special Privilege for Naturalized Koreans, or simply Zaitoku-Kai (在日特権を許さない市民の会). Adopting very different organizational styles, the two groups attracted public attention in both traditional media coverage and Internet platforms. By analyzing their strategies to organize nationwide grassroots movements, this section aims to explain how these offline activists use the Internet to involve greater participants. In conclusion, I underscore the role of the media in expanding such projects.

GANBARE NIPPON! NATIONAL ACTION COMMITTEE

Established in February 2010, the Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee aims to “cheer up”⁴³ (“Ganbare”) and reform Japan's society in crisis through the efforts of ordinary Japanese people. The movement has conducted rallies and demonstrations across Japan to raise public awareness on varying issues from national security to disaster relief. The leadership of the organization is composed of conservative, rightwing activists with different career backgrounds. For example, one of the two founders, Toshio

⁴³ The term, “Ganbare,” is a common phrase to cheer up others in Japanese. Hence, “Ganbare Japan!” is directly translated as “Cheer up Japan!”

Tamogami is well known as a former Air Self Defense Force Chief, who was expelled from the office by publishing radical opinions on Japan's defense policy in 2008.⁴⁴ The other founder, Satoru Mizushima, is a filmmaker by profession. He is also famous for his controversial works that question the traditional perception of Japan's history such as the Nanjing Massacre in 1937.⁴⁵ He also runs his own cable television channel, "Japanese Culture Channel Sakura" (日本文化チャンネル桜). While engaging diverse conservative political groups from the LDP to Tibetan activists, Ganbare Nippon exercises a significant presence within Japan's conservative political space.

The power of localized grassroots activists is central to Ganbare Nippon's vision to reform Japan. According to their mission statement, those activists are willing to "cry for their friends and comrades, sweat for their families, and bleed for their nation."⁴⁶ Their organization's motto, "Soumou Kukki" (草莽崛起) is literally translated as "the rise of grassroots activists" or "the rise of ordinary people," who are normally working outside public offices and stand up to save the country in difficult times. Originally coined by a rebellious political leader who confronted the Tokugawa Shogunate to start Japan's Meiji Reformation in the 19th century, the slogan of "the rise of grassroots" underscores their ideological ties with Japan's historical reformers who spoke to the public, rather than those in power. By encouraging ordinary citizens to take collective

⁴⁴ Kirk Spitzer, "This Is the Extreme Right Wing Japanese Politician Who Has a Lot of People Worried," *Time*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://world.time.com/2014/02/13/toshio-tamogami-japanese-right/>.

⁴⁵ "Look Back in Anger," *The Japan Times*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2007/12/06/films/look-back-in-anger/>.

⁴⁶ "Mission Statement (綱領・設立主旨)," *Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee*, February 25, 2010, <http://www.ganbare-nippon.net/official.html>.

actions, Ganbare Nippon aims to incorporate a new group of individuals who are also worried about Japan's "crisis of losing our state sovereignty and nationhood."⁴⁷

The political stance of Ganbare Nippon is not at all abnormal or extreme in the context of Japan's traditional conservative movements. Their general sense of crisis is framed rather broadly, as it states "Japan has neither moral principles nor a national goal to survive this time of global turbulence."⁴⁸ For them, the problem of Japan is twofold: domestic and international. In "time of global turbulence," rising powers start to contest each other, jeopardizing the national security and urging all Japanese to unite together. However, Japan's social and moral decay at the domestic level makes it difficult to defend the nation from external threat, as Ganbare Nippon emphasizes

Beside the economic prosperity, we have lost our traditional culture inherited from the ancestors. We have forgotten, or even humiliated, the history to be proud of. We have lost our resolution to defend our country and to devote ourselves to society. And, our society now suffers from the prevalent tendency to care only about self-interest and pleasure.⁴⁹

As observed in this passage, their mission statement attributes the lost glory of Japan to people's indifference to the Japanese identity, culture and history, lamenting their lack of patriotism to devote their lives to the public good. Promoting nationalistic patriotism, the organization inherited a particular vision of national history from other nationalist movements. As the Association for Japanese History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会) started a movement to denounce Japan's postwar historical narrative in the 1990s, Ganbare Nippon also calls for the reexamination of Japan's historical

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

narrative. The issue of security and defense also resonates with the conservative political discourse that Japan's true recovery from the post-WWII starts from easing the constitutional prohibition of both maintenance and exercise of forces,⁵⁰ discussed extensively in Chapter Three. Hence, framed in a milder tone of patriotism and conservatism, Ganbare Nippon inherits many agendas from the past movements. As evident in its mission statement, Ganbare Nippon does not present any narrowly defined organizational agenda. Instead, its message speaks to the broad range of patriots among ordinary citizens by alluding only to generally conservative values.

Ganbare Nippon hosts rallies and protests to address a wide array of political agenda, attracting hundreds to thousands of protestors. The video records of protests show a diverse demography of participants, younger and older generations, male and female, professional activists as well as citizens with their children.⁵¹ Their activity records from July 2010 to June 2011, the one-year period when the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute brought heated political debate, indicate a wide array of political aspirations. Table 5.3 below shows the list of the group's activities from July 2010 to June 2011, which are all uploaded on their website with photos and videos along with brief text summaries.⁵² In analyzing their activities, I group these protests into three categories. First, the rightwing conservative agenda addresses the reinterpretation of national history, in particular Japan's war guilt, while condemning "leftwing" movements as undermining

⁵⁰ Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No: Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals*, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

⁵¹ 【Ganbare Nippon】11.6 Freedom and Human Rights United Asian Nations Rally – Demonstration [Sakura 2010/11/9] (【頑張れ日本】11.6 自由と人権アジア連帯集会 – デモ行進[桜 H22/11/9]), 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U1YBM2AFY2s&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

⁵² “Activity Report 2010 Jul-Dec (活動報告 平成 22 年後期),” *Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee*, n.d., http://www.ganbare-nippon.net/22_2.html.

of Japan's social values, such as respect for the royal family. The second category deals with anti-DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) government movements, particularly concerning its diplomatic failures in defending Japan's territorial sovereignty and its negotiation to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Third, the majority of the protests attack China's aggressive foreign policy. Combining different angles from the suppression of freedom, to China's hegemony over Asia, to invasion of the disputed islands, rallies and demonstrations vehemently directed the public's anger against China. Even though the rejection of dictatorship and fascism traditionally belonged to the leftwing position, the movement also adopted the discourse along with Taiwanese, Mongolian, and Tibetan activists in Japan. As much as their mission statement presents a mild, inclusive tone, Ganbare Nippon hosts protests against various social issues.

While providing a collective platform for protesters over many issues, Ganbare Nippon cooperates closely with other political organizations. Leveraging its broad agenda of defending national security and countering China's hegemony, the group attracts many issue-specific movements to amplify their voices together on varying policy agendas. In addition to typical conservative activist groups such as the Japan Public Opinion Association and Rational Opinion Association (日本世論の会・正論の会), Asian political movements from Taiwan, Uyghur, Vietnam, Mongolia, Tibet, and Bengal also joined the rally against the PRC. The participants are not confined to anti-China and rightwing activists. Renowned movements such as the Sukuu-Kai National Committee (救う会全国協議会)⁵³ participated to save victims of North Korea's abduction of

⁵³ "Sukuu Kai: National Committee to Save Japanese Victims of North Korean Abduction(救う会：北朝鮮に拉致された日本人を救出するための全国協議会)," *Sukuu-Kai*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.sukuukai.jp/>.

Japanese citizens. The wide array of activities shed lights on Ganbare Nippon's characteristics as policy discussion forum, rather than a unitary conservative organization. Grounded in its flexible policy agenda, Ganbare Nippon acts as the effective host of diverse grassroots movements that share a similar political agenda.

Table 5.3: Protest Record by Ganbare Nippon between July 2010 and June 2011

Date	Title	Participants ⁵⁴	Agenda
7/31/2010	Stop Destruction of Japan! Return North Korea's Abduction Victims! Defend Japan! National Action (日本解体阻止! 拉致被害者奪還! 守るぞ日本! 国民大行動 in 渋谷)	N.A.	North Korea's Abduction of Japanese citizens
8/15/2010	March to Yasukuni Shrine to Thank Souls of War Victims (英霊に感謝し靖国神社を敬う国民行進)	300	History and War Guilt
8/15/2010	Counter-Rally for Monitoring Anti-Emperor!/Anti-Yasukuni! Protests (反天皇!・反靖国! デモ監視 (抗議) 行動)	N.A.	Anti-Leftwing, Royal Family, History and War Guilt
9/21/2010	National Rally: Condemn the DPJ Government! (「民主党政権・糾弾!」国民集会)	Over 500	Anti-DPJ Government
10/2/2010	10.2 All National United Action: Condemn China's Invasion of the Senkaku Islands! (10.2 中国の尖閣諸島侵略糾弾! 全国国民統一行動)	Over 2,600	Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute
10/16/2010	Surround the PRC Embassy! Condemn Invasion of the Senkakus! National Emergency Action (10.16 中国大使館包囲! 尖閣侵略糾弾! 緊急国民行動)	Over 3,200	Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute

⁵⁴ The number of participants reported by Ganbare Nippon.

11/6/2010	<p>Liberty and Peace for Asia in Hibiya Park! “Solidarity for Freedom and Human Rights in Asia” Condemn Invasion of the Senkakus! Condemn China’s Militarist Hegemony in Asia! Release Chinese Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo!</p> <p>(日比谷公でアジアに自由と平和を！「自由と人権 アジア連帯集会」 尖閣諸島侵略糾弾！中国のアジア軍事覇権糾弾！「ノーベル平和賞」劉曉波氏の釈放を！ & デモ)</p>	Over 4,500 (Rally 4,000 / Demonstration 4,500)	Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute, Asia’s Freedom and Peace, Anti-Chinese Hegemony
11/13/2010	<p>Counter Rally against China’s Invasion of Asia & Suppression of Human Rights (中国のアジア侵略・人権弾圧を阻止する抗議デモ)</p>	3,500 (Rally 2,500 / Demonstration 3,500)	Asia’s Freedom and Peace, Anti-China’s Hegemony
11/14/2010	<p>Demonstration for Freedom and Peace for Asia! Condemn Hu Jintao and Invasion of the Senkakus!</p> <p>(アジアに自由と平和を！中国（胡錦濤）のアジアと尖閣諸島侵略糾弾！街頭宣伝活動 in 横浜)</p>	1,400	Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute, Asia’s Freedom and Peace, Anti-Chinese Hegemony
11/20/2010	<p>Condemn China’s Invasion of the Senkakus in Osaka (中国の尖閣諸島侵略糾弾！全国国民統一行動 in 大阪)</p>	3,300	Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute
12/1/2010	<p>Protest: “Defeat DPJ Kan Cabinet”! 12.1 “Surround National Diet, Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office” National March and Rally (「民主党（菅）内閣」倒閣宣言！12. 1 「国会・首相官邸包囲」国民大行進&国民大集会)</p>	2,000 (Rally 1,100 / Demonstration 2,000)	Anti-DPJ Government
12/18/2010	<p>Defeat “DPJ (Kan) Cabinet”! Condemn Anti-Royal Family Movements! Stop China’s Invasion of the Senkakus! National Action Rally (「民主党（菅）内閣」打倒！皇室冒瀆糾弾！中国の尖閣諸島侵略阻止！国民大行動 in 渋谷)</p>	4,000	Anti-DPJ Government, Royal Family Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute

1/29/2011	<p>“Gambare Nippon!” 1 Year Anniversary, 1.29 Anti-TPP Rally! Defend the Senkakus from China’s Occupation! Defeat DPJ (Kan) Cabinet! Move toward “The Third Wave”! National March and Assembly (「頑張れ日本！」設立一周年 1. 29 亡国「TPP」絶対阻止！中国尖閣占拠絶対阻止！民主党（菅）内閣打倒！「第三の潮流」へ！国民大行進&国民決起集会)</p>	1,900 (Rally 1,900 / Demonstration 1,700)	Anti-TPP, Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute, Anti-DPJ Government
2/26/2011	<p>2.26 Stand up for the Nation! “Anti-Dictatorship” “Anti-Fascist” National Rally, Freedom and Peace for Asia! Defeat DPJ’s Kan Cabinet! Stop China’s Invasion of the Senkakus, Taiwan, and Asia! (2.26 決起せよ！「反独裁」「反ファシズム」山手線一周国民ラリー アジアに自由と平和を！菅民主党政権打倒！中国の尖閣・台湾・アジア侵略阻止！)</p>	N.A.	Anti-Dictatorship/Fascism, Asia’s Freedom and Peace, Anti-DPJ Government, Anti-Chinese Hegemony, Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute
5/11/2011	<p>Surround the Parliament! Defeat DPJ’s Kan Cabinet is the First Step to Rebuild Japan! National Action and Rally (国会代包囲！日本復興の第一歩は菅民主党内閣打倒！国民行動&国民大集会)</p>	N.A.	Anti-DPJ Government
5/21- 2/2011	<p>National Rally: Protest against the PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s Visit to Japan! (温家宝首相来日反対！国民大行動)</p>	N.A.	Anti-Chinese Leadership
6/1/2011	<p>National Emergency Rally: Defeat Kan Cabinet by the Hands of People (菅内閣を国民の手で打倒せよ！緊急国民行動)</p>	N.A.	Anti-DPJ Government
6/25/2011	<p>National Rally: Defeat Kan Cabinet as the First Step to Rebuild Japan (日本復興の第一歩は菅内閣打倒！国民行動 in 渋谷)</p>	N.A.	Anti-DPJ Government
6/30/2011	<p>Symposium to Think about Japan’s Future: Should We Trust the DPJ government? (民主党に政府を任せていいのか？！日本の未来を考えるシンポジウム)</p>	N.A.	Anti-DPJ Government

Source: Data from “Activity Report 2010 Jul-Dec.” Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee, n.d. http://www.ganbarenippon.net/22_2.html; “Activity Report 2011 Jan-Jun.” Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee, n.d. http://www.ganbarenippon.net/23_1.html.

