

Eyeing Prestige, Eluding Risk:

Explaining European Union Security Missions and Operations



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Research Problem

- Why does international cooperation work under certain conditions?
- How can we better explain and understand cooperative behavior?
- Can these findings help create more efficient and effective organizations and inter-organizational cooperation?

TIME

Behind a United Front, NATO Meeting Deepens Cracks in the Alliance

By TRISTANA MOORE / BERLIN Saturday, Apr. 16, 2011

African Union split in Togo row

By Martin Plaut
BBC News

BBC
NEWS

are needed to see this picture.

LETTER FROM EUROPE

Libya Crisis Reveals Splits on E.U. Goals

By JUDY DEMPSEY

Published: April 18, 2011


Research Question

- Why do European Union member states cooperate in certain Common Security and Defense Policy missions and not others?






EU CIVILIAN MISSIONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS



Conventional Wisdom

- Unified EU foreign policy impossible
- Existing literature neglects cases of **absent** cooperation
- Why do we need to study cases of absent cooperation?
- Four theories explain the **presence** of cooperation: Liberalism, Constructivism, Realism, Institutionalism
- Now turn to analytical eclecticism:
 - An approach to selectively integrate elements of analysis from different theoretical paradigms

Figure 2.1 *The triad of major international relations paradigms*



My Argument

- States cooperate first to project organizational power
 - The EU exists in a unique institutional environment
 - Institutionalized goal of increased global actorhood
 - The EU seeks prestige and legitimacy, so is risk-averse
- This is not enough! A mission of high cooperation must also:
 - Respond to a human rights violation
 - Promote the rule of law
 - Respond to a regional security threat



Research Design

- Mixed method:
 - Large- N and case study analysis
 - Quantitative and qualitative
- Procedure:
 1. Calculate and classify missions by level of cooperation
 2. Formulate and test a diverse range of theoretical hypotheses explaining divergence in cooperation level
 3. Using a coding system, identify the strong presence, presence, or absence of these variables
 4. Identify which variables and combinations of variables are influencing cooperation
 5. Explain *why* and *how* these variables explain cooperation (qualitative)



1. Calculate and classify the level of cooperation

| Cooperation Measure | Range of Cooperation | Justification |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Proportional number of member states cooperating | <p>Low cooperation: Under 33% of member states cooperate</p> <p>Medium cooperation: Between 34% to 66% of member states cooperate</p> <p>High cooperation: Greater than 66% of member states cooperate</p> | I chose these numbers according to my own relative judgment of mission participation. Because there are very few missions above 66%, I set this as the High level of cooperation and adjust correspondingly for the lower levels. |
| 2. Total number of troops/personnel deployed | <p>Low cooperation: Under 100 troops/personnel</p> <p>Medium cooperation: Between 101 and 999 troops/personnel</p> <p>High cooperation: Greater than 1,000 troops/personnel</p> | I first identify the range of total deployment to establish a frame of reference. The range of total deployment in EU missions is from 8 to 3,700 troops/personnel. Only a handful of missions have a total troop number of above 1,000, so I set this figure as the level denoting high cooperation. |
| 3. Proportional deployment among cooperating member states | As I only look to identify significantly disproportionate troop deployment, there is no change in cooperation calculation unless there is identified significant inequality, defined by a mission or operation in which one member state contributes over 33% of troops and personnel. Therefore, in these cases of inequality, I calculate this measure to be of Low cooperation and average this as a third measure along with the first two. | There is inherent inequality in member state deployment. France, Germany and the UK consistently have higher deployments because they have more resources and larger military forces. I determined a frame of reference of typical proportional troop commitment, and a single member contributing more than a third of the total is identified as a significant inequality in deployment. |
| Note on: Negative Cases | <p>Absent cooperation is defined as the non-existence of an official EU mission or operation under the CSDP. I classify two cases to be of absent cooperation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lebanon in 2006 2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2008 | Factual cases show which variables <i>explain</i> outcomes in cooperation, but the addition of counterfactual cases shows which variables <i>produce</i> outcomes. |

