Islamic Immigration, Sex Trafficking, and the Media:
The Implications of Racialized and Gendered Trafficking Discourses in the Netherlands

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ABSTRACT

Abstract of “Islamic Immigration, Sex Trafficking, and the Media: The Implications of Racialized and Gendered Trafficking Discourses in the Netherlands”


This thesis studies the impact of the media on views on Islamic immigration through the lens of gender and sex trafficking narratives. According to Mahdavi’s Trafficking and Terror model derived from research on the United States, Islamophobia is infused into trafficking narratives to raise public support for U.S. government anti-terrorism measures in the Middle East. My research applies Mahdavi’s framework to the case of the “loverboys” in the Netherlands, a least likely case given the country’s history of liberal tolerance. Using discourse analysis, I examine perspectives on Islam, immigration, and sex trafficking in Dutch media and find that post-9/11 discussions of Islam and sex trafficking use gendered narratives to defend intolerance in a historically tolerant state. I find that this narrative, which focuses on protecting white women from brown men, is used to subtly support Islamophobic integration policies and anti-immigration measures in the Netherlands. This thesis offers a Mahdavi-inspired framework for understanding the correlation between Islamophobia and sex trafficking narratives outside of the U.S. context. This framework has implications for understanding Islamophobia and anti-immigration policies that can contribute to the growth of radical Islam, as well as the continuation of human rights abuses of migrants and sex workers.

Keywords: loverboys, Islamophobia, sex trafficking, trafficking narratives, gender
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Almost all the angry letters I received were from Muslims. People called me an Uncle Tom, white on the inside, a traitor to my people. All these ad hominem attacks were basically distractions from the real issue, which wasn’t me - It doesn't matter who I am. What matters is abuse, and how it is anchored in a religion that denies women their rights as humans. What matters is that atrocities against women and children are carried out in Europe. What matters is that governments and societies must stop hiding behind a hollow pretense of tolerance so that they can recognize and deal with the problem.

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CHAPTER ONE
TRAFFICKERS AND TERRORISTS: EU NARRATIVES ON NON-WESTERN IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS

When I was twelve and it was [my Moroccan boyfriend’s] birthday, he said I had to go in his pants. Later he asked me to do the same thing to his friend. I made it very clear I didn’t want that, but he convinced me, saying ‘If you love me, you’ll do it’.

—Anonymous Dutch interviewee for Witness: Loverboys, a documentary about Moroccan pimps and underage, ethnically-Dutch sex workers.¹

In the 2000s, the Dutch media exploded with stories of “loverboys,” young Muslim men who allegedly romanced white, ethnically-Dutch, high school girls and convinced them to move to cities and engage in sex work.² The media portrayed these youths as handsome, deviously charming, and manipulative by the Dutch media and many ethnically Dutch sex workers with boyfriends from immigrant communities began to emerge, claiming that they too had been the victims of “loverboys”. Despite the fact that most of these women were of legal age to consent to sex work and that sex work and pimping are legal in the Netherlands, there was a moral uproar throughout the country


² Note: American understandings of race as “white” being all-encompassing do not apply in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, being a member of the majority white population requires Dutch ethnicity, not just European ethnicity. For example, there is a significant difference in the classification of Eastern-European or Russian white women and Dutch white women in modern Dutch society. Han Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” in Discovering the Dutch: On Culture and Society in the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 232.
when these stories broke. The “loverboys” were found to be criminals under trafficking laws and hundreds of these men were put in jail. Although many of these Muslim men are actually legal citizens of the Netherlands, they are treated as outsiders by the ethnically-Dutch community and are criminalized not only for pimping, but for many other crimes as well.³

The public outcries against Muslims were not limited to the pimping issue. Following September 11, 2001, the date that is considered the start of the “War on Terror” in the United States and the Western world, racial tensions have been mounting throughout Western Europe. Although the attacks themselves were launched against the United States, the tensions between the Islamic immigrant communities and the white Europeans who sympathized with the U.S. mounted quickly, as people feared that Islam would turn their sights to Western Europe as well, especially following the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005. For instance, Muslim women in France have been banned from wearing the burqa in public. In the UK, Islamic immigrants have been forced to leave their homes to escape extreme violence. Through the continent, debates over halal menus, the acceptance of sharia law by major governments, and other potent issues for Islamic immigrants have sparked and Europe is approaching a breaking point—so much so that some even claim that the continent may be approaching religious civil war.⁴

Politicians have been attempting to develop strategies for limiting the impact of these racial tensions, from integration schemes to border closings. There is also evidence that there is a correlation between the rise of anti-trafficking laws and the rise of anti-immigration policy throughout the European Union (EU), which is now being nicknamed “Fortress Europa.” Some researchers have proposed that anti-trafficking policies may be a way for the liberal Northern European states to reclaim their status of “moral superiority,” through championing the end of trafficking and supporting human rights and women’s rights, while actually creating measures that keep out migrants and make it more difficult for immigrant populations to thrive within state borders.5

Globally, anti-trafficking policies have been put in place, supposedly to protect women and promote women’s rights and human rights, but these measures have had varying success and are often detrimental to women migrants. Many times, women who have been categorized as “trafficked” moved transnationally in order to escape poor conditions, but trafficking laws in various EU states support deportation of trafficked women. Plambech argues that this occurs because the line between a “victim” of human trafficking and a “criminal” who is trying to illegally cross the border often gets blurred in European states. If a woman is found to be involved in sex trafficking, Plambech claims that her deportation results from states painting her as a criminal who need to be

sent back to her home countries, while justifying their actions from a human rights perspective. This creates a hierarchy of violence in which violence during sexual trafficking is found to be worse than the violence experienced by these women in their home countries that they were fleeing.⁶ The maintenance of anti-trafficking laws for moral reasons by the EU human rights regime thus seems at odds with the growing intolerance for immigrants and the negative treatment of migrant communities.

The Netherlands has an attitude classified as “liberal tolerance” by Essed and Hobving, meaning that it has a history of allowing migrants to find safe haven within its borders and tolerating all religions and cultures.⁷ Even this liberal state, however, has a conflict building between the white majority and the Islamic immigrant minority: the ethnically Dutch population and the Moroccan and Turkish immigrant groups that have been entering into the country. Interestingly, in the Netherlands, it appears that the impact of trafficking discourses extends beyond their utilization to support deportations and limit the entrance of migrants into the country: it may also be leading to increased social and political exclusion of first and second generation people of Muslim descent living in the Netherlands.

Although the Netherlands has a policy of legal sex work and pimping is legal, there are still women working in the sex industry against their will or as a result of coercion. Many of the women who are classified as “trafficked” in the Netherlands are

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women of color and foreign-born women who were brought to the Netherlands under false pretenses and are suffering under poor labor conditions as sex workers.  

Predominant media discourses, however, focus on internal trafficking efforts and paint brown Muslim men as those who are forcing women into sex work and white, ethnically-Dutch, women as victims. This discourse of brown men trafficking white women is not uncommon, with brown men being portrayed as villains and white women being portrayed as victims, but it has historically been applied to external threats, such as terrorists or foreign militants, rather than to an internal threat, like immigrant populations.

Through this research, I seek to determine what factors explain the shift towards anti-immigration sentiment in the Netherlands. I ask, given that the Netherlands has a strong human rights regime that emphasizes multiculturalism and has many policies in place regarding opening borders to refugees, why has this liberal, Western state become intolerant of Islamic immigrant communities? More specifically, in what ways does the media in the Netherlands emphasize the racial nature of internal trafficking discourses and how does this impact anti-immigration sentiment? In turn, how does this anti-immigrant sentiment impact trafficking discourses? The purpose of this research is to create a framework to explain how the Dutch culture of “liberal tolerance” is being impacted by trends and discourses in the media and politics that resulted from the

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8 UNODC: Trafficking in Persons: Analysis on Europe, (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, February 2009).

9 Bovenkerk, ‘Loverboys’ of modern pooierschap in Amsterdam, 7.

Islamophobia that arose after September 11, 2001 and how that shift in culture relates to a shifting attitude towards human trafficking.

I argue that trafficking discourses in the Netherlands, specifically those that focus on protecting white women from brown men, have been used to subtly support rising anti-Islamic sentiment, because mainstream Dutch society has accepted the idea that Dutch views on gender and sexuality are incompatible with those of “Islamic culture” and can thus utilize gendered narratives, such as narratives about human trafficking, in order to condemn Islam. Furthermore, I show that multiple states utilize racialized trafficking narratives to promote Islamophobia and that the type of narrative utilized reflects the constructed threat that Islam is perceived to pose to mainstream society.

CONCEPTS AND CHOICE OF TERMINOLOGY

The language surrounding the issues of both migration and human trafficking is heavily charged and specific terms are often used in order to manipulate public perception or to demonstrate one’s personal views. Thus, it is important to clarify the choice of language throughout this thesis.

Sex Work Language

Although the historic term for the exchange of money or goods for the service of sexual acts is “prostitution,” it is generally associated with an immoral and illegal occupation. The preferred term by many people in the sex industry, and many people who believe that the sale of sex should be a viable option for men and women who are of legal age and have the mental capacity to consent to the choice to enter this field, is “sex
work.” Dewey and Zheng argue that this is because “sex work” and “sex worker” are more encompassing terms and include not only those who engage in the sale of vaginal, anal, or oral sex, but also in a myriad of other intimate arrangements, including stripping, pornography, and fetish work.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, the term “sex worker” is said by many laborers in the sex industry to be a term that has been freed from the “shame” of “prostitute” and that it allows work of a sexual nature to have more dignity.\textsuperscript{12} For the purposes of this thesis, I use the term sex work unless I specifically refer to the views of another author or if there is a situation in which consent was not freely given.

Related to this concept of consent is the idea of “human trafficking.” The terms “trafficking in persons” or “human trafficking” are defined by the UN as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.\textsuperscript{13}

Particularly important to the UN definition, which is commonly accepted by many states, including the Netherlands, which ratified the Palermo Protocol in 2000, is the


concept of “consent.” According to the UN, “the consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation…shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth have been used.”\(^{14}\) It is the basis of this definition, in addition to other reasons, that I criticize the usage of “human trafficking”. Firstly, implicit in this definition is the idea that people who have been subjected to any sort of coercive measure are deprived of their agency and cannot offer consent. Furthermore, the utilization of the term “trafficking” is typically associated with movement of illicit substances, such as drugs and arms, across borders. By applying this term to human beings, it reduces them to objects and again, removes agency. Additionally, the term combines forced labor and forced migration, which removes the possibility that someone may have migrated willingly and was then forced into an exploitative labor situation by state practices or by criminal organizations.

“Modern day slavery” and “human slavery” have become popular replacement terms for “human trafficking,” particularly following the utilization of these terms in Kevin Bales’ *Disposable People*, as well as other scholars, like Siddarth Kara and Gloria Steinem.\(^{15}\) However, I only use this term in reference to Bale’s work and related work, because the term “slavery” is steeped in historical connotations that discourage open

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discussions on the rights of sex workers when the term has been applied to someone in the sex industry.  

Thus I utilize the term “human trafficking” purely in reference to the laws, discourses, and studies that refer directly to this term. Whenever appropriate, I attempt to use the term “forced sex work” in reference to sex work that is truly done under protest, in order to reduce problematic connotations with agency and historical situations.

**Migration Language**

It is additionally important to explain the difference in terminology when defining migrant populations in the Netherlands. Firstly, a migrant or immigrant is defined as someone who has moved from one state of residence to another, but a member of a migrant community or migrant population may be a migrant or someone descended from a migrant. A second-generation migrant is someone who has a parent who was a migrant, even if that parent is ethnically Dutch. It is important to mention here that the Dutch have their own words for these terms, which colors the way these concepts are conceived in the Netherlands. The Dutch call all those who have any ancestry that is not Dutch “allochtonen”, which roughly translates to “foreign.” “Autochtonen”, or “native Dutch” is a term reserved for those who can trace their ancestry on all sides to Dutch lineage. Having one grandparent who is not Dutch is, to many Dutch people, enough to categorize someone as allochtoon. This term is not necessarily derogatory and is even used by Dutch government reports to delineate what I call, “members of the Dutch migrant

16 Orlando Patterson, “ Trafficking, Gender & Slavery: Past and Present,” in The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the Contemporary (Oxford University Press, 2012).
community” and people with primarily Dutch heritage, who I refer to as “ethnically Dutch,” utilizing my own translation of these terms.17

Although they will not be mentioned often, I occasionally refer to “Western migrants,” or people who moved to the Netherlands from a western state, like Germany or the UK, as “white migrants,” which includes people from western states and from Eastern Europe. For example, the Netherlands has a very large Polish migrant community and they would fall under this category.18 This thesis will predominantly, however, focus on “non-western migrants” and “Islamic migrants.” As a result of the overwhelming majority of Moroccan and Turkish migrants identifying as Islamic, any member of the Moroccan or Turkish immigrant community will sometimes be identified under the umbrella term of “Islamic migrant,” but will also be identified as a “non-western migrant” in some cases, as this is a term often used in government studies.19

**Racial Language**

The idea that the Islamic migrant is the victim of Islamophobia is not novel but my decision to define the discrimination faced by Muslims in the western world as “racialized” or “racism” is a carefully considered and potentially contentious one. I chose

17 Han Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” in Discovering the Dutch: On Culture and Society in the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 232.
to consider this issue a racial one because my model is based heavily in the ideas of Mahdavi, who conceptualizes modern narratives on Islam and human trafficking in the context of “brown bodies” versus “white bodies”. These terms are used to define people who are of Islamic versus western descent. Furthermore, there are several scholars who have argued for the classification of Islamophobia as a form of racism, which is why I refer to it as such in some sections of this study. Frost points out that having a “look that is associated with Muslims” can trigger discrimination and Islamophobic sentiment and Johnson goes so far as to say that Islamophobia is racism “wrapped in religious terms.”

Some may argue that Islam is a religion, not a race, particularly since Islam is, of course, not a monolithic race or an ethnicity, but the fact that it is perceived as such and, as suggested by Said, the way the West perceives of something is how it defines it, particularly when that concept or thing is defined in opposition to the West itself. The racial markers of someone from an Islamic background are largely considered to be those of “brown” people and the appearance of being “brown” is grounds for discrimination on the basis of Islamic identity. For example, even those “brown” people who are not Muslim, such as turban-wearing Sikhs, often experience Islamophobic discrimination.

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(like being subject to Islamophobic slurs) because their appearance of being Muslim—a perceived race—triggers a racial response.\textsuperscript{23}

In providing this definition, I understand that I essentially exclude ethnically white Muslims, and even black or East Asian Muslims, who do not fit the traditional stereotype of the “brown” Muslim, but this serves my point that it is the perception of someone as a Muslim, rather than their internal beliefs or religious practices, which triggers Islamophobia. Furthermore, those people who do hold ethnic markers of Islam, such as people who have what are perceived to be Islamic-sounding names or Islamic-style dress, do generally experience discrimination in the way that people who fit the stereotypical “brown” appearance do.\textsuperscript{24}

\textbf{SIGNIFICANCE}

\textbf{Theoretical Significance}

Several bodies of literature are relevant to anti-immigration policy in the Netherlands and the greater EU. Firstly, I assess the “trafficking and terror” model developed by Pardis Mahdavi and its relevance to my study. Then I examine the impact of immigration theory, sex trafficking theories, a collection of sociological theories that I call “immigrants in society” theory, and “media panic” theories, in order to restructure the “trafficking and terror” model to suit the situation in the EU.


\footnote{\textsuperscript{24} Frost, “Islamophobia: examining causal links between the media and ‘race hate’ from ‘below.’”}
I am not the first researcher to demonstrate a connection between racialized sex trafficking discourses and Islamophobia. In her book, *From Trafficking to Terror*, Pardis Mahdavi develops a theory for understanding the relationship between human trafficking rhetoric and anti-terror rhetoric called the “Trafficking and terror” model. Her work focuses on the way that the war on terror and the war on trafficking overlap and work together to build similar discourses. According to Mahdavi, an ideal victim is a white woman who is violated by a brown man.\(^\text{25}\) She finds that making Muslim men into villains leads to a rise in Islamophobia, or fear of Islam, in the Western world. Mahdavi claims that this narrative is utilized in the United States in order to justify the war on terror and increase sympathy for security policies, torture, and warfare.\(^\text{26}\)

While Mahdavi’s work creates a good basis for understanding how Islamophobia builds, the work is largely anthropological and does not consider how the model would work outside of her anthropological case of the United States. As her work deals solely with a nation that does not have a large influx of Islamic immigration, it does not consider the impact of Islamophobia on immigration policy. My thesis reinterprets the “trafficking and terror” framework to study the Netherlands by moving the discourse to the domestic level. I argue that in the Netherlands, where Islamic immigration has become a primary concern for the government, the struggle with Islamic immigration has led to an increase in Islamophobic trafficking narratives that encourage the growth of

\(^{25}\) Pardis Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*, 8.

\(^{26}\) Pardis Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*, 21
xenophobic parties and of anti-immigration policies, as shown in Figure 1.1, which is my interpretation of Mahdavi’s argument, set next to how I interpret it in the Netherlands.

Figure 1.1 Mahdavi’s Trafficking and Terror Model vs Dutch Application of the Model

In order to further develop my Dutch model, I utilize the intersection of other theories that inform the situation in the Netherlands. First, I examine immigration theory. I primarily utilize theories on the legality, morality, and human rights implications of closing borders in order to determine the expected course of action for a state such as the Netherlands, which adheres to a human rights regime. According to scholars Schotel and Karatani, it is a violation of the human rights of asylum seekers and those fleeing poor
conditions to close borders to immigrants. Other scholars who argue for closed borders tend to approach migration issues for security reasons, down-playing the importance of human rights. My work will utilize this theory to determine not only the likelihood of the Netherlands creating closed borders, but also to contextualize the potential impact on human rights that occurs when anti-immigration policies are put in place. This study contributes to this literature by demonstrating the impact of sex trafficking concerns and Islamophobia can have on anti-immigration sentiment through the “trafficking and terror” paradigm.

Secondly, I examine sex trafficking theories. I contribute to the theory that opinions on the morality of sex work are being exploited in order to persecute the lower-class participants in the sex work economy through criminalization. Thus, those who participate in sex work are constructed as victims, regardless of their motivations, particularly in racialized narratives. Those who fit into one of these victim narratives are, furthermore, more likely to garner sympathy and assistance from the government. This literature will inform the language and discourses I utilize throughout my work, but contextualization within Islamophobia and immigration issues will move it beyond what has already been studied in this field.

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Thirdly, I utilize a group of theories from sociology that I categorize as “tolerance and culture” theories in order to demonstrate the impact of Islamophobia on immigrant communities. Samuel Huntington’s theory on the “clash of civilizations” explains that Islam is “fundamentally” at odds with western values, painting “Islam” as a monolithic culture that cannot be changed, while Said explains that this thinking serves to create a conception of Islam that allows for widespread condemnation of an entire group of people, contributing to tensions even further.29 I find that, in the Netherlands, there is an idea that certain values of “Islamic culture” regarding gender and sexuality are at odds with “Dutch values.” I aim to integrate these findings into my framework in order to explain why Islamophobia rises in the western world and what can lead to the collapse of tolerance that I argue has been supported by racialized sex trafficking narratives.

Fourthly, I examine the importance of women’s bodies as a battleground for society’s issues. Utilizing the arguments of Rao and Enloe, I establish that women are symbols of society and that their violation is often seen as a violation of the nation as a whole.30 This study contributes to this scholarship by that there is an exploitation of feminism for the ends of protection of the nation in the Netherlands.


Finally, I assess “moral panic” studies. Although Mahdavi does mention the impact of media itself, the term “moral panic” or “witch hunt” is used by various theorists who study both sex trafficking and Islamophobia. The sociological concept of “moral panic” was introduced in the 1800s and was later developed fully by Young who describes it as deviance amplified by mass media concerns.\textsuperscript{31} Cook, et. al’s 1983 study demonstrated that the way in which we talk about issues in the media and the tropes that are visible in popular culture have a potent impact on the way in which policy decisions are made, making these media frenzies particularly important to this research.\textsuperscript{32} I contribute to existing literature in this field by demonstrating the importance of timelines in the creation of a moral panic through proving that the rise of the “loverboys” panic was primarily related to rising Islamophobia after the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks.

Thus, I utilize Mahdavi’s framework and integrate the theoretical intersection of the fields of immigration, human trafficking, media discourses, and social exclusion/multiculturalism, to show that the primary issues of a nation are what structure the way in which discourses about sex and forced sex work are used.

**Practical Significance**

These findings have practical implications for policy. The findings of this research can impact Dutch immigration policies, integration policies, and trafficking


policies by examining trends and determining the impact of discourse on policy. As of 2014, the European Union is in crisis. The powerhouse economies of Europe, the Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, with some of the highest standards of living, are currently struggling to maintain their power and influence of the EU. Furthermore, these states are attempting to minimize their domestic issues as welfare states begin to fail. Many politicians and prominent public figures have blamed the immigrant population for these problems and the majority of citizens in Western EU states would like to decrease the size of the immigrant population in their country. However, rising Islamophobia has led to problems for the Islamic immigrant population that could be described as human rights violations and that requires attention.

The security implications for the rise of Islamophobia are also potent. Exclusionism and anti-immigration policies that arise from Islamophobia and racialized trafficking discourses, have been linked by Hammond to the rise of fundamentalism and hatred of the West within Islamic populations. Understanding the causes of exclusionism and anti-immigration policies can thus contribute to scholarship that guides policymakers in their attempt to curb security threats from fundamentalist Islamic terror groups.


This study shows the driving forces and reactions of a community that perceives itself as struggling with a gender-based “clash of cultures” between western society and Islamic migrants in the post-9/11 world. By describing the circumstances that lead to the Islamophobia, it is possible to create policies that mediate some of the human rights abuses that occur as a result of anti-Islamic sentiment. The work done in this thesis also has the potential to apply to states beyond the Netherlands in that it is reflective of the situations of other EU states dealing with similar issues to those of the Netherlands.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Case Selection

According to Van Evera, a case study should create theory by explaining the significance of a specific event or situation.³⁶ There are numerous examples of states in the EU that are struggling with Islamophobia and immigration policy concerns, all of which could help me generate theory, but I focus my study on the Netherlands in order to limit my scope to a reasonable size to perform in-depth analytical work and to test the “trafficking and terror” model in the EU within a specific state.

As the Netherlands is a state with a legacy liberal sex policy and a history of religious and immigrant tolerance, the policy decisions around Islam and sex work that have been arising in the 21st century are considerable deviations from their traditional policy decisions, making this case a specifically strong example of the anti-Islamic sentiment and anti-sex work sentiment that have been rising throughout western Europe.