Hybrid Strategy: Politicians and the Media within the “Grassroots”

The collaborative strategy of Ganbare Nippon also extends beyond grassroots activism to policymakers and the conventional media. The activity records⁵⁵ also indicate that their rallies involved politicians at the local and national levels, as well as traditional media journalists. In anti-DPJ rallies, former Prime Minister⁵⁶ Shinzo Abe and several prominent political figures such as the Head of Stand Up Japan Party Takeo Hiranuma, and former Defense Minister Yuriko Koike made speeches. In addition, a few other parliament members attended their event, including those who questioned the DPJ’s handling of foreign policy in the National Diet. Ganbare Nippon also orchestrates a group of local politicians, the Grassroots National Association of Local Congress Members (草莽全国地方議員の会),⁵⁷ led by Metropolitan Ward Assembly member Yoshiko Matsuura, who is also the Secretary General of Ganbare Nippon and one of the founding members of nationalist news channel, “Sakura Channel.” Calling themselves as a “grassroots” association, many local level politicians, in the Metropolitan Ward Assembly and the Town Council members, gather for the events. Furthermore, the events were not closed to incumbent members: several former National Diet members, mayors, and local officeholders stood in front of the protestors. As these examples indicate, Ganbare Nippon actively incorporates policymakers in their movement in contrast to their emphasis on “the rise of grassroots.”

⁵⁵ “Activity Report 2010 Jul-Dec (活動報告 平成 22 年後期)”; “Activity Report 2011 Jan-Jun (活動報告 平成 23 年前期)”, *Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee*, n.d., http://www.ganbare-nippon.net/23_1.html.

⁵⁶ Shinzo Abe served as Prime Minister between 2006 and 2007, and was reelected to the office in 2012. In 2010, he was a member of the LDP, the largest opposition party in the National Diet.

⁵⁷ “Soumou Local Policymakers Association (草莽全国地方議員の会)”, *Soumou Local Policymakers Association*, n.d., <http://www.soumou.info/>.

Ganbare Nippon works closely with the media and opinion leaders. Although the mainstream conventional media in Japan found little of interest to it, the movement complements its lack of media coverage by growing its own media apparatus in partnership with Japanese Culture Channel Sakura. Established by Satoru Mizushima, one of the two founders of Ganbare Nippon, this channel started as “Japan’s first satellite broadcasting service dedicated to...recover the Japanese spirit.”⁵⁸ The public protests, lectures, and programs of Ganbare Nippon are linked directly to the Channel Sakura. This content are also broadcasted on their regular television programs as well as webpages. The supporter’s page lists dozens of corporate executives, professors, politicians, and activists. Among them, Tokyo University Professor Emeritus Keiichiro Kobori (小堀桂一郎), and Kyoto University Professor Emeritus Terumasa Nakanishi (中西輝政) are particularly famous as hardline opinion leaders on history issues, such as the content of history textbooks, Tokyo War Crime Tribunal, and the revision of the constitution. Hence, through its direct connection with the media outlet, Channel Sakura, Ganbare Nippon access Japan’s conservative opinion leaders and the conservative political communities.

Finally, while complementing the lack of media attention with its own media apparatus, Ganbare Nippon and Channel Sakura launch collaborative attacks against the mainstream media along with conservative opinion leaders and the resentful public. In 2009, Channel Sakura’s President Mizushima, representing over 8,000 individuals, filed a lawsuit against the public television service, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), for

⁵⁸ “About Channel Sakura (チャンネル桜について),” *Channel Sakura*, n.d., <http://www.ch-sakura.jp/about.html>.

inaccurate reporting and distortion of Japan's history.⁵⁹ In 2014, led by Sophia University Professor Emeritus Shouichi Watabe (渡部昇一) and Channel Sakura President Mizushima, over 20,000 citizens filed a lawsuit against the *Asahi Shimbun*, one of Japan's largest newspaper and television media groups in order to "clear out the anti-Japanese media from our nation to 'recover Japan.'"⁶⁰ In both cases, the claim emphasizes distorted reporting caused the self-humiliation of national historical narratives, unjustly deteriorated Japanese identity and ancestors. Moreover, they cast fundamental doubt on the role of the conventional media as watchdogs, stating, "We need to teach *Asahi Shimbun* that we do not tolerate the freedom of fabricated reporting and fake propaganda."⁶¹ Therefore, the organization not only developed its own conventional and online media outlets to increase its media presence, but it also campaigned against the mainstream media for its biased, untrustworthy reporting. In other words, they compete with the conventional media in a rivalry relation to influence and interpret public opinion.

Self-identified as a "grassroots" movement representing ordinary people, Ganbare Nippon has two faces in its strategy. On the one hand, the group orchestrates mass-demonstrations and rallies offline while spreading the movements online. On the other hand, it opens up its platforms to prominent politicians and opinion leaders to pursue their political projects, which often condemn the conventional media. Combined with its own television and Internet broadcasting apparatus, Ganbare Nippon builds a

⁵⁹ "About NHK 10,000 People Collective Law Suit (NHK 一万人・集団訴訟のご案内 - NHK が上告しました！)," *Channel Sakura*, December 12, 2013, <http://www.ch-sakura.jp/topix/1054.html>.

⁶⁰ "National Committee to Accuse Asahi Shimbun 朝日新聞を糺す国民会議," *Asahi Tadasu Kai*, accessed April 3, 2015, <http://www.asahi-tadasukai.jp/>.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

comprehensive campaigning scheme that incorporates each actor: citizens through their online and offline activities, the conventional media through the Channel Sakura, and policymakers through hosting political rallies. This strategy reflects Ganbare Nippon's understanding that the mobilization of the public cannot create policy change without support by the traditional media and politicians. Even though the group claims to be a grassroots movement, its hierarchical operation model argues for the relevance of the conventional media and policymakers.

THE SENSATIONALISM OF ZAITOKU-KAI

In contrast to the multilayered organizational structure of Ganbare Nippon, Citizens against Special Privilege for Naturalized Koreans, or simply Zaitoku-Kai, (在日特権を許さない市民の会) presents a more horizontal grassroots structure. Known as an extremist, anti-foreigner movement that promotes racist speech in public demonstrations, Zaitoku-Kai also conducted a series of protests against China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.⁶² While explaining that the group was modeled after the Tea Party in the US, Makoto Sakurai (桜井 誠) leads his group of “conservatives who take action” (行動する保守).⁶³ While mobilizing over 15,000 members to initiate anti-foreigner demonstrations,⁶⁴ Zaitoku-Kai aims to abolish “Special Arrangements for Koreans in Japan” (在日特権) granted by the Japanese government in offering subsidies and

⁶² “Anti-Korean ‘Hate Speech’ Rallies Continue in Kyoto,” *AJW by The Asahi Shimbun*, December 11, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201412110009.

⁶³ Koichi Yasuda, *The Internet and Patriotism (ネットと愛国)* (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 2012).

⁶⁴ Alleged number of members as of March 20, 2015. See the exact figure in their official webpage: <http://www.zaitokukai.info>.

citizenships.⁶⁵ At the same time, their hostile actions are also directed toward Japanese who support such social systems and jeopardize Japan's security by believing in self-humiliating war guilt and accepting unequal treatments of foreigners. In other words, their enemies are Japanese people who belong to "anti-Japan cohorts" (反日勢力) as well as the Korean community in Japan (在日).

In response to the Boat Collision Incident in 2010, Zaitoku-Kai extended its anger to Chinese. In his blog article following the incident, Zaitoku-Kai leader Sakurai urged readers to "eliminate anti-Japan cohorts and defend the nation from external enemies,"⁶⁶ while expressing his concerns that "anti-Japan cohorts" may prevent them from protecting Japan. The blog records that Zaitoku-Kai has conducted five demonstrations against the boat collision.⁶⁷ Moreover, Zaitoku-Kai's webpage also shows his movement spread all across Japan: Sapporo,⁶⁸ Sendai,⁶⁹ Osaka,⁷⁰ Hiroshima,⁷¹ and Fukuoka.⁷² On

⁶⁵ "Introduction to Zaitoku-Kai (在日特権を許さない市民の会 - 挨拶)," *Zaitoku-Kai*, December 5, 2006, <http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/about/zai/speech.html>.

⁶⁶ Makoto Sakurai, "China's Strategy over the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島をめぐる支那の思惑)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, September 18, 2010, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10651484307.html>.

⁶⁷ Makoto Sakurai, "Announcement: 9.25 Anti-Chinese Communists Protest (『【お知らせ】 9・25 シナ中共への緊急抗議活動』)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, September 24, 2010, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10657275280.html>; Makoto Sakurai, "The Senkaku Problem: Anti-DPJ/ Angry Japanese People's March in Shibuya (『<尖閣諸島問題> 反民主党/ 日本国民怒りの大行進 in 渋谷』)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, September 28, 2010, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10660417390.html>; Makoto Sakurai, "Video Information: Senkaku Islands Issue・Anti-DPJ Demonstration in Shibuya(『【動画案内】 尖閣諸島問題・反民主党デモ in 渋谷』)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, October 4, 2010, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10666505325.html>; Makoto Sakurai, "Heated Events in Nagoya This Weekend! (11/6-11/7)(『今週末は名古屋が熱い! (11月6日~7日)』)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, November 3, 2010, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10695190149.html>; Makoto Sakurai, "11/13 Yokohama Protest Report (『11・13 横浜デモ報告など』)," *Dronpa's Monologue (Doronpa の独り言)*, November 14, 2010, 13, <http://ameblo.jp/doronpa01/entry-10706561220.html>.

September 25th, the group's members protested in front of the PRC embassy in Tokyo, requesting the Japanese government to prosecute arrested Chinese crews. Right before the video leak, Zaitoku-Kai also requested the DPJ government to disclose the video to defend Japan's legitimacy.⁷³ Finally, in Sendai, the members protested against China's pressure to release crews, and conducted a demonstration to encourage Japan Coast Guard officers, who defend Japan's border.⁷⁴ As these examples indicate, Zaitoku-Kai conducted a series of nationwide protests in response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Even though Zaitoku-Kai's protests appear to be similar to Ganbare Nippon, its extensive use of the Internet differentiates Zaitoku-Kai from Ganbare Nippon's somewhat traditional approach to involve the news media and policymakers.

68 "Report: Video Release: Hokkaido Branch Protect Japan from China's Invasion! Angry Protest March (報告:【動画案内】北海道支部 中国の侵略から日本を守れ!怒りのデモ行進," *Zaitoku-Kai*, November 10, 2010, <http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/news/article.php?storyid=421>.

69 "Report: Video Release: Miyagi Branch Support Coastguard! Support Demonstration! (報告:【動画案内】宮城支部 海上保安庁断固支持!激励街宣!),” *Zaitoku-Kai*, October 29, 2010, <http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/news/article.php?storyid=422>.

70 "Condemn Senkaku Problem, We Never Forgive the Traitor DPJ! In Osaka: Osaka Branch(尖閣糾弾、売国民主党を許さないぞ! in 大阪【大阪支部】),” *Zaitoku-Kai*, November 15, 2010, http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/piCal/index.php?smode=Daily&action=View&event_id=0000000557&caldate=2010-11-15.

71 "Senkaku Is Only the Beginning, Dont' Allow China and Korea to Invade Japan! : Hiroshima Branch (尖閣は序の口・中国・朝鮮による日本乗っ取りを許すな【広島支部】),” *Zaitoku-Kai*, November 1, 2010, http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/piCal/index.php?smode=Daily&action=View&event_id=0000000547&caldate=2010-11-1.

72 "Report: Video Release 11/14 Fukuoka Branch Senkaku Problem Demonstration (報告:【動画案内】11・14 福岡支部 尖閣問題デモ&街宣),” *Zaitoku-Kai*, November 16, 2010, <http://www.zaitokukai.info/modules/news/article.php?storyid=427>.

73 Makoto Sakurai, "Heated Events in Nagoya This Weekend! (11/6-11/7)(『今週末は名古屋が熱い! (11月6日~7日)』).”

74 "Report: Video Release: Miyagi Branch Support Coastguard! Support Demonstration! (報告:【動画案内】宮城支部 海上保安庁断固支持!激励街宣!).”

