Transforming Refugees Into “Illegal Immigrants:”

Neoliberalism, Domestic Politics, and Syrian Refugee Employment in Jordan

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Abstract

As Syrian refugees have arrived in Jordan since 2012, fleeing a brutal civil war in their home country, they have entered a policy environment shaped not only by previous waves of refugees but also by decades of neoliberal policy formation. Yet few analyses of Syrian refugee migration address the influence of neoliberalism on Jordanian policy, while the literature on neoliberal migration policy does not often extend to cases of refugee movement in the Global South. This thesis therefore uses a combination of primary and secondary source material to analyze how Jordanian citizens have interacted with their state’s refugee policies, with an eye to existing literature on neoliberal migration frameworks and state-citizen relationships under neoliberalism.

In this thesis, I make three central claims. First, I establish that the Jordanian government’s Syrian refugee policies bear the imprint of neoliberal values and systems. Like neoliberal migration policies documented by sociologists and geographers in other settings, Jordanian refugee policy has facilitated the exploitation of Syrian refugees in the labor force by preventing refugees from living and working legally. Second, while the literature on other settings indicates that states must portray migrants as racial “others” or criminals in order to legitimate neoliberal migration policies, I argue that these tactics are ineffective in the Jordanian context. Syrians’ claims to humanitarian status, as well as the close links between the Jordanian and Syrian communities, appear to make Jordanian citizens less receptive to this kind of rhetoric. Third, I show that Jordanians do not simply react reflexively to changes in their access to resources, whether due to neoliberal austerity measures or the arrival of new populations; Jordanian citizens have both critiqued the neoliberal aspects of Syrian refugee policy and articulated a desire for greater government regulation of Syrian refugee employment, in contradiction of neoliberal ideology and practice. These findings, illustrating the extent to which the Jordanian case complicates and adds nuance to existing sociological and geographic theory, underscore the importance of examining the full range of neoliberal migration policies and popular reactions to neoliberalism in the Global South.
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Introduction

Emphasizing the “chaos” that Syrian refugees have created in Jordan, particularly in the areas of housing and employment, Jordanian journalist Rania Tadris reported in May of 2015 that four former ministers of the interior had called on the government to close its border with Syria (Tadris May 2015).¹ When Tadris wrote her piece, Syrian refugees had been crossing into Jordan for over three years. Fleeing the brutal, apparently endless civil war that broke out in their country in 2011, hundreds of thousands of these refugees had settled in Jordan’s northern governorates and in its capital city of Amman.² Citing the impact of this influx on Jordan’s economy, as well as its impact on Jordanian society and security, Tadris and other Jordanians have begun to call on the government to stem the flow of new arrivals crossing the Syrian border. Not all Jordanians frame this demand the same way, however. While the statements from the former ministers adopted the language of international politics, describing Jordan’s sovereign right to make such a decision and the responsibility of international actors to share the refugee “burden,” Tadris herself took a more domestic perspective in her article.

In her critique of current refugee employment policy, Tadris incorporated two threads that are not commonly woven into academic discussions of Jordan’s refugee situation: a perceived state of disorder in the national economy and the presence of migrant workers of other nationalities with no recognized claims to refugee status. Claiming to speak for the citizens of Jordan, Tadris threw responsibility on the government for its failure to regulate or “order” the issue of Syrian asylum. In her analysis, asylum seekers should not work. She has support for this

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¹ Citations from Arabic-language sources have been transliterated (in the case of authors’ names) or translated (in the case of headlines and titles). Sources that cannot be found in the English-language bibliography can be found in the list of Arabic-language sources further down, accompanied by their transliterated/translated citation.

² At time of writing, the Syrian Civil War is still ongoing and shows no clear sign of slowing down or approaching resolution.
position: most interpretations of Jordanian law from prior to 2016 claim that a Syrian who worked—with or without a permit—automatically relinquished his or her asylum-seeker status (“Around 200,000 Syrians illegally work in Jordan,” Al-Kalash). Yet as many as 200,000 Syrians work in Jordan, and most Jordanians interviewed for this thesis agreed that Syrian refugee employment has become widespread (“Around 200,000 Syrians illegally work in Jordan”). As Tadris put it, the government “had allowed [Syrians] to abandon the status of asylum seekers and transform into migrant workers.” She then tied this back to the “chaos” associated with migrant workers from other nationalities, apparently referencing a commonly-held understanding of the history of migrant labor in Jordan and the state of the national economy. To conclude her piece, still in the voice of “the citizens,” she stated that Jordan has “no ability to take in more refugees for any reason.” These words do not represent a marginal viewpoint; to the contrary, Tadris’s questions and concerns represent a microcosm of discussions taking place across Jordan. The nuances of her argument thus merit careful consideration.

While readers may immediately be drawn to Tadris’s striking comments about “chaos” and her call for the government to close the border, the author’s comments on the Jordanian government’s obligation to regulate or control “the issue of asylum” and Syrians’ de facto status as “migrant workers” are just as intriguing from a scholarly perspective. Those accustomed to academic accounts of refugee flows into Jordan, which generally situate each new influx in a sequence of refugee waves going back to the Palestinian influx of 1948, may not recognize Tadris’s references to the history of economic migration. Sociologists focused on the dynamics of labor migration, on the other hand, have not often discussed the points of similarity between

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3 See Jaaroun, Stevens 3, Ryan 2010, Mason 358, Chatelard.
economic migrants and refugees. Yet a notable share of the Jordanian population clearly view Egyptian economic migrants and Syrian refugees as part of the same history. Not only have other Jordanian journalists drawn this connection, as when op-ed author Khaled Al-Zubaidi wrote about Egyptian and Syrian “migrant labor” in 2013 without differentiating the two in any way (Al-Zubaidi Sept 2013), but policy analysts and workers in the informal economy sometimes speak about Egyptian and Syrian employment as different facets of the same issue (Awad, Amman Worker 2, Amman Worker 3). This issue, in turn, is inextricably tied to regulation in the labor market.