Though many of the states mentioned earlier are struggling with the issues of immigration, trafficking, and Islamophobic resistance to multiculturalism, sometimes in much more extreme ways, the Netherlands’ history as a liberal, multicultural, tolerant, and human-rights supporting state means that this case is a hard case for human rights understandings of migration theory and sociological theory. Liberal states that support multiculturalism and religious tolerance should theoretically be supporting open borders for those fleeing human rights violations and should be supportive of religious freedom and economic equality for migrants, yet the Netherlands is doing the opposite of what is expected. However, this case is also an illustrative case for my model, in that it demonstrates the impact that discourse can have on the opinions and policies of a state.

I also study the Netherlands because there is a breadth of information regarding the rich case of the “loverboys,” which I examine in Chapter Five. I chose to focus on this specific case over time in order to go in-depth with a situation that demonstrates my argument. There is already research regarding the “loverboys” from a variety of perspectives, yet there is no work that synthesizes these perspectives with the “trafficking and terror” framework. Finally, my pre-existing knowledge of Dutch language and of the Netherlands biased me towards this choice.

**Approach**

To provide a full and complete picture of the situation in the Netherlands, I zoom out to view the situation in general for migrants in the Netherlands and the media narratives and government policies that are associated with Islam, immigration, gender, and sexuality in Chapter Four, but Chapter Five focuses more closely on the specific case
of the “loverboys”, to give an in-depth look at a specific case as a way to thoroughly understand the impact of racialized and sexualized narratives on the Islamic migrant community. Both chapters will utilize mixed methodology in order to illustrate my theory that there has been an increase in negative narratives about Islamic men violating ethnically white women following 9/11 in discussions of human trafficking in the Netherlands and that these narratives are over-emphasized relative to the magnitude of the issue.

I utilize historical, comparative, and quantitative analysis of how public opinion has changed after 9/11 regarding immigration. I examine public opinion data on the opinions of the ethnically Dutch and the ethnically Moroccan regarding immigration, Islam, feminism, and sex trafficking. I also use discourse analysis of media reporting on “loverboys” and anti-Islam or anti-immigrant sentiment, to give a clear picture of how sentiment has changed since 9/11, by comparing pre-2001 and post-2001 data. I chart the frequency of certain key words regarding Islam, immigrants, and sex trafficking in newspapers, social media, and television programs in order to examine the extent to which this shift has occurred. Demographic and statistical data on the economy, welfare programs, crime rates, population change, and immigration changes will determine the extent to which there is a lack of connection between public opinion and hard facts.

In addition to the quantitative facts that inform the Netherlands case, I also compare the situation of the Netherlands with other states in the EU in my conclusion, in order to determine whether this case can be extrapolated outwards and whether this case is supported by other data and situations. Upon the examination of this data, I demonstrate that there has been a clear shift in attitudes, policy, and law with regards to
Islam, immigration, and forced sex work in the Netherlands since 2001. It should be noted that although the above methods combined should provide a clear picture of the reality of the situation, I am only demonstrating correlation, not direct causation.

Discourse analysis will be the central aspect of my qualitative approach to gathering data. I utilize similar media sources as those mentioned for my quantitative analysis, but I also analyze films. During my discourse analysis, I study the meaning and impact of the language utilized by policy makers, the media, and laws, in the context of my Dutch application of the “trafficking and terror” model. I utilize this analysis to codify attitudes towards sex work, gender, sexuality, feminism, Islam, and immigration in modern Dutch media and public statements over a set time period and demonstrate changes over time.

**Timeframe**

My research focuses primarily on the events after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, because even though this was an attack on the United States, it completely altered the international political landscape, particularly in western states. I show that 9/11 was a turning point in immigration and sex work policies in the Netherlands and the earliest cases of the “loverboy” phenomenon appear in the early 2000s. Though I consider my research timeframe to be 1995-2015, with the beginning of my timeframe coinciding with early post-Cold War-period, which Martiniello demonstrates was the beginning of negative attitudes regarding immigration in Western Europe, I am careful to consider 9/11 as an important event in my tracking of the rise of the “loverboy” phenomenon in
the 2000s. Furthermore, this timeline is linked to the earliest dates of Internet archiving in Dutch newspapers, allowing me access to a broad range of information.

**Sources**

I use a variety of newspapers, films, online sources, selected for popularity and diversity of perspectives, to trace trends in textual and discourse analysis with regards to Islam, trafficking, and immigration (See Table 1.1 for more information regarding the specific sources). Taken together, these sources form a mix of top-down and bottom-up sources. In doing deeper linguistic analysis to assess attitudes and opinions, I only include editorials, as the topics of Islam and sex trafficking are far too commonplace to assess all articles. Other data, including survey data and quantitative evidence of public attitudes regarding the issue of “loverboys”, immigration, and Islam and census information is provided through the work of other researchers and national and international organizations.

I also utilize public reports of laws and proposed immigration, trafficking, and religious tolerance laws (including the votes that were affiliated with the approval or disapproval of the laws in government) to show how the political climate has changed since 2001. Additionally, all translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

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### Table 1.1 Sources for Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Source</th>
<th>Name of Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers (used both to find</td>
<td><em>NRC Handelsblad</em> – A moderate, liberal newspaper founded in 1970 as a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>articles from the perspective of</td>
<td>merger between two major newspapers founded in the 19th century. This</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporters, as well as to find</td>
<td>newspaper is the 4th most read newspaper in the Netherlands but it was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quotes that display the views of</td>
<td>selected for use over other, more widely-read papers for its well-established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prominent politicians and public</td>
<td>online archive and its use by other researchers upon which this study builds,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>figures)</td>
<td>as well as for its rigor and intellectual prestige.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>De Volkskrant</em> – A moderate newspaper founded in 1919 and the third most</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>widely circulated paper in the Netherlands. This paper is not the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>predominantly analyzed paper in this study, but it is used as another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>source to corroborate the findings from my analysis of the NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handelsblad.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Films (Documentaries and Fictional)</td>
<td><em>Mijn Loverboy</em> – A short 2010 documentary that features interviews with 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“victims” of “loverboys” and follows police prosecution of one of these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“loverboys.”40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Loverboy!</em> – A dramatic film (fictional) about the relationship between a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>white teenager and her “loverboy”. The film is shown in most Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secondary schools and has had a broad reach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Witness Loverboys</em> – An Al Jazeera piece on the “loverboy” phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that focuses on Ibrahim, a social worker who works with Moroccan young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>men to discourage them from entering into criminal enterprises, such as sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Taken</em> – A 2005 dramatic film (fictional) that focuses on a white man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rescuing his daughter from Islamic traffickers. Mahdavi argues that this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>movie has had large impact on the international perception of human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trafficking.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book</td>
<td><em>Echte Mannen Eten Geen Kaas</em> – A controversial “memoir” written by a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-proclaimed victim of a “loverboy”, Maria Mosterd, in 2008. Though</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>largely denounced as a fabrication,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


the book was a best-seller and ignited a serious focus on the “loverboys” in Dutch society and media.42


**Analysis**

I have codified any quantitative data utilizing the variables that are laid out in Table 1.2. The choice to codify certain articles as “negative” or “positive” towards Islamic immigrants resulted from discourse analysis of each individual article, book, or film. The choice of the words in the textual analysis comes from the fact that these words that are associated with certain trends (such as “loverboy” and “terrorism”). I perform textual analysis in Dutch, but the English translations are given in the table for ease of understanding. Once I gathered my quantitative information, I utilized Microsoft Excel to create charts that determine the frequency of terms, articles, laws, and government policies around the issues of my study. I determine whether upward trends for frequency


in anti-Islamic, anti-immigration, and anti-trafficking language and policy. I then evaluate whether or not that these trends are correlated and whether fluctuations in these trends are associated with key events that impact all three areas.

Table 1.2 Variables that Require Codification and Elaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Measurement</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of the words associated with the loverboys and with human trafficking (e.x. “loverboy”, “human trafficking”, “white slavery”) in the media [total numeric values per year]</td>
<td>NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant</td>
<td>Evaluate the rise of the “Loverboy” phenomenon after 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of words associated with Islamic immigration (ex. “immigration”, “migrant”, “headscarf”, “Islam”, “Muslim”) in the media [total numeric values per year]</td>
<td>NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant</td>
<td>Evaluate whether or not and when there were rises in anti-Islam sentiment since 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of positive and negative articles regarding the Islam and immigration [Numeric values per year; codified through discourse analysis]</td>
<td>NRC Handelsblad</td>
<td>Evaluate whether discourses have become more negative towards Islam since 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of paired terms that connect Islamic immigration with gender or human trafficking (ex. “loverboys” AND “Islam”, “homosexuality” AND “Islam”, “sex” AND “Islam”)</td>
<td>NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant</td>
<td>Determine the correlation between human trafficking, gender, and Islam in popular Dutch media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to demonstrate that there is a causal effect of trafficking and terrorism discourses on anti-immigration policy, I compare over time, utilizing 9/11 as a turning-point. Unfortunately, there are no social democracies that do not utilize both discourses, so it will be impossible to study a deviant case that can act to prove that there is a direct correlation between each of these discourses and anti-immigration policy independently.
during the process tracing method, a major limitation to my study; however, this does show that the two concepts seem to be paired in some way.

Limitations

The depth, accuracy, and completeness of my research is limited in several ways. Firstly, restrictions to access to data is a limitation on this project. Accessing archived newspapers going back to before the year 2000 online is very difficult and may impact the completeness of this thesis, because only two major Dutch newspapers had thorough and complete online archives for my time period of interest and time-constraints prohibited me from accessing these documents while in the Netherlands and on-location. Furthermore, access to court cases would be highly beneficial, but as many of these cases deal with minors, examining them was impossible.

Finally, my own personal bias will impact this research in unforeseen ways, particularly with regard to my ethnographic work. As a Dutch citizen with sympathy for the desire in mainstream Dutch society to preserve traditional Dutch culture, I understand the desire to resist integration of new groups into society. However, as an International Relations scholar with an interest in and respect for human rights and liberal ideals, I can also sympathize with the Islamic population, whose access to religious freedom, social welfare, and fair treatment under the law are being restricted. I am also a woman and I identify as a sex-worker-supportive feminist, which may color my opinions on sex work. Accordingly, I have very conflicting feelings about this issue as a whole. Particularly, my personal biases may have impacted the codification of some articles as positive and others as negative during my analysis of news sources.
Finally, I am limited by the constraints of my chosen method, because in showing correlation, rather than causation, I risk providing data that has no relationship at all. In order to circumvent these limitations as fully as possible, I plan to triangulate my methods and my theories through the utilization of quantitative and qualitative sources, an array of analysis techniques, and a variety of theoretical fields. I also attempt to be reflexive and self-aware whenever necessary during my analytical process.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Chapter Two ("The Dutch Application of the Trafficking and Terror Model") discusses and evaluates the existing theory on immigration, sex trafficking, immigrants in society, and religious tolerance and reframes Mahdavi’s theory on "trafficking and terror" to connect it with immigration theory and create a new model that applies to the Netherlands. Chapter Three ("Liberal Tolerance? The Changing Landscape of Dutch Politics") examines the history of religious tolerance, immigration law, and sex work law in the Netherlands, with particular focus on the 20th and 21st centuries, in order to trace the decline of tolerance in Dutch society and government. Chapter Four ("Gender and Islam in the Media After 9/11") utilizes discourse-analysis and quantitative analysis of newspaper and media sources over time in order to demonstrate that there has been a shift in the treatment of immigrants in the Netherlands (with particular focus given to the media) since September 11, 2001 and determines that Islamophobia is linked to gender and sexuality in the Netherlands. Chapter Five ("The Loverboys: Complicating the Victim-Perpetrator Narrative") provides an in-depth assessment of the "loverboy" phenomenon through the Dutch application of the "trafficking and terror" model, looking
largely at ethnographic data and media discourse analysis, and demonstrates the idea that trafficking narratives are sexualized and racialized to promote Islamophobia through a gender lens. Chapter Six (“Conflict or Coexistence: Islamophobia in Context”) draws implications for theory and practice and makes recommendations for future research on the intersection of trafficking, terrorism, and immigration, particularly with regards to the Netherlands and the rest of the EU.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUALIZING TRAFFICKING AND TERROR IN THE NETHERLANDS

When our paradigms about human trafficking are broken and when the issues are misportrayed, discourse and policy continue to build on one another to increase challenges faced by Muslim populations in the post-9/11 world.

—Pardis Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror*

The following chapter discusses theories and studies relevant to my research. I begin with a breakdown of migration theory, examining the fields of economics, security, and human rights studies. Second, I trace the different perspectives on trafficking, including the abolitionist discourse and the modern-day slavery discourse, as well as the impact of trafficking policies. Thirdly, I discuss theories on the role of tolerance and cultural understanding in the creation of Islamophobia in liberal societies. Fourthly, I discuss theories of “women and nationalism”, which review the reasons for the significance of women as the focus of the issues of human trafficking and Islamophobia. Fifthly, I discuss the importance of moral panics in explaining Islamophobia.

Finally, I build my theoretical model as a reflection of Pardis Mahdavi’s framework of “trafficking and terror” and evaluate her work within the context of the Netherlands. Her model is not entirely applicable to states besides the United States, and I reassess her model to apply to the Dutch state. In order to explore the cause of the current problems facing Islamic migrants in the Netherlands today, I utilize my reassessment of

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1 Pardis Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*, 39.
the “trafficking and terror” model and evaluate the way these theories on trafficking, media, multiculturalism, and terrorist-age Islamophobia interacts within contemporary Dutch politics. I develop a framework for understanding the relationship between trafficking and terrorism in the Netherlands called “the Dutch Application of the ‘Trafficking and Terror’ Model.”

MIGRATION THEORY

Economy

According to Ostrolenk, one of the primary arguments for curtailing immigration is that competition for jobs generated by the rise of a workforce that is willing to work for less money will lead to greater overall unemployment and reduced wages. This concept has been the basis for many studies in the 80 years since its publication. For example, Islam and Khan utilize this idea in their 2015 study that found that increased immigration flow reduces the average wage of “natives.” Jean and Jiménez also found that, in OECD countries, immigration is linked to temporarily heightened unemployment in the receiving country. Furthermore, immigration has been named as an issue by economists for reasons beyond simple labor supply-and-demand. Alan and McCarthy present the


argument that immigrants tend to create a burden on already straining welfare states by moving to states with generous welfare systems and utilizing them more heavily than other members of the state.⁵

Others argue, however, that there is an economic argument for encouraging immigration. According to Basik, there is significant evidence that relaxing national border control leads to large economic gains and that the cost of border security often becomes a heavy strain on the nation, which suggests that there is actually an economic benefit to leaving borders open.⁶ There is also an overwhelming amount of evidence that the idea that the presence of immigrants negatively impacts wages and employment is false. Dixon and Fromentin both provide evidence, based on studies of separate countries, that tighter border control actually contributes to overall reduced wages for citizens of the state that tightened borders and that opening borders contributes to an increase in employment.⁷

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Security

Ting argues that if borders are left open and if it becomes easier for immigrants to enter western states, it will become much more difficult for these states to keep out “illegals” who can enter the country undetected. He argues that for the United States in particular, it has become a security requirement to keep borders closed, because fundamentalist Islamic groups are intent upon entering the U.S. and inflicting violence and death. 8

Hammond argues, however, that the security argument falls short because tightening borders actually produces more security issues than it prevents. For example, in the United States, when antiterrorist measures limited the entrance of Muslim immigrants into the state, it created a significant backlash among the Islamic communities that already lived in the U.S. and generated sympathy and support for fundamentalist Islam, thus contributing to the creation of domestic terror threats. 9 This has been proven to be the case in the Netherlands as well by Tom, who argues that the strict immigration policies focused on ethnic exclusion put in place by the Dutch government led to the rise of fundamentalist Islam in the second generation of Muslim immigrants, despite the fact that most of the first generation immigrants were not supportive of fundamentalist Islam. 10 Furthermore, criminalizing immigrants on the basis


that some immigrants may pose a security threat is described by Chacon as “overcriminalizing,” because when security measures become overtly emphasized, immigrants are wrongfully treated as criminals.\textsuperscript{11}

**Human Rights**

In his *On the Right of Exclusion*, Bas Schotel argues that any sort of immigration policy is essentially exclusion without justification and it should not be considered heroic to help migrants, but rather common practice, because there is little legal reason for the exclusion of migrants. Schotel’s argument rests largely on the idea that it would violate the human rights of global citizens to deny them access to better opportunities and that a state that supports human rights should open their borders. Finally, Schotel argues that the state must actually prove why they should not let a migrant in, rather than having the migrant prove that they should be let in, because states do not have a strong legal right to exclude migrants under the human rights regime.\textsuperscript{12} This argument is further supported by Basik, who criticizes human rights regimes that condemn inequality on the national level but diminish its importance in the international sphere. He claims that this attitude has caused significant human rights abuses on the international level because it has led to rich states closing their borders and limiting the access to resources for people from poorer states who are looking to migrate.\textsuperscript{13}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{11} Chacon, “Overcriminalizing Immigration,” 613-615.


\textsuperscript{13} Basik, “Open Minds on an Open Border,” 403-405.
Thus, it should follow that the predicted model of behavior for a state that champions human rights would keep open borders; however, in the case of the Netherlands it does not. Karatani explains this by arguing that it is fully understandable that under the threat of terrorism and during economic hardship, the EU has overall decided to keep borders tighter and protect the interests of its citizens. He does acknowledge that this is perhaps not the most “responsible” policy, because it does not necessarily address the issue of human rights outside of the EU boundaries, but nevertheless, Karatani argues the realities of the security and economic issues seem to outweigh the desire to protect human rights.14

Paraschivescu argues that it is not a fear of security issues that is causing the western states in the EU to close their borders to immigrants, but rather a fear of having to expand the welfare state and having that welfare state be harmed by the entrance of migrant communities. She refers to this type of discrimination as “welfare chauvinism,” because certain groups are deemed more worthy of welfare than others, and argues that states that believe that economic growth is hindered as a result of migrant populations sending remittances home and “freeriding” the welfare system are failing to recognize that this “cost-benefit” way of viewing immigration will create undue poverty and cause inequality among states.15


Though I agree with Schotel’s stance on the unethical nature of closing borders and believe that his argument regarding the negative impacts on asylum-seekers is compelling, this model is not practical for explaining the current situation for the Netherlands. It is rather an idealistic vision for the future. Karatani’s use of security and economic theories of immigration policy formation to explain that protection from security threats is the reason that the human rights approach to immigration is not winning out in European policy trends is logical, but he fails to consider several other factors, including Basik’s argument that there is little economic reason to keep borders open and Hammond’s argument that tightening borders for security reasons can actually lead to great threats from internal immigrant communities.

I further argue that it is Paraschivescu’s assertion that internal politics of the state can impact trends towards stricter immigration policies that must be more thoroughly explored and that it is issues of racial differences and exclusionism that can cause states to disregard human rights perspectives on immigration in favor of policies that limit immigration and make the lives of immigrants more difficult. This argument is supported by its combination with exclusionism theories, which are discussed later, in my larger, Dutch application of the “trafficking and terror” framework.

**TRAFFICKING THEORY**

Immigration—and particularly illegal immigration—has become something to be curtailed in Western Europe, but trafficking is something to be fought. Although both of these issues traditionally involve the movement of persons, immigration has agency, whereas “trafficking” has absolutely none. As discussed in my explanation of terms in
Chapter One, “trafficking” is defined by the UN, as well as by many other state governments and international organizations, as something that is “forced” and which no one can offer “consent” to, but “immigration” is a choice made by an individual to move across borders.

Abolitionism and Modern Slavery Discourses

One of the major arguments against prostitution is called “abolitionism.” Like the slavery abolition movement, these scholars and activists argue that sex work should be illegal. Kathleen Barry is a leading scholar in the movement and she claims that sex work is inherently oppressive of women and cannot be considered real work.16 Authors such as Kevin Bales have been pushing to reframe prostitution as “human trafficking” and “modern day slavery” in order to encourage moral outrage against this work. He claims that the “new slaves” are disposable, cheap, and profitable and that oftentimes the person is forced to work through violent control. Under this definition, if someone’s working conditions are characterized by threats and coercion, they are a slave. By defining people as slaves, a term that is steeped in history and charged with emotion and morality, Bales aims to convince people that there is a moral issue with forced labor and forced sex work.17 This definition has been adopted by numerous leading scholars in feminist and human rights studies, from Gloria Steinem to Siddarth Kara.18

Elizabeth Bernstein pushes back against the notion that sex work should be compared to slavery, arguing that those “modern-day abolitionists” who support this discourse are attempting to seek justice in the form of incarceration, which generally leads to the imprisonment of vulnerable sex workers and pimps. These individuals who have been brought to “justice” are generally people of color and are being persecuted by this hostile treatment of sex work. I argue in favor of Bernstein’s perspective on the moralization of sex work. Although there is clearly a moral issue with forcing women to enter into the sex industry when they are unwilling to be sex workers, sex work should be a legal option for those women who wish to work in that industry, and by demonizing sex work, the media can create an environment that constructs sex workers as victims.

In the case of the Netherlands, sex work is legalized and many of the women who claim to be domestically trafficked are legal adults of sound mind who are not being threatened with violence and are capable of giving consent. However, discourses of the immorality of sex work have led to the demonization of pimps who benefit from sex work. Throughout my discussion of the “loverboys”, I resist the notion that there is an inherent moral wrong in sex work and that it is acceptable to vilify men for profiting from legal sex work performed by an adult.

**Anti-Trafficking Laws or Anti-Immigration Laws?**

Danna argues that the true purpose of the anti-trafficking legislation that has become so popular is to limit immigration while justifying the abuse of human rights

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associated with closing borders. Regardless of the policymakers’ reasons for closing borders, liberal states that champion human rights find restricting immigration problematic when they must turn away asylum seekers. Danna claims that in Sweden, championing women’s rights through preventing harm to “victims of sex trafficking” has become a way to justify these policies.\textsuperscript{20} There are consequences to emphasizing the importance of women’s rights to justify tighter immigration policies. Plambech argues that the victimization of sex workers and immigrants through these trafficking discourses results from the moral judgment that sex work is such an evil crime that ending its violence should be prioritized over keeping women out of the violence they were trying to escape by immigrating to the west.\textsuperscript{21}

I argue that the utilization of international anti-trafficking legislation by policymakers in order to restrict immigration reflects a desire by these policymakers to appear as though they support human rights and are make moral decisions in order to gain the support of the public for policies that restrict the rights of migrants and criminalize them as “illegal immigrants.” I argue that in the Netherlands, the policymakers utilize this principle on the domestic level by utilizing anti-trafficking legislation and stories to gain support for restricting the rights of members of immigrant communities and criminalizing immigrant men as perpetrators of sexual violence against white women. I further assert that this leads to a higher value being placed on the


violation of women from a Western state than on the rights of people from developing states.