Blurred Boundary between Online and Offline Activism

There is no obvious border between protestors on site and those online. In Zaitoku-Kai's activism, the members live-broadcasted all of the demonstrations on Niconico Douga, which were later posted as edited video clips on YouTube and Niconico Douga. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, having over 15,000 members, their protests often occur without thousands of participants. Instead, they simultaneously broadcast public demonstrations, full of sensational and disturbing content that can attract the public attention. The live-streaming is shared on SNS, commented in the video webpage, cited in blogs, and re-edited on other video sharing platforms. Even though the scale of events is small, they can *produce* a popular content by filming public debates with officials and quarreling with other organizations' leaders.⁷⁵ Taking full advantage of this method to amplify the perceived scale of their movement, the group uses local branches to organize compact protests frequently in a broader geographic area in order to catch more attention of those who live close to them. By integrating online and offline strategies, organizers on site and those in front of computers share the simultaneous experience of protest against injustice regardless of the actual impact of each protest. In a cynical view, these protests are a content of consumption.

In this respect, Zaitoku-Kai draws stark contrast with Ganbare Nippon in its style of activism. First, it does not engage any prominent political figures seen in Ganbare Nippon movement. Ganbare Nippon invited the parliament members and other policymakers to their rallies, Zaitoku-Kai organizes their protests around the charismatic leader, Makoto Sakurai. According to an award-winning book on Zaitoku-Kai's operation,

⁷⁵ Yasuda, *The Internet and Patriotism* (ネットと愛国), 184.

The Internet and Patriotism, this group is composed of numerous ordinary citizens from middle school students to retired elderlies, and members even characterize themselves as “anti-elites.”⁷⁶ Unlike Ganbare Nippon, which actively incorporates existing political actors, Zaitoku-Kai sticks to demonstrations led by anonymous citizens just as the leader’s name “Makoto Sakurai” itself is a fake. Second, although these records do not clarify the number of participants, video footage in those webpages suggest modest scale of demonstration, in many cases dozens of crowds rather than thousands of protestors. However, the smaller size of their protests *offline* does not mean their weak presence *online*. As Yasuda observes, “hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of people resonated with Zaitoku-Kai and gained catharsis through the Internet.”⁷⁷ In this light, the perceived scale of the movement matters more than its actual size. While Ganbare Nippon focused on the offline political activities, Zaitoku-Kai relies on its online movement in order to complement its lack of connection with the conventional media apparatus and policymakers.

On the other hand, Zaitoku-Kai shares similar issues when it comes to framing Japan’s problem as their core values. Claims by both Zaitoku-Kai and Ganbare Nippon stem from almost identical denunciation of Japan’s history of self-humiliation and war guilt. As Sakurai answers in an interview that leftist politicians and liberal media “have made Japan powerless to stand up to China and Korea,”⁷⁸ the Zaitoku-Kai emphasizes enemies within the Japanese society, who mislead the public as elites. Thus, just as

⁷⁶ Yasuda, *The Internet and Patriotism* (ネットと愛国).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁸ Martin Fackler, “New Dissent in Japan Is Loudly Anti-Foreign,” *The New York Times*, August 28, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/asia/29japan.html>.

Ganbare Nippon condemns a group of policymakers and media as traitors, Zaitoku-Kai also criticizes the mass media as the promoter of distorted “self-humiliating historical narratives.”⁷⁹ As a more direct example, in a different protest against Japanese immigration control, Sakurai shouted to media reporters, “The media people! Please cover this news accurately! We’re doing this because you guys don’t.”⁸⁰ In this respect, Zaitoku-Kai’s goal goes beyond simply raising the public awareness; it aims to replace the harmful, useless conventional media by publicizing the “accurate reality” through their channels. Therefore, Zaitoku-Kai maintains comparable distrust against policymakers and the conventional media.

On the other hand, their sensationalist activism isolates Zaitoku-Kai from its supporters including the conventional media. As an extreme rightwing leader Kunio Suzuki⁸¹ observes, Zaitoku-Kai members are often perceived as “not patriots but attention-seekers.”⁸² Even the nationalist news media such as Sakura Channel also terminated the relationship with Zaitoku-Kai due to the violent racism against minority groups. In fact, it was the Channel Sakura that initially welcomed Sakurai as a regular commentator and supported Zaitoku-Kai’s early movement.⁸³ However, although leadership members admit the effect of the media coverage in expanding its group, these

⁷⁹ “Introduction to Zaitoku-Kai (在日特権を許さない市民の会 - 挨拶).”

⁸⁰ *【Report 2! 3/9 Tokyo Immigration Control】 Mass-Media Cannot Say a Word against Makoto Sakurai (【速報2! 3.9 東京入管前】桜井誠に何も反論できないマスコミ取材陣)*, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NzCDqQjUHI&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

⁸¹ Founder of traditional rightwing group, Issui-Kai (一水会). This group is well known for its radical activism in the history of Japanese conservative movements.

⁸² Hideki Ishibashi, “Hate Aimed at Ethnic Korean Residents Continues, but One Man Changes,” *AJW by The Asahi Shimbun*, April 28, 2013, sec. Social Affairs, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201304280053.

⁸³ Yasuda, *The Internet and Patriotism (ネットと愛国)*, 37–40.

early media supporters left the movement by 2009 due to the escalating violence and racism.⁸⁴ In this respect, and in contrast to Ganbare Nippon, Zaitoku-Kai failed to build coalitions with the traditional media, not to mention policymakers. Its sensational, radicalized activism attracts a certain group of participants by teaching them “the immense pleasure of breaking taboos,”⁸⁵ as one participant reflects. And yet, even though it successfully creates solidarity within its members, it fails to speak to the larger audiences, who are more closely linked to policy change.

The Zaitoku-Kai’s protests employ sophisticated Internet strategies to maximize its engagement with the participants. Their grassroots activism integrates online and offline spaces as the equal field of protest to involve larger number of participants regardless of geographic distance. However, their sensationalism and racism isolate the movement from others, leaving marginal impact in policymaking. Although Zaitoku-Kai successfully gains popularity on the Internet, it should be attributed to the sensationalist performances of their online posting, not to their political goals and achievements.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 34-40.

⁸⁵ Yasuda, *The Internet and Patriotism* (ネットと愛国), 348.

Table 5.4: Protest Records by Zaitoku-Kai between September and December 2010

Date	Title	Location	Agenda
2010.9.25	Emergency Protest against Chinese Communists シナ中共への緊急抗議活動	The PRC Embassy in Tokyo	Anti-China
2010.10.3	Senkaku Problem & Anti-DPJ Protest 尖閣諸島問題・反民主党デモ	Tokyo	Anti-China, Anti-DPJ
2010.10.23	Senkaku Problem & Anti-DPJ Angry People in Protest <尖閣諸島問題> 反民主党／日本国民怒りの大行進	Tokyo	Anti-China, Anti-DPJ
2010.10.24	Defend Japan from China's Invasion! Protest of Anger 中国の侵略から日本を守れ！怒りのデモ行進	Sapporo	Anti-China
2010.10.29 ⁸⁶	Support Japan's Coastguard! Cheer Up Demonstration 海上保安庁断固支持！激励街宣	Sendai	Support Coastguard
2010.11.6	Senkakus belong to Japan! Don't Forgive the Japanese Government's Failure 尖閣は日本固有の領土！日本政府のへタレぶりを許さない！	Nagoya	Request Disclosure of Video, Anti-DPJ
2010.11.13	Zaitoku-Kai Anti-APEC Protest: Hu Jintao Listen to the Angry Voices of Japanese People! 在特会 A P E C 抗議デモ 胡錦濤よ日本国民の怒りの声を聴け！	Yokohama	Anti-China
2011.11.14	Senkaku Problem & Anti-DPJ Protest 尖閣問題デモ&街宣	Fukuoka	Anti-China
2010.11.21	Senkaku Problem & Anti-DPJ Protest 尖閣は序の口・中国・朝鮮による日本乗っ取りを許すな	Hiroshima	Anti-China, Anti-Korea
2010.11.27	Condemn Senkaku Problem, Don't Forgive Traitor DPJ! 尖閣糾弾、売国民主党を許さないぞ！	Osaka	Anti-China, Anti-DPJ

⁸⁶ Actual date was not available. Video posted on this day.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: POWER OF “OLD MEDIA” AND NEW WATCHDOGS


The case studies on Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai indicate that citizen grassroots groups interactively use online and offline spaces to influence foreign policymaking. On the Internet, people shared information about mass-demonstrations as well as the leaked video while criticizing the conventional media’s underreporting of these citizen protests. On Twitter, specifically, people shared information, monitored the media, and promoted their activism. Two groups of grassroots activists stood out in utilizing cyberspace to reinforce their influence over foreign policymaking. Publishing their demonstration videos on the Internet, Ganbare Nippon partnered closely with the conventional media and prominent policymakers to maximize their political influence. Moreover, they internalized the conventional television media and existing political party members to convey their voices directly to the policymaking process. Meanwhile, though not widely supported, the radical activism by Zaitoku-Kai attracted significant attention on the Internet, which spotlights the effectiveness of their sensationalist marketing strategy. As these examples indicate, citizen grassroots movements can engage broader audiences by integrating online and offline promotional efforts.

CITIZEN GRASSROOTS GROUPS AS WEB CONTENT SUPPLIERS

Theoretically, these models of citizen activism can be summarized as a hybrid strategy shown in Figure 5.2. In the online space, individual citizens participate in sharing important information, such as video of demonstrations and the boat collision. Once this sharing grows exponentially, it evolves into a larger movement, in which individual users

cooperate to achieve common goals. This phenomenon was evident when numerous posts encouraged others to copy, save, and repost the leaked video. Hence, while individuals take action to participate in online movement-making, these movements also encourage other users to join the sharing process at the same time. Furthermore, citizen activists can leverage this online activism to generate greater impact online and offline. In organizing mass-demonstrations, rallies, and other events, they not only advertise their activities through websites, but also live-stream these events on the Internet, allowing people sitting in front of computers to participate. By posting content on their activities in texts, videos, and images, these grassroots groups reinforce their online presence by showcasing their tangible impact in the real world. Citizen activists create digital content from their offline activism, and feed them on online platforms so that numerous web users can enjoy and share their posts. As the Hybrid Strategy in Figure 5.2 illustrates, citizen grassroots movements interactively utilize both online and offline spaces to create a self-reinforcing cycle of their movements.

Figure 5.2: Hybrid Strategy of Self-Reinforcing Citizen Activism




WEB USERS AS THE WATCHDOG OF WATCHDOGS

Common to the discourse of Twitter users, Ganbare Nippon, and Zaitoku-Kai is their criticism of conventional media as well as of the government. Twitter users also closely monitored the Japanese mainstream media reporting. They not only disagreed on their reporting policy, but also cited other sources, such as foreign media articles and YouTube videos, to evaluate and challenge domestic news reporting. Even though the majority of these tweets simply lamented the existence of the distorted media narratives, this process of critically examining media reporting with various sources appears to be similar to that of investigative journalism.⁸⁷ For example, Twitter users did not accept the lack of news reporting on citizen protests and shared international media reports as counter-evidence to the Japanese news. In the video leak, online activists collaborated to assess the authenticity of the video and shared it once they confirmed the validity of its content to inform the public. Even though the media have long been considered as the watchdog of powerful social actors on behalf of the people, Internet users now regard the media as one such power to be monitored. Despite the primitive and institutionalized nature of their investigation, these Internet users compare conflicting evidence to monitor the performance of the conventional media, the watchdog of society.

⁸⁷ By investigative journalism, I refer to a style of journalism, in which journalists independently conduct an investigation on important social issues, such as corruption of government officials and damage to user's health by commercial products. Unlike regular reporting of publicized events, it requires them to collect sensitive information, access the credibility of sources, and publish the news in a careful manner.

Figure 5.3: Citizens with the Internet as New Watchdogs



On the other hand, people’s monitoring capacity suffers from several constraints. First, they heavily rely on sources already available online. Just as they cited digital materials including foreign media articles and disclosed online government documents, their scope of evidence search is mostly confined to materials that are already digitized and published on the Internet. Given the significant amount of information only recorded offline, their access to information is still limited, when compared with professional journalists who extract information from internal sources in person. Second, the credibility of online evidence is not necessarily guaranteed. Except for direct citations from the conventionally trusted institutions such as the government, academic sources, and the media, the original producer of the information remains difficult to identify. For example, the leaked video could establish its credibility with its visual image, arguably because people were already informed of its existence as well as its content through

media reporting. However, it would have been much harder to assess the authenticity of allegedly leaked diplomatic documents published on a personal blog. Finally, unlike the conventional media, citizen activists' criticism of media reporting seems to happen rather spontaneously without a systematic structure to consistently review news reporting.

Although these limitations do not necessarily marginalize the role of online activists as the watchdog of the conventional media, it suggests that Internet users do not yet have the capacity to replace the conventional media. In this respect, citizens' new online capacity to monitor news rather complements the existing media reporting by holding newspapers, television stations, and magazines at least somewhat accountable and responsive to the demand of their consumers.