Sample classification of each mission by level of cooperation

| Mission | Date | Type | Number of States | Proportional Number of States | Total Number of Personnel | Participating States: "Permanent Operational Contribution" | Significantly Disproportionate Troop Deployment | Mission Goals, according to EU mission publications | Inter-organizational Cooperation | Cooperation |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--|---|---|--|--------------------------|
| EUFOR ALTHEA/ BIH | 2 Dec. 2004 to 21 Nov. 2010 | Mil. | 21 | 77.70% | 1,448 | Austria 304 Bulgaria 120 Cz. Rep. 2 Estonia 2 Finland 4 France 4 Germany 111 Greece 49 Hungary 166 Ireland 43 Ireland 193 Lithuania 1 Luxemburg 1 Netherlands 75 Poland 184 Portugal 51 Romania 64 Slovakia 40 Slovenia 29 UK 4 Sweden 1 | | <input type="checkbox"/> Provide safety and security <input type="checkbox"/> Deny conditions for a resumption of violence <input type="checkbox"/> Manage uphold of the Dayton Accords | | 3.0 High Cooperation |
| EULEX KOSOVO | Since 2008 | Civ. | 27 | 100% | 1490 | Austria 25 Belgium 21 Bulgaria 77 Cz. Rep. 29 Denmark 37 Estonia 8 Finland 75 France 188 Germany 118 Greece 38 Hungary 62 Ireland 18 Italy 182 Latvia 7 Lithuania 6 Luxembourg 1 Malta 2 Netherlands 36 Poland 138 Portugal 17 Romania 196 Slovakia 18 Spain 9 Sweden 85 UK 90 | | <input type="checkbox"/> Assist and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law <input type="checkbox"/> Mentor, monitor and advise with a limited number of executive powers | | 3.0 High Cooperation |
| EUNAVFOR Somalia | Since 2008 | Mil. | 19 | 70.40% | 1943 | Belgium 9 Bulgaria 1 Cyprus 2 Cz. Repub. 3 Finland 1 France 410 Germany 496 Greece 195 Hungary 1 Italy 233 Luxemburg 1 Malta 1 Romania 1 Netherlands 8 Spain 387 Sweden 130 Portugal 1 UK 61 | | <input type="checkbox"/> Protect international aid vessels <input type="checkbox"/> Help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery <input type="checkbox"/> Protect vulnerable shipping <input type="checkbox"/> Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia | Works to protect United Nations World Food Programme ships | 2.75 High Cooperation |

Abbreviations: Cz. Rep. = Czech Republic; Lux. = Luxembourg; Neth. = Netherlands; Rom. = Romania

Source: For ongoing missions, data for troop and personnel deployment is from the CSDP Mission Analysis Partnership hosted by ISIS Europe, CSDP Map: Mission Personnel.

For completed missions, data for troop and personnel deployment is from the European Union Institute for Security Studies *European Security and Defense Policy: The First Ten Years*.

Step 2: Hypothesis Testing

| Theory | Hypothesis | Measurement |
|---|---|--|
| Liberalism H1: Societal Pressure and Public Opinion | <i>If there is identifiable national or international societal pressure for action on a mission, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Present: Interest group publications and international media try to elevate support for a mission. 2. Strongly Present: If condition one is satisfied and scholarly journals (secondary sources) also cite strong societal demands for a mission. |
| Constructivism H2: Human Rights | <i>When a mission's parameters respond to a violation of international human rights, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Present: Human rights or responding to a violation of human rights is used by elites in speeches, minutes, newspaper articles, or editorials. 2. Strongly Present: If condition one is satisfied, and a human rights response is an explicit mission goal. |
| Constructivism H3: Normative Power Europe | <i>When the mission enforces the values supported by Normative Power Europe, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Present: The mission promotes accordance with international standards and NPE values in official mission mandates, speeches and minutes. 2. Strongly Present: Condition one is satisfied in accordance with European standards and NPE values. |
| Constructivism H4: Rule of Law Promotion | <i>When a mission protects or promotes rule of law, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Present: Rule of law promotion is identified as a justification in minutes or speeches 2. Strongly Present: If condition one is satisfied and Rule of law is an explicit mission goal or mandate. |
| Realism H5: Regional Security | <i>When European regional security is threatened, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Identified as present if the mission is on the European/ Eurasian continent 2. Identified as present if text: a. states that the mission provides for EU security or defense or b. uses the language of a threat If the variable satisfies one condition, the variable is present. The variable is strongly present if the mission satisfies both conditions. |
| Institutionalism H6: Inter-organizational Cooperation | <i>When a mission inter-organizational with other institutions, cooperation increases. (When a mission is not inter-organizational and is solely an EU mission, cooperation decreases.)</i> | 1. If there is any involvement during any stage of the mission with another international organization, the variable is present. 2. If the mission is a direct request from another international organization, the variable is strongly present. |
| Institutionalism H7: Organizational Power Projection | <i>When a mission is justified as a projection or expansion of EU organizational power, cooperation increases.</i> | 1. Present: If a mission is said to expand or project increased EU responsibility or capabilities in official EU documents or reports, speeches and meeting minutes, secondary sources (journals) 2. Strongly present: If the mission fulfills 2/3 types of missions projecting organizational power (after crisis, geographic expansion, or an EU First as elaborated in Chapter Four) |
| Analytical Eclecticism H8: Analytical Eclecticism | <i>When variables from multiple intellectual traditions are present, cooperation increases. (When independent variables from only one intellectual tradition are present, cooperation decreases.)</i> | 1. If independent variables are strongly present in three different theoretical traditions, analytical eclecticism is present. 2. If independent variables are strongly present in four different theoretical traditions, analytical eclecticism is strongly present. |