**Zeroing In: Syrian Refugees and Jordanian Neoliberalism**

To fully understand how Syrian refugees, the history of labor migration, and economic regulation come together in a single conversation, it is necessary to examine two aspects of Jordan’s political landscape: the long-standing economic policies that have rendered Jordan dependent on a largely unregulated foreign workforce, and the more recent policies with which the Jordanian regime has addressed the Syrian influx over the past three years. To understand these policies, in turn, one must understand the neoliberal framework that has become the foundation for much of Jordan’s economic decision-making. This thesis will therefore address the domestic politics in Jordan surrounding the issue of Syrian refugee employment, focusing on the following question: How can a case study on this issue contribute to the existing literature on the relationship between the citizen and the state under neoliberal policy frameworks? In particular, what does this case say about government attempts to legitimate neoliberal migration policies? And how does public opinion on this issue draw out popular understandings of neoliberalism’s economic and

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4 This is arguably because authors have tended to focus on the United States case. While the United States takes in some people as officially-designated refugees, far more individuals enter the country without documents of any kind—even if they are fleeing generalized violence or persecution in their country of origin. Thus authors like Hiemstra, De Genova, and Theodore have focused almost exclusively on the category of the undocumented migrant. Bauder’s work is an exception to this rule: though he does not explicitly address how refugees fit into his framework, he includes them in his analysis of immigration in the labor market.
social consequences? In answering this question, this thesis will touch on issues that hold relevance for humanitarians concerned for refugees’ welfare, government officials and political analysts concerned with the stability of the Jordanian government, sociologists and anthologists interested in the shape of neoliberalism in the Middle East, and researchers focused on the dynamics of migration in labor markets touched by neoliberal policies.

The domestic politics surrounding Jordan’s refugee policies hold significance both for humanitarians concerned with the plight of Syria’s refugees and for analysts who view Jordan as a crucial bastion of stability in a war-torn region. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has identified and registered more than 630,000 Syrians as refugees since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, some claim that the true size of the refugee population considerably exceeds this number (“Number of Registered Syrian Refugees Reaches 637,000”). As many as 84% of this population lives outside of designated refugee camps, generally finding shelter in the Northern governorates or in the capital city of Amman (Su). There they have joined Palestinian families who came to Jordan during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the Six-Day War of 1967, Iraqis who fled their homes during the Gulf War of 1990 and the US invasion of 2003, and the Egyptian and South Asian workers who constitute a significant share of the Jordanian labor force. While numerical estimates vary widely, observers agree that tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have found work in their new communities (“Around 200,000 Syrians illegally work in Jordan,” Al-Wazani 2014 81, JRP 195, Hazaimeh 2015). Jordan’s policies regarding encampment and refugee employment thus have humanitarian and rights-related consequences for hundreds of thousands of people within Jordan’s borders.

Those who hope to help Syrian refugees in Jordan must understand not only how current policies shape refugees’ lives but also how the Jordanian government formulates these policies in the first place. If international observers only address how restrictions operate on the ground and
how refugees exert agency within them, taking the policies themselves as set in stone, their work may have the unintended effect of naturalizing policies that were created by policymakers with agency of their own. In this sense, they may absolve the Jordanian government of responsibility for refugees’ living conditions and downplay the possibility of policy reform. Yet Jordanian policymakers, pursuing their own agendas while responding to an array of political pressures, might in fact be responsive to changes in the political climate. Viewing refugee policy as product of domestic politics will help observers better predict the evolution of these policies over time, assess their sustainability in the long-term, and determine how they might be changed through the astute use of political pressure and negotiation.

Placing the refugee presence in Jordan’s domestic political context, some also claim that the refugee presence has put a great deal of pressure on the Jordanian regime (Francis, Schenker April 2014). In April 2013, as refugees continued to pass from Syria into neighboring Jordan, Jordan’s UN ambassador sent a letter to the Security Council arguing that the “grave humanitarian situation” associated with the refugee presence also represented a serious threat to national security and stability (Lederer). For the most part, these observers have focused on broad measures of the Jordanian government’s financial situation and its resilience in the face of opposition. But their work also suggests the potential value of examining the individual policies with which the government has addressed this most recent refugee “crisis,” how these policies came to be, and how they reinforce or undermine Jordanian stability. Given the degree of popular resistance to previous waves of neoliberalization in Jordan, any relationship between the government’s larger neoliberal policy framework and its approach to the Syrian refugee influx could impact citizens’ opinion on refugee policy and even their overall response to the refugee presence. An exploration of this relationship thus holds significance for analysts of the Jordanian regime’s resilience and capacity to weather or diffuse opposition.
Considering the extent to which neoliberal policies and values have permeated Jordan’s economy, political system, and society over the past two decades, one would naturally expect to see the imprint of neoliberalism on refugee policy formation as well. Since Jordan experienced an economic collapse in 1989, the Jordanian government has been adopting elements of a neoliberal economic model. Then, in the first few years of the 21st century, Jordan experienced a “flood” of economic reforms: privatization, market liberalization, and the creation of new free trade zones and qualified industrial zones (Schwedler 2010 550). Though it is virtually impossible to draw any absolute conclusions concerning cause and effect, some observers have linked neoliberalism to the economic problems Jordan has faced over the past decade (Hourani, Ryan 2014 144). The employment situation in Jordan was “dire” in the years leading up to the Syrian refugee influx, with youth unemployment at up to 30%, rising unemployment rates in the Northern governorates, and large numbers of working poor (Brown et. al, Kawar et. al.) Compounding these factors, government austerity measures have raised food and utility prices (Moore and Peters, Wilson).

Sociologists have often described how neoliberal governments formulate immigration policy and how migrants interact with neoliberal economies, suggesting that neoliberal systems can and do shape the realities of migration; very few, however, have applied this analysis to migration patterns within the Global South. These scholars have clearly documented how various nations have maintained large migrant labor forces in a constant state of legal non-compliance ("illegality"), arguing that this framework supports neoliberal policymakers’ goal of ensuring employers’ easy access to largely unregulated labor (Cámara, Hiemstra, Kretsedmas, Tobias). They have also drawn connections between illegality and the criminalization and racialization of migrant populations (De Genova 2002, Hiemstra, Tobias). These analyses, largely focused on economic migration within North and Central America, rarely address refugees’ experiences or the notion of refugee status. Given that Jordan and other nations in the Global South have adopted
neoliberal economic programs, however, one might naturally expect them to apply neoliberal principles to migrants and non-citizens of other types within their borders. Of course, specific policies and the rhetoric around them differ based on the political context.