Furthermore, several citizen grassroots groups take one more step beyond merely criticizing the existing media. They integrate conventional media channels with their Internet platforms. As Ganbare Nippon partnered with cable television service, the Channel Sakura, the conventional media and the Internet can complement each other by offering information outlets to different segments of audiences. Even in the case of Zaitoku-Kai, the group leader's presence on Channel Sakura supported its early-stage growth by appealing to those who were not originally interested in Zaitoku-Kai's issues. Moreover, once these groups acquired supporters on the Internet and non-Internet platforms, they attacked the legitimacy of other mainstream media such as newspapers and television stations. Their logic of self-legitimization is simple and immune to attacks by the conventional media. Once they identify another media's "inappropriate" interpretation of controversial issues, such as war guilt and historical narrative, they protest against their "distorted" reporting. Even if these targeted media remain silent to

their activism, they can claim that these media intentionally ignore the “inconvenient truth” revealed by their collective efforts. In this way, grassroots advocates can safely discredit their rivals simply by sending the same message, while reinforcing their credibility as the “enlightened” people who “access the truth” on the Internet. Thus, the Hybrid Model of the Internet and conventional media provide citizen grassroots with an ideal platform to engage many participants. By attacking socially trusted mainstream media, they leverage this platform to inflate their legitimacy by creating solidarity among those who are “better informed.”

These strategies of Internet users and citizen grassroots movements to monitor the existing media reflect the fundamental values that the traditional news media offers: credibility in reporting and channels to consumers. As a public opinion report in 2012 indicates, television and newspapers exceeds the Internet in both usage and credibility when people want to simply follow world news.⁸⁸ The same report also indicates that people use the Internet to search for specific information.⁸⁹ Recognizing this strong influence of conventional media reporting, citizen activists argued that these media have spread a misguided perception of Japan and its historical narrative by using their credibility to exploit their national audiences. The conventional media can even provide these activists with credible information, just as Internet users quoted foreign media reporting to criticize Japanese reporting. Finally, the citizen activists also utilize the conventional media outlets including television broadcasting. It increases their exposure

⁸⁸ Akihiro Hirata, Kumiko Nishi, and Tomoe Sekine, *Televisions as Powerful Information Tool and Portal Websites in the Rise* (情報ツールとして根強いテレビと存在感を増すポータルサイト), Broadcasting Research and Survey (Tokyo, Japan: NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), July 2012), 52-3, http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/research/report/2012_07/20120703.pdf.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

to new audiences, from whom they recruit new participants to expand their online movements. Therefore, these examples of citizen activism highlights that the “old media” still maintain its relevance as the gatekeeper to credibility and to the broadest possible audience.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examines citizens’ online reactions to the Boat Collision Incident and the Video Leak Incident. The analyses of online platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, and Niconico Douga indicate web users’ frustrations toward conventional media reporting as well as the Kan Cabinet’s diplomatic failure. Among the numerous posts that commented on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai stand out for their powerful online campaigns to engage Internet users’ attention. Ganbare Nippon partners closely with a conventional media station and local policymakers, while Zaitoku-Kai employs sensationalist marketing strategies to affect the policymaking process. In both cases, they combined online sharing and offline protesting to create a self-reinforcing cycle to scale their movements, which I theorized as the Hybrid Strategy. Furthermore, their enhanced ability to collectively monitor news reporting on the Internet makes them the watchdog of watchdogs. In the next chapter, I continue the case study of Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai to measure their actual impact on conventional media reporting and policy debates.

**CHAPTER SIX:
THE OLD WORLD: THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA AND POLITICS**

Protests in Japan and China were completely different in their magnitude.

— Former Global Communications Director at Prime Minister's Office,
Noriyuki Shikata

Every news is weighed against their significance relative to other news.

— *Asahi Shimbun* Bureau Chief, Daisuke Kanda

The previous chapter illustrates a hybrid model of citizen activism, one that utilizes online and offline spaces to influence foreign policymaking. Twitter users, Ganbare Nippon, and Zaitoku-Kai commonly attacked the conventional media's reporting, encouraging the government to take more drastic measures against China. Although their emphasis on the conventional media signifies the continued relevance of these "old" media, it is important to understand *how* the traditional media are relevant in the rise of these new media platforms. This chapter examines how the conventional media and policymakers reacted to these citizen grassroots movements. In doing so, I rely upon discourse analyses of the archived newspaper articles and National Diet records, while my interviews with media and foreign policy experts add first-hand insight. Through these analyses, I explain not only why the conventional media remains relevant for citizen grassroots groups, but also how these more traditional media filter world

events to inform policymakers as well as the public. Grounded in empirical research, I further articulate my Hybrid Model that explains the mechanism through which citizen activism affects foreign policymaking.


CONVENTIONAL MEDIA: DOMINANT GATEKEEPER

Conventional media such as television, radio, print magazines, and newspapers dominate the supply of information to citizens in Japan. According to a government survey¹ in 2014, 97 percent of Japanese adults relied on television and radio, and 70 percent also read newspapers to gather information about the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. In contrast, only 11 percent had ever used the Internet to learn about the dispute.² As Chapter Four indicates, the conventional media dominate the role to convey credible information about the world to a nationwide audience. Thus, whether the conventional news media cover citizen movements or not directly affects the impact of these movements. In this section, I examine the conventional media's response to citizen protests that followed the boat collision incident in September 2010. In conclusion, this chapter clarifies a set of criteria, which the conventional media and policymakers rely on to weigh the relative significance of grassroots movements.

¹ *Summary of "Public Opinion Survey on the Senkaku Islands"* (「尖閣諸島に関する世論調査」の概要) (Tokyo, Japan: Cabinet Office of Japan, December 25, 2014), <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/tokubetu/h26/h26-senkaku.pdf>.

² Ibid.

Figure 6.1: Channels to Know about the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (2014)



Source: Data from Summary of “Public Opinion Survey on the Senkaku Islands”. Tokyo, Japan: Cabinet Office of Japan, December 25, 2014. <http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/tokubetu/h26/h26-senkaku.pdf>.

MARGINALIZED CITIZEN PROTESTS IN NEWSPAPERS

The Gap in Coverage between Foreign and Domestic News Media

While foreign conventional media, such as BBC, CNN, and Reuters, reported anti-Chinese protests in Japan,³ the online discourse analyses in the previous chapter suggests that Japanese domestic newspapers paid little attention to those movements.

Grounded in the results from the Chapter Five, this section aims to answer the following questions. To what extent and why did the Japanese media underreport citizen protests in

³ “Japan Laments China Protest Damage,” *BBC News*, accessed April 5, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11562973>; “China Accused of Invading Disputed Islands - CNN.com,” accessed April 2, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/02/japan.anti.china.protest/>; *Anti-China Protest in Tokyo*, accessed April 5, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/video/anti-china-protest-in-tokyo/418A48EB-9609-454A-8A7B-5EC6516251A3.html>; “Japan Rallies against China over Disputed Islands,” *Reuters*, October 16, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/us-japan-china-protests-idUSTRE69F0PH20101016>.

Japan? How did editors and reporters perceive the mass-demonstrations, compared with other issues such as anti-Japanese protests in China? In order to examine these puzzles, I conduct a discourse analysis on over a thousand news articles archived for *Asahi Shimbun*, *Nikkei Shimbun*, and *Yomiuri Shimbun* between September 2010 and December 2010.⁴ At the same time, this section also introduces articles from *Kyodo News* and *Sankei Shimbun* on the Internet in order to reinforce the diversity of reporting sources.⁵ According to research on Japanese media reporting on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, Japanese traditional media conglomerates maintain great influence through their combined news outlets in newspapers and television broadcasting.⁶ Building upon this business model, *Asahi*, *Sankei*, and *Yomiuri* present different stances on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute.⁷ *Asahi* is known for its liberal interpretation of foreign affairs, while *Sankei* presents the opposite, a nationalistic tone.⁸ *Yomiuri* is positioned as “center-right” and its views are observed as “pragmatic.”⁹ *Nikkei*, a business and economic paper, also adopts a rather conservative position.¹⁰ Throughout this section, I aim to examine

⁴ In this discourse analysis, I access news articles in Yomidas Rekishikan (Online Yomiuri Shimbun Archive), Kikuzo II Visuals for Libraries (Online Asahi Shimbun Archive), and Nikkei Telecom 21 (Online Nikkei Shimbun Archive). I used search system by specifying the keywords, “尖閣” and “尖閣&デモ,” as well as the timeframe for the six-month period since the collision incident. I also confine the scope of my research to nationwide versions, not including local editions.

⁵ It must be noted that the discourse analysis does not comprehensively examine *Kyodo News* and *Sankei Shimbun* due to the lack of accessible archive. Thus, the quotes from these media should be regarded as supplementary.

⁶ Shunsuke Murai and Takeshi Suzuki, *The Dispute Over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: How Media Narratives Shape Public Opinion and Challenge the Global Order*, ed. Thomas A. Hollihan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 142.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 142-3.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss, *Media and Politics in Japan* (University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), 319.

what factors determine the relative significance of citizen activism in their news selection, given the stark contrast between widely shared news of the protests in China and minimal reporting of the ones in Japan.

Nikkei Shimbun reported citizens' reactions to the dispute only as part of larger debates over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. On October 8th, 2010, the paper introduced that a group of a famous alpinist and environment researchers established a new grassroots movement to protect biodiversity on the disputed islands.¹¹ On November 6th, two days after the leak, the paper argued that the information security compromise damaged people's confidence in the government.¹² As part of the news, the article only briefly mentioned the protests as a consequence of the mishandled foreign policy, stating: "Since the boat collision in September, rightwing groups have conducted frequent protests against China, while some citizen groups are calling to join demonstrations on the Internet."¹³ The article used citizen activism only to emphasize the government's policy failures, not to highlight people's frustration itself. Furthermore, on November 14th, *Nikkei* reported a demonstration of approximately 4,000 protestors in Yokohama as "no big trouble"¹⁴ to the APEC summit meetings. While mentioning a conservative citizen grassroots group, Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee (頑張れ日本！全国行

¹¹ "Alpinist Ken Noguchi Founod a Project to Protect Senkaku Moles (登山家の野口氏ら、尖閣のモグラ、守る会を設立。)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, October 8, 2010, Evening edition.

¹² "Video Leak Damages the Cabinet -- Information Leak Reflects Distrust against the Government (ビデオ流出政権に痛撃——情報流出、国への不信映す。)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, November 6, 2010, Morning edition.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Protestors Rally against the Conference and China, No Trouble Reported (APEC Yokohama 2010) (会議反対や反中デモ集会相次ぐ、大きなトラブルなし (A P E C 横 浜 2 0 1 0))," *Nikkei Shimbun*, November 14, 2010, Morning edition.

動委員会), the article frames the citizen demonstration within a larger context of the APEC meeting, where the Japanese Prime Minister and the Chinese President planned to hold a summit meeting. Although several articles feature citizen activism, they discuss citizen grassroots movements only as part of the larger political context.

The *Asahi Shimbun* reported only one major citizen protest. On November 7th, it covered a mass demonstration with approximately 4,500 participants in the center of Tokyo.¹⁵ The article plainly refers to the location, scale, and time of the protest, while quoting Toshio Tamogami, a rightwing political activist, as well as Yuriko Koike, an incumbent parliament member. Interestingly, the article does not clarify the name of the grassroots organization, even though it cites the number of attendees as well as the movement's slogans. This reference to politicians' participation without the group's name suggests that the presence of well-known political figures, rather than the protest itself, provided incentive for the media to cover the event. The *Asahi Shimbun* does not cover other citizens' demonstrations, in contrast to its detailed reporting on Sino-Japanese relations, the video leak, and anti-Japanese protests in China.

Without covering any of these mass-demonstrations, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported collective efforts by the local policymakers in Okinawa Prefecture to establish "The Day of the Senkakus." On December 18th, it reported that the Ishigaki city council unanimously passed a new legislation to create "The Day of the Senkakus" to celebrate the disputed islands as Japan's territory.¹⁶ *Yomiuri* also covered China's official statement

¹⁵ "Senkaku Protestors Marched in Ginza (尖閣抗議デモ、銀座など行進)," *Asahi Shimbun*, November 7, 2010, Morning edition.

¹⁶ "Okinawa, Ishigaki City Council Ruled January 14th as 'The Day of the Senkakus' (1月14日を「尖閣諸島の日」 沖縄・石垣市議会が可決)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 28, 2010, Morning edition.

against “worthless and invalid efforts,”¹⁷ as well as the city’s ceremony, which invited several parliament members.¹⁸ Throughout this reporting, the *Yomiuri* underscored this rather formal movement’s impact on local, national, and international politics, while describing the larger political structure surrounding the events.

Other news media also only lightly covered the citizen protests. Known for its conservative political stance, the *Sankei Shimbun* reported several public demonstrations on October 16th.¹⁹ The first one took place in front of the Chinese embassy in Tokyo with 2,800 participants, led by Tamogami Toshio’s Ganbare Nippon National Action Committee. In Okinawa, another protest attracted 700 attendees including the local mayor and parliament members. Similarly, *Kyodo News*, one of Japan’s largest news reporting networks, broadcasted mass-protests of 4,000 participants against the DPJ and China on November 6th, which were also organized by the Ganbare Nippon.²⁰ Although these news media also reported citizen protests, their articles were quite similar to the plain reporting by the three media I previously examined.