**TOLERANCE AND CULTURE**

Curtailing immigration and trafficking may be motivated by human rights desires or economic interests, but in situations where a state already has an immigrant population and they are being mistreated by the government and society, many researchers seek to determine the causes, effects, and policy implications. Dutch attitudes towards migrants can be traced through the following series of events: collapse of tolerance, the rise of conflict between Islamic and ethnically Dutch citizens, and the introduction of integration policy. Here, I examine the theories that surround these events.

Religious tolerance is a well-known concept and, according to Habermas, involves a culture tolerating the religious expression of an individual or group, regardless of whether it is a mainstream belief or not. Habermas delineates “tolerance” from “toleration,” suggesting that it has a cultural element to it, rather than a legal or governmental one. Where “toleration” involves the government allowing a group to practice their religion, “tolerance” involves people *behaving* tolerantly towards members of that religion.22 Tolerance can also, however, be associated with any ideas, identities or

activities that may fall outside the mainstream, not just religion. For example, people can be tolerant of homosexuality, of cultural diversity, and of immigrants.23

According to Miller, western culture puts a premium on the tolerance of different cultures and ways of life, because liberal thought has traditionally supported tolerance, but that the rise of Islamic extremism is now prohibiting the west from continuing to be unfailingly tolerant. He thinks that the “limit of tolerance” is “indignation,” suggesting that when faced with violence and beliefs that are incompatible with their own, the west cannot be expected to continuously encourage these beliefs to flourish, and will eventually become “indignant”. He proposes that in an increasingly global world, people are continuously coming into contact with cultural beliefs and values that are incompatible with their own and that although liberal states make an effort to tolerate a large range of such beliefs, they will fail.24

Huntington characterizes this view on the relationship between the west and non-western immigrant populations as the “clash of civilizations,” wherein two cultures (rather than two ideologies or economic systems) come in to conflict with one another because the differences between different “civilizations” or “cultures” are “fundamental” and people are unwilling to compromise or change with regards to their cultural beliefs. As the world gets smaller, these “fundamentally different” cultures are forced into contact with one another and cannot agree with one another. He specifically believes that


Islam and Asian culture come into conflict with the West because fundamentalist Islam is incompatible with western values.\textsuperscript{25}

Many scholars, including Berman and Chomsky are critical of this concept, noting that in creating a system in which each civilization has a uniform and monolithic set of values, one ignores the diversity of the community and reduces two massive populations down to one “culture” that is not changing.\textsuperscript{26} Edward Said, noted scholar of Islam in a global context, has been a direct critic of Huntington and believes that the portrayal of Islam as fundamentally incompatible with some set of standard western values serves to create an over-simplified understanding of the world that leads to an “ignorant” and “racist” view of Islam and directly leads to unnecessary conflict. He believes that the continued use of Huntington’s ideas will lead to constructed divides between Islamic people and “Western” people and create a “disorderly reality.”\textsuperscript{27}

While I utilize some of Miller’s beliefs in my explanations of the ends of tolerance in Dutch society during my study of the rise of Islamophobia, I keep the arguments of Said in mind throughout my study of the case of the Netherlands. I argue that intolerance of Islam and immigration have become prevalent in the post-9/11 age as a response to the rhetoric of the “clash of civilization” in which Islam is directly incompatible with liberal and western beliefs, stimulating a fear of Islam entering Dutch

\textsuperscript{25} Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 72, no. 3 (July 1, 1993): 25.


society. Furthermore, I argue that the value of tolerance is still upheld, even when the west begins a conflict with Islam that seems fairly intolerant, because this intolerance is based on the Huntingtonian idea that Islam has different values and, in the Netherlands, the “fundamental” difference in values is considered to be tolerance itself, particularly of homosexuality and women’s rights.

**WOMEN AND NATIONALISM**

**Gender Equality and Islam**

In Europe, one of the major issues of exclusionism regards the conflicting values of Islam and the western states regarding gender equity, and integration efforts are often targeted towards encouraging tolerance of diversity in gender and sexuality, because predominant criticisms of Islam revolve around the issue of gender-equality. Okin notes that cultural integration should only be encouraged under certain circumstances and recommends its discouragement when it promotes gender inequity. 28 Islamophobia in these areas seems to rise as a result of fundamentalist Islamic views on homosexuality and the role of women is viewed as more restrictive than that of the western cultures. Islam is consistently painted as a religion that devalues women, both in Okin’s work and in western culture at large.

Danna suggests that the decline of the welfare state in Sweden has led to the leaders of the state attempting to find “another area of excellence” in order to “maintain the pride of being Swedish” and that they have chosen gender-equality to be the issue that

28 Okin, *Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women*?
they champion.\textsuperscript{29} The decline of the welfare state is not an issue that is exclusive to Sweden. The welfare system in the Netherlands has been in decline for the past few years and I argue that there is any focus on anti-trafficking and gender-equality in this time period, which could reflect Danna’s belief that it is their way of maintaining a morally superior stance in the global sphere.

This moral superiority is defined by Bracke as “secular and sexual exceptionalism.” Bracke argues that in some highly liberal states and, specifically, in the Netherlands, the state and the society construct an “exceptional” identity on the basis of their application of tolerance of sexuality and their secularism. Bracke argues that any group that does not hold these values and is attempting to join the liberal society will thus become vilified because they threaten the moral exceptionalism and are “bad subjects.” She explains that, specifically in the Netherlands, Muslim women are either party to views that oppress women or are victims of these views. Bracke claims that valuation of women’s rights and sexual liberation by the liberal society can thus lead to intolerance of those groups who do not share these values, as Said suggests can happen when a society accepts the ideas of Huntington.\textsuperscript{30}

I argue that the utilization of women’s rights and protecting women as a way to attack Islam extends beyond discourses that claim that Islam is a religion that restricts the rights of women. In the Netherlands, the media discourses emphasize that Islamic men not only restrict the rights of their wives, but also the rights of ethnically Dutch, white

\textsuperscript{29} Danna, Daniela, “Client-Only Criminalization in the City of Stockholm: A Local Research on the Application of the ‘Swedish Model’ of Prostitution Policy,” 80–93.

women they come in contact with. I argue that the vilification of Islam as an anti-feminist religion is being used to construct Islamic men as ideal villains who are capable of violating white women’s bodies and maintain a sense of moral superiority during their critique of Islam, particularly when racial intolerance is not usually respected in Dutch culture.

Women as Symbols of the Nation

According to Rao, women are utilized transnationally as “passive symbols” by the media to tell the stories of the nation. For example if a nation wants to promote narratives of modernization, stories of women who have taken control of their reproductive rights may be mentioned by the media, whereas if the same nation wants to emphasize the problems related to traditionalism, they will show stories that highlight women being mistreated in the name of religion. Rao posits that this behavior demonstrates that women are the symbols of society and that the narratives that the media tell about women’s bodies reflect the narratives that the media is attempting to construct.31 Cynthia Enloe argues that women’s position as symbols within a society contributed to their utilization in discourses of rape and sexual violation, because societies view a violation of a woman as a violation of the nation. 32

Rao and Enloe’s arguments act as a strong foundation for the development of my framework, but they must be applied in a more specific way to understand why the


32 Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives.
violation of one groups’ rights is considered to be more important than others. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the idea of women representing the nation is deeply intertwined with the exploitation of negative perspectives on Islam and gender and sexuality, as discussed above, and that victimizing a woman within a narrative where Islam violates the feminist ideals of a nation can serve to be a symbol to generate a social war against Islam—one that could have real consequences.

MORAL PANICS

A specific type of media discourse, like a gendered discourse, is the “moral panic”. The sociological concept of “moral panic” was, according to Krinsky, introduced in the 1800s and was later developed fully by Young who describes it as deviance amplified by mass media concerns. Krinsky claims that relativism is the only way to fully understand what is going on in our society and that morality cannot be absolute, thus downplaying the importance of these moral panics by reducing their validity: if a moral panic is based on absolute morality, it is not a rational response. Thus, he argues that when these moral frenzies arise, they are most likely the result of specific interest in the issue, rather than in an inherent morality.33 Bovenkerk and some other scholars who

oppose this theory claim that there is nothing wrong with morality in public outrage.  

Critchner claims the response to events are natural and proportional.  

Ben-Yehuda categorizes these perspectives on moral panic as the interest perspective and the moral perspective. The former is the view that moral panic arises as a result of the timeliness of the issue, whereas the latter is the view that moral panic arises as a result of the immorality of the issue. Ben-Yehuda’s study focused primarily on the war on drugs and the panic around drug trading and he demonstrated that the arguments of morality were primarily based around the morality of using drugs, rather than the morality of the harm they cause to the population at large through warfare and violence.

In my view, it is Ben-Yehuda’s fusing of the morality and timeliness of issues that generates the most cohesive understanding of why a moral panic arises, but I am inclined to agree more with Young than with Bovenkerk and Critchner, because the understanding of many “moral issues,” like sex work, are not black and white. As explained earlier, I do not think it is appropriate to make moral judgments on sex work because the spectrum of opinions regarding its rectitude are too broad, and I argue that many of the issues that spark “moral panics” cannot be quantified as “right” or “wrong” either. Furthermore, the


reasons that the issues that cause panics can be considered human rights abuses are often not the moral issues that are emphasized by the panic.

Additionally, a sexualized issue is very likely to be the focus of a moral panic, particularly when a victim with whom a mainstream audience can sympathize is constructed. The idea of “white slavery”, a term that has existed throughout the history of the anti-sex-trafficking movement, is firmly connected with the concept of moral panic. Doezema writes about the “white slavery” accusations of European women being sold to the near East in “Loose Women or Lost Women”, and explains that white slavery, which is technically just another word for trafficking, is usually inaccurately portrayed as the result of an innocent victim being taken by an evil slave master. As a result, there was a media flurry around the subject of “white slavery”, with organizations devoted to its eradication and many plays, films, and news pieces covering its existence. However, Doezema explains that while many women are trafficked against their will, the concept of all victims being white and innocent is essentially a myth, and that we continue to perpetuate this stereotype because it garners more support.37

For the purposes of this thesis, the timeliness of an issue will be the emphasized factor, because the morality of sex work and sex trafficking is difficult to quantify, though I do acknowledge that the justifications for these frenzies must arise from morality. Specifically, the violence and sexual assault associated with forced sex work are, in my opinion, reprehensible; however, I argue that the importance of the specific issue of Islamic men trafficking white women in the Netherlands rather than a focus on

37 Doezema, “Loose Women or Lost Women? The Re-Emergence of the Myth of White Slavery in Contemporary Discourses of Trafficking in Women.”
other, more violent types of trafficking that occur in this state, means that the emphasized quality in this panic is the sexual and racial nature of the crime, indicating that timeliness rather than morality is a more important quality in this case.

### Policy Implications of Moral Panic

Cook, et al. suggest that the importance of moral panic is not merely based on its impact on public opinion, but on policy, and that it is not public opinion that causes this policy shift, but the media itself. Cook examined the events around a single media phenomenon, the exposure of fraud in federal home health programs in the United States, and determined that the media around the phenomenon generated substantial changes in policy, but that it was primarily the collaboration between journalists and politicians that brought about these changes. Viewers of the news segment that exposed this fraud were more likely to consider fraud and home health care as policy issues after viewing the segment overall, but the researchers found that it was the policy makers collaborative efforts with journalists that determined their decision to make policy changes regarding this issue.\(^{38}\)

I argue that the media impact on public opinion and policymaker’s decisions is present in the Netherlands and that if there are policy implications for the way a story is portrayed, the way an issue is framed is incredibly important. In the Netherlands, the issue of the sex trafficking is being framed as a domestic issue that demonizes Islamic

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men. The evidence that public opinion and policy is swayed by the media indicates that there is a connection between this moral panic and policy measures taken to criminalize the actions of Islamic men.

THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE WAR ON TRAFFICKING

The concept of moral panic and moral crusade is what builds the argument behind Pardis Mahdavi’s “trafficking and terror” paradigm, which she constructs in her 2014 work, *From Trafficking to Terror*. 39 This paradigm demonstrates that the forces that motivate the war on terror and the war on trafficking overlap and work together to build similar discourses. She begins by explaining that the war on terror and the war on trafficking, like the war on drugs, are primarily based on moral panics and goes on to demonstrate that both of these faux-wars rely heavily on the discourse of the brown man violating the white woman. For example, a popular media production was the film *Taken*, made in 2008 by French director, Pierre Morel. In the film, a white woman is kidnapped by dark-skinned traffickers with Middle Eastern accents and is eventually rescued by her father, who uses his knowledge of counter-terrorism to find her and kill all of the men who took her. In one fell swoop, the movie manages to connect trafficking and terrorism in our mind by a terrorism plot that involves trafficking and must be stopped by someone with counter-terrorism knowledge. Furthermore, it presents the white woman as the victim and the white man as the perpetrator.40

39 Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*.

40 Ibid., 18-20.
According to Mahdavi, the face of an ideal victim in either “war” is young, preferably white, and preferably female, while the face of the ideal perpetrator is almost always a Middle-Eastern man. By “other”-ing Muslim men, a trope of Muslim men as villains forms, leading to a rise in Islamophobia, or fear of Islam, in the western world.

This theory builds from the arguments presented by Rao and Enloe that assert that there is an association between the victimization of women and the establishment of a perpetrator, which reflect discourses in society at large.

In the United States, the purpose of the “trafficking and terror” paradigm is made clear by a Washington policy-maker in his interview with Pardis Mahdavi. He states that the wars on terror and the wars on trafficking “show the public clearly who are the bad guys and who are the good guys and they make our (U.S.) case for why we need to go after the bad guys really well.” Mahdavi argues that by casting a villain and victim, the government and the media can manipulate the American public into supporting aggressive policies abroad.

Mahdavi suggests that this discourse manipulation is used by the U.S. government as a strategy to build support for their military tactics. I offer my contribution to Mahdavi’s work in the next section, which develops the Dutch Application of the “Trafficking and Terror” Model.

41 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem, 18.

42 Ibid., 7.


44 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem, 23.
CONCLUSION: THE DUTCH APPLICATION OF THE “TRAFFICKING AND TERROR” MODEL

In the Netherlands, the “trafficking and terror” paradigm is manipulated in a different way than in the United States. In the U.S., the association of Islam with terrorism and trafficking, and the resulting problems for immigrants, are byproducts of an attempt to end trafficking. I argue that in the Netherlands, which has been struggling with recent influxes of Islamic immigrants, policymakers and media influencers who utilize the anti-trafficking framework have the goal of impacting immigration streams and decreasing the prominence of Islam in Dutch society. In this thesis, I apply the Mahdavi framework of “trafficking and terror” to the Netherlands. Though the arguments regarding the way in which the “trafficking and terror” framework arises, including the use of the media, the influential abilities of Islamophobia, and the importance of moral panic, hold well in both regions, the ways the strategies outlined in the framework are used are substantially different.

Despite the fact that human rights theories on immigration generally consider restricting immigration to be a violation of the rights of immigrants that promotes global inequality, the Netherlands has chosen to restrict its borders during the 21st century. I argue that these policies arise as a result of exclusion of Islamic immigrant communities in the Netherlands, which is impacted by the rising Islamophobia in the media, generated through the spread of racialized trafficking discourses that incite a moral response to protect Dutch women in the Dutch public.

According to Mahdavi, in the United States, the fusion of trafficking and terrorism discourses is designed to inspire Islamophobia by portraying white women as...
victims, but I demonstrate, through my case study of the “loverboy” phenomenon in the Netherlands, that the generation of anti-Islamic sentiment through movies, news stories, TV specials, and other forms of media distribution, and their discussion of trafficking, has been used to generate support for anti-migration policies in a state that is struggling with a growing Islamic population. While Mahdavi argues that racialized trafficking discourses have been used in the United States as a way to justify foreign military intervention and anti-terrorist measures, I offer evidence that in the Netherlands, as well as in other states in the EU, manipulation of discourses around the trafficking of white women by brown men are a way to justify Islamophobia and anti-immigration policies.

The results of my study are presented in Chapters Four and Five, but this narrative is interpreted and displayed more carefully in Chapter Six, which utilizes the findings of this work and places them within Mahdavi’s framework and interprets them in the context of the Dutch case.
I am shocked by the heinous and cowardly attack in Paris. My sympathies go out to the families of the victim, the wounded, and the staff of Charlie Hebdo. Let us realize that this attack is on all of us – on our European ideas of freedom and tolerance. Terror cannot and should not win against our free society and they will not win if we all join forces in support for free speech and tolerance.

—Diederik Samsom, MP for the Dutch PvDA (the major left party), January 7, 2015, reacting to the attacks on Charlie Hebdo

On January 7, 2015 two Islamic men entered the Parisian office of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine that famously created cartoons that portrayed the prophet Muhammad in degrading positions and situations, and shot twenty-three people, killing twelve of them while shouting “Allahu Akbar”, the Arabic term for “God is Great”. The world mourned and on January 11, 2015, over 2 million people met in Paris in a show of solidarity and support for free speech and French national unity. The relationship that the Netherlands shares with France as a fellow western state, steeped in a history of Christianity and secularism, meant that this shooting inevitably triggered a strong empathetic response among Dutch citizens. As I walked through the streets in the days


following the attack, Amsterdam was covered in signs bearing the slogan, “Je Suis Charlie” to show people’s support for France and the actions of the writers and artists at *Charlie Hebdo*. My family and friends in the Netherlands were noticeably rattled and some were afraid, refusing to use public transportation and making vague comments about how things “never used to be like this.”

The media, particularly in the United States, latched onto the idea that the backlash against this attack was a response to the violation of the principles of free speech because members of the press had been killed for expressing their beliefs. There was another concern, however, which rested heavily on the minds of many Dutch people, as well as many people in Western Europe in general: the fear that centuries of cultural history and secular tolerance were beginning to die as a result of the steady growth of the Islamic minority.³ According to Mijnhardt, Muslims are constructed as an “Other” in contrast to the “nation of tolerant individuals” and those Muslims who are unwilling to adopt the Dutch attitude of tolerance, are simply not to be tolerated.⁴ As explained in Chapter One, the Dutch have constructed a term for outsiders and members of the migrant communities, who gain this label regardless of whether they were born abroad or in the Netherlands: *allochtonen*, or “non-indigenous.”⁵ These *allochtonen*, or other members of the non-western migrant community have become feared and tolerance (as Miller suggested it could) has turned into indignation for many people.

⁵ Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 232.
As a result of this indignation of the lack of tolerance for certain Dutch values by some members of the global Islamic community, the Netherlands has ironically become a place where religious tolerance and tolerance of immigrants are values that are in question. This chapter attempts to situate the history of tolerance that has characterized the Netherlands for centuries within the context of immigration, sex work, and religion, as well as how that tolerance has shifted and been transformed over the past few decades, with the rise of Islam as a minority religion. As explained in Chapter Two, there are a variety of opinions on many of these subjects and many of the scholarly perspectives have their application to the events of the past few centuries in Dutch history. Tracking the attitudes towards religion and immigration over the past six centuries in the Netherlands, while pulling out key events and comparing the situation in the Netherlands with those in its neighboring states, this chapter functions as a historical overview to contextualize the research that follows and to frame the question of how the country that was once the safe haven of Europe for heretics and Pilgrims alike has become a place where a religious minority is becoming increasingly less tolerated, as well as to determine what values the Dutch may hold most dear.

**A SAFE HAVEN**

In the years following 1648, the Dutch Republic was enjoying independence from Spain after fighting for freedom during the Eighty Years War and establishing sovereignty during the signing of the Peace of Westphalia following the Thirty Years War; however, conflict quickly arose in the form of religious differences between the many groups who already lived within Dutch borders. Although the region was primarily
Calvinist, and in the past only Calvinists could hold any form of political office, there was still a strong Roman Catholic minority and many other Protestant sects existed. While the Catholics had very narrow rights because the government was suspicious of their potential relationship with enemy Catholic Spain, non-Calvinist Protestants were “grudgingly tolerated” and generally had similar rights to other Protestants—Mennonites were even granted full citizenship in the late 17th century. The origins of this religious tolerance are written directly into the Dutch constitution, which in 1579 proclaimed that “each person shall remain free in his religion and that no one shall be investigated or persecuted because of his religion.”

As a result, the Netherlands received immigrants fleeing religious persecution from across Europe, including the Scottish Presbyterians, the English Baptists, the Pilgrims, and the French Huguenots. Jews also found refuge in the Netherlands following exile during the Spanish Inquisition. They were recognized as nationals as early as 1657 and participated actively in trade and daily Dutch life. The Netherlands thus became known as a “tolerant” state and visitors from other countries marveled at how “one neighbor knows not, nor cares not much what religion the other is.” Even though the religious tolerance that existed during this time was not as conceptually advanced as modern religious tolerance, it still allowed immigrants to practice their religion in a reasonably open manner and the Dutch government refrained from interfering with the

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8 State, A Brief History of the Netherlands, 62-68.
The years following the establishment of this policy of religious tolerance saw the rise and fall of the Dutch empire, the conquest and liberation of the area during the Napoleonic Wars, and the establishment of the first Dutch royal monarchy in the 19th century, but the principle remained, allowing the Netherlands to develop a national identity around the idea of religious and social tolerance and to create a tradition of separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{10}

During this time, the Netherlands also became known for its liberal and progressive beliefs with regards to the role of women in society. Although the rights of women were fairly limited by modern standards, Dutch women were allowed to own land and businesses, to enter into a contract, and to control their own dowries, giving them a degree of financial independence that was not enjoyed by women in other European states. The Dutch colonial empire that was established in this time period offered even more opportunities for women to exert their independence, because the colonies had even fewer social restrictions than the motherland. Women became active participants in the public sphere, going to court, confronting religious authorities, and sharing parental duties with their spouses to give them time to run businesses.\textsuperscript{11}

Furthermore, the Netherlands had a fairly open attitude towards sex work. Ever since the 17th century, Amsterdam’s “Red Light District”, situated in an area of the city

\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid., 111.
\end{itemize}
called De Wallen, has attracted clients seeking sexual services from around the world.

The city’s busy shipping port brought both sex workers and “johns” to the area to participate in a thriving sexual entertainment industry.\textsuperscript{12} Although there were occasional limitations placed on sex work throughout the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the Red Light District was generally tolerated and thriving, suggesting that the Dutch did not have a particularly significant issue with what was considered a grievous moral wrong in other areas of Europe. In fact, sex and sex work were openly discussed in the public forum and punishments for adultery were not usually more severe than a public lashing and were decided on humanistic, rather than religious bases.\textsuperscript{13} This tradition of having comparatively forward-thinking attitudes towards religion, as well as towards women and sex work continue into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century and are deeply engrossed in the collective Dutch identity.