A nuanced examination of the relationships among illegality, criminalization, and racialization in Jordan can help avoid universalization of cases from the Global North and shed light on how states in the Global South with neoliberal migration policies justify their actions to wary or unsure citizens. Dealing with very different racial dynamics, as well as international rhetoric touting the blamelessness figure of the refugee, governments outside the Global North may have reason to use very different tactics to legitimate neoliberal migration policies. In the United States, for instance, members of the most financially and socially empowered racial group in the world have coped with—and actively managed—an influx of people from communities that white societies have traditionally considered inferior. In the Global South, however, it is much more likely that both receiving and sending nations hold non-white majorities. Traditional signifiers of race, like skin color and language, may even be identical across the two countries. This point of distinction can lead to substantial differences in government rhetoric and public conceptions of migrant identities. Outside the Global North, for instance, discrimination and “otherization” directed against migrants may be based more heavily on citizenship, tribe, or family grouping than on measures of race used within the Global North (Tobias). Alternately, governments in the Global South may struggle to muster up distrust or disapproval of “illegal” migrant groups who closely resemble the native population or share common identities with
citizens.\textsuperscript{56} These factors complicate past analyses that have described racialization and criminalization as integrally tied to neoliberal migration policy (Hiemstra, De Genova 2002)

**This Study: Jordanian Views on Refugee Employment Policies**

Putting data from interviews, Jordanian newspaper articles, and various materials on specific Jordanian refugee policies in conversation with sociological and anthropological work on communities around the world, this thesis will analyze a sample of Jordanian views on refugee employment and encampment policies. Though an unconventional choice, public discussions on these policies provide a uniquely clear, well-defined platform for a study of state-citizen relations under neoliberalism. Discussion of this issue picks up on how Jordanian citizens and the state frame the double standards, exploitation, and lack of humanitarian concern in neoliberal approaches to migration. Neoliberal policies, as will be shown, often include components of dispossession and lead to increased measures of social inequality. For instance, typical neoliberal policies include cuts to welfare programs and subsidies that primarily benefit the poor (Ong, Peck and Tickell 389). Understanding how the Jordanian government seeks to legitimate low wages and poor working conditions for Syrian refugees, and how citizens react to these strategies, will shed light on neoliberal migration policies specifically and, more generally, on state-citizen relationships under neoliberalism. Second, the issue of Syrian refugee employment taps into long-standing anxieties about the nation’s economic trajectory and the conditions of the Jordanian labor market. In a nation with 30\% youth unemployment and an influx of over six-hundred thousand new people, refugee employment is not a side issue: the clear majority of private sector workers and employers interviewed for this study expressed deep concern about refugee encampment or

\textsuperscript{5} As used here, the word “illegality” should always be understood as a condition created by government policies rather than a trait of lawlessness ascribed to an individual or his or her actions. More information about use of the term “illegality” in this thesis can be found in Appendix B on page ___.

\textsuperscript{6} Also see Sadiq 176 for a discussion of how governments can use bureaucratic systems to create “category markers” when there are no visible differences between citizens and migrants.
employment policies, described these policies as relevant to their lives, and/or narrated an incident related to these policies that they or an acquaintance had experienced (Brown et. al., “Number of Registered Syrian Refugees Reaches 637,000”).

Among the Jordanian government’s current refugee policies, those concerning Syrian refugee employment and mobility are particularly relevant to this study. Syrian refugees who arrive in Jordan are generally transported to a processing center, then to a refugee camp; those who wish to leave legally must go through a “bail-out” process in which they claim sponsorship from a native Jordanian and pay a fee (Joint Assessment Review 7-8). Other limitations on mobility apply as well. The Jordanian government has also made it difficult for Syrians to work legally in Jordanian host communities. Details on refugee employment policy are hard to pin down: some claim that employers have always been able to procure permits for Syrian workers, though the process is neither easy nor simple, while others claim that the government previously banned Syrian refugee employment altogether (Jordan Response Plan, Kawar et. al., Su).

Directly impacting the structure of the labor market, these policies fit into the government’s larger economic policy framework. Syrian refugee employment policies, enforced by the Ministry of Labor, have a clear economic component. And while policies regarding refugee camps and identity cards may seem more security-based, Jordanian interviews, scholarly sources, and specific aspects of the policies themselves all point to the link between these policies and the regulation of refugees’ labor market participation. In the early days of the refugee influx, for instance, an employer could arrive at Zaatari refugee camp and pay a fee to “bail out” as many Syrian refugee workers as he needed for his enterprise (Amman Worker 6, Amman Worker 7). To many of the Jordanians I spoke with, the connection between encampment policy and the labor market was thus very clear. Further, previous wages of sociological literature have linked migration policies to deregulation and labor market structure under neoliberal policy regimes.
Though much of this literature focuses on the Global North, I was nevertheless able to draw connections with the Jordanian case.

This thesis will show that sociological theories on the dynamics of neoliberal migration policy often align with the Jordanian government’s refugee response, making this framework applicable to the Syrian refugee case. At the same time, as I will show, this case highlights how existing literature on the popular understanding and legitimacy of neoliberal policies must be expanded to credit citizens with greater awareness of political and economic trends and to address the dynamics of migration outside the Global North. Jordanian refugee policies have supported the maintenance of the “flexible” reserve pool of labor that David Harvey and others describe as a hallmark of neoliberal economies (Harvey 75-76, Peck and Tickell 3). Yet even as neoliberal policies and power dynamics have corralled Syrian refugees into the established role of “illegal” migrant workers, two factors have impacted the public reaction to these policies and caused this case to diverge from the analyses and predictions present in existing literature. First, Syrian refugees’ asylum claims and cultural, social, and linguistic ties to native Jordanians distinguish them from other migrant groups in ways that substantially alter the government’s scope for action. Second, Jordanian citizens have not merely responded to the immediate economic effects of the refugee influx; to the contrary, they have incorporated criticisms of Syrian refugee employment policies into broader critiques of neoliberalism as a whole. By showing how public debate on neoliberal migration policy differs based on a nation’s specific history and racial composition, and crediting citizens with a high comprehension of neoliberal systems, this thesis will build on existing literature concerning citizen-state relationships under neoliberalism.