As these examples indicate, the Japanese conventional media did not offer detailed coverage on the citizen protests that took place in response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. While they did report on the arrested crews, the video leak,

¹⁷ “China Files Official Protests against ‘The Day of the Senkakus’ (「尖閣諸島の日」 中国が非難談話),” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 18, 2010, Evening edition.

¹⁸ “300 Attended ‘The Day of the Senkakus’ Ceremony (「尖閣の日」制定式典に300人出席),” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 15, 2011, Morning edition.

¹⁹ “Senkaku Collision Incident: 2800 Protested in Front of the PRC Embassy in Tokyo, Another Protest in Okinawa (【尖閣衝突事件】東京の中国大使館前で2800人デモ、沖縄でも集会),” *Sankei Shimbun*, October 16, 2010, <http://web.archive.org/web/20110207095319/http://msndata.jp.msn.com/channellist1580097.aspx>.

²⁰ “On the Senkaku Dispute, 4 Thousand Protest in Ginza against the DPJ Government and China (尖閣、4千人が銀座で抗議デモ 民主党政権や中国に),” *Kyodo News*, November 6, 2010, <http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/senkaku/2010/11/post-159.html>.

parliamentary debates, and the diplomatic implications on a daily basis, these citizen protests occupied marginal space in the newspapers. Even when the media reported these demonstrations, it was either as a plain description of the events or as supplementary information in a larger political discussion. In the eyes of the newspaper editors, these grassroots movements did not count as significant news. Meanwhile, many of the reporting on protests highlighted participation of policymakers such as local politicians and parliament members. Although several media reports referred to Ganbare Nippon's demonstrations, its protests were linked each to the presence of prominent political figures. Otherwise, they portrayed protests as one of many concerns for foreign policy, especially when these activists planned demonstrations during the APEC conferences. This media's tendency to link protests with policymakers reflects newsmakers' interests in policymakers' response and diplomatic tensions after the incident, not in the anger of protestors.

Japanese News Reporting Focused on the Chinese Protests

The anti-Japanese protests in China engaged abundant media attention to various damaging consequences. First, the direct damages to Japanese businesses and stores became the central media concern in October, when protestors rioted and attacked Japanese supermarkets and cars. In addition to the threat to the Japanese community in China, all three newspapers, *Nikkei*, *Asahi*, and *Yomiuri* underlined that these demonstrations put any future economic partnership with China at risk.²¹ Moreover, these

²¹ "Anti-Japanese Protests, Thousands in Scale, in Three Chinese Cities, Customers Evacuated in Chengdu's Yokado (中国 3 都市で反日デモ 数千人規模 成都のヨーカ堂、客避難)," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 17, 2010, Morning edition; "Strong Anti-Japanese Sentiment -- Japanese Supermarkets on Alert (反日感情、強さ浮き彫り——日系スーパーなど警戒)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, October 17, 2010,

articles regarded the Chinese government's response to such protests as an indicator of China's foreign policy attitudes, based on the belief that these protests are under the control of the authorities.²² Japanese media also underscored the ongoing tension between Chinese citizens and the Communist Party government in the gradual shift toward democratization,²³ while attributing the escalation of protests to the power struggle over the next leadership selection within the Chinese Communist Party.²⁴ Unlike the Japanese protests, the Japanese newspapers heavily reported demonstrations in China as a threat to Japanese travellers, businesses, and foreign policy.

The discourse analyses of diverse newspaper coverage on Japanese and Chinese citizen movements highlight that the relevance of protests in the news are measured by their linkage with other significant issues such as economics, diplomacy, domestic politics, and people's safety. That is, while the protests in Japan impacted neither foreign policy nor economics, waves of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China threatened the lives of the Japanese population, the prospect of future economic partnership, and

Morning edition; "Anti-Japanese Protests in Three Chinese Cities, Threw Stones against Japanese Supermarkets in Protest against the 'Senkaku' (中国 3 都市 反日デモ 「尖閣」抗議 日系スーパーに投石)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 17, 2010, Morning edition; "Anti-Japanese Protests under Control by the Authorities; China Is Venting the Public's Anger (反日デモ 当局が統制 中国 民衆のガス抜き)," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 19, 2010, Morning edition.

²² Ibid.

²³ "Expecting Asia Conference in Guanzhou in the Next Month, China Desperate to Control Protests, Democratization/Anti-Japanese 'Unacceptable,' What's Chinese Online Opinion? -- While the Authorities Strengthen Monitoring, Situation Uncontrollable (Research) (広州で来月アジア大会 中国、デモ封じ 躍起 民主化・反日「絶対許さない」, 中国のネット世論、実態は——当局は監視強化、影響力抑えきれず (検証))," *Nikkei Shimbun*, October 24, 2010, Morning edition.

²⁴ "Ongoing Power Transition in China, New Leader Mr.Xi Supported by Strong Connection with 'Princelings'(権力移行へ中国動く 後継習氏、広い人脈 幹部子弟「太子党」後押し)," *Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, 2010, Morning edition; "Protests in China Rise Again, Hu Leadership in Cooperative Diplomacy under Attack, Power Transition Creates Power Game between Conservatives and Reformers (中国再びデモ、胡政権、協調外交に痛手、権力移行期、保守派・改革派綱引き?)," *Nikkei Shimbun*, October 18, 2010, Morning edition.

China's policy direction in diplomacy, according to the conventional media. Even though many anti-Japanese protests involved only dozens of citizens, it crystalized the broader context of Sino-Japanese relations and thus acquired greater significance in Japanese news reporting.

THE INTERNET AND NEWS MEDIA: WHICH IS MORE OBJECTIVE?

Discourse analysis of the mainstream newspapers indicates that mass-demonstrations in Japan attracted little news media attention. In the first section, I conduct expert interviews to ask how newsmakers perceived the Japanese protests as well as why the news reporting focused on the Chinese protests. Based on the answers attained from senior journalists at the *Asahi Shimbun* and NHK, the second section critically analyzes the different criteria of significance between the Internet and the news media.

Japanese News Media and their Criteria of Significance

An interview I conducted with Daisuke Kanda, a current Teheran Bureau Chief at *Asahi Shimbun* and a popular Twitter account owner,²⁵ casts doubt on the relative significance of these demonstrations compared with other news topics.²⁶ While the traditional news media “delivers a package of information that is likely to interest many people,”²⁷ the Internet “responds to the specific demand of individual users with deep, detailed information.”²⁸ In other words, even though the Internet may present information

²⁵ Daisuke Kanda (@kanda_daisuke) has 15.1K Followers as of April 11, 2015.

²⁶ Daisuke Kanda, Interview with Asahi Shimbun Bureau Chief, Email, March 19, 2015.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

amplified for each advocate of the protests by analyzing their personal interests, it does not mean that the rest of the world cares equally about the issue. This gap in the perceived relevance of the protest also explains why so many Twitter users expressed their frustrations against the lack of the media coverage. In one way, they assumed the information they access on the Internet, or more accurately within self-selected communities of “Followers,” must be equally visible offline. Therefore, the gap in perceived and actual significance arguably creates a self-reinforcing cycle of frustrations for protestors.

Another interview I conducted with a senior journalist at NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, clarifies how the conventional news media weighs the relative significance of citizen protests. According to Hironobu Kato,²⁹ Commentator at NHK and a leading China expert in the company for decades, the news media in Japan generally employ two criteria to evaluate mass-protests: alignment with the regime and scale of public support. That is, a citizen protest is more likely to be featured in media reporting, if it is against the regime and has won broad public support. For instance, the Japanese media heavily covered the Civil Rights Movement in the US and the Arab Spring in the Middle East, since they satisfied these two criteria by overturning the existing regime with nationwide public support. While having such internal criteria to assess mass-demonstrations, the Japanese media also have “exceptions” in selecting protests for their reporting. In order to avoid the expansion of racism, they do not cover protests against specific racial and ethnic groups, except in cases where the reporting treats these protests as a social problem. As Japanese news media outlets, they are also obliged to cover

²⁹ Harunobu Kato, Interview with NHK Former Senior Commentator on China, Email, March 16, 2015.

information of riots for Japanese travellers abroad. Hence, Kato's explanation also underscores the news media's conscious evaluation of citizen protests.

Furthermore, Kato suggests why the media paid little attention to demonstrations in Japan, even less than to those in China. As Figure 6.2 applies Kato's framework in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, both the Chinese and Japanese protests belong to the pro-regime category. In a narrow sense, it is true that Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai protested against the government. However, in a broader scope, they both sought to strengthen the current government's position toward China, which supports rather than seek to replace the regime. China's protests are viewed as an extreme type of pro-regime protests, since these demonstrations were perceived as "government-made."³⁰ Although the involvement of the government makes the Chinese protests less significant, the widespread public sentiment against Japan and potential danger to the Japanese population made it imperative for the Japanese media to prioritize the Chinese protests.³¹ As illustrated in Chapter Three, China has an enduring history of patriotic education and anti-Japanese protests. In this context, the emergence of new violent protests might have evolved into a national scale, jeopardizing Japanese travellers and residents in China.³² Finally, Kato also explained that none of the media acknowledged Zaitoku-Kai's sensationalism because the media are reluctant to broadcast such racist content.³³ Unlike online space, where an unlimited amount of information is uploaded and stored for search, the public media selectively report protests within limited time and space.


³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

Figure 6.2: Media's Evaluation of Mass-Protests



Conflicting Visions of Media between Newsmakers and Citizen Activists

Requiring high levels of public support and attitudes toward the regime, Kato's answer reflects the conventional news media's strong hesitation to promote younger, evolving citizen movements like Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai. As much as the newsmakers are aware of the nationwide influence of their reporting, they prefer to stay as the final gatekeepers who only acknowledge established citizen activism such as rallies against the US military base in Okinawa. It is a risky decision for newsmakers to report emerging movements because the reporting itself may help these movements establish their credibility, not vice versa. Although this hesitance may sound reasonable, it is doubtful that such reasoning behind news reporting is shared with citizen activists who criticize the conventional media. In other words, citizen activists feel frustrated by what they perceive as underreporting, simply because they assume the news media should pick

up the voices of citizens as closely as possible. This gap between activists' assumption and newsmakers' policy arguably creates a source of conflict between Internet-based activists and conventional news media on "objective reporting." As long as this miscommunication remains unresolved, online criticism against the news media is likely to continue.

Although Kanda and Kato's theory of news selection present a reasonable explanation for the reason why the Japanese protests were not very heavily reported, their accounts overlook several assumptions that might bias newsmakers' judgment. First, their definition of "timeliness" is closer to that of policymakers. That is, because they measure the relevance of news against greater political context, they are compelled to pay more attention to news' implications to policymakers more than to citizens. In this regard, Kato's criteria of "anti-regime" can should be interpreted as the degree of direct threat to ongoing policy, not necessarily the degree of discrepancy between policymakers' opinions and citizens'. Although it is unfair to completely denounce the Japanese media for lacking "objectivity" as some citizen activists do, in discussing the "relevance" of news, it is important to ask *for whom* they measure relevance.

The second assumption is repetition of events. While news reporters have high standards in evaluating citizen activism, a movement is more likely to be covered again after it is reported for the first time. For example, both in articles and interviews, news on anti-Japanese protests in China underlined that similar events had happened since 2005. In this respect, the Japanese protests had lower probability of being covered, because it was the first large-scale demonstrations on the issue and the news media did not expected them unlike the Chinese protests. This can also bias their definition of timeliness, in that

protests that have happened before are more likely to be featured in news as “timely” world events. As a result of the rigorous news selection, the conventional media have radically different definition of “timeliness” from Internet users who follow the latest world events on webpages.

Scholars have discussed the bias in the media’s definition of “timeliness,” even before the rise of the Internet. In 1964, prominent Japanese political scientist Masao Murayama already argued that news writers in Japan often overemphasized the power struggle inside politics (政局) over the policy debates that matter more to the public.³⁴ In contemporary scholarship, Kabashima et al.³⁵ also claim that the Japanese media prioritize fast information delivery over investigative journalism, which compels them to maintain close relationship with policymakers in order to access information ahead of their competitors. Although these biases do not mean that the Japanese conventional media and policymakers collaborate, their definitions of “timeliness” and “relevance” for newsmakers are close to each other.

The inherent bias in news reporting is not new at all. Since it has been crucial for these media to access information in politics, their close ties with policymakers does not necessarily mean their arbitrary manipulation of reporting. However, as the Internet spreads, this weakness becomes increasingly exposed to the public. In the eyes of citizens who search topics that match their interests on the Internet, news reporting seems far less relatable than online content. Empowered by the Internet, citizens now demand news that is relevant for themselves, not for policymakers.

³⁴ Masao Maruyama, *Philosophy and Behavior in Modern Politics* (現代政治の思想と行動) (Tokyo, Japan: Miraisha, 1964), 531–2.