\textbf{“SOVEREIGNTY IN ONE’S OWN CIRCLE”: DEFINING THE MODERN DUTCH STATE}

The diversity of religious beliefs in the Netherlands as a result of the attitude of tolerance led to issues in the mid-nineteenth century with the establishment of state-supported schools. Catholic schools were becoming established throughout the south of the country and were attempting to attain state recognition, but Protestants wanted their children to be taught with Protestant values and many supporters of secular nationalism


\textsuperscript{13} Vann, “Dutch Women in Seventeenth-Century New Netherland.”
wanted to establish schools that taught values from all faiths, as well as love for the state. When the state created a fairly secular school system, religious groups created political parties to oppose what they considered “hostility” towards religion. One of these political leaders, Abraham Kuyper, proposed that different political and religious sects have control over institutions like school and media, or “sovereignty in one’s own circle”. This concept led to the Dutch approach to multiculturalism that existed well into the 20th century, called “pillarization”. The concept gets its name from the idea that different areas of society are pillars that hold up the roof of the nation.14

By 1914, four pillars had been clearly established: socialist, liberal, Catholic and Protestant. This pillarization only deepened after World War I and the Dutch found that they were able to live day-to-day without ever leaving their “pillar”. The subcultures had political parties, trade unions, sports teams, radio stations, and clubs; however, there was still a high level of cooperation between different pillars and the Netherlands developed well-functioning coalition governments that had strongly developed national values, which included high morality, peace, and tolerance.15 Some argue that this system actually about “accommodation” rather than “tolerance”, because it did not force people to accept differences, only to be content with ignoring them, but it functioned very well for many decades, allowing the growth of a strong social system.16

14 State, A Brief History of Netherlands, 142-146.
15 Ibid., 181-182
16 Ido de Haan, “Politics between Accommodation and Commotion,” in Discovering the Dutch: On Culture and Society in the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 122-123.
The pillarization system was also utilized as a way to establish one of the defining features of Dutch life in the 20th century: the welfare state. Since the Golden Age in the 17th century, Dutch towns had systems in place to take care of the elderly, orphaned, and poor, be it the rich giving alms to the poor or the community pooling funds to support “hofjes”, a form of housing for the elderly; however, private charity was always more strongly supported in the Netherlands and a formal state welfare system was not part of the national culture. The pillarization model allowed the state to fund specific actions of the institutions within the pillars that would benefit social welfare. Towards the end of the century, this system would fall away, but the pillar system was a way to give each area of society a feeling that they were supporting their fellow Catholics, Protestants, liberals, or socialists, allowing “civil society charity” to remain intact.17

NEWCOMERS AND NEW TENSIONS

The 1940s ushered in a period of horror in the Netherlands, as occupation by the Nazis in World War II became a daily reality for Dutch citizens. There was initially very little change to Dutch society, but ethnically Dutch people were recruited to join the cause of racial purity and the Nazi party began slowly dissolving the government and only gave control to members of the Dutch National Socialism (Nazi) party. As opposition developed within the Netherlands, the Nazi party started issuing orders, something that rubbed the Dutch, a people historically known for a dislike for authority, 

the wrong way. Acts of protest and demonstrations grew but were met with “brutal reprisals” and forced labor declarations. Attempts to save Jews from being sent to concentration camps were plentiful, but generally ineffective against the powerhouse of the German army. The Netherlands, which had so fondly embraced its identity as a safe haven for those facing religious intolerance, was unable to protect the Jewish population that resided within its borders and 71% of Dutch Jews ended up in Nazi death camps, and the lack of effort on the part of the gentile population became a point of shame that colors the atmosphere in the Netherlands to this day. Today, criticism of immigrants is sometimes labeled racist and people utilize imagery of defenseless migrants and religious persecution from the Holocaust to encourage acceptance of Islam.

Following WWII, the Dutch community was forced to rebuild after the death of over 205,000 of its citizens and extreme destruction of the landscape. Although many people emigrated, those who stayed utilized the national values of hard work and perseverance to bring about large-scale economic growth and prosperity. The growth attracted some unskilled laborers from other European countries, such as Spain, Italy, and Portugal, in the 1940s and 1950s, but they generally returned home. In the 1960s, however, Turks and Moroccans arrived in droves and stayed for good, taking advantage


of the plentiful job opportunities, and the Netherlands quickly became a popular site for labor migration. In addition, citizens of former colonies, many of which declared independence following the war, were arriving in the Netherlands in waves. 22 The migrant populations coexisted fairly peacefully with the Dutch population until the recession of the 1970s, when unemployment skyrocketed for all Dutch nationals, but especially for those of non-Dutch origin. 23

Although the Netherlands had previously used a system in which specific pillars were funded by the state to care for the needy within the pillar, the extraordinary demand for welfare and the rising amount of people who did not benefit from the pillar system led to the creation of a state welfare system, culminating in the broad-reaching “Algemene Bijstandswet” or “General Relief Act” in 1963. By the 1970s, 45% of the population was reliant on some form of welfare. 24 The overwhelming levels of unemployment, as well as the stress of an aging population, meant that the social welfare state that had developed quickly became strained; tensions rose. 25 Disdain for the immigrant population grew as welfare reform took away the benefits that the Dutch had grown used to and the popular opinion was that immigrants were taking too many of the benefits of the socialist system and taking away jobs from the Dutch. As poverty and unemployment rose in immigrant communities, so did crime, leading to further dislike of the newcomers in society. 26

22 Ibid., 212-213
23 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 19.
25 State, A Brief History of Netherlands, 213.
26 Ibid., 239.
This dislike became clear through both public discourse and political movements. As early as 1991, the leading right party, the Conservative Liberals (also called the “VVD”) began a Huntington-esque discussion about the incompatibility between western values and Muslim beliefs, even though it had previously been considered racist and intolerant to say something of that nature. In the end, influenced by nearby countries like France and Great Britain, who were having debates around these issues, the government moved away from policies that allowed immigrants to remain separate from society and began forcing people to adapt to a Dutch way of life.27

These policies may have been related to the fact that there were also numerous concerns about the fact that in the past, the new Muslim population stayed fairly isolated and did not adapt to Dutch life. The pillar system meant that there was a precedent of encouraging religious groups to set up their own structures, and the isolation of the Muslim community could have been seen as a success of the Dutch tolerance system.28

Some people, however, began to criticize their decision to move to the Netherlands and not take on Dutch customs and habits.29 Many of the Muslim guest workers who had arrived in the 1960s and 1970s had believed they would work in Europe temporarily, make enough money to support their family, and return home after their contract was completed. When they did not, and instead brought their families from their home countries under family reunification migration laws, the tradition of separating from the

27 Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 236.
29 State, A Brief History of the Netherlands, 240.
mainstream, in conjunction with a high density of people in the Islamic population, led to the formation very isolated communities of Muslims from Northern Africa and Turkey in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{30}

Cited aggressively during this critique of the Islamic immigrant community presented by the conservative factions was their treatment of women. Scholars, politicians, and media figures all believed that the Muslim community did not appropriately support women and painted it as heavily misogynistic. Concerned over the lack of education level obtained by Muslim women, their perceived inequality and oppression, people began to call for integration policies that would encourage the increased equality of Muslim women.\textsuperscript{31} As mentioned earlier, the Netherlands has traditionally valued the rights of women, even during a time when most women in Europe did not even have any legal status, and when this was threatened, Dutch society found a “fundamental” difference between their values and those of the immigrants, and, as predicted by Huntington, determined that this non-western culture was incompatible with their own.\textsuperscript{32}

Ironically, the pillar system was collapsing in the rest of the country, meaning that an isolated group was viewed with suspicion. The increasing xenophobia meant that pillarization became replaced with “undifferentiated mass society”; Dutch society no longer defined itself by being a group of separate belief systems, particularly since Dutch

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\textsuperscript{30} Sam Cherribi, \textit{In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed}, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 30.


\textsuperscript{32} Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?” 25-27.
\end{flushleft}
religious identities fell apart in the secularization of the 1960s, but rather in opposition to a group of newcomers who created their own isolated system. The Islamic society developed in opposition to another group—in this case the mainstream—as well. Cherribi argues that the dislike for Islam that developed during this time led to a shift away from people identifying as “Moroccan” or “Turkish” and towards an “Islamic identity”, which may have been the creation of European anxiety.

THE TURNING POINT

In the midst of these rising tensions came an event that would shift the perception of Muslims throughout the western world and set off a chain reaction of violence and prejudice throughout the world: the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. Although this event is often seen as a defining moment in American history, the change in policies and Islamophobia that followed the attacks could be observed worldwide. The United States launched their “War on Terror” in retaliation for the lives lost during the attack and the Dutch, who had often attempted to maintain neutrality, famously refusing to participate in World War II until they were occupied, were quick to join the U.S. in “stabilization missions” in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of promoting international peace.

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34 Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed, 33.

However, the Dutch engagement with the aftermath of 9/11 went far deeper than military deployments. According to Cherribi, “The methodical drumbeat of the media and politicians against Muslims beginning in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, succeeded in placing European citizens of Middle East and North African descent into the role of an internal threat.” The lives of Muslims in the Netherlands and Western Europe at large changed quickly once the War on Terror was declared. Firstly, the attacks on the World Trade Center mark a definitive shift in the attitudes towards Muslims in Western Europe. Throughout the region, Muslim citizens and foreign nationals were subjected to Islamophobia in many spheres. In France, women were banned from wearing the burqa in public because it was a “threat” to national security and to the gender equality. In the UK, religious hate crimes rose significantly after 9/11, and particularly after the London bombings in 2005 by Islamic radicals.

Beyond these examples, many states in Western Europe have become areas where Islamophobia runs rampant, impacting the daily lives of Muslims in these states to an extreme degree, but these states do not all have the deep-seeded history of religious and immigrant tolerance the way that the Netherlands does. September 11 alone may not have been impactful enough to keep a sustained fear of Islam alive in the Netherlands, but the events that followed served to strengthen that fear, allowing it to persist for years after the initial shock of the American tragedy.

36 Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed, 32.
SECULAR MARTYRS

The anti-Islamic attitudes that were expanding throughout Europe were a windfall for one Dutch politician: the gay and charismatic Pim Fortuyn. Throughout the 1990s he made speeches denouncing immigration and multiculturalism and after the attacks on the World Trade Center, he left his political party, which he felt was too soft on the “allochtonen”, and formed his own populist party, the “Lijst Pim Fortuyn.” His platform was simple: he wanted to reduce the presence of Islam in the Netherlands, calling it a “backwards culture.” Fortuyn framed the issue as one of women’s rights and gay rights. According to Bracke, who claims that the valuation of sexual exceptionalism of the Netherlands was what was used to justify the intolerant and Islamophobic tendencies of this party’s ideas, Fortuyn promoted the “emancipation” of Muslim women who he constructed as victims of their own culture and criticized well-educated Muslim women by calling them “responsible for the victimization of their sisters and mothers.”

Furthermore, Fortuyn was, by all accounts, flamboyantly gay and strongly supported by a decent size of the LGBTQ population. He criticized Islam for its persecution of homosexuality and for lagging behind western culture in promoting tolerance of different sexual identities. His ideas rippled throughout the Netherlands, triggering media


39 Ibid., 35.
discussions and increased interest in the idea of Islam being incompatible with Dutch culture.\footnote{Andrew Osborn in Rotterdam, “Dutch Fall for Gay Mr Right,” \textit{The Guardian}, April 3, 2002, accessed April 14, 2015, \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/14/andrewosborn.theobserver}.}

On May 6, 2002, Fortuyn was assassinated, just nine days before the elections were scheduled to occur. Although his murderer was not a Muslim, but rather an ethnically-Dutch animal rights activist, the Muslim population became even more isolated after the death.\footnote{De Haan, “Politics Between Accommodation and Commotion,” 130.} Cherribi, a Moroccan-Dutchman claims that the day after Fortuyn’s assassination was “like a revolution”:

\begin{quote}
The atmosphere was downright frightening. In the cafeteria, two guards from Surinam, who were Hindus, told me anxiously that they hoped the killer was not a migrant...the fact that he was not a migrant would be, for all intents and purposes, forgotten in the months that followed....The BBC \textit{News Night}’s anchorman, Jeremy Paxman, asked me live, on camera, about the atmosphere of hate that was so unusual in the traditionally tolerant Netherlands. For the first time, I felt real panic about what I should say. I felt for the first time in my life—despite all my years of devotion to the Dutch system and culture, despite my public service to Holland, despite my very real, official citizenship—that my Dutchness was questioned by the crowd. I knew that when they looked at me, they saw a Moroccan.\footnote{Cherribi, \textit{In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed}, 10.}
\end{quote}

Many ethnically Dutch public figures reacted to Fortuyn’s death with language about “tolerance” and people discussed their shock that such an “intolerant” event could happen in the Netherlands. Anyone who attempted to bring up the idea of tolerance of Muslims in a multicultural society was often accused of being overly concerned with
being politically correct.\textsuperscript{43} By the time he had been assassinated, Pim had already been established as a symbol of resistance to Islamization of Europe and his death allowed people to speak of his views in a positive way with less fear of being labeled as racist. In fact, many people credit the political failures of the left following the death of Fortuyn to their attempts to remain politically correct in an atmosphere where criticizing Islam had become popular and accepted.\textsuperscript{44}

Following the death of Fortuyn in 2002, the Netherlands was rocked once more by the 2004 assassination of a famous filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by twenty-six-year-old Mohammed Bouyeri, a Moroccan-Dutchman. Bouyeri shot van Gogh multiple times on the street before violently slitting his throat with a machete and pinning a note to his body with a knife. The note made something explicitly clear: unlike Fortuyn, van Gogh was murdered in the name of Islam, as a result of his anti-Islamic actions. Van Gogh was a self-proclaimed “provocateur” and a vocal critic of Islam and Judaism. In 2004, he worked with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali immigrant and an anti-Islam lobbyist, and made a scathing film about the abuse of Muslim women called Submission. The film included a highly controversial scene in which the verses of Quran are written on the naked bodies of the abused and bruised women, suggesting that the Quran justifies violence against women (see Figure 3.1).\textsuperscript{45} Again, feminism was utilized as a way to criticize Islam.

\textsuperscript{43} De Haan, “Politics Between Accommodation and Commotion,” 121

\textsuperscript{44} Cherribi, In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed, 151-154.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 150.
As with the Charlie Hebdo massacre, Van Gogh’s death was associated with an attack on free speech and tolerance by intolerant Islamists, especially since Submission had received criticism for being blasphemous by the Muslim community. Islam quickly became painted as a threat to tolerance and the murder was seen as the result of Dutch tolerance going “too far.” After the murder, 40% of Dutch citizens polled said they “hope

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46 The film that was cited by his murderer as the reason for his death.
that Muslim immigrants no longer feel at home in the Netherlands.” Van Gogh’s violent and shocking death turned him into a symbol of Dutch solidarity in opposition to the *allochtonen*.47

Fortuyn and Van Gogh’s sensationalized martyrdoms marked a violent turning point in the conflict between the ethnically Dutch and Islamic populations, with some going as far as to declare outright war between Islam and the West. Mosques and Muslim community centers were attacked in the name of “Theo” and Christian churches were targeted in retaliation. Although no one was harmed in the attacks, they did escalate to the point that a Muslim elementary school in Eindhoven had all of its windows blown out; scribbled on the walls were the words “RIP Theo” and “White Power”.48 The world erupted with news that the Netherlands was becoming a battleground, with one reporter dramatically declaring that the country was “burning”. Despite the shallow nature of the violence, which was perpetuated primarily by groups of thrill-seeking teenagers, politicians and media outlets fixated on all conflicts, large and small, leading to what Buruma describes as “the end of a sweet dream of tolerance and light in the most progressive little enclave of Europe.”49 The arguments of Fortuyn and Van Gogh, which constructed Dutch beliefs on gender and sexuality as fundamentally incompatible with Islam, thus generated the violent conflict that Said predicted they would.50


50 Said, “Clash of Ignorance.”
The martyrdoms of Fortuyn and Van Gogh were concordant with rising Islamophobia throughout Europe, something which was reflected in the elections following 9/11. As mentioned earlier, the sentiment regarding Muslims after 9/11 was generally very negative. Throughout Europe, xenophobic populist parties began to take hold and gain seats in parliamentary elections. In Denmark and Switzerland, anti-immigrant parties gained enough seats to be part of the coalition governments for over ten years in both countries. Although Finland’s anti-immigrant party could not make substantial enough gains to be considered significant in the years directly after 9/11, in 2011 they were the largest opposition party. In 2009, the European Parliament elections saw voter opinions leaning towards anti-immigration and tightened border security. Even when anti-immigrant parties are not in the majority, their ideas have crept into the ideology of centrists parties so that politicians can capture more votes.\textsuperscript{51}

The Netherlands is a prime example of the rise of xenophobic parties in political elections. Even though Fortuyn was dead, the 2002 Dutch election was essentially won by his political endeavors. His xenophobic “Lijst Pim Fortuyn” Party won 17% of the seats in Dutch parliament, the second largest amount of the sixteen parties that ran that year, reflecting the growing anti-immigration sentiment in the country.\textsuperscript{52} The party did


\textsuperscript{52} Cherribi, \textit{In the House of War}, 50-51.
not last long after the death of Fortuyn, around whom the party had been built, but the populist themes the politician had used endured.

Geert Wilders emerged as a successor to Fortuyn’s legacy and founded the “Freedom Party” (the PVV), winning 6% of the vote in 2006 and supported by 20% of the electorate in 2009. Other leading politicians in major parties, from Maxime Verhagen of the traditional Christian Democrats to Jan Marijnissen of the radical left Socialists, began utilizing anti-immigrant rhetoric to gain support during elections. Politicians who refuse to criticize Islam are often seen as “soft” and in some cases were forced to resign. As of the most recent Dutch general elections in 2012, the extreme right xenophobic parties have started to lose traction (Geert Wilder’s PVV lost half of their seats in the 2012 elections) and more centrist parties have regained the majority, with the current government operating as a coalition between the moderately right VVD and moderately left PvdA. The coalition government has tended to avoid the subject of immigration, choosing to focus primarily on economic issues, but the PVVs rising poll numbers in late 2014 and early 2015 indicate that voters are growing impatient with the lack of work done by Prime Minister Rutte’s cabinet on the immigration issues.

53 Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 239.
54 De Haan, “Politics Between Accommodation and Commotion,” 131.
Immigration

Although the high birthrate in the Islamic immigrant demographic means that the growth of the European Muslim population is not likely to be slowed by curbing immigration, the political xenophobia has led to movements to close borders and tighten security to prohibit the incidence of illicit migration and the acceptance of refugees in an attempt to limit the influx of competing cultures in western Europe.\textsuperscript{57} The Netherlands had a fairly permissive attitude towards immigration and was quick to grant naturalization throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, which was one of the reasons that their immigration stream was so dense, as well as the reason that it became very difficult to deport members of the migrant population. In addition to the Islamic guest workers and their families who are discussed above, the Netherlands also had a high concentration of Eastern European migrants and asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s at the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{58}

Their enjoyment of the open migration policies of the Netherlands was, however, short-lived. Following 9/11, the xenophobia triggered much harsher restrictions on immigration. Family reunifications were scarcely granted, returns to home countries were promoted heavily, and in 2004, there were more emigrants than immigrants in the Netherlands for the first time in four decades. Obtaining naturalization became much

\textsuperscript{57} Cherribi, In the House of War, 52.

\textsuperscript{58} Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 232-233.
more difficult and expensive and the amount of people who obtained Dutch citizenship yearly plummeted.59 Today, the immigration policy of the EU, which emphasizes closed borders and limiting movement in order to reduce the influx of immigrants, as well trafficking victims, falls in line with the Dutch policy, which features a continuation of stricter citizenship restrictions and a legal structure that encourages deportation.60 This is explored more in-depth in Chapter Four, which contextualizes the changes in immigration policy within rising Islamophobic discourses.

**Integration**

Beyond ending immigration and expanding the ability of the state to deport non-citizens already living within state borders, many European countries have also attempted to ease their dislike for the rising immigrant population by creating policies of integration that force citizens to adopt the attitudes and beliefs that the government values. In the Netherlands, despite its history of tolerance and allowing migrants to maintain their identity, there was still a strong push towards integration policy in the 1990s and 2000s. Entzinger claims this policy was born of a harsh criticism of the former policies of pillarization and multiculturalism, which many felt were to blame for creating a growing marginalized immigrant population that was a threat to Dutch culture. In 1994, the Christian Democrats, who had held back integration policies, lost favor with the public, allowing a coalition government to institute programs to force immigrant populations to

59 Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 238.

60 Ibid., 238.
adapt to “Dutch culture.” What was once called “Migrants’ Policy” was renamed to “Integration Policy,” and government ceased to provide the accommodations that many migrant communities had grown accustomed to. School instruction was no longer offered in mother tongues and mandatory Dutch language education and “civic integration” courses for new migrants were launched.\textsuperscript{61}

The efforts to integrate the Dutch Islamic population were initially fairly successful. Once the Integration Policy was instituted, unemployment rates in the migrant community fell rapidly, the education levels of second-generation allochtonen rose, and the immigrant housing situations improved; however the school systems remained part of the pillarization system and Muslim students were still segregated from the rest of the population as a result. In the decade following the institution of the policy, Islamic citizens continued to identify as “Turkish” or “Moroccan” or “Muslim”, rather than Dutch.\textsuperscript{62}

**Gender and Sexuality**

Perhaps the most salient issue for those Dutch citizens who hold Islamophobic beliefs is the concept that Islam is fundamentally at odds with western ideas on sexuality and gender. Cherribi explains that the fears over “Muslimization” may result from the fact that Europeans are concerned that Islam will overtake the important values of European society, including “sexual liberalization.” In most European states, abortion is

\textsuperscript{61} Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 236, 240.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 237-238.
legal, gay rights are widespread, and sex work is in some way legalized or decriminalized, but there is a widespread belief in Europe that “Muslim values” are opposed to gender equality and sexual liberation. The Netherlands in particular is known for its support of “homosexual civil liberties”, holding the first gay marriages in Europe and openly and joyously celebrating Gay Pride Day every year with rambunctious parades. The exploitation of this support for gay rights by xenophobic politicians, including Pim Fortuyn, led to widespread concern over Islam’s discrimination against the LGBTQ community, which continues to this day.63

The observed treatment of women by Islamic men in the Netherlands have generated a distrust of Islam that many Dutch feminists cite as the reason that they cannot tolerate Islam in their country. As a state that prides itself on the sexual liberation and freedom of the women that live there, the Netherlands is deeply concerned with the way that women in migrant communities are treated. Although the general thinking is that ethnically Dutch women in the Netherlands are “fully emancipated”, there are government initiatives aimed at emancipating “allochtonous” women and popular thinking is that Islam is a “backwards religion” with regards to their views on women. Bracke argues that this view of Islam is not only a values judgment, but also a way of establishing Dutch exceptionalism and superiority in contrast to Islam.64

The rhetoric of a “backwards” Islam is used to rile up feminist support for anti-immigration parties across Europe, and particularly in the Netherlands, because issues

63 Cherribi, *In the House of War*, 33-34, 43-44.

that arise in the Islamic community regarding domestic violence, genital mutilation, and forced marriages, trigger emotional responses with the Dutch, who have great pride in their feminist identity. This interestingly leads to a situation where the radical conservatives are utilizing liberal values, such as human rights and women’s rights, in order to garner support for their beliefs. The issue of gender in Islam is one that even very liberal Dutch citizens struggle with and many agree with Okin, who thinks that multiculturalism and appreciation for cultural difference can only be upheld when women’s rights are upheld first. This issue is particularly important to this thesis, because it seeks to explain why a gendered narrative may be one of the most important “differences in culture” between Islam and Dutch “culture” in media discourses. As has been shown throughout this chapter, gender is an incredibly important point of pride for the Netherlands and a primary tool for the criticism of Islam by prominent public figures, like Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh and .

HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A NEW BATTLEGROUND?

Despite the historic tolerance of sex work in the Netherlands, in 1911, anti-prostitution activists utilized moral and feminist objections to pass the “Morality Laws”, which included a ban on brothels, but this only pushed prostitution out of the public eye and into inconspicuous locations like tobacco shops and massage salons. By “veiling” the activity, the public attitude towards sex work became much less severe and the need for

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66 Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?
city revitalization in the 1990s led to the repeal of the brothel ban and legalization of sex work as a form of labor subject to government regulation in October 2000.\textsuperscript{67} The repeal was largely the result of changed attitudes regarding sex work. While early 20\textsuperscript{th} century feminism believed that sex work was oppressive to the progress of women, the unionization of sex workers and the formation of advocacy groups in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century gave sex workers a larger voice in the government. They influenced the public to believe that this was a feminist movement which would “counter exploitation of prostitutes”, who were thought to be abused by pimps and clients as a result of their lack of government protection.\textsuperscript{68}

In addition to this interest in making the lives of sex workers safer was an interest in limiting the amount of sex trafficking that occurred within the Netherlands; this is why only EU citizens were legally allowed to be employed as sex workers under the new law. Any sex worker who was working without citizenship could not apply for a work permit and foreign nationals in the sex industry were thus undocumented workers without government protection, despite the legalization of sex work.\textsuperscript{69} Prior to the establishment of the repeal on the brothel ban and the legalization of sex work, there had already been legislation put in place to limit the possibility for human trafficking and “coercion of

\textsuperscript{67} Deinema and Aalbers, “A Global Red-Light City? Prostitution in Amsterdam as a Real and Imagined Place,” 276-278.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 276-278.

persons for the possibility of sex work.”\textsuperscript{70} These laws came in response to rising global interest in the concept of “white slavery” and “sex trafficking. “White slavery” was a term that first entered the vernacular in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, in reference to sex work in the developing world, the oppression of non-Muslims in the Middle East, and women in polygamous marriages as a rhetorical device by abolitionists. By the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it had come to have a strong correlation with sex work and Soderland claims that “white slavery was a social construct…a model for understanding commercial sex exchange.”\textsuperscript{71}

Moral laws, like those that had arisen in the Netherlands, had arisen worldwide and international bodies created laws to end sex trafficking of minors and to curtail sex trafficking in adults.\textsuperscript{72}

Concerns over the movement of women across borders such as these persisted through to modern day and are reflected in the formation of the Dutch and international anti-trafficking legislation. In the Netherlands in particular, there was concern over ceasing the trafficking of women into the state from Eastern Europe and former colonial holdings, further explaining the importance of such legislation during the negotiations for legalizing sex work.\textsuperscript{73} After the legalization of sex work, however, the global attitude towards sex work changed dramatically. Pardis Mahdavi outlines 9/11 as a turning point in how the world conceived of not only Islam and terrorism, but also human trafficking.

\textsuperscript{70} Katherine Gregory, \textit{The Everyday Lives of Sex Workers in the Netherlands}, (Routledge, 2012), 4.


\textsuperscript{72}Stephanie Limoncelli, \textit{The Politics of Trafficking: The First International Movement to Combat the Sexual Exploitation of Women} (Stanford, California.: Stanford University Press, 2011): 73, 78-82.

\textsuperscript{73} Gregory, \textit{The Everyday Lives of Sex Workers in the Netherlands}, 18.
There was a rapid increase in the international interest in human trafficking, in some ways as a result of the increased fear of Muslim men. Mahdavi argues that trafficking narratives where brown men traffic white women became increasingly popular and were then utilize to justify continued Islamophobia on the grounds of the protection of women.74 In the chapters that come, I demonstrate that human trafficking has taken on a racialized dimension that are used to justify Islamophobia in the Netherlands as well.

CONCLUSION: RECONCILING INTOLERANCE AND TOLERANCE

Despite its origins as a progressive state that was a leader in religious tolerance, the Netherlands has followed the path of many other western European states and become a place where Islamophobia and xenophobia are unavoidable aspects of the political landscape. Potentially as a result of a policy of pillarization which permitted migrants to maintain their cultural identity, rather than assimilating to Dutch culture, the Muslim community was isolated from mainstream society. Although this was initially considered a success of pillarization, the sub-population’s separation from the rest of Dutch society caused resentment when they became a burden on the welfare state. This resentment only grew when a fear of Islamism arose throughout the western world after multiple acts of violence in the name of Islam took place. The Charlie Hebdo massacre has brought this fear to the forefront once more and one can predict that this fear will continue to expand after each act of radical Islam.

74 Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Conceptualizing a Global Social Problem*, 25.
Today, the Netherlands struggles with balancing its identity as a tolerant state with the society’s increasing intolerance of Islam. As Edward Said predicted, the construction of certain cultures being “incompatible” with others by Huntington seems to have taken hold there and is leading to significant conflict. Specifically, the sexual exceptionalism of the Netherlands is perceived to be incompatible with conservative views on sexuality in Islam and this feminist critique of Islam has been used as a justification for Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment.

The chapters that follow will trace the situation for members of the Islamic community in the Netherlands today, while examining the media’s role in building stereotypes around Islam and determining the impacts of media discourses on how Islam and migration is perceived relative to gender and intolerance. The impact of the events in the Netherlands both before and after 9/11 and the political atmosphere around tolerance and intolerance that have been described in this chapter will be utilized as a tool to analyze the information that results from that study. Furthermore, this thesis aims to examine the idea that Islamophobia is being battled out in the sphere of human trafficking. Pardis Mahdavi has already demonstrated that this is the case in the U.S., where the utilization of racialized trafficking narratives has been used to promote fear of Islamic men and justify international intervention to halt the criminal activities of these men, both in the trafficking realm and the terrorism realm.75 The chapters that follow demonstrate that human trafficking is a new battleground for Islamophobia in the Netherlands as well.

75 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Conceptualizing a Global Social Problem.
CHAPTER FOUR
GENDER AND ISLAM IN DUTCH MEDIA AFTER 9/11

I don't hate Islam [but] I consider it a backward culture. I have travelled all over the world and wherever Islam rules, it's just terrible…Then look at the Netherlands. In what [Muslim] country could an electoral leader of such a large movement as mine be openly homosexual? It is wonderful that that's possible; that's something that one can be proud of and I'd like to keep it that way, thank you very much.

-Pim Fortuyn, leader of the LPF in an interview with De Volkskrant on February 9, 2002.¹

The growing concerns in the Netherlands over the expanding Islamic population are not without a technical foundation: the “immigrant” population—which is henceforth used to describe not only immigrants, but also their children—is rapidly growing. The primarily Islamic groups, such as the Moroccan and Turkish populations, have had particularly substantial growth in the 21st century, growing by 43.0% and 28.3% respectively from 2000-2014. By contrast, the ethnically-Dutch population only increased .01% in size in the same time period, a nearly negligible shift.² According to Jenkins, if the rates of growth continue at this rate, the Muslim population will be in the majority in


² Bevolking (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, May 14, 2014), http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0&D6=a&HDR=T&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4,G5&VW=T.
all states in Western Europe by 2050, which he claims may be one of the roots of the anxiety over the growth of Islam: if Europe becomes Islamic, what will happen to the traditional “European” values and traditions that have existed for centuries? Leading anti-immigrant politician Geert Wilders has been exploiting that fear in his fight against “Islamization.” In an interview in 2007 he expressed a prevalent view in Dutch society:

Do we want to live in a country that will soon be one-third, half, or even the majority of the people are Muslim? Most people say ‘No, that is not my Netherlands anymore!’ These people don’t hate Muslims and they are not xenophobes or fascists. They simply wish to stand up for their culture…They don’t want their land and their government dominated by Muslims.4

Although Wilder’s anti-immigration has greatly reduced in popularity and size since the mid-2000s, a period where national opinions about Islam and immigration were at a peak of negativity, national opinion about immigration is consistently negative, with the immigrant population blamed by a large percentage of the overall population for the issues that the nation faces today. According to a study performed by the Dutch government in 2014, over 40% of the population felt that the Netherlands would be a happier place if there were fewer immigrants living there (Figure 4.1).5 Throughout the time period after 9/11, the media has also responded with concern and negativity with

3 Jenkins, *God’s Continent*, 283.
regards to Islam and immigration, reflecting and influencing the views of the public and the way these views are justified, as well as the response of the government.

**Figure 4.1** Representation of Survey Data about the Dutch Government’s Study of the Dutch Perception of the Relationship between National Happiness and Immigration in 2014

Percentage of Dutch Nationals Who Agree that "The Netherlands would be a happier land if there were fewer immigrants living there" in 2014


Jenkins predictions about the Islamic population reaching the majority that are being utilized for fear-mongering are based on rates of population growth that do not account for lowered birth rates in non-western communities, suggesting that the growth

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The data used in this chart is in response to the statement, “Nederlands zou een prettiger land zijn als er minder immigranten zouden wonen.” My translation of this question to English has been used for presentation purposes.
of the Islamic population is not as exponential as he would claim.\textsuperscript{7} Furthermore, census data reveals that the population is still overwhelmingly Dutch or western in background, with only 9.5\% of all Dutch citizens coming from a non-western background, suggesting that an over-take of the Dutch population in the next 35 years is fairly unlikely (see Figure 4.2).\textsuperscript{8} In considering the growth of the “Muslim problem” that many Dutch critics of Islam exploit, it would seem that there is not a significant basis in fact to suggest that this phenomenon exists.

\textbf{Figure 4.2 Representation of Census Data with Regards to Ethnic Background in 2014}

![Ethnic Make-Up of the Netherlands in 2014](image)

Source: Data from \textit{Bevolking} (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, May 14, 2014), http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0&D6=a&HDR=T&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4,G5&VW=T.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7} Gijsberts and Dagevos, \textit{At Home in the Netherlands: Trends in Integration of Non-Western Migrants}; Jenkins, \textit{God’s Continent}, 283.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Bevolking} (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, May 14, 2014), http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0&D6=a&HDR=T&STB=G1,G2,G3,G4,G5&VW=T.

\textsuperscript{9} This is a government organization that operates in a similar manner to the U.S. Census Bureau, collecting statistics and data about the lives of all citizens in the Netherlands.
In order to conceptualize the impact and validity of rising Islamophobia and the fall of tolerance in the Netherlands, I examine demographic data from government reports to establish the current situation of Islamic immigrants in the Netherlands and the ethnic Dutch perspective on these immigrants. I then examine trends in media (particularly in newspapers) to determine how the media has been portraying Islam and the grounds upon which it is criticized, paying close attention to the idea that 9/11 may have triggered a protectionist attitude towards Dutch identity that is justified through negative narratives about Islam, particularly with regards to the treatment and tolerance of women and homosexuals by the Muslim community. I begin this section by introducing the findings of other researchers who have studied trends in newspapers in the Netherlands, but then introduce my findings and engage in a dialogue with the earlier findings and compare the trends in my data with government policies and election results. I conclude my analysis by presenting and critiquing the discourse on the relationship between gender and sexuality and Islam used by reporters and editorialists in the *NRC Handelsblad* and demonstrate media trends in Dutch newspapers with regards to discussion of certain terminology relevant to this relationship.

As a result of my findings on the importance and consistent nature of protection of gender and sexuality by mainstream Dutch culture and media, I determine that there must be a reason for the utilization of the “protection” of women and homosexuals in narratives about Islam. I posit that in a culture that is fundamentally formed on tolerance, it is difficult for the media to continuously justify the use of Islamophobic language, but that through utilizing narratives in which women are violated, the media invokes the idea of women as a symbol of society and of the protection of women’s rights as part of the
Dutch culture of “secular and sexual exceptionalism”, the media constructs Islamophobic narratives without falling subject to accusations of intolerance.

**LIFE FOR THE “ALLOCHTONEN”**: THE STRUGGLE OF BEING BROWN IN THE NETHERLANDS

Although there is a definitive lack of evidence to suggest that the non-western population is growing to the point that it will overtake the Christian population, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that there is a problem with the way that non-western migrants function and are treated in Dutch society. The problem with the immigrant population is in terms of upholding socialist and democratic values: they are, overall, far less privileged in Dutch society than the ethnically Dutch, which moves the Dutch population away from the idea of an equal and fair society.

In order to assess social disparity, the Dutch government often uses statistics around income, unemployment, and education—in all of these areas, Moroccans and Turks are significantly disadvantaged in comparison with the ethnically Dutch. National census data reveals that Islamic immigrant populations are significantly more likely to be unemployed and specifically experienced a spike in unemployment not observed by the ethnically Dutch community directly after 9/11 (Figure 4.3). Furthermore, despite large strides in education for Turkish and Moroccan students from 2002-2012, people of Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds are still three times less likely than their ethnically Dutch counterparts to obtain a bachelor’s degree or higher and three times more likely to fail to achieve a degree above primary education. Additionally, as of 2013, people of non-Western decent are six times more likely than ethnically Dutch citizens to be reliant
on some form of social welfare assistance, make, on average, a third of an ethnically Dutch citizen’s salary, and are four times more likely to be living in poverty.  

**Figure 4.3 Representation of Census Data on Unemployment with Regards to Ethnic Background in 2014**

It is thus difficult to say that there is no “Muslim problem” in the Netherlands, although perhaps not in the way that it is meant by people like Geert Wilders. The most

recent report by the Dutch government provides their recommendations to policy-makers on how to mediate this issue and suggests that it is, in fact, Dutch public opinion which is impacting the lives of migrant community members so negatively.\textsuperscript{11} There is likely a strong degree of truth to this: about 50\% of citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent perceived that they have been discriminated against in a public space in the Netherlands and approximately 40\% believe that they have been discriminated against while seeking work (Figure 4.4).\textsuperscript{12} In explaining the high unemployment rate for Moroccan people in the Netherlands, a young Moroccan men interviewed for the “Witness” documentary points to one of his friends and claims that “If I’m Dutch and he’s Moroccan and we both apply for a job, even if the foreigner is ten times better they’ll always hire [me], the Dutch guy.”\textsuperscript{13}

Furthermore, although there is an undeniable faction of Dutch society which believes that immigrants are a problem for society, many people refuse to believe that the environment in the Netherlands is, in fact, problematic for people of other backgrounds. A study on integration in the Netherlands performed by the government determined that 68\% of the ethnically Dutch population believe that the Netherlands is a “hospitable” place for migrants (Figure 4.5). If such a large percent of the population does not believe that there is a problem with discrimination and the attitudes of the ethnically-Dutch

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\textsuperscript{11} Jaco Davegos, Willem Huijnk, and Mérove Isabelle Léontine Gijsberts, \textit{Labour Market Position of Migrant Groups in Times of Economic Recession}.
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\textsuperscript{13} Rooke, \textit{Witness Loverboys}.
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(despite the fact that there most likely is), but a similarly large percent believes that the Netherlands would be a happier place with less immigration, it follows that the “Muslim problem” must be, in the minds of many Dutch people, the result of Muslims themselves.

**Figure 4.4** Percentage of Participants in a Dutch Government Study who Believe they have Experienced Discrimination, by Domain and Ethnic Background

![Figure 1.4](chart.png)


**Figure 4.5** Opinions of Dutch Nationals on the Climate in the Netherlands Towards Migrants, Divided by Ethnic Background
REFLECTIONS IN THE MEDIA

In order to understand how the Dutch perceive Islam and to understand the impact that this may be having on policy and society, I examine the media. Chapter Two outlines the theories of Cook, who explains that the media plays an incredibly important role in shaping the decisions of policy-makers in a democratic system. He argues that the media can be utilized as a tool through which public opinion and policy is shaped, which suggests that the way in which the media frames an issue can be incredibly important. 14 Thus, in examining the way in which Islam and immigrants are portrayed in the media it is possible to understand how public opinion may shift and may give hints as to the

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difference between the reality and perception of the Islamophobic frenzy that has been occurring in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the ideas in the media around why Islam deserves to be discriminated against may help to explain the motivations for the collapse of tolerance in the Netherlands.

The idea that the media has an impact on the treatment of Muslims has already been addressed by other researchers that Jennifer van Genderen released a study of the utilization of terminology and rhetoric around Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands in the *NRC Handelsblad*, a major Dutch newspaper, during 1995, 2002, and 2009, and found that the majority of the language in the news stories in general were negative and that the incidence of mentions of Islam increased dramatically from 1995 to 2009. This study builds on the initial premise that van Genderen introduced: that there has been a shift in the way that the Dutch media has been treating Islam.¹⁵ Van Kligneren, et al. also conducted a study on the impact of the media on Dutch public opinion, but they focused primarily on immigration, not Islam. Still, they find that in the years following 9/11, the increased interest in immigration had the effect of causing anti-immigrant sentiment to flourish in the Netherlands, even when one corrects for the effect of immigrant inflow on media salience.¹⁶

Furthermore, Van Genderen found a clear model for understanding the impact of the media on perceptions of immigration in the Netherlands, demonstrating that there was

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an increase in the mention of Islam in the media from 1995 to 2009 and that the percentage of negative articles increased as well.\textsuperscript{17} Van Klingereren, et al. also found that there was an increase in the amount of negative articles, though their findings were not quite so dramatic and further utilize their findings to suggest that the media interest did not have a significant impact on public opinion.\textsuperscript{18}

In this study, I fill in the gaps of these study, strengthen their findings, and contribute new data with new implications. Like van Genderen, I found that there was an increase in the incidence of the terms “Islam” and “foreigners” in Dutch newspapers before and after the events of September 11, 2001. Van Genderen does not explicitly state that she sees 9/11 as a turning point, but her decision to study ’95, ’02, and ’09 seems to betray her belief that there was a change from the media in the 1990s from the late 2000s that happened directly after 2001.\textsuperscript{19} My study, which includes the \textit{NRC Handelsblad} and \textit{De Volkskrant} and examines articles from every year during the timespan explored by van Genderen, in addition to the years leading up to 2014, suggests that there was a significant interest in the idea of Islam following 2001, as is claimed by Mahdavi in her study of islamophobia in the United States (Figure 4.6). This data shows that 9/11 is a clear turning point in the way the media in the Netherlands treated immigration and

\textsuperscript{17} Van Genderen, “Van Fatwa Tot Fitna: Een Onderzoek Naar de Berichtgeving van NRC Handelsblad over de Islam Tussen 1995 En 2009.”

\textsuperscript{18} Van Klingereren et al., “Real World Is Not Enough: The Media as an Additional Source of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigration, Comparing Denmark and the Netherlands.”

\textsuperscript{19} Van Genderen, “Van Fatwa Tot Fitna: Een Onderzoek Naar de Berichtgeving van NRC Handelsblad over de Islam Tussen 1995 En 2009.”
Islam, and this had an impact on the way in which the public viewed immigration as well.20

Figure 4.6 Occurrence of Terms Related to the Immigration Crisis in Selected Dutch Newspapers from 1997-2014, with a focus line delineating the events of September 11, 2001

Source: Articles from the *NRC Handelsblad* and *De Volkskrant*21

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20 Van Klingerent et al., “Real World Is Not Enough: The Media as an Additional Source of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigration, Comparing Denmark and the Netherlands.”

21 Utilizes all internet-database articles from two Dutch newspapers (*NRC Handelsblad* and *De Volkskrant*) that mention the terms “Muslim”, “allochtonen”, and “Islam”. In order to prove that the database is complete and that it is not merely an increase in overall articles over time that has caused this trend, I use the control variable terms “the” and “it”; Original analysis performed in Dutch using the terms “Moslim,” “allochtonen,” and “Islam” but terminology is translated for presentation.
I differ from the studies created by van Genderen and van Klingeren, et al. in that in my assessment of the “positive” or “negative” nature of media perspectives on Islam, I only utilized opinion pieces in one newspaper to develop my data, and unlike van Klingeren, et al., I chose to focus my study solely on Islam and Islamic immigration. I believe that my basic assessment of the proportion of articles that were coded positive, negative, or neutral demonstrates that there has been a slight decrease in the amount of negative articles that deal with Islam (Figure 4.7). In fact, many of the articles that were coded negative were actually purposefully defending Islam and criticizing the “racist” and “xenophobic” tone that other members of the media continued to be taking even after the public perspective on the acceptability of openly being intolerant of Islam changed.²²

A fairly high proportion of the vote had gone to the anti-immigration party in the 2010 election, when there was a high proportion of anti-Islamic sentiment in the media and a large amount of articles that focused on Islam in the media, but over time, the amount of negative media, as well as support for the anti-immigration party, decreased (Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9). Public perspective regarding immigration and Islam were similarly correlated with the media perspective on these issues. Concern over immigration increased in the end of 2014, but, as predicted by the fact that Islam became less of a mentioned issue in the media and had less negativity surround it, concern was much lower than it had been in the past from 2012-early 2014.²³

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²³ Josje den Ridder et al., Kwartaalbericht van Het Continu Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven.
Figure 4.7 Percentage of Selected Opinion Pieces that View Islam Positively/Negatively/Neutrally in the Netherlands from 2010-2014

Source: Articles that mention Islam in the Op-Ed section of the NRC Handelsblad

Figure 4.8 Dutch Election Results for Selected Political Parties from 1994-2012


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24 The LPF and the PVV are combined because both are anti-immigration parties. The LPF is actually a precursor to the PVV and neither existed during the same election cycle.
Furthermore, according to the van Klingeren study, negative opinions regarding Islam in the media spiked around 2006 and in late 2009; although van Klingeren claims positive attitudes towards immigration in the news have a significant positive impact on the way that immigration is perceived by the public and that negative attitudes do not have a significant impact on the perception of immigration in the Netherlands, utilizing public opinion data in conjunction with the amount of positive and negative news stories about Islam from 2003-2009, the study falls short when one considers the events of 2010. Although there was a significant reduction in concerns over immigration during 

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25 These results combine the results of the LPF with those of the PVV; see Chapter 4, footnote 24.