Chapter Overview

After a brief literature review, this thesis will move on to three primary sub-findings. Drawing on both data from Jordan and sociological literature developed in other settings, Chapter
1 will show that some Jordanian policies concerning refugee employment and mobility fit into a larger body of neoliberal laws and practices that work together to sustain particular economic systems in the country. Not only does the government push refugees into conditions of exploitation in order to support Jordanian business interests, but it also uses classic strategies to quell popular opposition to these policies. This chapter will draw heavily on materials detailing what neoliberal labor markets and labor market policies look like in theory and practice, as well as discussions of how policies resulting in widespread “illegality” among migrant populations fit into neoliberal models. Next, Chapter 2 will explore an area in which the existing sociological literature does not fully address the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Much of this literature points to the ways in which governments have scapegoated migrant populations for structural economic problems and used racial or other kinds of discriminatory rhetoric against migrant populations (Hiemstra, Tobias). Yet Syrians’ refugee status and similarity to native Jordanians may lead various segments of the Jordanian population to respond differently to this type of policy, which the government has applied to Egyptian migrant workers in the past. Chapter 3 will then address how and to what extent various groups within Jordan view current refugee policies as neoliberal in some way, and how this perception has colored their overall opinion of the government’s refugee response. Though Jordanian citizens do not generally reference neoliberalism by name in their assessments of the government’s refugee response, this chapter will show that the terms in which they express their views often match up with the themes, discourses, and conclusions present in scholarly analyses of modes of order and disorder under neoliberal policy regimes. An analysis of recent policy changes in light of these findings will constitute the conclusion of this thesis.

Abstract though it may seem, this project has direct implications for both observers of Middle Eastern politics and analysts of neoliberal systems. A better understanding of Syrian
refugee employment policy as a Jordanian political issue can lead to larger conclusions about the
direction of Jordanian politics as a whole. For observers trying to assess Jordan’s overall stability
and divine its political future in a region hit by war and mass migration, this kind of analysis is
crucial. At the same time, an examination of Jordanian refugee policy through a neoliberal lens
can support sociologists’ understanding of the techniques through which states construct and
legitimate neoliberal policy and particularly how these techniques operate in contexts beyond the
Global North. By drawing out some Jordanians’ own conceptions of neoliberal governance,
including framings that have not often been discussed in the context of the Global South, this
project also strives to build on the literature on Jordanian neoliberalism in line with the general
assertion of Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and other geographers that looking deeply at the
contestation of neoliberalism requires the study of the “sociospatial imaginaries” of people who
have different, non-neoliberal visions for the world.⁷ Even the apparently narrow subject of
Jordanian refugee employment policy has broad implications for Jordan itself and neoliberal
systems around the globe (Leitner et. al. 11).

**Methodology**

To ensure that my findings are grounded in both sociological theory and the perceptions of
Jordanians from a range of socio-economic groups, I have drawn from three sets of sources. These
include data from my own fieldwork, articles from Jordanian newspapers, and a range of scholarly
perspectives. Based largely on the details of individual government policies and the process of
policy formation, Chapter 1 primarily references secondary sources and other written materials.
These include not only scholarly articles but also NGO reports; American, European, and
Jordanian news articles; and other sources documenting the current situation in Jordan. As my

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⁷The authors continue: “To ignore these [imaginaries] would be either to reduce contestants’ actions to simple
reactions to neoliberalism or to impute analysts’ views of alternative imaginaries onto groups contesting
neoliberalism, rather than allowing them agency in their own right” (Leitner et. al. 11). This subject will be discussed
in greater depth in Chapter 3.
focus turns to public opinion in Chapters 2 and 3, I will incorporate more interview data and Jordanian op-eds into my analysis.

Over the course of my fieldwork, which consisted of semi-structured interviews with over forty Jordanians and a survey at a Jordanian university, I spoke with students, private sector workers, private sector managers and business owners (“employers”), and various individuals whom I believed might possess a more academic or research-based understanding of refugee issues. I completed the bulk of my fieldwork in the Jordanian capital of Amman during April and May of 2015. During this period, I also carried out one day’s worth of interviews in Irbid and made several research visits to a complex of stores in a village in Mafraq. Irbid is a city in Northwestern Jordan with a relatively high population of Palestinian descent. Mafraq is a more rural governorate in Northeastern Jordan made up of predominantly East Bank Jordanian communities. Both are considerably closer to the Syrian border than Amman, and have received comparatively high numbers of Syrian refugees per capita (Al-Wazani 2014 57, Hillesund and Stave).

All study participants were Jordanian citizens, to the best of my knowledge, with the exception of several survey-takers. I did not seek out the perspectives of Syrian refugees themselves; while their views are worth studying, they are less essential to the discussion of citizen-state relationships in Jordan. I also felt that it would be potentially unethical for me to interview Syrians who were working illegally, lacked valid documents, or had no officially-sanctioned reason to be outside the camp system, as I could not guarantee with total certainty that

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8 Though I will occasionally break down my sample by numbers and categories, categorizations should not be viewed as strict: some private sector workers are also students, and the brother of a business owner may himself adopt the perspective of an owner even if he works as an employee.

9 East Bank Jordanian communities hold ties to the land on the East Bank of the Jordan River, where the Jordanian state is now located, dating back to the period before the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.
their participation in my research would not endanger them in some way.\footnote{As the anthropologist Nicholas De Genova writes, “Ethnographic disclosure can quite literally become a kind of surveillance... in the case of undocumented migrants, the ethnographic documentation and exhibition of practices [that the state deems illegal] can have quite practical consequences and strategic risks at the levels of both research practice and representation” (De Genova 2002 422).} Considering the potential harmfulness of asking Syrians to participate in my study, and my ability to gather sufficient data from other sources, limiting my sample to Jordanian citizens seemed appropriate.

My interviews were brief and informal, based on loose interview guides and only a rough, preliminary sense of what themes might emerge from our discussion of Syrian refugee employment. I found some interviewees using a snowballing approach based on a set of initial contacts provided by staff at the School for International Training. I located others by approaching them at their place of work or study. While I generally centered my questions around the topic of Syrian refugee employment policy, I also focused some interviews on the related issues of encampment policy, the extent to which the Syrian refugee presence represented a “threat” to Jordanian citizens, and the extent to which national identity and the politics surrounding it played into citizens’ perception of refugee issues. Throughout this process, I asked only one interviewee a question specifically about neoliberalism (Al-Madi). The semi-structured format gave interviewees the freedom to discuss issues how they liked, and the diversity of topics and questions helped me understand which issues are most relevant to which populations.