³⁵ Ikuo Kabashima, Toshio Takeshita, and Youichi Serikawa, *The Media and Politics* (メディアと政治) (Tokyo, Japan: Yuhikaku, 2010).

POLICYMAKERS' INDIFFERENCE TO MASS-PROTESTS

Policymakers also paid more attention to public protests in China than those in Japan, just as the conventional media did. Many parliament members³⁶ expressed concerns over the surge of anti-Japan protests and their violence toward the Japanese community in China. Furthermore, criticizing the government's reluctance to file an official protest against the PRC, opposition party members argued that the Kan Cabinet abandoned their basic responsibility to protect Japanese citizens.³⁷ Alluding to newspaper reporting, these politicians emphasized the destructive demonstrations between October 16th and 18th when anti-Japan riots saw their climax in multiple cities.³⁸ At the same time, they also interpreted the Chinese government's response to mass-demonstrations as a sign of aggressive foreign policy. For example, one member even argued that anti-Japanese protests would escalate to China's expansionist ambition to occupy Okinawa, a southern prefecture of Japan.³⁹ While protests in China presented policymakers with a

³⁶ “The 176th National Diet, Foreign Policy and Defense Committee No.2 (第176回国会 外交防衛委員会 第2号),” *National Diet Library*, October 21, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0059/17610210059002a.html>; “The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号),” *National Diet Library*, October 22, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0004/17610220004002a.html>; “The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号),” *National Diet Library*, October 21, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/176/0003/17610210003002a.html>.

³⁷ “The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号),” October 22, 2010; “The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号),” October 21, 2010.

³⁸ “The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号),” October 21, 2010.

³⁹ “The 176th National Diet, Foreign Policy and Defense Committee No.2 (第176回国会 外交防衛委員会 第2号).”

threat to the Japanese community as well as a sign of Chinese expansive diplomacy, mass-demonstrations in Japan remained barely discussed.

While Isshiki's video leak evoked debates in the National Diet, politicians generally remained silent about citizen protests, not to mention the online nationalism behind them. During the period between the collision incidents in 2010 and the end of 2011, only a few parliament members acknowledged the public demonstrations in Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. One major opposition party member, Tsutomu Takebe, warned against the ruling party ministers that public opinion polls and public protests signaled deteriorating trust of the general public toward the incumbent cabinet.⁴⁰ Likewise, another LDP member criticized "the Japanese government's indecisive, incoherent attitude in treating arrested Chinese crews"⁴¹ led to mass protests in China and Japan, while rather stressing the widespread anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Their comments on citizen demonstrations suggest that politicians regarded protests in Japan merely as one of many consequences of policy failures, not as the crystallization of people's collective will. Therefore, despite the popularity of the boat collision incident and the video leak, the Diet members barely acknowledged the citizen protests as an indicator of public resentment. Likewise, the PRC's Foreign Ministry reacted to the Japanese protests only briefly, calling for collaborative efforts to prioritize practical

⁴⁰ "More and more people are now worried about the government diplomacy failure. I also heard about news that foreign policy failure damaged the public trust toward the cabinet in a recent poll. It is also reported that public protest happened in Japan." "The 176th National Diet, Budget Committee No.4 (第176回国会 予算委員会 第4号)," *National Diet Library*, November 1, 2010, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/176/0018/17611010018004a.html>.

⁴¹ "The 176th National Diet, Law Committee No.2 (第176回国会 法務委員会 第2号)," October 21, 2010.

interests over nationalist sentiment.⁴² The policymakers' responses in Japan and China indicate the marginal impact of Japanese citizen protests in contrast to the video leak.

Why did parliament members and foreign policymakers leave these grassroots groups unacknowledged? Beside the relevance to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute itself, protests in Japan did not present imminent threats to other key issues unlike anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and the video leak. Even though these demonstrations crystalized people's anger toward the government and China, these actions were conducted under the watchful eye of the police. While policymakers understood that the video leak was likely to ruin diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan, they did not see the direct consequences of these organized protests to foreign policy. In domestic politics, the disclosure of video evidence already provided a topic for parliamentary debates. Along with declining public approval rates of the Kan Cabinet, the opposition parties could use public opinion surveys, which represented far more voices than protests, to in order to attack the government's policy failure. Finally, these protests mostly directed anger toward foreign policy of Japan and China, not toward the Chinese community itself or Chinese business. In this respect, these movements were confined merely to citizen activism, which had low risks of jeopardizing the Sino-Japanese economic partnership. Compared with other events, the mass-demonstrations in Japan were less relevant to other important issues such as public safety, foreign policy, and economics.

Moreover, an interview I conducted with a foreign policy official indicates that diplomats interpret anti-Japanese protests from a different angle. "The protests in China

⁴² "2010/11/9 MOFA Spokesman Hong Lei Conducts Regular Press Meeting (2010年11月9日外交部发言人洪磊举行例行记者会)," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, November 9, 2010, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/jzhsl_602247/t767721.shtml.

were completely different in magnitude from those in Japan,”⁴³ former Director of Global Communications at Prime Minister's Office Noriyuki Shikata states. While underlining the Japanese government’s obligation to protect Japanese nationals in China, he indicates that the anti-Japanese demonstrations had greater diplomatic implication behind them. Foreign policymakers believe that anti-Japanese demonstrations in China are traditionally guided under government supervision. Although they are not necessarily caused by the PRC government, the fact that the authorities remain silent to these riots reflects the PRC’s aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, in the case of 2010, the Chinese government’s reluctance to intervene during the destruction of Japanese cars and attacks on Japanese businesses signaled the PRC’s diplomatic stance against Japan. This larger implication of the Chinese protests compelled diplomats to address the issue, while the Japanese domestic demonstrations did not entail greater policy contexts.

Finally, my interview with the former Global Communication Director Shikata also highlights key signals in domestic politics, to which foreign policymakers pay attention. According to him, foreign policymakers generally respond to people’s demand through four channels: public opinion polls, mass-media reporting, elections, and elected officials’ directions. As many parliament members mentioned in the National Diet records, public opinion polls provides an indicator of people’s demands in shaping Japan’s diplomacy.⁴⁴ The mass-media also plays a significant role in problematizing foreign policy issues, which reflect public interests. Meanwhile, he also notes that foreign policymakers also actively provide the media with foreign policy information to explain

⁴³ Noriyuki Shikata, Interview with Former Director of Global Communications at Prime Minister’s Office, Skype, March 15, 2015.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Japan's position on important agenda. Although it is generally a long-term barometer, elections reflect people's approval and disapproval of the government policy including foreign policy. Even more directly, these elected parliament members lead diplomacy as foreign ministers through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In terms of the four criteria, unlike the controversial video leak and protests in China, the grassroots movements in Japan lacked significance in every respect. They did not greatly influence public opinion, attract the conventional media attention, or invoke parliamentary debates.


THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The discourse analyses of the newspapers and the National Diet records indicate that neither the conventional media nor policymakers paid much attention to the citizen protests in Japan. Indeed, the newspapers conveyed only a few stories of citizen activism against the government, varying from mass-demonstrations to setting "The Day of the Senkakus." In their reporting, these grassroots efforts were only briefly introduced, in contrast to their rich coverage given to the anti-Japanese protests in China. On the other hand, policymakers barely responded to the rise of citizen protests in Japan. Although several parliament members referred to the mass-demonstrations, they treated citizen movements in Japan merely as a fragment of the greater political and diplomatic turbulence that the DPJ's policy failure caused. Foreign policymakers also identified the protests in China as more relevant issue due to their implications for Chinese foreign policy, the economic partnership with China, and the safety of Japanese nationals in China. Therefore, although Chapter Five highlights the self-legitimizing cycle that citizen

grassroots movements employ, they actually were of marginal significance in the eyes of the conventional media and policymakers.

Based on the insights gained from this empirical chapter, Figure 6.3 illustrates the role of the conventional media and policymakers in detail. The conventional media selectively convey relevant world events to inform the public and policymakers through news reporting. In the process of news-making, the media employ their expertise in investigating facts and connecting each event to the greater social context in order to explain its significance. Similarly, the conventional media also receive information from policymakers on particular issues for their investigations. While the news media deliver selected news to the public, the public returns their public opinion to these topics. Observing the public demands, the news media also transmit public opinion by problematizing certain issues and publicizing public opinion surveys. On the other hand, policymakers closely monitor these inputs in shaping foreign policy. Based on public opinion surveys, parliamentary policy debates, and elected officials' supervision, foreign policymakers react to the people's voice in a democratic regime.

Figure 6.3: The Roles of the Conventional Media and Policymakers



DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF “SIGNIFICANCE”

The detailed case study on the media in this chapter indicates that the political function of the conventional media goes beyond simply selecting important news for the public. They identify important world events, independently investigate facts and contexts, and frame those events according to their *relative* significance. And yet, it is also helpful to examine the different measurement of significance used by citizen activists.

The definitions of “significance” draw stark difference between citizen activists and the conventional news media. While citizen activists stressed the *absolute* scale of mass-demonstrations as a justification to expect the media coverage, the actual reporting evaluated these events in terms of *relative* importance. For example, beside the timeliness of the topic, they weigh protests based on a certain criteria in which anti-regime protests with broader public support are likely to attract the maximum media attention. Moreover, their reporting on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute also illustrates the connection between certain events and other political, economic, and social issues at large. Generalizing this

trend, the conventional media reporting is based on the relative significance of news, determined in terms of its *connectedness* with other social issues. In this light, citizen protests matter only when these voices present *connectedness* to other important topics such as domestic politics, diplomatic relations, business, and people's safety, regardless of the absolute scale that protestors often emphasize. Therefore, the citizens' frustrations toward the news reporting stem from this different measurement of significance, not necessarily the malicious political intent.

INTERACTION BETWEEN NEWS MEDIA AND POLICYMAKERS

The National Diet Records and archived newspapers indicate that neither policymakers nor the conventional media cared much about the Japanese protests. Instead, the parliamentary debates' emphasis on the anti-Japanese protests in China signifies that the policymakers, just like the conventional media, tend to react to issues related to the safety of the Japanese population as well as the government's foreign policy. Moreover, quoting newspapers as sources, opposition party members referred to the Japanese protests only as tactics to attack policy failures. Hence, in the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Boat Collision Incident, the media and policymakers' narrative are aligned in the same direction.

The conventional media and policymakers share a similar idea of significance in evaluating citizen movements. Just as the conventional media exist as a gatekeeper of significance against citizen activism, they function as the translator of the significance for the public and policymakers. In other words, the news media not only select and investigate events, but also make the events relatable to their consumers. In the

Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, news reports illustrated how the interstate dispute in distant waters related to its audience by explaining its political, business, and security implications. Since media reporting aims to match the interests of the people and policymakers, it naturally shares the definition of significance with its audiences. In this manner, media reporting provides valuable input to the public and the policymakers. The conventional media are not only gatekeepers, but also translators of the significance.

Once the conventional media frames the world events, policymakers use their reporting for their own political purposes. As the empirical study of this thesis indicates, policymakers cite the newspapers to build their policy arguments because their reporting provides an indicator of public opinion and credible source to monitor the government policy. Meanwhile, the media also obtain information from policymakers in that they convey the policy debates while receiving information from the internal sources within the government. Due to this constant interaction, the relations between the conventional media and policymakers can be closer than those between the media and citizen activists. Meantime, there exists certain tension between the conventional media and policymakers, since the news reporting investigates the policymaking process as well as evaluate their results as the watchdog. Even if their emphasis on a particular agenda matches, the media aim to monitor government policy while policymakers pursue their own political interests. Therefore, it is important for citizen activists to distinguish different goals of the conventional media and policymakers in framing their narratives.

THE LIMITS OF THE INTERNET-BASED CITIZEN ACTIVISM

The different definitions of “significance” between the conventional media and citizen activists shed light on the limits of citizen movements. As Chapter Four indicates, citizen grassroots groups can mobilize a large number of participants in order to inflate their significance simply by expanding their movements. However, Ganbare Nippon’s case shows even demonstrations with thousands of participants cannot attract sufficient attention. Even though the Internet allows these organizations to engage far more participants online and offline, the absolute scale alone is never enough to be recognized as “public support” by the conventional media. Their focus on scale is only effective in reinforcing internal solidarity and legitimacy to recruit members, but cannot guarantee direct influence over the policymaking process. Instead, Ganbare Nippon built partnerships with a cable television station and policymakers to increase their influence. Thus, it is a problematic to assume that the Internet allows citizen activists to immediately gain public support unless it presents its linkage to relevant issues for the rest of the world. For citizen activism, it is crucial to note that the popularity online does not automatically translate into significance in the offline world. Unless they actively translate their absolute significance shared among its supporters into the relative significance in their contemporary world, the movement cannot drive a policy change.

DOES THE INTERNET EMPOWER CITIZEN ACTIVISM?