26 Van Klingeren et al., “Real World Is Not Enough: The Media as an Additional Source of Negative Attitudes Toward Immigration, Comparing Denmark and the Netherlands.”
time periods where positive news stories increased, this does not match up with the results of the 2010 elections, when a spike in negative news stories at the end of 2009 lines up with a large percentage of the votes going to the anti-immigration party the next year. There may actually be some connection with an increase in negative news stories and public opinion, as reflected through election results and public opinion surveys.

The rise of integration policies in the Netherlands is briefly explored in Chapter Three and it is noted that they did not have a great deal of success. Regardless of this fact, Islamophobia intensified the Dutch government’s integration pushes in the 21st century, with the support of the anti-immigration policies who gained popularity during the rise of Islamophobia. In 2007, the government proposed a “Law on Integration” that forces any anyone who is considered *allochtonen* (with the exception of western migrants) to pass an “integration exam” that includes questions about Dutch language, and culture, before they can even attempt to apply for citizenship.27 Interestingly, the “Samenleving” or “Living Together” section of the exam has a question about the test-taker’s reaction to homosexual public affection, suggesting that tolerance of homosexuality is important enough to warrant a place on an exam about quintessential Dutch values.28 Even if one completes the exam satisfactorily, the government reserves the right to monitor the “effort migrants make to integrate” and claims that if one does “not make enough effort,” they can lose their right to residency. In 2014, certain municipalities even require non-citizens to sign “participation statements” with “rules of social interaction.”29

27 Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 237-238.

Beyond making direct demands from the migrant community itself, the government also allocates resources towards educating second-generation migrants, “dealing” with youth crime perpetrated by men of non-western descent, “promoting gay acceptance,” and “tackling discrimination.” These policies remain and are likely to continue in the future, furthering the government’s goal of eliminating Islamic identity and constructing an overarching Dutch culture based in “traditional Dutch ideals” that specifically rely on promoting “tolerance” in the migrant community.

Beyond attempting to limit the impact of the already-present migrant community on the apparent disunity of the population that was become more and more evident in the post-9/11 society, the Dutch government, like many governments in the EU, became increasingly interested in limiting immigration—a bold move for a country once known for its open migration policy and lax asylum laws. They limited the rights of people to hold dual-citizenship, tightened family-reunification policies, increased standards for asylum qualification, and required that foreigners take a civic integration exam. The well-supported anti-immigration parties were particularly strong proponents of these rules and have proposed far more severe measures, such as a five year moratorium on all


31 Entzinger, “Immigration and Multiculturalism,” 237-238.

immigration, suspended voting rights of foreign nationals (who are currently allowed to vote in municipal elections), and the deportation of immigrant criminals.  

Closed borders are also often linked to anti-trafficking laws: specifically, human trafficking laws that aim to repatriate people who have been moved across borders for reasons of sex or labor trafficking. CoMensha, the European anti-trafficking umbrella organization, states on their Netherlands-oriented website that they work closely with the government to appropriately re-integrate people who have been repatriated into their home environments, but it is unclear whether these women and men actually want to be repatriated. The government claims that they only repatriate if it is “determined to be in their best interest,” but does not trace clear guidelines for what that determination process looks like and it is clear that it does not fully involve the opinion of person who has been designated a “victim.” According to Danna, many of these EU laws involving “repatriation” are actually aimed at “deportation” under the pretext of promoting human rights and women’s rights, utilizing a paternalistic discourse of “protecting” non-western women in order to achieve the ends of closing borders, which is something that Schotel has established is often incompatible with supporting human rights.


36 Danna, “Client-Only Criminalization in the City of Stockholm: A Local Research on the Application of the “Swedish Model” of Prostitution Policy.”
The discourse around the issues of Islam and immigration is fairly varied. There are several defenses of Islam that are often seen in articles that are “positive” towards Islam. Multiple articles defend Islam by emphasizing the tolerant history of the Netherlands and the idea that racism is wrong. Specifically, there is a fairly common tendency to compare criticizing Islam to criticizing Judaism, invoking the guilt of the Holocaust that still lingers in the Netherlands today. Some others attempt to use Islamic doctrine, history, and cultural analysis to separate radical Islam from mainstream Islam and diminish fear of Islamic immigrants in western states. Others are less defensive and simply celebrate the importance multiculturalism and encouraging diversity. There are, however, many who are critical of Islam, for a variety of reasons.

For example, the ideas of Alan and McCarthy and Ostrolenk regarding the impact of immigrants on the economy gained some amount of traction in the Dutch media. In a casual conversation I had with a native Dutch woman in early 2015, she expressed her belief that there should be less economic programming targeted towards helping asylum seekers or promoting the education and employment status of the allochtonen. These ideas are echoed by several authors, who express their belief that immigrants are “costly”. Rijlaarsdam and Steel claim that immigrants are bad for the economy and that the government pays approximately €45,000 per migrant that enters the country. This is a belief held by many Dutch people: a 2003 study determined that, more so than most other EU countries, Dutch people generally believed that migrants simply negatively impact
the economy.\textsuperscript{37} This, however, is not a particularly “sexy” perspective, which could explain why it does not generate the type of frenzy that some other perspectives, which focus on sexuality and scandal, do.\textsuperscript{38}

**Gender and Sexuality: Defending Racism**

Oftentimes, arguments for “integration” have a veiled dislike for Islam, suggesting that Islamic culture is incompatible with western culture. This “culture clash” is a common reason cited for criticizing Islam, and, in particular, clashing values around sexuality and gender. This idea is linked to those of Huntington, who argues that Islam is problematic in modern society because Islamic “culture” is fundamentally at odds with “western culture.”\textsuperscript{39} The shocking violence of 9/11 and increasing radical Islamic terrorism, combined with the type of rhetoric that Said argues is sufficient to categorize a massive group of people as having the same belief system, leads to a discourse in which Islam is something to be feared.\textsuperscript{40} Yet it is difficult for a “tolerant” society like the Netherlands to justify intolerance of a religion unless there is a specific value that the Dutch hold dear that is at odds with Islam.

\textsuperscript{37} OECD, “Public Opinions and Immigration,” in *International Migration Outlook* (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), 115–56, [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/chapter/migr_outlook-2010-6-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/chapter/migr_outlook-2010-6-en).

\textsuperscript{38} Doezema, “Loose women or lost women? The re-emergence of the myth of white slavery in contemporary discourses of trafficking in women.”

\textsuperscript{39} Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization?”

\textsuperscript{40} Said, “The Clash of Ignorance.”
Many media figures argue that this value is the respect of women and homosexuals. Thus, in determining where persisting attitudes in opposition to Islam exist in Dutch society, I have found the one of the clearest trends is a consistent concern about the treatment of women and people with sexual identities or sexualities that deviate from the norm, such as homosexuals. In my analysis of these articles, I found that all of the articles in the *NRC Handelsblad* that mention Islam in the context of sexuality and gender in 2014, 21% percent are positive (and generally in defense of national criticism), while a staggering 70% are negative. Furthermore, those articles that are coded “positive”, often refer to Muslim women or gay Muslim men who are “defying the stereotype” or offer up statistics to dispel the idea that Muslim men are the only ones who are sexist and homophobic by displaying white men as equally likely to commit a hate crime. In fact, only one article in all of 2014 on Islam and gender and sexuality featured a strong argument in favor of Islam and discussed the fact that although Muslim women are seen as “trapped” in the home, only psychological pressure and social issues can truly lead to such beliefs and that “if women really are trapped by their husbands, that has nothing to do with culture” and “psychological problems generally play an important role in the behavior of the man.” The lack of assertive and compelling arguments in favor of the treatment of women in Islam suggest that the negative perspectives are, by far, the dominant ones.

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Gender Equality & the Oppression of Women

It is empirically true that there is a larger disparity between non-western migrant men and women than ethnically Dutch men and women with regards to income, education, and employment status, but the range in the status of women in Islamic communities suggest that it is not Islam itself that is oppressive of women. This is not what is generally believed by the Dutch media. Many of the news stories in 2014 dealt with women attempting to achieve equality or “empowerment” and being told that this is unacceptable by Muslim men—one article is specifically titled “Empowered Woman? There Goes Your Honor,” suggesting that Muslim men are directly threatened by strong women.42

To give a specific example of one of the primary perceived issues in the media with regards to gender equality in Islam is the issue of the headscarf. Throughout Europe, governments have been debating banning the headscarf on the basis that it is a symbol of oppression and misogyny, suggesting that allowing people to wear the headscarf or the burka is to allow Islam to behave in a way that is oppressive towards women. Although the Netherlands, unlike France and Turkey, has never upheld a ban on the headscarf or the burka, legislation has been proposed many times.43 My analysis of the occurrence of the term “headscarf” from 1995 to 2014 demonstrates that the term was not particularly popular in the media up until 2001, at which point the press began to utilize it with


dramatically increased frequency (Figure 4.10). This data shows that has become a hot-button issue for the Dutch media since September 11, 2001. Furthermore, the idea that the headscarf is linked to perceived lack of gender equality in Islam is supported by the content of these articles. An op-ed in the *NRC Handelsblad* in 2003, when the headscarf issue truly came to the forefront and when Islamophobic opinions were climbing, states that the men force women to wear headscarves to keep their public role limited and that unless women “take their liberation into their own hands” they will continue to be “unequal.”

Be they articles in support of or against such legislation, all of these articles address the issue of whether or not Islam limits gender equality in the Netherlands. Differing attitudes on gender roles and gender relations have always existed between the migrant populations and the ethnically-Dutch populations, but September 11th seems to have led to an increased interest in this issue. Although they primarily focus on the way in which Islam treats its own women, the fear of “Islamization” echoes.

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**Figure 4.10** Occurrence of Articles that Reference the “headscarf” in Dutch Media from 1995-2014

![Graph showing the occurrence of articles mentioning the term "headscarf" in Dutch media from 1995 to 2014.](image)

*Source: Articles from the NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant.*

### Sexual Expression and Freedom

In a similar vein, freedom of sexual expression and liberal attitudes towards sex are different between non-religious Dutch citizens and religious citizens. Islamic women in particular are generally opposed to pre-marital sexual relationships, while non-religious Dutch people are overwhelmingly approving of this action (Figure 4.11). My analysis of mentions of “Islam” in articles that also mention “sex” suggests that the perceived difference between attitudes towards sexual freedom are reflected by the increase in media interest around the issues of sex and Islam following 9/11 (Figure 4.12). As it is not the difference in attitudes that has changed, it follows that it is a

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45 Original analysis performed in Dutch using the term “hoofddoek” but terminology is translated to English for presentation.
difference in willingness to criticize Islam that is triggering this increase in concern in the media. This is exemplified by an article that criticizes Islam for its intolerance in the context of a vandalism case. Normally, a simple vandalism would not make the national news, but when a few local Muslim boys spray-painted “slut” on an advertisement that featured scantily-clothed women, it became grounds to critique an entire population for their sex-negative views.46

**Figure 4.11 Pre-Marital Sex Approval in Dutch Youths, by Religious Belief**

![Percentage of Dutch Nationals from Age 12-25 who Approve of Pre-Marital Sex, Divided by Religious Beliefs](chart.png)

Source: Data from *Sex under the Age of 25* (Rutgers WPF, January 2012), [http://www.rutgerswpf.org/sites/rutgersorg/files/PDF/](http://www.rutgerswpf.org/sites/rutgersorg/files/PDF/).

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**Figure 4.12** Occurrence of Articles that Reference “Islam AND Sex” or “Muslim AND Sex” in Dutch Media from 1995-2014

![Graph showing occurrence of articles mentioning Islam and sex or Muslim and sex in Dutch media from 1995 to 2014, with a peak post-9/11.]

Source: Articles from the NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant. 47

**Homosexuality**

The Netherlands’ respect for freedom of expression in sexuality extends very staunchly to respect for the LGBTQ community, something that many people in Dutch society pride themselves on. Amsterdam has one of the largest gay pride parades in the world and LGBTQ rights and inclusion are a major issue for the government. 48 The Dutch government released a report in 2013 expressing their belief that there is a direct correlation between a society’s treatment of homosexuality and its views on gender equality and the role. The report claims that states with high Gender Equality Index

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47 Original analysis performed in Dutch using the terms “Islam EN Seks” and “Moslim EN Seks” but terminology is translated to English for presentation.

scores and “liberal views” tend to be more acceptable of homosexuality, while also claiming that the Netherlands as an example of a state which is both supportive of equality and very accepting of homosexuality compared to other states in the EU. It is true that the Netherlands ranks high in both of these categories: 93% of those surveyed in 2010 believed that gay men and lesbians “should be free to live their lives as they wish”, as illustrated in Figure 4.13. Another report released that year suggested that not only were the Dutch very tolerant, they were the most tolerant state in the EU with regards to homosexuality, ranking the Dutch first in many categories around tolerance of homosexuality based on a 2012 study, and claiming that “social acceptance of homosexuals is greatest in the Netherlands.”

The first report also concludes with a warning that although European attitudes around homosexuality are improving, rising unemployment and falling incomes are affiliated with less social acceptance, because people return to “traditional values” and self-interest during these times, and that migrants have their own traditions and values that they try to hold on to, while rejecting ideas like homosexuality, which “are perceived as being ‘imposed by Europe’.”


Figure 4.13 Maps Displaying Opinions on Homosexuality in the Countries of Europe in 2002 and in 2010


Ignoring the fact that accuracy of a report that is produced by the Dutch government may be compromised by bias, it is undeniable that in producing this report, the government is promoting the idea that attitudes around sexuality and gender are correlated, that the Dutch have high levels of tolerance, and that tolerance is threatened by the introduction of viewpoints from migrants, particularly if there are high levels of unemployment. As established above, the economic crisis in the Netherlands is felt the hardest in immigrant communities and these communities are perceived as valuing “traditional” conceptions of sexuality and are seen as less accepting of homosexuality, which is not based in any sort of untruth; the same report that released the statistics
regarding Dutch tolerance of homosexuality in 2012 demonstrated that Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish decent were significantly less likely than ethnically Dutch people to be accepting of homosexuality (Figure 4.14).52

**Figure 4.14** Attitudes towards Homosexuality in the Netherlands, Divided by Ethnic Background in 2013

![Percentage of Population that Agrees that "Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish" in 2013](chart)


As explained in Chapter Three, a substantive portion of the Dutch electorate has historically supported the promotion of the rights of the LGBTQ community over the rights of Muslims. Pim Fortuyn is often described as “colorful” homosexual and

52 Saskia Keuzenkamp and Lisette Kuyper, *Acceptance of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Individuals in the Netherlands.*
developed his anti-Islam platform on the grounds that Islam opposes homosexuality and his death and subsequent martyrdom likely served to reinforce this affiliation in the minds of the Dutch public. In 2002, he stated that he did not want to have to “emancipate homosexuals all over again” and that the increased presence of Islam has led to people becoming less comfortable sharing their sexual identity in the public sphere. This aspect of his platform apparently rang true to parts of his homosexual constituency and led to the growth of his party.

The government’s promotion of the idea that perceptions of sexuality and gender equality are correlated and are important to Dutch identity serves to further emphasize the idea that gender equality is an important concept in establishing a Dutch values system. Thus, the dramatic increase in news stories regarding Islam and homosexuality after 9/11 suggest that there was rising concern about the way in which Islamic citizens perceive homosexuality as Islam became a more prominent issue in the news (Figure 4.15). There has always been a disparity in how Islamic citizens and ethnically-Dutch, non-religious citizens perceive homosexuality, but as with the others issues around gender and sexuality already discussed, the international anxiety around Islam after the traumatic events of September 11th seem to have triggered a discourse that uses defense of homosexuality to justify Islamophobia. In 2014, several stories were released about homosexual men feeling oppressed by Islam or being discriminated against by Islamic

53 De Haan, “Politics Between Accommodation and Commotion,” 130.
54 Poorthuis and Wansink, “Pim Fortuyn op herhaling: 'De islam is een achterlijke cultuur.'”
society, including the story of one gay imam who was forced to leave his Muslim religious community because they refused to accept his identity.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Figure 4.15 Occurrence of Articles that Reference “Islam AND Homosexuality” or “Muslim AND Homosexuality” in Dutch Media from 1995-2014}

![Graph showing the occurrence of articles mentioning both Islam and Homosexuality from 1995 to 2014.](image)

Source: Articles from the \textit{NRC Handelsblad} and \textit{De Volkskrant}.\textsuperscript{56}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

As explained in Chapter Three, Sarah Bracke suggests that the Netherlands suffers from a form of “secular and sexual exceptionalism”, which involves the establishment of western superiority over Islam on the basis of their secularism and free


\textsuperscript{56} Original analysis performed in Dutch using the terms “Islam EN Homo” and “Moslim EN Homo” but terminology is translated to English for presentation.
attitudes towards sexuality, as well as their championing of women’s rights. It appears that the sense of pride that is experienced by Dutch citizens with regards to their liberal attitudes towards gender and sexuality may be impacting the way in which some groups are able to enjoy the principle of Dutch tolerance. One interviewee for a Dutch newspaper wrote, “I stand for freedom of religion. But not for religious coercion, which is the opposite. I respect the faith and the faithful, but I have no respect for women's oppression.”

The question is not if the Netherlands is a tolerant state anymore; it is who it will tolerate. The media and public opinion both demonstrate that despite difficulty respecting Islam following 9/11 and the death of prominent anti-Muslim figures, the Netherlands is still attempting to maintain a reasonable attitude of tolerance towards Islam: in 2014, the amount of negative opinion pieces about Islam was noticeably smaller than the amount of positive ones and many people turned away from the anti-immigration parties in the most recent election. There is still, however, a nagging and persistent belief in the Dutch media that Islam is in a “clash of culture” with Dutch society. The issue of women’s and gay rights has been held up as a way of comprehending Islamophobia and justifying continuing negative stereotypes of Islam, without having to give up the Dutch value of tolerance. In this way, the Dutch media promotes a continuation of this “clash of cultures” in which they hold the moral high ground and are able to paternalistically

dictate the beliefs that Muslims should have and how they should treat women, both brown and white, as well as homosexuals.

The next chapter takes this idea and zooms in on a specific issue relevant to gender and sexuality that has risen directly alongside Islamophobia—human trafficking—and asks how the issue of racialized gender discourses, such as the misogyny of brown men, play out in this field, in order to demonstrate a clearer link between racial discrimination and gender in Dutch media and public perception. It then demonstrates the implications for human trafficking and immigration policy in the Netherlands.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE LOVERBOYS: COMPLICATING THE VICTIM-PERPETRATOR NARRATIVE

There is a fight in the Moroccan community. There’s a small group of criminals that are bringing shame on everyone else and it’s marking us out in Holland as a bad community. It’s not only the political climate, but also the social climate…I’m very worried about young Moroccan boys and girls growing up with such negativity about being Moroccan…it makes me sick.

-Ibrahim, a social worker interviewed for Witness: Loverboys ¹

Chapter Four has illustrated that the media has the power to transform immigration and integration policy through narratives of Islamophobia and that the most dominant negative narrative around Islam relies on the idea that Islam does not respect Dutch culture and values, particularly with regards to gender and sexuality. This chapter explores the reasoning for a different type of change in policy: change in sex work and trafficking policies. Pardis Mahdavi has suggested that trafficking narratives after 9/11 have been highly Islamophobic and that this has permitted both the rise in anti-trafficking laws, as well as the continued vilification of Islam. In the United States, trafficking narratives contributed to rising support for anti-terror measures and international criminal prosecution of Islamic men, yet the heavy focus on domestic trafficking narratives by the Dutch media seems to indicate that this framework may not make sense in this case.

¹ Rooke, Witness Loverboy.
I argue that in the Netherlands, trafficking narratives contributed to rising support for border closings and domestic criminal prosecution of Islamic men. I demonstrate this by showing the concurrent rise in racialized narratives of trafficking with various policy measures, election results, and public opinion polls, the lack of defense of Islam in media discussions of trafficking, and the rise in trafficking prosecutions of Islamic men during the time period following 9/11.

TRAFFICKING IN THE NETHERLANDS: CONTEXT AND HISTORY

In late 2013, I found myself walking in the Red Light District. Although this tourist trap is not a place I frequented during my brief stint living in Amsterdam, a friend visiting from out of town insisted that she needed to see what it was like, insisting that “it’s such a typical Amsterdam experience!” The first and only time I had been in “De Wallen”, as the area is known to locals, was at night, when I made a wrong turn on the way to a pub. Then, it had seemed disturbingly threatening and wild, but in daylight it was sterilized: there were glorified souvenir stands masquerading as “sex shops”, bored-looking sex workers who would smile if you waved at them, and hordes of middle-aged tourists, laughingly taking pictures of themselves in windows that had been set up for photo-ops. Here, sex work is not what is on sale – the idea of sex work is.

A large part of the commercialization of the idea of sex work in the Netherlands revolves around giving tours of the Red Light District (for a fee, of course). Although they strongly discourage people from “hopping on” to their tours, in the crowded, narrow streets, it is sometimes impossible to avoid hearing what they have to say and as we walked past, the tour guide crowed, “70% of the women in this Red light District have
been trafficked.” “Wow,” my friend remarked. “Really? That’s so many.” She was right to question the number. “70%” is a statistic that is oft cited by anti-trafficking groups, but it has no real basis in fact—defining trafficking is so difficult that any statistics about the amount of women who have been “trafficked” must rely on a definition of trafficking that may not reflect another person’s definition and utilize data acquired through reporting, despite the fact that many women who are in a country illegally would most likely not report a crime.²

Yet, regardless of whether the moniker is accurate, Amsterdam is consistently accused of being a “modern-day sex slavery capital” by those aiming to criminalize sex worker there again, blaming the liberal policies on sex work for the abuse of sex workers that occurs in this area.³ The concern around trafficking reflects international concern with regards to forced sex work. As Mahdavi demonstrates in *From Trafficking to Terror*, September 11th was a transformative moment in the way that the world conceived of Islam, but it was also a turning point in the way that U.S. narratives about human trafficking played out. A media frenzy around the issue seemed to erupt concurrently with rising Islamophobia and suddenly, rescuing women from sex work became a priority for many human rights organizations and states that value human rights.⁴

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⁴ Mahdavi, *From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*, 6-7.
The U.S. responded to this concern by creating the Trafficking in Persons Report in 2001.\(^5\) This report was designed to rank all states on their performance in the field of trafficking prevention and places them into a “Tier One,” “Tier Two,” or “Tier Three” categorization, with Tier One being the best and Tier Three and the Tier Three Watchlist being the worst. The TIP Report generally promotes the criminalization of sex work and encourages states to have stricter borders and immigration policies.\(^6\)

The Netherlands is not exempt from the frenzy that generated the creation of these reports, as is exemplified by the inflated statistics about sex trafficking and the increased presence of anti-trafficking organizations. As a result, regardless of the successfulness of the TIP Report policies and reasoning behind their creation, it is clear that the Netherlands intended to adhere to the international standards set by the U.S. When the TIP report claimed that their trafficking practices had been lagging, there was a significant change in the anti-trafficking policy set forth by the Dutch government.\(^7\) The government has publically declared their pride that the U.S. has determined that they have been compliant with the recommendations set forth in the TIP Report, citing

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\(^5\) Henceforth referred to as the “TIP Report”

\(^6\) Kim and Chang, “Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s).”