Both the second and third chapters of this thesis rely heavily on interview data, but the use of this data differs greatly between the two. To construct the second chapter, concerned with the racialization, criminalization, and scapegoating of refugee and migrant populations, I examined how my data from Jordan corresponded to hypotheses constructed based on existing literature. My third chapter, meanwhile, focuses on Jordanians’ own framings of refugee policy and related issues. Though I did not formally adopt the recommended procedure for the construction of
grounded theory, as developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, the analysis in this section reflects Strauss’s recommendation that “one does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge” (Corbin and Strauss 23-4). Only through coding and analysis did “order” and “disorder” emerge as key terms related to both neoliberalism and Jordanian perceptions of refugee policy. In fact, I had not intended to discuss neoliberalism in any way when I began this project.

I also had an opportunity to get a broader sense of student opinion by surveying an introductory-level class at the University of Jordan. This survey was designed to assess students’ level of awareness and concern about refugee employment, determine whether they view refugees as a source of economic competition, and analyze their level of satisfaction with government policy in this area. More information on my fieldwork and analysis can be found in Appendix A.

To provide this thesis with a stronger basis in contemporary events and a broader sense of public discourse on the government’s refugee response, I have incorporated Jordanian news articles and op-eds into my analysis. Within the Jordan Times, an English-language newspaper, I browsed relatively informally in order to find articles relevant to my topic. Taking a more rigorous approach to my analysis of Arabic-language sources, I created a small database of results for particular search terms (such as “ministry of labor” and “refugees camp”) in the newspapers Al-Ra’i and Ad-Dustour. I chose to include Arabic-language sources in my analysis because these sources are more likely to be focused on domestic politics and geared toward a Jordanian audience. Despite the substantial degree of government control over the Jordanian press, I found that Al-Ra’i and Ad-Dustour contained slightly different political orientations and thus complemented each other nicely.11

11 Al-Ra’i regularly publishes articles criticizing government policy and highlighting instances in which the government appears inept, while Ad-Dustour is generally more aligned with the government.
Literature Review

To provide a foundation for the analysis in Chapters 1-3, this section will first provide a review of the literature on neoliberalism and its social and economic consequences; the relationship among neoliberalism, the labor market, and migration policy; Jordan’s long history of receiving refugees; and how Jordanian citizens relate to their increasingly neoliberal state. It will then move into a description of the literature on the history of migration in Jordan. To situate this thesis and its definition of the term “neoliberalism” in the theoretical literature summarized here, the section will begin with a brief discussion of the term itself.

Defining Neoliberalism

To create clarity and consistency, this thesis will define neoliberalism as a policy framework that privileges and promotes the process of accumulation, concentration, and consumption of capital by private individuals and entities, or a subset thereof, while appearing to place private actors at the forefront of this process. This definition corresponds to what Harvey describes as typical neoliberal practice and the natural consequences of neoliberal policies. Though it does not center the concept of neoliberalism as a “utopian project,” which Harvey also lays out, Harvey himself notes that neoliberal systems in reality have tended to reinforce elite power and promote capital accumulation far more often than they have moved the world toward a theoretically-sound free market system (Harvey 19) [emphasis in original]. The definition I will use is also closely linked to Ong’s analysis. Ong presents neoliberalism as a combination of two types of governing technologies: “technologies of subjectivity,” consisting of government techniques to allow or promote individual optimization techniques in an economic, market-based context, and “technologies of subjection,” which “differently regulate populations for optimal productivity” (Ong 3, 6). Given the base assumption that neoliberal policies need not promote capital accumulation for all people at once, both of these technologies serve to provide private
actors with opportunities to accumulate capital and thus fit the definition above. Finally, Nancy Hiemstra’s strong assertion that indirect governance practices are “integral to state strategies and practice under neoliberalism” corresponds to the second part of the definition (Hiemstra 76).

While it might seem natural to think of neoliberalism as a kind of institutionalized disorder, given the rhetorical emphasis that neoliberal leaders have placed on individual self-determination and economic rights and freedoms, neoliberal systems create and reproduce an economic and societal order of their own. Harvey, Peck, and Tickell, some of the most widely cited authors on the sociology of neoliberalism, show that neoliberalism in practice creates its own kind of order by reinforcing economic inequality” (Harvey 70, Peck and Tickell 400). Particularly during and after the 1990’s, in a movement toward what Peck and Tickell describe as “roll-out neoliberalism,” neoliberals who claimed to reject big government began to take an increasingly active role in regulating and controlling public life. As part of this “deeply interventionist agenda,” Peck and Tickell write, neoliberal states have taken a harsher tack in the areas of crime, welfare reform, “urban order and surveillance,” and immigration (Peck and Tickell 389). Peck and Tickell also argue that policies in Britain and the United States ranging from mass incarceration to “social surveillance” aim to create and reproduce a flexible, low-wage workforce as a means of fuelling corporate growth (Peck and Tickell 392).

Though this analysis has been very focused on the Global North up to this point, it has direct implications for the history of neoliberalism in Jordan. First, the Jordanian government has clearly adopted many policies typical of neoliberal theory and practice. These include privatization, the removal of subsidies, and the creation of Qualified Industrial Zones exempt from many forms of government regulation. Second, as this thesis will show, one could view Jordan’s

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12 Harvey makes a similar point: seeking to destroy strong welfare systems and organized labor, both of which challenge the concentration of capital that neoliberal policymakers work to create, neoliberals found themselves engaged in “intense state interventions” or anti-democratic measures to pursue their agendas (Harvey 69).
labor market and migration policies as part of the nation’s larger neoliberal policy framework. Migration policy in Jordan appears to create strict restrictions in the labor market, dictating who can employ whom at what wage, and thus seems to violate the tenets of neoliberal theory. But it should be clear at this point that even state interventions can be neoliberal, depending on how they operate and what they are designed to accomplish.

**Neoliberalism, Migrant Labor, and State Legitimacy**

The literature on neoliberalism has a great deal to say about labor market policies, the incorporation of migrants into the workforce, and how governments deploy these policies to reinforce their own legitimacy and sovereignty while attempting to dispel citizens’ doubts about the neoliberal order. To meet the needs of private industry, according to neoliberal principles, the market must yield an affordable supply of labor. In practice, as Harvey points out, this approach to the labor market has resulted in lower wages, decreased job protections, and the general de-prioritization of workers “collective rights and quality of life” (Harvey 70, 259). And because a neoliberal state is “necessarily hostile” to labor collectivization as a barrier to capital accumulation, Harvey argues, neoliberal governments have initiated “a violent assault on all forms of labor organization and labor rights” (Harvey 75-76). As noted previously, this is one instance in which neoliberal policy makers have taken a strongly interventionist approach. When it comes to immigration policy as well, neoliberal states have been anything but laissez-faire.