Steps 3 and 4: Identifying the factors influencing cooperation

| Mission | Regional Security Threat | Organizational Power Projection | Inter-Organizational Cooperation | Human Rights Violation | NPE | Rule of Law | Societal Pressure | Analytical Eclecticism | Dependent Variable: Cooperation |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|-----|-------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| EUMM Georgia | ++ | ++ | + | ++ | | ++ | ++ | ++ | High |
| EUNAVFOR Somalia | + | ++ | + | ++ | | ++ | ++ | ++ | High |
| ALTHEA/BiH | ++ | ++ | | | ++ | ++ | | + | High |
| EULEX KOSOVO | ++ | ++ | | | ++ | ++ | + | + | High |
| EUPM/BiH | ++ | ++ | + | + | ++ | ++ | + | + | High |
| EUFOR RD Congo | | + | ++ | | | ++ | + | | High |
| PROXIMA/ FYROM | ++ | + | + | | ++ | ++ | | | High |
| AMM | | ++ | + | + | | ++ | | | Medium |
| ARTEMIS/ DRC | | ++ | ++ | ++ | | + | + | | Medium |
| EUJUST THEMIS/Georgia | ++ | ++ | | | ++ | ++ | | + | Medium |
| CONCORDIA/ FYROM | ++ | + | + | | | | | | Medium |
| EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories | + | + | | | | + | | | Medium |
| EUPOL AFGHANISTAN | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | | Medium |
| Moldova and Ukraine Border Mission | ++ | | + | | ++ | ++ | | | Medium |
| EU Somalia Training Mission | + | | + | | | + | | | Medium |
| EUPAT | ++ | | | | + | ++ | | | Medium |
| EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) | | | ++ | ++ | | ++ | ++ | + | Medium |
| EUSEC RD Congo | | | + | + | + | + | | | Low |
| EU SSR Guinea-Bissau | | | | | | ++ | | | Low |
| EUPOL RD CONGO | | | + | + | | ++ | | | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | | | + | | | ++ | | | Low |
| EUJUST LEX/Iraq | + | + | | | | ++ | | | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | + | + | | + | | + | | | Low |
| EUFOR TCHAD/RCA | | | | ++ | | | ++ | | Low |
| Lebanon 2006 | ++ | | + | ++ | | + | ++ | + | Negative |
| DRC 2008 | | | ++ | ++ | | + | ++ | | Negative |

Key: + = present, ++ = strongly present

Step 5: Qualitative Analysis

- **Case Study 1:** Explains *why* organizational power projection variable has most explanatory value
- **Case Study 2:** Explains *how* this variable, and other variables, produce cooperation in context and combination in a 2 by 2 case study:

| | Comparative Case 1 | Comparative Case 2 |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| High Cooperation | EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) | EU Naval Force in Somalia (EUNAVOR) |
| Absent Cooperation | Lebanon in 2006 | Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2008 |

Implications

Theoretical and Methodological Implications:

1. Broaden the applicability of organizational theories
2. Reconceptualize the purpose of power
 - Power for symbolic—not material—gain
3. Merits of mixed-method research

Policy Implications:

1. The EU must engage in organizational confidence building
2. EU-US relations
3. EU cooperation with other organizations



So what?

- Why do we need a more cooperative EU?
- Why do we need better inter-organizational cooperation?
- Why do we need more cooperative organizations?
- Bottom line: More cohesive and effective organizations can better respond to crisis and conflict worldwide



Final Thoughts: Divided We Stand

- International cooperation is not perfect
- We can learn more about organizations based on not **what** they do, but **why** they do it
- Javier Solana reflected, “The decisive factor is not what the EU does, but what we do together.”