\(^7\) Note: The TIP Report is an incredibly inaccurate source and despite the citation of the TIP report in many academic texts, their methodology is flawed. Thus, any accusations or claims made by the TIP report must be taken lightly. Lisa Fedina, “Use and Misuse of Research in Books on Sex Trafficking Implications for Interdisciplinary Researchers, Practitioners, and Advocates,” *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse* (2014).
particular pride that the report determine that have had increased rates of prosecution of trafficking.⁸

THE LOVERBOY FRENZY: PIMPS OR TRAFFICKERS?

“I was fourteen…Manou had regular customers. Some were fathers, family men, business owners, school officials…he told me ‘you’re going to have sex with them, sweetheart’,” writes Maria Mosterd in her allegedly autobiographical book, Real Men Don’t Eat Cheese.⁹ This popular book details the interactions between Mosterd, a half-Dutch girl living in a suburban area of the Netherlands, and “Manou”, the Guinean migrant who she alleges seduced her and convinced her to become a sex worker to support his lifestyle. The book traces a shocking tale: 18-year-old Manou forcing Mosterd into her first sexual encounter at age 12 while she is under the influence of drugs, the years she spent acting as an under-age sex worker, and her isolation from the rest of her family and friends. Mosterd’s story was not the first “loverboy” story but it was one of the most popular and triggered a massive response in the Netherlands as other women came forward, telling stories that echoed the ones in Real Men.

Thus, although international human trafficking is arguably one of the largest perceived human rights crises in the world, the anti-trafficking fervor in the Netherlands goes beyond concerns about international trafficking. Instead, despite the fact that the government admits that over 60% of people who are trafficked in the Netherlands are not

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Dutch (see Figure 5.1) the Dutch discourse on trafficking has a focus on the topic of domestic trafficking: specifically, the trafficking of young, ethnically Dutch women by young men, commonly referred to as “loverboys” by the Dutch media.\textsuperscript{10} As was the case of Maria and numerous other publicized “loverboy” cases, the “victims” are generally young and the narrative states that they are easily manipulated and seduced by handsome young men. They generally meet on the street or in the schoolyard and the victim is allegedly manipulated into becoming a prostitute to support their new “boyfriend.” The boyfriend generally pockets the majority of the money, giving the prostitute money for food and clothing and providing her with housing, while also showering her with gifts and attention to keep up the façade of a romantic relationship. There have been reports of relationships of this nature being not only coercive, but also violent in some cases.\textsuperscript{11}

Interestingly, no other region of the world has an actual term for this type of prostitution, suggesting that it is only a categorized phenomenon in the Netherlands and a few other western European states, like England and Germany.\textsuperscript{12} Bovenkerk argues that this name derives from the coercive practices that these men use but was utilized by the courts as a way to diminish the connotations of “prostitution” for the “victims” of the

\textsuperscript{10} An Interesting thing to note about this figure is that it is reproduced directly from the “Ninth Report of the Dutch Rapporteur” and, despite the clear dominance in percentage of non-Dutch “victims,” all of the emphasis is placed on Dutch victims. The Dutch victims are put in a bright color, in contrast to a drab gray for non-Dutch ones, and the Dutch victims get an entire other diagram to break down even further the situation for this specific group of victims. It seems that the protection of white women seems to be a priority of the government – not the protection of women in general.

\textsuperscript{11} Bovenkerk, “Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic,” 183.

\textsuperscript{12} Bovenkerk, “Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic,” 185.
“loverboys”. In calling the “loverboys” “pimps”, the logical conclusion is that the girl is a “prostitute,” but the victim of a “loverboy” can be assumed to be a romantic partner who has been criminally taken advantage of.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Figure 5.1 Dutch Government Statistics Regarding the Nationality and Age of Victims of Domestic Trafficking}


\textsuperscript{13} Bovenkerk, \textit{Loverboys, of Moderne Pooierschaap}, 19.
Like the frenzy that arose around human trafficking in the Netherlands and the rest of the world after 9/11, the “loverboy” issue became largely publicized in the media—with little statistical evidence to suggest that it deserves that degree of attention. Bovenkerk’s intensive study on the “loverboy” phenomenon discovered that, by 2011, there were approximately 50 television programs and hundreds of newspaper articles focusing on the “loverboy” crisis, but that there may have been a moral panic over a non-existent issue. For a good deal of time, there was no reliable, first-hand evidence to prove the existence of the “loverboys”, and the police admitted that it was difficult to gather the necessary evidence to prove that there have been actual cases. In fact, most of the abusive pimps discovered by the Amsterdam police during that time frame were ethnically Dutch. The case of Maria Mosterd, the aforementioned memoir-writer, is heavily scrutinized by Bovenkerk, because it appears that she provided false details and her “tormenter” was cleared of all trafficking charges.\(^\text{14}\)

Thus, Bovenkerk has already established that there was a media frenzy around the “loverboys” starting in the early 2000s. As shown in Figure 5.2, my findings firmly support his, suggesting that the term “loverboy” only came into existence in the Dutch vernacular following the same event that has already been connected with rising Islamophobia and rising interest in immigration and Islam by this thesis: September 11. This connects to my argument in Chapter Four in that it shows that Islam is introduced in a negative way but this negativity is justified by protecting feminism and, in particular,

\(^{14}\text{Bovenkerk, “Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic.”}\)
the rights of ethnically white women. Unfortunately, this frenzy did not remain abstract for long. Bovenkerk continued to analyze the phenomenon after producing his initial book and discovered that what was initially a moral frenzy turned into a true crime trend when “loverboys” began appearing in the media had actually become a legitimate societal issue as the result of “copy-cats” utilizing the techniques outlined by the media as a money-making scheme.\(^\text{15}\)

**Figure 5.2 Occurrence of Articles that Reference the term “Loverboy” in Dutch Media from 1995-2014**

![Graph showing the frequency of the term "Loverboy" in Dutch newspapers from 1995 to 2014.](image)

*Source: Articles from the NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant*

Interestingly, in 2012, the year that the term “loverboys” started falling out of fashion (see Figure 5.3, above), the terms “human trafficking” and “slavery” began getting massive media attention. The idea that the “loverboys” are traffickers at all is something that has been debated by scholars and policy-makers alike. Bovenkerk points out that any of the men who fit this profile are simply motivated by the fact that this is a legal form of income in the Netherlands and that there is nothing in the criminal code that bans profiting from sex work. Even coercive sex work, while illegal in the Netherlands, should be difficult to prosecute, because it is very difficult to prove

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16 Original analysis performed in Dutch using the terms “slaverij” and “mensenhandel” but terminology is translated to English for presentation.

17 Original analysis performed in Dutch using the terms “slaverij” and “mensenhandel” but terminology is translated to English for presentation.
coercion.\textsuperscript{18} It appears that only way the government is even capable of prosecuting these men is to reclassify pimping it as “human trafficking.” This term is instantly taken very seriously, particularly in a state like the Netherlands, which values its status as a country that promotes women’s rights, human rights, and equality and has a tradition of “secular exceptionalism”.\textsuperscript{19}

Furthermore, by framing this issue as “trafficking”, the government is able to crack down on pimping without making profiting from sex work illegal. The challenge of prosecuting pimps when pimping is legal is clear: if the only laws that prohibit pimping rely on proving that a woman was coerced into sex work, one must define coercion, an incredibly fluid term. Some of the “loverboy” cases are more easily determined because the sex worker is underage, but in the event that the “victim” is of age, it is very difficult to prove that they were coerced in the absence of physical force.\textsuperscript{20} Labelling these cases as trafficking cases also allows the state to increase their levels of prosecution, giving them a reputation for being hard on trafficking in the international community, as explained earlier in this chapter. The national government released a report in 2014 demanding that people stop calling coercive boyfriend/pimps “loverboys”, claiming that “the term is a misnomer, for in fact “loverboys” are human traffickers. Now’s the time to call “loverboys” by their proper name and treat their prey as victims of human

\textsuperscript{18} Bovenkerk, “Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic.”

\textsuperscript{19} Bracke, “Subjects of debate: secular and sexual exceptionalism, and Muslim women in the Netherlands.”

\textsuperscript{20} Bovenkerk, “Loverboys in the Amsterdam Red Light District: A realist approach to the study of a moral panic.”
There, has, in fact, been a significant increase in the prosecution of domestic traffickers—and these prosecution rates seem to disproportionately target non-western Muslim men.

RACIALIZED DISCOURSE

The “loverboy” narrative is popular enough that it is recognizable to members of all areas of society. An amateur filmmaker went out into a Dutch town and asked people on the streets to describe what a “loverboy” was and from young girls to old men, everyone had an idea of what this archetype was: a young man who seduces a young woman, buys her presents, and convinces her to become a sex worker. Yet the phenomenon itself is not particularly common: compared to the amount of foreign sex workers who are regularly exploited in the Netherlands, the amount of women who trafficked by “loverboys” is presumed to be fairly small. Why, then, is the media so obsessed with this issue?

According to Doezema, moral frenzies are often tinged with racial undertones and can become most popular when they follow a familiar discourse that the public can be sympathetic to: specifically, the discourse of brown men violating white women. It is all


the better if the discourse is sexualized, which adds to the “sex appeal” of the issue. As Rao and Enloe explain, these discourses are often popular because a woman’s body can be identified as a symbol of the nation, the violation of which is particularly offensive. Mahdavi suggests that, specifically in the case of post-9/11 trafficking discussions, trafficking discourses have become overtly racialized, which may have allowed for the growth of Islamophobia outside of a context in which Islam is generally specifically mentioned. Movies like Taken, where the white main character fights to save a white woman from being trafficked by brown men, characterized the national image of trafficking, while reinforcing a narrative in which a symbol of the white mainstream is violated by the brown perpetrator.

Thus, the relevance of this sex trafficking media phenomenon to this thesis relates to the ethnic tones that run through the national narrative of the “loverboys”. “Loverboys” are explicitly defined by a Dutch anti-trafficking NGO as “a boy or man, often of foreign descent.” Although there is an acknowledgement that white men can also be involved in the coercion of women into sex work, it is the brown man who has taken center-stage in this narrative. Perhaps the clearest example of the racialization of sex narratives in the Netherlands derives from film and television media, which are able to transmit a racialized image without explicitly stating a racial connection. In almost all

24 Doezema, “Loose women or lost women? The re-emergence of the myth of white slavery in contemporary discourses of trafficking in women.”
26 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem, 18-19.
films where “loverboys” are the focal point and all news programs that explore this topic (particularly those that provide re-enactments), the “loverboy” is portrayed by a darker man, while the “victim” is a white girl—generally blonde and blue-eyed as well.

One of the most viewed movies about the phenomenon is the 2003 film Loverboy, which is commonly used in Dutch middle schools as an educational film about the dangers of sex trafficking. In the film, the main character/victim, Denise, is conspicuously the only blonde-haired, light-eyed girl in her friend group, making her the only stereotypically-Dutch-looking primary character in the film, with the exclusion of her family members. All the other characters that she encounters, including the main villain, Michael (the “loverboy”), are dark-skinned, dark-haired, and dark-eyed. Michael convinces her to work as a prostitute and her first client is a dark-skinned men wearing stereotypical Middle-Eastern garb and the work is performed in an apartment with Middle-Eastern décor. As she services him, typical Middle-Eastern music plays in the background. All this works together in order to create the strong illusion that these men are Muslim, which is all but confirmed when Denise apologizes for not being able to speak Arabic. Though she does have three white clients, the villainy seems to fall almost entirely on Michael, and Denise is only rescued by returning home to her blonde mother.28 Similarly, Mijn Loverboy, a documentary film about the victims of “loverboys”, begins with “Sara” telling her story. Before we even see her entire face, the

camera zooms tight to her bright blue eyes, reminding us that she is, without a doubt, white.\textsuperscript{29}

There is, however, something that distinguishes these cases from general criticism of Islam on the basis of gender and sexuality-related issues. Although it may at first seem strange, the articles about these deeply racialized loverboys cases seem to avoid mentioning the race, origin, or religion of the perpetrator. Figure 5.x illustrates the fact that despite the fact that “Islam” and “loverboys” are oft mentioned terms in the media (see Figure 4.c and 5.v) there was only a very brief window in which Islam and “loverboys” were mentioned concurrently with any sort of frequency. In fact, the articles about the “loverboys” seem to avoid discussing Islam, foreigners, migration, or any other terminology that would directly lead to these cases being seen as a racial issue. In some informational pieces and in early media explanations of the narrative, the specifically foreign nature of the “loverboys” was mentioned. Now, the print media does not frequently form explicit links between the “loverboys” and Islam and the national narrative seems to silently accept the racial nature of this crime.

Occasionally, the race of the perpetrator will be mentioned. For example, in the story of “Barbara”, an extended narrative used to support the idea that sex trafficking runs rampant in the Netherlands, it is purposefully stated that Barbera is Dutch (with “big friendly eyes” that portray the idea of innocence) and that her “loverboy” was Moroccan, but these facts are, as they usually are, presented without comment. Instead, the story focuses on the injustice of the Dutch system of prosecuting these “loverboys” when they

violate an ideal “victim” like Barbera: white, deprived of her money, and physically assaulted. In this case, there was very little the police could do and this is used to criticize Dutch policy for being too “soft” on “human trafficking.”

Other times, race is not even mentioned at all. In fact, the articles frequently use racial markers, such as their name. The “traffickers” are often mentioned in the news by initials only, but “Choukri” and “Abdes” (traditionally Arabic names) are mentioned explicitly by name. Even the speech patterns of the perpetrator can betray a racialized narrative – in Echte Mannen Eten Geen Kaas, before we even learn Manou’s (decidedly non-western sounding) name, we learn that he speaks with a thick foreign accent. Furthermore, the prevalence of film narratives where race can be presented through a casting choice, rather than through the mention of the character’s race, allows the filmmaker to subtly portray a racial narrative without explicitly stating that one character is foreign.


32 Mosterd, Echte Mannen Eten Geen Kaas, 8.
RESULTS AND REALITY

Trafficking Policies: Helping and Protecting Women?

Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, the Netherlands had decided to make a novel decision: they lifted the ban on brothels that had previously limited the permissibility of prostitution and essentially legalized sex work throughout the country. It initially appeared that there had been tentative success regarding the feminist goals of the Dutch government following the lift of the brothel ban. The efforts were heralded as a positive step for women’s rights and for the safety of sex workers and a step forward in the “sexual exceptionalism” of the Netherlands. This would all change shortly after the amendment was passed at the start of the new millennium.

Thus, the international pressure meant that despite the lack of concrete evidence suggesting that the lifting of the brothel ban was linked to rising rates of human trafficking, in 2007, less than a decade after sex work was legalized, the Amsterdam city council launched Plan 1012, which aims to “clean up” the Red Light District through a reduction of the amount of window prostitution. Proponents argue that the women working in the Red Light District are often put in dangerous situations and are frequently the “victims” of human trafficking. Other laws were proposed and passed as well. In order to curtail the “trafficking” of schoolgirls by “loverboys”, several policymakers proposed raising the age of consent for sex work from 18 to 21, a law which was passed

33 I use “window prostitution” in deference to standard terminology. Please see Chapter One for an explanation of the history and meaning of the term “prostitution”

in 2008. Public schools began teaching students how to “protect” themselves from being “trafficked” by a “loverboy”, which, in itself, exposes some problematic issues with victim-blaming in Dutch society. Finally, as addressed earlier and in Chapter Four, rising interest in human trafficking prevention, which has been supported by this media frenzy, has had a large impact on the lives of migrants who have been deemed “trafficked” by the government and are repatriated (potentially against their wills).

In my conversation with a former sex worker in the Netherlands, she expressed her extreme distaste for the new plan, which she claims is a policy to limit the freedom and safety of sex workers under the guise of “cleaning up the city” and “reducing trafficking.” Deinema and Aalbers also argue that shutting down window prostitution will most likely push prostitution into less secure locations and worsen their working conditions. Deinema and Aalbers question this policy decision, which they claim seems paradoxical when the Red Light District was once heralded a site of “free choice in labor” and claim that, it too, can be attributed to the shift in the international opinion on sex work and heightened efforts to curtail sex trafficking.

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37 This individual has asked to remain anonymous

38 Michael Deinema and Manuel B. Aalbers, “A Global Red-Light City? Prostitution in Amsterdam as a Real and Imagined Place,” 284

International trafficking is viewed as an issue by many human rights activists in the Netherlands and is known to be linked to the immigration issue; women who come to the Netherlands to marry a spouse are sometimes seen as the victims of “marriage migration” trafficking or other forms of sex trafficking and are deported for the own safety. This concept is explored in Chapter Two during my explanation of Danna’s belief that human trafficking laws are often manipulated by the government in order to allow the government to deport sex workers against their will and to curb immigration rates under the guise of promoting human rights and fighting human trafficking. This paternalistic and disingenuous practice may very well be practiced in the Netherlands and may discourage immigrant women from coming forward if they are facing exploitative labor practices in the sex industry, because they may fear deportation, suggesting that laws that are formed to protect sex workers and women may actually harm them.

Furthermore, the fluid and amorphous definition of “human trafficking” mean that those women who have been categorized as victims may not actually feel that they are victims or may not qualify as victims. Bovenkerk suggests that many of the women who claim to have been victimized by “loverboys” are not as innocent as they seem but have constructed themselves as victims in order to gain reparations and attention. Under a stricter definition of human trafficking, emotional coercion may not qualify someone to be the victim of trafficking. Additionally, those women who are actually being harmed but do not fit into the model of trafficking that has become popular may find that they do

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not get the same respect and protection from the legal system. People who are not perfect victims and fight to overcome their circumstances tend to be overlooked. Kathleen Barry explains that there is a tendency to force women to portray themselves as victims, rather than survivors, in order for them to garner the public support.\footnote{Kathleen Barry, \textit{Female Sexual Slavery}, Reprint edition (New York, New York: NYU Press, 1984).} It seems that media frenzies attach onto issues where they think they can find a sympathetic victim and warp them into a good story. Those women who are not “symbols” of the nation—\textit{allochtonen}—find that their stories are not as well-listened-to or respected and, judging from the narratives that are portrayed in the media, cannot get the same public attention as ethnically Dutch women.\footnote{Gregory, \textit{The Everyday Lives of Sex Workers in the Netherlands}, 19.}

Thus, it appears that the increase in sex trafficking legislation that has been born from the moral frenzy around the “loverboys” actually serves primarily to worsen the lives of women and sex workers. The “defense” of women and human rights that the anti-trafficking tries to achieve may not be a realistic goal when these tactics are being used.

\textbf{Criminalizing Brown Men}

There is an undeniable racialized aspect to the role these young men have taken on in this narrative that has been projected on them. Most of their clients are white and Bovenkerk claims that the “loverboys” take pleasure in taking from the class that is oppressing them, a way of conceptualizing pimping that was initially introduced by a scholar studying the culture of African American pimping in the U.S. who get “revenge”
on white people by taking their money and profiting off of white women, betraying a new

The conscious decision to follow this narrative may be linked to the fact that
Muslim men already have this narrative and stereotype forced upon them. Young
Moroccan men are significantly more likely than any other group to be suspected of
criminal behavior.\footnote{Gijsberts and Dagevos, \textit{At Home in the Netherlands: Trends in Integration of Non-Western Migrants}} According to Kamans, et al., many members of the Moroccan population legitimize their own criminality, extremism, and aggression, because they feel that the ethnic Dutch population has been attempting to marginalize them into these behaviors and that they are only doing what is expected of them.\footnote{Elanor Kamans et al., “What I Think You See Is What You Get: Influence of Prejudice on Assimilation to Negative Meta-Stereotypes among Dutch Moroccan Teenagers,” \textit{European Journal of Social Psychology} 39, no. 5 (August 1, 2009): 842–51.} A young Muslim man who does not identify as a “loverboy” was interviewed and claims he can understand why someone would fall way to criminal behavior under the circumstances that they live in: “you must be very strong \textit{not} to get into problems...because it’s easier than the life that many people live here.”\footnote{Rooke, \textit{Witness Loverboys}.}

When a young man does get involved with this industry, there can be dire
consequences. According to Terpstra, there are multiple Muslim men who are serving jail
time for profiting off of consenting, ethnically Dutch sex workers and some of them
clearly confess that they did what they were accused of; however, many of them do not
view their actions as illegal, because they are pimps—and pimpping is legal in the Netherlands. Although now there is more light being shed on the white perpetrators of this supposed “crime,” the reasoning for prosecuting men for romantically coercing people into sex work seems to come from a media frenzy about a faux-issue, suggesting that the racially motivated construction of a trafficking narrative has served to negatively impact the men who have initially been constructed as the perpetrators. Ibrahim, a Dutch social worker involved with the “loverboys” crisis, says that even though he judges those men who profit from sex work and is working to make it more difficult for “loverboys” to legally operate, he understand that the “loverboys” are victims too. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, he says, “they have a criminal record and it’s hard for them to get money. It’s not only sad for the victims, but it is sad for the young men who don’t have a clear future here.”

When a young man is prosecuted under trafficking laws, it can ruin their lives, despite the fact that there is not a strong case for this form of pimpping to be found illegal under current Dutch law, yet the witch hunt continues. Today, the Netherlands is calling for increased prosecution of traffickers and certain people are even calling for specific increases in the prosecution of “loverboys.” The construction of these boys as criminals


48 Rooke, Witness Loverboys

has become a self-fulfilling prophecy and now, the Muslim community is paying the price.