Critics of neoliberalism argue that policymakers have used immigration policy to maintain immigrants in a constant state of “illegality” and deprive them of legal protections, all in order to maintain an flexible, exploitable workforce. While much of the existing literature on neoliberal migration patterns has focused on the American case, these sources nevertheless provide a useful theoretical framework and set of terms for this study. Painting a fairly comprehensive picture of the interplay between migration and neoliberalism in the U.S., for instance, geographers Joseph
Nevins and Monica Varsanyi describe how economic incentives to cross borders, light enforcement of border and workplace controls, and immigrants’ consequential residency without legal status ultimately result in the “production” of the ideal worker—at least in the eyes of economic elites (Nevins and Varsanyi 224-225). These authors’ work represents only a single drop in a deep well of scholarship documenting the role of “illegality” as “a racialized, spatialized social condition facilitating the manipulation and control of immigrants” and tying this mode of control to exploitation in the labor market (Hiemstra).13 Most elegantly, Noelia Cámara points to the ways in which illegality allows employers to rob migrants of their rightful compensation and writes that illegality therefore represents a form of “accumulation through dispossession” (Cámara 559). This concept fits perfectly with the definition of neoliberalism laid out above. At the same time, Hiemstra shows, the rhetoric that governments use to establish illegality of migrant populations can transmit messages to citizens about state power and legitimacy.

Literature on other cases, particularly immigration to the United States, describes a consistent set of messages about immigrants that governments often use to legitimate harsh policies and direct public attention away from government shortcomings. These include three very closely related rhetorical tactics: racialization, criminalization, and scapegoating. “Racialization” in this context involves the creation of strong associations between immigration status and a particular racial category, particularly one differing from the dominant or majority race. By means of racialization, governments can portray immigrants as dangerous “others” who do not belong within the borders of the state. Distinct from “illegality,” which will be used in this paper only to refer directly to migrants’ immigration status, “criminalization” will be defined as the process of using rhetoric to equate a particular set of identities or social categories with criminality in a broad sense. Building on the work of Nicholas De Genova and other prominent scholars on illegality,

13 Note that this quotation appears in the abstract on Wiley Online’s homepage. It is not in the body of the text itself.
Hiemstra makes racialization and criminalization central to her analysis; in the United States case, she asserts, it is impossible to separate the policies that have created widespread illegality with “the criminalization of all brown bodies” (De Genova 2002 433, Hiemstra 79). She also describes how the United States has scapegoated immigrants for economic problems. When a government scapegoats a group within a society, it not only portrays it as destructive and alien, but also depicts it as the primary source of social, political, or economic ills in a deliberate bid to draw attention away from problems for which the government itself might be responsible.

These rhetorical strategies have helped governments gloss over contradictions in neoliberal migration policies. As Anne McNevin writes, “irregular migration poses particularly acute legitimacy problems since it remains at once economically productive and, at least ostensibly, unauthorized by the state” (McNevin 657). Hiemstra adds that the harsh treatment of even the most responsible, productive, upwardly-mobile immigrants appears in conflict with neoliberal states’ glorification of these characteristics.\(^\text{14}\) By appearing to crack down on immigrants for interrupting the otherwise faultless order of the state, in words if not in actions, politicians can overcome the first dilemma. And by criminalizing undocumented migrants, harping on the fact that some do not buy insurance or pay certain taxes, governments can portray them as people failing to live up to a neoliberal standard of personal responsibility.\(^\text{15}\) Race certainly has a role to play here, as well. As Lina Newton writes, describing the US immigration system, “the use of racialized languages and images as markers of disentitlement assure the populace that policies are just in denying access to some people” (Newton 145). Finally, given the economic dislocation that structural adjustment frequently causes, neoliberal governments often have need for a scapegoat.

\(^{14}\) Kretsedemas and Gerken make very similar points, without Hiemstra’s explicit focus on neoliberal ideals.

\(^{15}\) Of course, undocumented people face extensive systemic barriers to buying insurance and paying certain taxes.
Of course, these strategies are all premised on the notion that citizens will willingly accept the messages that the state conveys.

Expanding this area of analysis to refugee flows within the developing world, Saul Tobias argues that refugee host nations across sub-Saharan Africa have adopted a neoliberal approach to the legal, economic, and social integration of newcomers. Because his work represents the closest analogue to this thesis that exists in the literature, his conclusions merit careful consideration here. “Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Tobias writes, “find themselves subject to many of the same incentives and constraints that operate in the developed North as a result of the widespread implementation of neoliberal policies” (Tobias 1). Like Jordan, several of the nations in Tobias’s study place restrictions on refugee employment and set bounds on the spatial mobility of refugee populations. Tobias shows how these policies subject refugees to the kind of illegality experienced by immigrants in the United States, further arguing that these measures force refugees into the same subordinate role in the local labor market. While confining refugees to camps may seem like a measure primarily designed to appease local people worried about economic competition, for instance, Tobias writes that the poor conditions and widespread food shortages in camps force immigrants to work as sharecroppers or day laborers “under conditions of illegality [that] greatly advantage native employers” (Tobias 8). Further, Tobias argues that the government can use enforcement and under-enforcement of encampment policies as a kind of faucet to make sure that the flow of refugee labor corresponds to market demand (Tobias 8).

Describing how Sub-Saharan governments represent their migration policies to their citizens, Tobias also reiterates Hiemstra’s point about scapegoating migrants for problems resulting from neoliberal reforms. As he reports, nations across Sub-Saharan Africa have seen protest over rising inequality and the decline of public services. “In the face of this rising discontent,” Tobias argues, “elites have mobilized anti-migrant sentiment and in many cases fueled xenophobia as a way of
deflecting popular frustration over the declining standards of living and rising inequality” (Tobias 10). By generating this rhetoric and then following it up with clear restrictions on refugees’ employment and mobility, African governments can also present themselves as responsive to popular demands. As he does not discuss race per se in his analysis, Tobias provides a useful model for understanding how governments create or manipulate xenophobia in the absence of clear racial categories or differences. 16 Tobias’s work lays a solid foundation for the analysis of refugee policies in a neoliberal context, but scholars have yet to test the validity of his arguments in the Middle East and other settings. There are also imbalances in the literature with regards to contestations of neoliberalism: while sociologists have studied resistance to neoliberalism across the world, particular aspects of popular contestation in the Global South have gone largely unstudied.