The Internet significantly empowers citizen activism by growing their capacity to engage a greater scale of participants, to convey their messages, and to monitor powerful actors in the policymaking process. In spite of the persistent influence of the conventional

media and policymakers, the Internet allows citizen grassroots groups to expand their movements more effectively, while opening an alternative space for individual citizens to bypass and monitor the conventional media as the dominant distributor of the world information. By using the Internet, citizen movements can protest against the lack of the media attention to their issues and signify the underreported people's demands. In retrospect, this situation is dramatically different from the pre-Internet era when the news media singlehandedly evaluated the significance of citizen movements without much pressure to respond to citizens' demand as shown in Figure 6.5. Therefore, the Internet has certainly empowered citizen movements with the new capacity to become the watchdog of the watchdog. If not replacing the conventional media, citizen movements are likely to expand their influence through their own communication channels with supporters and the rest of the world, independent from the conventional media. The conventional media can no longer rely on their dominance of information distribution, and citizens acquire greater influence by finding alternative paths to access information on the Internet. Just as Benedict Anderson underscores the lingering legacy of the old powers after nationalist revolutions,⁴⁵ the emergence of the Internet invoked a shift in the political power balance between citizens and the media by ending the dominance of news reporting by the conventional media. Yet, it was only the balance of power that changed, not the structure of the power operating behind policymaking.

⁴⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006).

Figure 6.4: The Hybrid Model of Empowered Citizen Activism





Figure 6.5: Citizen Activism in the Pre-Internet Era



CONCLUSION

Continued from Chapter Five, this chapter examines the reactions of policymakers and the conventional media toward citizen grassroots movements such as Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai. The discourse analyses on newspaper articles and National Diet records indicate that both policymakers and newsmakers paid more attention to the Chinese protests than to the Japanese ones, implying that the two actors share similar criteria to evaluate citizen protests. In order to elaborate on these criteria, this chapter also incorporates my interviews with senior journalists and a foreign policymaker on how they perceived Japanese demonstrations, which draws stark contrasts with the self-image perceived by citizen activists. In conclusion, I complete the theorization of my Hybrid Model by articulating the interactions between the conventional media and foreign policymakers. Grounded in my analytical framework, I illustrate how the Internet empowers citizens to monitor other actors while noting the persistent influence maintained by the conventional media. In the next chapter, I reintroduce my arguments to integrate insights gained from my research and shed lights on the conceptual and practical implications of my Hybrid Model.

CHAPTER SEVEN: HYBRID APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

The Internet is a tool just like pencils and erasers. I have never thought that the Internet and other existing media conflict with each other. They may complement each other, but never compete.

— *Asahi Shimbun* Bureau Chief, Daisuke Kanda

It is an immense oversimplification to explain the role of the Internet in foreign policymaking as either a fundamental game changer or a negligible technological shift. Optimists would insist that rapidly expanding access to the Internet has created a new platform for citizens' political participation in place of old ones, grounded in recent events such as the Arab Spring. Pessimists would criticize such optimistic observations for downplaying the traditional political actors, pointing to the fact that some governments use the Internet to suppress citizens through online censorship and propaganda. My thesis, however, argues that scholars should pay more attention to the *intersection* of both empowered citizen activism and conventional actors' response. My Hybrid Model of Empowered Citizen Activism illustrates the process through which citizens combine both new and traditional channels to influence foreign policymaking, incorporating other actors such as the news media.

This thesis started with the following research questions: *To what extent has the increased use of the Internet among citizens affected foreign policymaking? If so, through what mechanisms and to what extent do citizens utilize the Internet to influence foreign*


policymaking? How responsive are governments to the new public demand expressed online concerning foreign policymaking? These questions are particularly important, since the existing scholarship does not provide analytical models that articulate the interactions between citizen activism and foreign policymakers, as discussed in the literature review of Chapter Two. The historical overview in Chapter Three further signified the demand for such models by highlighting the increasing citizen participation in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute both online and offline. In order to answer these questions, the three empirical chapters constructed a model that illustrates the online and offline interactions between actors, explaining criteria on which these actors react to citizen activism. Reviewing the video leak on YouTube by the Japan Coast Guard officer Masaharu Isshiki, Chapter Four investigated how online whistleblowing can directly affect foreign policy by tracing the process of the diplomatic crisis. Focusing on the major actors illuminated in this model, Chapter Five examines citizen grassroots groups and their strategies to increase their influence through online promotion and offline rallying, based on the cases of Ganbare Nippon and Zaitoku-Kai. Finally, Chapter Six studied how the conventional media and policymakers evaluated these citizen activists by content analyses and expert interviews. At the end, this chapter also completed my Hybrid Model of Empowered Citizen Activism, integrating all empirical insights gained through my research into a theoretical model.

A careful analysis on the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Boat Collision Incident highlights the hybrid structure between the online and offline political spaces. Citizen activists effectively use the new open space of the Internet to share information, monitor news reporting and government policy, and organize movements in order to make

themselves heard. At the same time, the degree of success for this type of citizen grassroots activism relies on the support that conventional media reporting provides. Although the Internet allows citizens to rapidly grow their movements online and offline, the conventional media still remain the gatekeepers of influence, in that policymakers continue to rely on conventional news reporting, rather than citizen groups' self-promoting webpages, to measure public opinion and shape their policy agenda. As gatekeepers, the conventional media evaluates citizen movements in terms of their connectedness with larger social issues such as international and domestic politics, economic development, and national security. By having a third-party view of citizen movements, the conventional media weigh the relevance of activism and translate their significance for the public and policymakers.

Meanwhile, with the rise of the Internet, citizen movements are also empowered to bypass the dominant influence of the conventional media in asserting their relevance. As illustrated in the empirical chapters, citizen grassroots movements combine their own news outlets both on the Internet and through the conventional media channels to speak to the public directly. Although their scope of influence is still limited compared to the mainstream news media, citizen grassroots groups are likely to continue expanding their own media outlets. This process has the potential to accelerate the diversification of news sources in the long run. Finally, the Internet empowers citizen activism by giving an effective tool to monitor the conventional media as well as government policy. The Internet weakens the conventional media's monopoly on information sharing, putting them in a competitive relationship with citizen grassroots movements.

Figure 7.1: The Hybrid Model of Empowered Citizen Activism



THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The empirical and theoretical components of my thesis answer key debates in the existing scholarship on foreign policy decision making, the Internet and citizen behaviors, and political representation.

Scholars on foreign policy decision making have underlined the limited capacity of citizens to influence foreign policymaking, given the profound information asymmetry between citizens and policymakers.¹ However, the conclusion of my thesis indicates that this understanding by and large fails to take into account the Internet media as a new tool

¹ Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, no. 1 (May 1, 1998): 29–61; Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 415–32; Jon Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 1–30; Matthew Baum and Philip Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 39–65; Mintz and Jr, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*.

to enhance citizens' access to information. In other words, although foreign policymakers continue to dominate policy information as insiders, the conventional media is no longer the only channel through which people stay informed. By using the Internet, citizens bypass the conventional media to share and debate foreign policy information, which they gather from other international media as well as their own sources. Hence, my thesis argues that the Internet has indeed empowered citizens by ending the monopoly on news supplied by the conventional media.

My Hybrid Model also contributes to the existing literature on the Internet and citizen behavior. The empirical chapters on the whistleblower Masaharu Isshiki, Ganbare Nippon, and Zaitoku-Kai have shown that citizen activists can create a self-reinforcing cycle of influence by combining online and offline movements. While such a mobilization strategy supports the conventional academic knowledge that the Internet facilitates citizen mobilization,² these three cases spotlight the purpose for which citizens are mobilized. Promoting their policy agenda, activists in all three cases attacked the conventional media as biased and dishonest. Furthermore, their distrust toward the mainstream news companies compels citizen grassroots groups to create their own media apparatus, including television channels and video blogs, to provide unbiased, credible media as an alternative to the established news media. While the existing literature is focused on this mobilization itself, my thesis highlights the new competition for credibility between citizen grassroots movements and the conventional media.

This new effort by citizen activists to monitor the conventional media is likely to improve the mechanism of political representation. Founded as the watchdog of society,

² Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, "The Role of Digital Media," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (2011): 35–48.

the conventional media has played a significant role in monitoring policymakers as an agent to citizens. Despite emphasis on the free press by scholars who studied political representation before the Internet,³ recent researchers on the Internet and political representation⁴ fail to acknowledge the mechanism of representation mediated by journalism, while overemphasizing the direct connection that the Internet potentially creates between citizens and policymakers. However, despite general people's trust on the media as watchdogs of policymakers, there have been limited ways through which citizens can actually monitor whether these media are hiding information unfavorable toward policymakers. By comparing domestic media reports with international media responses and their own sources, citizens are now able to collectively evaluate mainstream media reporting. Theoretically, this new monitoring process by citizens indirectly improves the government's responsiveness by reinforcing the news media's function as a watchdog. Therefore, while conventional scholarship emphasizes the direct linkage between citizens and policymakers, my thesis underlines the indirect impact of the Internet in reinforcing citizen's capacity as watchdogs of the watchdog.

At the same time, it is too simplistic to assume that the Internet completely changes the political structure in which citizens deal with foreign policymaking. Rather, this thesis signifies the persistent influence of policymakers and the conventional media. As elaborated in Chapter Six, the Internet's empowerment of citizens has not yet transformed the overall power structure in foreign policymaking. That is, foreign

³ Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1973).

⁴ Stephen Coleman, "New Mediation and Direct Representation: Reconceptualizing Representation in the Digital Age," *New Media & Society* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 177–98; Peter Dahlgren, "The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation," *Political Communication* 22, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 147–62.

policymakers and the news companies continue to access more information than citizens. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu Boat Collision Video Leak Incident of 2010, although the Internet played a key role in spreading the leaked video, the subsequent reporting of the incident was virtually dominated by news media, which updated the process of investigation while revealing the secret diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the PRC. Hence, even though the Internet allows citizens to break through the monopoly on information by the news media, it is not yet realistic that citizens have better access to information than professional journalists and foreign policymakers.

The limits of citizen empowerment also apply in the field of citizen behavior and political representation. The traditional players such as the news companies and policymakers also respond to the new technology. The conventional media opened their online news platform to distribute credible information, leveraging the generally trusted news reports based on their internal sources in governments. Governments also extended their police force to the Internet, just as the authorities seized account records from Google in the video leak incident. The example of the video leak also indicates that the conventional media can be better prepared for such government countermeasures, in that they have accumulated operational tactics to protect their sources, which lie beyond technology. Thus, given the resources and expertise of policymakers and journalists, citizens are not the only actor that appropriates technology for their benefits.

Furthermore, it is also overly simplistic to assume that the increase of citizen activism online immediately leads to the structural transformation of political representation. While citizen grassroots groups have significant merit in utilizing the Internet, foreign policymakers still consider the Internet as one of many channels through

which they communicate with citizens. Moreover, the parliamentary debates in the case study indicate that the Internet content is not qualified as legitimate evidence unless it is reported in newspapers. Hence, even though the Internet creates a new political space, it is expected to take much longer for policymakers to actually acknowledge the online discourse as key indicators comparable to public opinion surveys. In contrast to the Internet's benefit to citizens, there is little demand for foreign policymakers to respond to the online discourse, when they already have other indicators of public opinion.

PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

While answering key questions debated in conventional scholarship, my Hybrid Model also indicates that each of the three key actors, citizens, foreign policymakers, and the conventional media, have the potential to incorporate the Internet in order to achieve their political aspirations.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIZEN ACTIVISTS

My Hybrid Model highlights three approaches that allow citizens to leverage the Internet to influence foreign policymaking, as labeled in Figure 7.2. The first approach is direct intervention into diplomacy. Just as the boat collisions and video leak created a diplomatic row between China and Japan, it is possible for citizens to cause trouble for foreign policymakers as part of an effort to raise awareness. Essentially, landing on the islands, colliding boats, and whistleblowing were likely to have similar impacts in disturbing the bilateral relations. The only difference, before and after the Internet, is that citizens can interrupt diplomacy regardless of their physical constraints. In particular, it


allows whistleblowers to spread their movements rapidly without relying on any external authorities including conventional news media, which significantly reinforces the capacity of individuals to act against policymakers. Meanwhile, it is difficult for whistleblowers to control the outcomes of their action, since they bypass the conventional media and foreign policymakers, which remain influential in shaping policy debates.

Meanwhile, the second grassroots approach provides a more predictable channel that actively engages the conventional media and policymakers. As illustrated in the end of the previous chapter, this grassroots strategy takes two steps. The first step is to expand the movement by combining offline activities and online promotion. Once the citizen group successfully scales its movement, it may be able to leverage its presence to attract the media and policymakers' attention. If the first approach does not create sufficient impact, the second step requires strategies vis-a-vis the conventional media and policymakers. The group can build conventional media apparatus by partnering with existing media channels, while hosting rallies that also interests policymakers. By combining their Internet-based supporters and new supporters attracted by the conventional media promotion, the organization can speak to a more diverse, larger population as articulated in Chapter Five. Their activities are more likely to attract policymakers' interests because such rallies help them acquire new supporters for themselves. By closely engaging other actors, citizen activists can guide through the policy change.

Finally, the Internet nullifies geographical constraints on interacting with people in different countries. By leveraging this feature, citizen activism can also cooperate with partners and address their political agendas internationally. Just as the Chinese activists

gathered millions of online signatures to protest against Japan's membership in the UN Security Council in 2005, the citizen grassroots groups can use the Internet to orchestrate global scale movements. On the other hand, it can also facilitate mutual understanding by sharing information across the states in conflict.⁵ Hence, the Internet's ability to connect people beyond geographic borders allows activists to create platforms for global citizen interactions.