EXPLOITING THE DISCOURSE: APPLYING THE “TRAFFICKING AND TERROR” FRAMEWORK AND BUILDING A NEW MODEL

As suggested in Chapter Four, there is a paternalistic discourse related to Islamic and other non-western immigrants, in that the Dutch government feels that it is its duty to protect the bodies of traditionally feminized people from the “intolerance” and “discrimination” of Islam (specifically: women and homosexual men). The celebration of women’s rights and the emphasis on the importance of championing gender equality over religious tolerance seem to be characteristic of the discourse promoting Islamophobia. Thus, there may be a link between this rising intolerance of Islam, not just immigration, in creating anti-trafficking feminist rhetoric. Mahdavi argues that this is the case in the United States, the home of the TIP Report, and it is very possible that the close relationship that the Netherlands shares with the U.S. may have led to the rise of this rhetoric in the U.S.

This Islamophobic discourse is mirrored by the paternalistic discourse on human trafficking in which the government tries to protect the bodies of women from the danger of men; in particular, brown men. Where once, the gold standard in Dutch feminism was to permit women with an interest in sex work to exercise self-agency and work safely and legally, the rise of anti-trafficking sentiment is now the ideal way to promote feminism in
the international community. The “loverboys” discourse combines this discourse with the Islamophobic discourse and produces a situation in which both human trafficking and Islamophobia become more potent issues in the media. This is not a novel phenomenon as a similar situation arose in the United States with regards to how their Islamophobic discourse combines with their trafficking narratives to promote the further exposure of both ideas, but the differences in the two policies essentially lie in the different outcomes they produce.

The racialized trafficking narratives presented by Mahdavi, like those that have been proven to exist in the Netherlands, are utilized to reflect and reinforce growing Islamophobia, but the application of Islamophobia in the United States is to an external threat. In the United States, the white woman is still a symbol of the nation, but the brown man who violates her does not belong to the American community; instead, he is a Middle Eastern man, the Terrorist, who operates as a far-off threat to security and safety. Thus, the narrative turns towards international trafficking, emphasizing far-fetched tales of white women being kidnapped and sold into white slavery by brown men. Thus, the government and media in the U.S. focus on two international threats: terrorism and international trafficking.

As impactful and important as these issues for the Dutch government and society, the media (and even the government’s) attention to trafficking seems to instead be going

50 Kim and Chang, “Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s).”

51 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem.

52 Mahdavi, From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem, 41.
to domestic trafficking. The first page of the 2011 *Report of the Dutch Rapporteur*, a report produced on human trafficking in the Netherlands to discuss the initiatives and issues that have been judged most important, is devoted to women who are trafficked within the Netherlands and on coercive sex work, rather than on international movement of persons.\(^{53}\) While terrorism and international warfare are important issues for the Dutch, who are militarily involved in the Middle East, most Dutch people view immigration and integration as major threats to their daily lives. It seems that, in the Netherlands, the “other” and the “brown man” are not violent, abstract threats, the way that they are in the United States. Instead, the Dutch focus their attention on the more threat of Islamic immigrants and also focus their attention on the far-fetched story of women being coerced into sex work by their boyfriends who give them presents, thus constructing a system in which the nexus of trafficking and Islamophobia rest on two *domestic* issues. It thus appears that Mahdavi’s model falls short of explaining the Dutch case because it views “anti-terrorism” as the result of Islamophobia. While this is fully accurate in the United States, in the Netherlands, Islamophobia results in anti-immigration and pro-integration policies.

I utilize my findings to propose a new framework for understanding the intersection of sex work narratives and Islamophobic discourse, wherein the salient issue for the state is represented in the trafficking narrative and this narrative is used to support Islamophobic policies that impact that salient issue. The trafficking narrative casts a (usually white) woman who is symbolic of the nation as the victim and an Islamic man

who is symbolic of the threatening issue, be it terror, immigration, or something else. The moral outrage that Doezema suggests is generated by white slavery narratives helps develop media interest in the story, while the Huntington-esque belief that Islam is a monolithic culture allows this negative view of Islam to generate Islamophobia. Finally, this Islamophobia is targeted in the sense that a specific archetype of Islamic man is vilified and thus that man is attacked during calls for policy change, be it against the Islamic terrorist or the Islamic immigrant.

**CONCLUSION**

The link between the war on terror and rising Islamophobia with the creation of the TIP report and the increase in anti-trafficking legislation has been clearly established, as has the utilization of anti-trafficking laws to limit immigration from Islamic countries in Western Europe; however, the studies that have established these links have focused primarily on international trafficking, rather than domestic trafficking, which is a deeply salient issue in the Netherlands. From this research, it is possible to show that this model may apply to domestic trafficking as well. It appears that there is a positive correlation between the frequency with which the Dutch media focuses on Islam and the frequency with which the media focuses on sex work. Furthermore, the majority of newspaper articles, film, and books that deal with human trafficking in the Netherlands since 2001 utilize a sort of racialized narrative of sex trafficking that may represent a criticism on Islam on the basis of feminism, without forcing those who relay this narrative to engage in outright intolerance.
The dominance of such narratives in the media is affiliated with a rise in sex trafficking concern, regulation, and legislation, suggesting a relationship between Islamophobia and the enforcement of human trafficking laws. Furthermore, the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Islam by these media discourses may have some effect on the continuation of Islamophobia in Dutch society, suggesting that human trafficking narratives may impact policies that are directly influenced by discriminatory attitudes towards a migrant group. Pardis Mahdavi claims that in the United States, human trafficking discourses are utilized to reinforce Islamophobia which is, in turn, utilize to garner support for anti-terrorism measures. It appears that, in the Netherlands, discriminatory attitudes towards Islam are affiliated with anti-immigration and pro-integration measures, as are mentioned in Chapter Four, differentiating it from the internationally-focused narrative of the United States. I conclude this chapter by developing a framework for understanding the similarity in the cases that can potentially be applied in other cases as well.

Thus, where in the United States the “trafficking and terror” narrative is used to demonstrate the aggressive violation of a white woman by a brown man abroad, in the Netherlands, the white female body represents the Dutch nation and the violation of that woman occurs in a deeply personal and domestic context within the “loverboy” narrative. This woman is seduced, coerced, and used by a brown man who does not have respect for her body and her personhood, who forces her to turn away from her family and her values, and who subtly controls her. This less aggressive narrative betrays a deep fear in the minds of the collective Dutch public: that their nation will be slowly and subtly coerced into becoming Islamic and into losing the values that they hold dear. They cling
to their values and enact intolerance of any intolerance of their ideals and rescue their
women, saving the nation-symbol from corruption and seduction, fearing that they cannot
save the nation itself.
CHAPTER SIX
CONFLICT OR COEXISTENCE: ISLAMOPHOBIA IN CONTEXT

Islam’s borders are bloody and so are its innards. The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.

—Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*

This study explains the implications of a broad intersection of theory on a specific case in order to answer a question: can the relationship between discourses on Islam and discourses on human trafficking be used to explain the rising intolerance of Islam in the Netherlands? Utilizing Pardis Mahdavi’s study of Islamophobia in the United States, in which she claims that racialized trafficking discourses have led to increased Islamophobia and growing support for anti-terrorism, I discover a connection between increasingly racialized domestic trafficking discourses and rising support for anti-immigration measures in the Netherlands in the media. Yet this support for anti-immigration seems at odd with the history of the Netherlands as a traditionally tolerant state, and this study thus explores the context in which this trafficking discourse arises in the larger media discourse of the Netherlands around Islam. I find that the use of Huntington’s conception of the “clash of civilization” seems to be a popular way of

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conceptualizing Islam in Dutch media. The equality of women is seen as the emblematic value of Dutch society that is at odds with Islamic beliefs, thus causing sexualized narratives, such as trafficking narratives, to become important in establishing Islam as a “culture” that is incompatible with western values.

There are thus three major findings of this thesis. Firstly, this thesis establishes that there is a perceived “clash of civilizations” between Islamic and Dutch “culture” on the basis of different values regarding the rights of women and homosexuals. Secondly, my findings about the Dutch application of the “trafficking and terror” framework indicate that the immigrant is portrayed as a dangerous force capable of seducing and violating a woman who is symbolic of the nation, encouraging Islamophobic attitudes targeted towards the immigrant. I use these findings to develop a model of “trafficking and terror” that can be used in future research on states struggling with Islamic immigration, particularly in the EU. Thirdly, this thesis finds that it is September 11th which was a turning point in all of these narratives and that the fear of radical Islam after this event may be to blame for the creation of these gendered media narratives to justify intolerance of an entire group of people in a tolerant state. I conclude this chapter by introducing the broader implications of this thesis for international policy and politics in the post-9/11 world and contextualize my findings within the global issues of radical Islamic terror, immigration crises, and human trafficking.

GENDER AND THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATION”

My research shows that although there has in fact been an upturn in positive articles regarding Islam and more articles published in defense of Islam over the past few
years, there is one subject that remains heavily negative: Islamic treatment of women and homosexuals. Furthermore, a substantial increase of articles that link Islam with misogyny and homophobia is seen after the attacks on the World Trade Center in the U.S. in 2001, suggesting that this event may be linked to a need to criticize Islam on the basis of what are perceived to be over-arching Islamic beliefs about gender and sexuality.

My study reveals that there is, in some ways, a “free-pass” for racism in the name of defending women’s rights in the Netherlands. The proportion of articles that discuss Islam in relation to gender, sexuality, and feminism in 2014 in the *NRC Handelsblad* that are “positive” pales in comparison to those that are negative, even though the overall opinion about Islam in the newspaper in recent years has been tentatively positive. These articles generally mention the implicit misogyny of Islam, the lack of tolerance of homosexuality in Islam, and the “sex-negative” attitudes of Muslims. I explain that this is characteristic of the years leading up to 2014, because, since the rise of the gay and Islamophobic politician Pim Fortuyn in the early 2000s, homosexuality and feminism have been portrayed as fundamentally at odds with Islamic belief by many writers in the Dutch media.

I argue that the importance of this justification may be linked to the arguments of Rao and Enloe, who both suggest that women are symbols of society and that the violation of a woman’s rights is linked to the violation of a nation, thus making women a prime battleground for the host society to fight against a new population with different values. Furthermore, Bracke’s argument that there is an attitude of “sexual exceptionalism” in the Netherlands in which national identity is built on a sense of pride with regards to how liberal their attitudes towards sexuality are, can be applied to this
A MODEL OF TRAFFICKING AND TERROR BEYOND THE U.S.

Chapter Five explores the issue of the “loverboys,” a national trafficking narrative about immigrant men who traffic ethnically Dutch women and seduce them into becoming sex workers. Despite the fact that I give evidence that suggests that this is not the most prevalent form of forced sex work in the Netherlands and that it is difficult to even define it as illegal under the current laws on sex work in the Netherlands, this narrative is one of the most popular and prevalent ones in Dutch media. Thus, the Netherlands’ sex trafficking discourses are about domestic trafficking and target members of immigrant communities as perpetrators, likely due to the emphasis on the
incompatibility of Islamic “values” with Dutch ones in the context of gender and sexuality.

I suggest that these findings indicate the need for a larger framework for understanding the impact of the media on public opinion and government policy with regards to immigration and human trafficking. Mahdavi has already proven that sex trafficking is heavily linked to Islam in the United States, and it is her framework that guided the ideas developed in this thesis. Yet in order to apply her “trafficking and terror” model in the Netherlands, it is mandatory to explain why the Dutch trafficking narratives focused on domestic trafficking and the U.S. trafficking narratives focused on international trafficking, as well as why anti-immigration—rather than anti-terror—fervor was correlated with a rise in these racialized trafficking narratives. I found that although the Netherlands does have a stake in anti-terrorism policies, it is not a primary concern for many citizens, whereas immigration is. In the United States, the opposite is true. It seems that the more salient issue for each population, be it terrorism or immigration, is then impacted by Islamophobic narratives to increase fear of and retaliation against these presumed problems.

Thus I present a framework that shows that that in states where race is representative of a salient issue, such as terror in the U.S. and immigration in the Netherlands, these racialized discourses may be applied to a sexualized issue that is likely to create a media frenzy (such as white slavery) and this will cause negative attitudes to rise without causing the discomfort of racism; fear of discriminating becomes an less salient factor when these discourses are utilized in a feminist context, because the defense of feminism produces pride in criticism of a different culture. The rise in Islamophobia
that results can in turn lead to significant policy changes, but the types of policy that are affected by the racial issue that is important to the state. Furthermore, in order to reflect this racial issue, the perpetrator in both the “racial policy issue” and the trafficking narrative must be the same. In the U.S., it is the abstract “terrorist” in the Middle East, whereas in the Netherlands, it is Moroccan or Turkish immigrant. I suggest that further research explore how this framework can be applied in other countries: for example, how would this framework play out in a state where the racial issue is not related to Islam? Is this framework applicable in cases besides the Netherlands and the U.S.?

The utilization of this framework, in which Islamophobia is able to impact the opinions of a government and a populace with regard to policy through its infusion into racialized sex trafficking narratives that paint brown men as perpetrators, can be applied beyond these cases. Further research should certainly explore the different societal and policy issues that can be impacted by racialized trafficking narratives.

THE TRANSFORMATIVE NATURE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON TOLERANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS

This study proves that media has an impact on policy by demonstrating the correlation between rising concerns over Islam in the Dutch media and rising electoral support for anti-immigration parties. For example, in the Netherlands, as the amount of articles regarding Islam or immigration in the newspaper rose, so too did the amount of people who believed that these themes were major problems for Dutch society and the fluctuations of the percentage of the vote that went to anti-immigration parties fluctuated alongside these mentions of Islam and immigration. It proves specifically that the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, was a turning point in the
way that Islam was conceived of in the Netherlands, because it was after this that Islam
became a significant topic in the Dutch media.

The Netherlands has had one of the strongest legacies of tolerance of religion and
immigration in the western world, acting as a safe haven for those escaping persecution
and celebrating multiculturalism for centuries. Today, however, “integration” has become
the policy of the day, as it is in so many other European states. The Netherlands has
raised requirements for citizenship, is considering restricting the granting of asylum for
many migrants, and has increased policies targeted towards “integrating” citizens into
Dutch society, rather than allowing newcomers to retain their beliefs and culture. This
study shows that a focus on integration predicates itself on media focus on the differences
and problems between “Dutch culture” and “Islamic culture”. This idea of the “clash of
civilizations,” as popularized by Samuel Huntington, fails to allow for multiculturalism
and essentially leads to the elimination of Muslims from society, which Said argues could
have dire results. I find that Dutch narratives about the “Muslim problem” rely on the
idea that Islamic beliefs are incompatible with those of western or Dutch ones, suggesting
that Samuel Huntington’s narrative has been adapted.

My research links the rising interest in the difference between Islamic values and
western ones to climbing Islamophobia in the post-9/11 age. I find that media usage of
terms such as “Islam,” “immigrant,” and “integration,” dramatically increases after 2001
and that this rise in concern over Islam is correlated with the rise of anti-immigration
sentiment and anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands. I posit that global
Islamophobic narratives and fear of Islamic radicalism may be the cause of this increased
concern about Islamic migrant communities. By creating the type of monolithic Islamic
“culture” that Said claims is produced by “clash of civilization” discourses and which appears to be present in most arguments seen in Dutch media, it becomes easy to apply fear of Islamic radicals to fear of all Muslims and to call for the removal of Muslims from society.

Researchers have labelled the type of restricted access to society for Muslims that results from Islamophobia as “exclusionism”, an issue that affects many migrant communities upon their formation in western countries. The policy implications of this exclusion are fairly severe: Fennema claims that exclusionism has visible effects in modern Europe because it can frequently result in the rise of anti-immigrant parties, particularly in the post-9/11 world, and may eventually lead to a religious civil war, because Islamic groups in particular are the ones who are being excluded. Aileen Tom agrees, arguing that anti-immigration policies make Islamic immigrants feel excluded by society and promote the criminalization of Islamic migrants. As a result of this exclusion, many members of immigrant communities feel marginalized and angry with the state in which they live, leading to the development of fundamentalist Islamic groups. These extremist beliefs actually form a security threat for the state.

This research shows that it is possible that exclusionism, which can result from the exclusion or vilification of an ethnic group, as is the case with Muslims in the

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Netherlands, can lead to the development of extremist political parties, both anti-immigrant and anti-Western. In the Netherlands, the rise of the LPF and the PVV, anti-immigrant populist parties that gained traction after 9/11, are a clear example of such extremism, as is the severe backlash against Islamophobia by radical Islamists, such as the man who assassinated Theo Van Gogh for his Islamophobic film.

Examining the way that tolerance has evolved and taken form in the Netherlands may serve as a way to understand the impact of intolerance in other regions. The Netherlands is, by no means, the only country in the west that has struggled with Islamophobia and immigration concerns, and is actually still considerably more tolerant towards their foreign populations than other European countries. When determining whether to ban the headscarf, the Netherlands decided that it would be a violation of human rights to do so, but France decided that in the interest of protecting French culture, they had the right to forbid the expression of Islamic belief. In this vein, a French town also determined that it is appropriate to only serve pork in schools, to encourage “secularism”, as pork is not allowed in kosher and halal diets.

Thus, the lessons learned from the Dutch case should be considered in the context of other states and in particular those states that have more extreme tensions between the native population and Islamic migrant community, like France. As a historically tolerant state, intolerance in the Netherlands is so abnormal that it is important to carefully consider the events and narratives that are occurring there to limit intolerance elsewhere.

Intolerance may be linked with many social issues and seems to be leading to inappropriate criminalization and victimization of citizens and the Dutch case should thus be examined further to determine how to prevent this tolerance from deepening and what other unintended consequences it may be having.

**IMPLICATIONS: IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SEX TRAFFICKING**

The Dutch government has attempted to downplay the importance of the immigration issue and has released numerous reports suggesting that integration of the non-western immigrant groups is improving and that the growth of the migrant population is slowing. Dutch Prime Minister Rutte chose to focus on the economy instead during his time as prime minister, which was an apparently popular choice if the 2012 election results are any indication. Yet the public concern over immigration continues to build and people are growing more and more irritated about the government’s lack of willingness to treat the issue of immigration with significant concern. Anti-immigration sentiment is growing once more, which this research suggests is linked with Islamophobia, and further research should explore the impact of anti-immigration policies on human rights to demonstrate the severe consequences of Islamophobia on the human rights of those seeking asylum.

Additionally, this study suggests that human trafficking policy seems to be targeted more at prosecuting potentially innocent men and victimizing specific women over others, while also serving to reinforce immigration policies that restrict human rights and discourage women who are being exploited to report criminal activity because they fear deportation under anti-trafficking regimes. Further research should look into the
impact of anti-trafficking legislation and anti-immigrant legislation for women who do feel that they have been trafficked in the Netherlands but who do not fit into a racialized domestic trafficking narrative as an ideal victim.

Furthermore, this study has significant implications for integration policies. As explained above, Fennema proves that exclusionism and intolerance of immigrant communities can potentially lead to the rise of radical actions and this study has shown a clear example of how placing a perpetrator narrative on an identity can lead to that narrative becoming a reality. This study shows that criminalizing Moroccan men could have dire consequences for the safety of the Dutch community and suggests that in excluding and villainizing Muslim men, the media and the Dutch society actually produce classes of criminals that did not previously exist. Further research should examine what policy measures would be more appropriate for dealing with the perceived issue of integration in the Netherlands and in other states that are struggling with conflicts between native and migrant populations and if this should be treated as an “issue” at all. Said suggests that in treating entire populations like a “culture” that is in direct conflict with a mainstream “culture”, we only serve to deepen the divides between ethnic groups and this study suggests it may be more advantageous for governments to abandon integration policies if they want to reduce racial tension.

LOOKING FORWARD FOR THE LOVERBOYS: THE FUTURE OF ISLAM, SEX TRAFFICKING, AND IMMIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY

The position of the “loverboys” case as one that reveals the racial tensions implicit in the issues of human trafficking and migration in a traditionally “tolerant” state
indicates that it is a rich source of information and should be a continued topic of research. Recent government discourses have emphasized that it is not “just” *allochtonen*, or “foreigners” who traffic, in an attempt to prove that this is not a racialized issue. The narrative continues to feature brown men in the perpetrator role, but if the government was able to change this narrative, it is possible that there would be a new framing of this issue, outside of a racialized context. Until then, however, there is little chance that the witch hunt against the incomprehensible and problematic “crisis” of human trafficking will die down and the fact that these men are so much easier to apprehend and prosecute than leaders of international criminal organizations indicates that the Netherlands will continue to use their arrests to demonstrate their commitment to anti-trafficking to the rest of the world.

This study finds that trafficking discourses are exploited in order to justify exclusion by constructing an issue that has importance to women’s rights, where the person to be excluded and prevented from participating in a global society is someone who is guilty of violating a female body that represents those values that the society is trying to uphold. The “loverboys” are a symbol of this concept. They suggest that in a post-9/11 western society, a woman’s body is the battleground for fighting against a culture that threatens a nation, that a brown body is something to be fought.

The universality of this isolated media narrative in a small country is surprising: wrongful imprisonment based on race is a phenomenon that has salience world-wide, as is the racialized prosecution and protection of those involved with sex work or the unwillingness of a western state to openly accept the different perspectives of a new immigrant group. Thus, the implications of the findings of this study of the “loverboy”
phenomenon are far-reaching, because they do not merely apply to Islamophobia or to Dutch immigration attitudes or to European sex trafficking policies. The pressing global issue of Islamic fundamentalism is not closely explored by this thesis, but the fear that it produces is. Throughout the western world, communities and governments are struggling with the issue of tolerance in multicultural communities. Fear of Islam is climbing and western citizens continue to fear the threat of extremist Islamic groups, like ISIS and Boko Haram. My study indicates that this fear produces the exclusion of migrant communities and the vilification of those members of the community to point that they end up playing out that narrative, because, if the “loverboys” are any indication, trafficking narratives and racialized narratives serve only to lead to the production of the villains that they portray.

Fear of Islam is thus unproductive and potentially dangerous, yet it seems to be an unavoidable aspect of life in the post-9/11 Western world. Miller argues that when we reach the end of tolerance we find indignation, but I believe we find fear (and it is, perhaps, that fear that leads us to intolerance in the first place): fear of violence, fear of the unknown, and fear that we may lose our way of life. In the Netherlands, this fear is deeply tied to the loss of national pride about the treatment of women and the liberal acceptance of homosexuality. When Islam is conceived of as a monolithic threat to Dutch culture, it seems logical that this could be perceived as an irreconcilable difference that will only be solved by deporting Muslims or forcing them to integrate into Dutch culture. This is not a productive solution and it is not yet clear what would be—further research should be aimed at determining this. Furthermore, although it appears that the continued decline of the anti-immigration parties in the Netherlands and rise of positive narratives
about Islam in Dutch media suggests that intolerance may finally be waning in the Netherlands, rising global tensions around Islam suggests that peaceful coexistence between the West and the Islamic immigrants who live in it may be a long way off.
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