The Jordanian Context

At this point, very few authors have discussed the experiences of low-wage migrants in the Jordanian labor force or explored the existence of migrant “illegality” in Jordan. In addition to this limited set of articles, two other forms of literature on Jordan serve to contextualize this study: assorted works on Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees in the country, and analyses of the protests that spread across Jordan in 2011.

Migrant Illegality in Jordan

Though no one has yet examined Middle Eastern refugee policies through a neoliberal lens, two authors have hinted that the Jordanian government has subjected some migrant

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16 Also see the work of Kamal Sadiq. When visible differences are not adequate for identification of the “other,” Sadiq writes in reference to South Asian migration, authorities may base their reading of migrant identities entirely on state documentation systems. This does not preclude profiling based on “category markers,” he argues, but may give it a different shape (Sadiq 176).
populations to the kind of illegality described above.\textsuperscript{17} These two authors, De Bel Air and Van Aken, have vastly different approaches. De Bel Air examines migration policy on a macro level, looking at the government’s response to range of migrant groups—including refugees—in the context of domestic and international political pressures. Van Aken, on the other hand, uses a more economic lens and focuses exclusively on economic migrants working in the fertile Jordan Valley region. Despite their differences, the two arrive at a similar conclusion: policies that force migrants into illegality often benefit native Jordanians. Further, each perspective adds a key component to the story. Van Aken’s work highlights the role of capitalist interests like landowners in policy formation, while De Bel Air’s analysis reveals the significance of nativist pressures in Jordanian political discourse. In this sense, they both contribute to a better understanding of the ties between migrant illegality and citizen-government relations in Jordan.

Focusing on how the illegality of Egyptian migrants in Jordan has benefited farm owners in the Jordan Valley, constituting a key condition of their success since the 1980’s, Van Aken’s analysis fits neatly into discussions of neoliberalism. As Van Aken points out, large numbers of migrants came to Jordan to work decades before the implementation of structural adjustment. But in the 1980’s and 90’s, their role in the Jordanian economy underwent a transformation: whereas they had once arrived and stayed as legal guest workers, Egyptians who came after 1985 were more likely to lack legal status. Van Aken attributes this shift to a series of changes in Jordanian policy that deliberately pushed migrants into a state of “vulnerability” in Jordan (Van Aken 38). Though he does not tie this shift directly to neoliberalism, he posits that it came about largely as a result of Jordan’s 1985 market crisis, became increasingly pronounced during the 1990’s, and particularly served land owners whose farms were not profitable at standard wage rates. The

\textsuperscript{17} YES, okay, Willen talks about refugees to an extent in the Israeli context but does NOT ever explicitly address the interaction between neoliberalism and Israeli refugee policy. GET MORE CITATIONS: both extra Willen and also maybe some stuff on illegality in the Emirates.
potential connections between illegality and neoliberalism in this analysis are hard to miss, particularly when one considers Cámara’s assessment of illegality as a form of capital accumulation through dispossession (Cámara 559).

De Bel Air’s work, by contrast, focuses much more on how public support for labor protections pushed Jordan towards apparently restrictive migration policies. Summarizing the domestic politics surrounding Jordanian migration policies in the 1990’s and 2000’s, De Bel Air writes that the state faced a trade-off between the permissive migration policies that would appease the United States and international agencies, and a stricter approach that would satisfy native Jordanians concerned about spiraling unemployment (De Bel Air 2007 2). By all appearances, De Bel Air writes, Jordan appeared to be following the second imperative. He lists a number of restrictions imposed on refugees and other migrants during this period, stating that the goal of these policies was to “Jordanize” the labor force in response to popular pressure (De Bel Air 2007 5). By the end of his analysis, however, it is unclear whether the people of Jordan won a clear-cut victory against international pressures, or whether the original conflict between the two forces had effectively been resolved through compromise. By creating regulations and then not enforcing them, De Bel Air writes, the government allowed business interests to exploit migrant labor; at the same time, this approach “enhances the social contract by recreating a segmentation between local and foreign workers…thus enhancing the social capital of the first” (De Bel Air 2007 7). De Bel Air only arrives at illegality at the end of his piece, and there is much more to be said about how this set of policies benefits—or doesn’t benefit—various groups within Jordan. There is also more to be said about how migration and labor market policy fit into Jordan’s broader turn toward neoliberalism during this period.
**Jordanian Neoliberalism**

Analyses of neoliberalism in Jordan can and should extend far beyond the realm of economic policy formation. As several authors have noted, the implementation of neoliberal policies has both sparked a great deal of protest in Jordan and created a tremendous degree of political and social change. While some have clearly benefitted from Jordan’s new economic order, other segments of the Jordanian population have consistently responded to neoliberal reforms with opposition and protest. “Widespread rioting” broke out in the town of Ma’an, for instance, following the government removal of bread subsidies in 1989 (Moore and Peters 278). Still relevant to thousands of Jordanians, grievances about Jordan’s economic situation and trends in economic policy constituted a significant driver of protest during the wave of demonstrations that spread across Jordan in 2011 (Yom 2013, Ryan 2014 144).

Though the literature on neoliberalism in Jordan is extensive and well developed, there are still areas in which it could be expanded. As noted, the effects of neoliberalism in Jordan extend far beyond straightforward subsidy cuts and reductions in public sector employment. To the extent that analysts discuss Jordanian citizens’ conscious, direct reactions to neoliberal policies, however, they tend to focus on the public protests that often follow cuts in entitlement spending.\(^{18}\) In contrast to articles on Jordanians’ desire for political reform, which credit Jordanian reformers with a measure of political acumen, articles on resistance to neoliberalism sometimes emphasize Jordanians’ reflexive reactions to immediate changes in government subsidies and assistance programs. It is worth exploring Jordanians’ reactions to the more subtle changes associated with neoliberalism, such as the economic disorder that arises from decreased regulation. After all,

\(^{18}\) Hourani’s [year] paper is a welcome exception to this pattern, but approaches responses to neoliberalism from a very different angle than the one pursued here. Her argument is discussed at greater length in the literature review.
neoliberalism has influenced countless aspects of Jordanian state action, including the formation of refugee policy.