Figure 7.2: Two-States Hybrid Model of Empowered Citizen Activism



⁵ Established in 2005, Tokyo-Beijing Forum is one of the largest collaborative dialogue platforms by Chinese and Japanese scholars, activists, journalists, and policymakers: <http://tokyo-beijingforum.net>.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICYMAKERS

The Internet enriches the plurality of information available for people by enabling actors to share what they believe are important with the rest of the world. It also provides foreign policymakers with a new channel to promote their countries' positions to the rest of the world through online public diplomacy. Moreover, policymakers can now use the platform to directly interact with influential foreign actors as well as numerous web users.

On the other hand, the Internet creates a space for extremist groups to grow their influence beyond their countries' control. Although these radicalized ideas are not commonly shared by many, their online platforms allow these minorities to participate in their movements as a new form of solidarity. Although the conventional media seem to follow their conventional wisdom to prevent the expansion of radicalized, violent movements, the Internet in general has no capacity to police such dangerous activities. In this respect, policymakers need to pay more attention to the expansion of extremist activities, just as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) recruit youths from all over the world by posting violent video footage.⁶ In Sino-Japanese relations, similar concerns apply to the ongoing anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese sentiments in the two countries since 2005. As Chapter Three elaborated, China and Japan still have yet to reconcile with their history of conflict, which often creates the ground for radicalized nationalism. Although the current state of these movements remains under the control of policymakers, it is crucial for them to closely monitor extremist movements growing on the Internet in order

⁶ "What ISIL's English-Language Propaganda Tells Us about Its Goals | Al Jazeera America," *Al Jazeera*, June 20, 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/6/19/how-isil-is-remakingitsbrandonthinternet.html>; "Briton's Jihad Video Leaves Family 'Heartbroken,'" *BBC News*, accessed April 9, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27952874>; J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, *The ISIS Twitter Census Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter*, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf.

to maintain the peace between the two countries. It is also important to note, despite the borderless interactions the Internet enables, the barrier of language still prevents peoples with different nationalities from communicating with each other.

In light of this research, the increasing use of the Internet by extremist groups indicates that it is dangerous for policymakers to deal with online and offline recruiting operations of radicalized groups with the same approach. As this thesis underscores that the Internet helps people with extreme, minority ideas connect with each other, policymakers need to monitor online movements that are not unanimously supported. In offline spaces, the general popularity of a group reflects its political influence. In contrast, the success of sensationalist marketing on the Internet suggests that a radicalized group can acquire influence as long as a reasonable proportion of the viewers support them. For example, even if the majority of general viewers feel distanced from such radical content, sensationalists can use the Internet to reach out to a significantly greater audience than they can find in the offline world. It is precisely this extreme nature of the content that sends signals to those who feel aligned with such ideology and feel isolated from the rest of his/her community. The more people disagree, the more valuable these extremist groups become for those who are attracted to radical ideas. By explaining this self-reinforcing mechanism behind online movements, my model also helps foreign policymakers counter the danger of extremist movements.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONVENTIONAL MEDIA

The Internet presents a new challenge to the conventional media. Despite its legacy of being the watchdog of the powerful, the mainstream media is now exposed to criticism by Internet users who constantly monitor news reporting. In order to maintain their credibility as news-provider, they are urged to respond to the citizens' demands and opinions expressed on the Internet. There is no obvious reason for the conventional media to distance themselves from the new media. By publishing online articles, the conventional media can also enjoy the benefit of low-cost distribution of their content to the broader viewers.

While it is critical for the conventional media to maintain its presence online, one may wonder how they will compete with the emerging online media. In fact, this thesis illuminates three competitive advantages to the new online media platforms. The first advantage is their widely acknowledged credibility. Despite the abundance of information available online, it is never an easy task to assess the credibility of information on the Internet. Just as many Twitter users selectively shared the leaked video posted in newspaper companies' YouTube accounts, people including the Internet users share their online articles and other content, based on the established trust of the conventional media reporting. Second, their professional expertise in creating news content differentiates them from the majority of net users. Although the Internet allows people to share information even faster than the conventional media, sharing is only part of the traditional news media's operation. As the case study of whistleblowing indicates, the conventional media have sophisticated its investigative journalism, which requires considerable investment and expertise to access and interpret sensitive information.

Notably, even though the Internet users monitor the media and governments by finding evidence by themselves, their level of complexity is lower than the reporting done by professional journalists. For instance, WikiLeaks also partners with major news media such as the Guardian and *Asahi Shimbun* to publish their leaked confidential documents, relying on their capacity to assess and investigate sources.⁷ Finally, the conventional media are likely to remain as an index of important world agendas. Although people use the Internet to specifically search the content of their interests,⁸ the media's comprehensive coverage of important social issues remains influential as an index. Therefore, the broad coverage of credible investigative reporting provides competitive advantage to the conventional media.

However, not all traditional media can leverage these advantages. To begin with, not all of conventional media have established credibility, sophisticated investigation, and broad issue coverage, as the top-tier news companies have. In my case studies, the mass media conglomerate companies such as the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* published online articles to earn significant “shares” and “mentions,” while the nationalist cable television station Channel Sakura barely signified its presence outside their specific

⁷ Andrew Chadwick and Simon Collister, “Boundary-Drawing Power and the Renewal of Professional News Organizations: The Case of The Guardian and the Edward Snowden NSA Leak,” *International Journal of Communication* 8, no. 0 (September 1, 2014): 22; Yoichi Nishimura, “Assess Credibility, Publish Selectively: Asahi Shimbun Analyzes US Diplomatic Cables (情報の信憑性確認、厳選し公開〈米公電分析〉朝日新聞社),” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 4, 2011, sec. Politics, <http://web.archive.org/web/20110505064946/http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0503/TKY201105030254.html>.

⁸ 2012 *Information Communication Whitebook* (平成 24 年版 情報通信白書), Information Communication White Book (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan, July 2012), <http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusintokei/whitepaper/h24.html>; 2013 *Research on Information Communication Media Usage and Information Behavior* (平成 25 年 情報通信メディアの利用時間と情報行動に関する調査〈速報〉) (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan, April 2014), http://www.soumu.go.jp/iicp/chousakenkyu/data/research/survey/telecom/2014/h25mediariyou_1sokuhou.pdf.

policy agenda. Hence, the beneficiaries of their fundamental advantage will be confined to the top tier media with all these advantages, while the other media are exposed to fierce competition with new online media outlets. In this respect, the future prospect of the media industry is polarized and likely to benefit disproportionately to larger, more established mass media companies.

Given the different value propositions between the conventional and Internet media, the conventional media should not attempt to compete with the Internet's speedy sharing of information and spontaneous collaboration to address social injustice. Instead, this research indicates that they should strategically pursue further sophistication of news interpretation, which the conventional media have accumulated as internal wisdom and ordinary web users cannot learn over a night. In this manner, the conventional media and the new media can complement each other. As much as the Internet empowers citizen activists, the technology also provides new opportunities for the conventional media.

PROSPECT FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis opens up a set of new puzzles for future research. First, even though this thesis conducts a detailed empirical study, studies on different cases in different regions are likely to reinforce the generalizability of my model. In particular, beyond the territorial disputes, other international problems such as free-trade agreement negotiations, counter-terrorism operations, and environmental protections will offer intriguing topics for research. Involving more than two states at the same time, these issues are likely to present a more complex structure of citizen activism online and offline beyond the state borders. Meanwhile, case studies on other countries, in particular non-

democratic states, would also add diversity to my model that was constructed upon an empirical study focused on Japan.

Second, despite its general use of the term, “the Internet” entails a virtually unlimited number of smaller online platforms including blogs, SNS pages, debate forums, and news media. Given the varying designs and purposes of these applications, it is interesting to see how people behave in different online settings in order to understand how citizen movements can optimize their Internet strategies. At the same time, it also bears practical implications for foreign policymakers to understand how they can take full advantage of the Internet for public diplomacy. While the case study of this thesis indicates that citizens generally support their own country’s claims, is it possible that information conveyed across countries through the Internet could persuade these citizens to abandon their country’s own claims?

Third, while this research highlights the potential and limits of citizen activism, it is also important to study how other actors utilize the Internet. People are not the only actor that appropriates the Internet. As mentioned in Chapter One, this new technology is widely used by governments, political organizations, and policymakers, and not just by citizens and grassroots movements. Although this thesis specifically examines citizen grassroots movements, it is also important to understand how other actors adopt the same technology for their respective political goals. Furthermore, this need to examine multiple actors extends beyond national borders. As the Internet shared the confidential video all over the world by the next day of the Masaharu Isshiki’s video leak, the Internet creates a globally connected forum to exchange information. Hence, though complicated, the future research on one event should include simultaneous studies on different countries.

In the case of this thesis, it is likely to offer meaningful insights to analyze the impact of the leaked video on the Chinese Internet, conventional media, and policymakers.

THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS

Grounded in my theoretical model, these puzzles offer ample space for future research. However, the analogy between the Internet and printing press I presented in Chapter One predicts an even broader possibility.

Does the Internet affect people's identities, just as the printing press gave birth to nationalism? My empirical chapters highlight the persistence of nation-based identity, which is arguably reinforced by the Internet because people tend to self-select the web content favorable to their original belief. However, it is too soon to give a definitive conclusion on the Internet's implications to people's identities. As Benedict Anderson traced the transformation process over centuries,⁹ the identity is only a product of the long-term process in which people and other actors compete for their power by utilizing the new technology. As long as people are still exploring the possibility of the Internet by designing new applications, it is hard to determine how people construct their identities upon the given media. It is also important to note that the Internet enables more flexible formats of the media than the printing press, making it even more difficult to predict how the online platforms in general influence users' identities. Thus, the research on the Internet and political identity must wait until its maturity as a technology. Or, instead of waiting, analogies with historical examples of comparable innovations may shed light on the future of the Internet and politics.

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso Books, 2006).

Do governments intervene into the new forms of citizen movements facilitated by the Internet? While the printing press enabled the public to participate in “popular nationalism” movements, Anderson also underlines that state power soon countered such movements by systematically imposing “official nationalism” at the policy level. Hence, it is important to consider the scenarios in which governments act to counter people’s new political activities made possible by the Internet. Although slower than citizens, the government is also expanding their capacity in this new political space, just as the Internet companies such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook see the increasing number of governments’ access to their internal data.¹⁰ Thus, as much as the Internet has potentials for future evolution, it is uncertain whether citizens can continue to be a beneficiary of the technology.

Despite such concern for government countermeasures, people should not simply reject external interventions to online citizen activism, since such interventions may strengthen their influence in policymaking. In the case of nationalism, government’s policy bridged the new idea of “popular nationalism” and traditional state systems. According to Anderson, people needed to wait until the governments’ “official nationalism” to integrate their “popular nationalism” into the old political regimes.¹¹ Similarly, the emerging concept of Internet-based citizen activism also appears to demand integration to the existing political channels in order to convey their agendas to policymakers. In other words, given my research result that neither those who shared the

¹⁰ “Transparency Report: Communicate Fearlessly to Build Trust,” *Twitter*, accessed April 1, 2015, <https://transparency.twitter.com/>; “Access to Information,” *Google Transparency Report*, n.d., <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/>; “Global Government Requests Report,” *Facebook*, n.d., https://www.facebook.com/about/government_requests.

¹¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

leaked video nor those who posted comments online remained unacknowledged in policy debates on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, online citizen activists are still searching for ways to make their voices heard by policymakers. In this regard, the need of the Hybrid Model itself crystalizes the current situation that the peoples' online voices alone cannot be represented in policymaking. The policymakers' silence toward online citizen activism signifies the need for intermediary actors, which help online activists deliver their collective preferences to policymakers.

The conventional news media can potentially bridge this gap between online citizen activists and policymakers. Theoretically speaking, it is already possible to statistically analyze people's online activities to measure their collective preferences, just as I conducted a small-scale discourse analysis of Twitter in this thesis. If mass media companies invest their resource to analyze online activity data, it will allow Internet-based activists to statistically represent their collective will. Although citizen grassroots groups have criticized the mainstream news companies for underreporting them, the creation of online public opinion surveys can resolve such frustrations by examining virtually *all* online actions in major platforms, rather than relying on reporting *selected* by newsmakers. In this way, the conventional news media are able to provide with policymakers a more objective indicator to evaluate the relative significance of Internet-based citizen movements. Furthermore, grounded in their established relationship with policymakers, as well as their expertise in interpreting public opinion, the mass media has the potential to institutionalize a new channel of political representation by reporting online public opinion.

These possible scenarios highlight that the Internet allows not only citizens, but also policymakers and newsmakers to appropriate the technology for their political aspirations. As both my Hybrid Model and Anderson's *Imagined Communities* indicate, innovations in communication technology expand each stakeholder's capacity as opposed to creating a new one. Therefore, in studying the future of the Internet and politics, it is more important to ask who is leveraging the technology than what the technology does.

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