**Refugees and Refugee Policy**

*Palestinian Refugees*

The literature on Palestinian refugees in Jordan reveals quite a bit about which demographics constitute “true Jordanians” in the eyes of the state, and which groups remain outsiders. Though the unique context of Palestinian migration makes direct comparison difficult, one can see in the Palestinian case how the government has historically minimized or reinforced—depending on one’s point of view—the social, political, and economic divide between refugees and what one might call “true Jordanians.” This topic is relevant for two reasons. First, this history establishes that the Jordanian government is not above engaging in identity politics or deliberately exacerbating social divides. Second, the split between East Bank and Palestinian Jordanians still shapes contemporary political discourse. A working understanding of Palestinian refugee history and insider-outsider dynamics in Jordan is therefore crucial to the discussion of the otherization and racialization of current Syrian refugees.

Some historians have written that the Jordanian has always been based on a particularly East Bank-based, tribe-centered form of national identity (Alon); others, however, contest this notion by arguing that the government’s strongly East Bank-centered rhetoric emerged from the political tensions of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Following the arrival of approximately one hundred thousand Palestinians in Jordan in 1948, Laurie Brand argues, the monarchy sought to “create a hybrid Jordanian identity” for both East Bankers and Palestinians (Brand 50). But as Palestinian claims to pan-Arab solidarity began to come into conflict with the Hashemite nation’s own claims to legitimacy, according to Joseph Massad, Abdullah battled these claims by promoting a new “Jordanian national self” based on the exclusion of Palestinians (Massad 222). Once welcomed as
citizens and full Jordanians, many Palestinians found themselves outsiders in Jordan. In what Brand describes as an “‘East Banker first’ trend,’ the regime began to give East Bank Jordanians greater priority when filling government positions (Brand 53). In line with the prioritization of East Bank Jordanians’ economic needs, analyses of contemporary politics in Jordan tend to refer to East Bank Jordanians as the primary beneficiary of government assistance programs and other supports. To the present day, the Jordanian government continues to manage—and even manipulate—the divide between East Bank and Palestinian Jordanians in order to achieve political goals. As these authors posit, the state is not above identity politics or the use of “otherizing” rhetoric to accomplish political goals. 

Iraqi Refugees

Because Iraqi refugees began to arrive en masse in Jordan around 2005, years after the nation entered its second major wave of neoliberalization, the government’s response bore the mark of neoliberal values and priorities; for this reason, the Iraqi case is highly relevant to this study. Government policies that made it difficult for poor Iraqi refugees to acquire legal status forced Iraqis with relatively little money and social capital into the kind of illegality that sociologists and geographers have described. Though Iraqis could sometimes remain in Jordan as “temporary guests,” their legal status was often tenuous and Jordanian authorities retained a great deal of discretion in handling their cases. Not only did this restrict their ability to exit and re-enter Jordan, but it also curtailed their access to certain services and constrained their ability to exercise legal rights. They were therefore unable to access high-quality jobs, and forced to take low-wage employment under sub-standard conditions (De Bel Air 2007 7). As Cámara, Hiemstra, and other scholars on neoliberal labor markets have suggested, policies perpetuating migrant illegality

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19 For an analysis of how the government continues to manipulate the divide between East Bank and Palestinian Jordanians, and how Syrian refugee politics may play into this dynamic, see Ryan 2011.
allowed native Jordanian business owners to exploit Iraqi refugee labor. Adding to the neoliberal dimension of the refugee response, the government simultaneously encouraged the settlement—and spending—of Iraqis wealthy enough to “purchase” their legality (Chatelard 2009 13). Clearly, neoliberalism has influenced Jordanian refugee policy over the past decade.

**Syrian Refugees**

Particularly considering how recently the Syrian influx began, the amount and variety of literature on this phenomenon striking: scholars have analyzed Jordanian refugee policy with reference to national identity, international political pressures, security concerns, and human rights. Along economic lines, multiple authors have assessed refugees’ impact on Jordan’s finances and indicated that this “refugee burden” might ultimately destabilize the nation as a whole. Despite the range of topics covered, however, very few authors have confronted the issue of Syrian refugee employment head-on. And because the phenomenon of mass Syrian migration is so new, the literature overall is clearly in need of further development. Much of the existing scholarship, for instance, is still heavily reliant on literature from previous waves of refugees. Nevertheless, a few sources merit consideration here, particularly a piece by Lewis Turner.

Unique in the literature to date, Turner’s paper focuses exclusively on current refugee employment policies in Jordan and Lebanon and examines them from an academic perspective. His conclusions are premised on a differentiation between the Lebanese case, in which the government has declined to set up refugee camps but appears to have facilitated legal refugee employment, and the current policies in Jordan. He argues that Lebanese policies facilitate the exploitation of the refugee labor force, while Jordan’s restrictions on refugee employment and mobility effectively prevent the diffusion of Syrian labor into the Jordanian labor market. In this way, he posits, Jordanian refugee policies serve the interests of East Bank Jordanians concerned about the nation’s high levels of unemployment. Turner makes several solid points that merit
consideration. Most importantly, he declares that “Jordan’s encampment and labor market policies must be understood within [the] context of economic grievances and unrest” (Turner 11). This thesis, which examines current refugee policies in light of Jordan’s recent turn to neoliberalism, is clearly built on the same premise. But because Turner’s work is based on government statements, NGO reports, and other secondary sources, it should be read as a theory on the workings of Jordanian and Lebanese policy rather than a reflection of reality on the ground.

Supporting the study of Jordanian refugee policy as it actually operates in the nation’s labor market, rather than as an abstract set of commitments and principles created in government offices and communicated to the international community, the fieldwork conducted for this thesis builds on and challenges Turner’s ideas in a few key ways. In principle, the “bail out” or “kefala” system in Jordanian refugee camps only allows a specific subset of refugees to leave the camp: Syrians who wish to leave must have connections to Jordanian citizens, who can bail them out in exchange for a fee. Turner bases his argument off of this version of the policy (Turner 11). In practice, however, rumors suggest that employers have bailed out poor, un-networked Syrians en masse in exchange for their labor (Amman Worker 6, Amman Worker 7). This calls into question Turner’s conclusion that camps have gone against corporate interests by hindering the employment of Syrian refugees. And while Turner contrasts Jordan’s government-sponsored refugee camps with the “informal tended settlements” in neighboring Lebanon, he does not address the fact that informal refugee/labor camps can also be seen dotted across Northern Jordan’s rural landscape (Turner 13). He may be correct in his point that these camps signal the exploitation of refugee labor in Lebanon; he is not entirely correct in his assertion that Jordanian policy has prevented this practice. Overall, Turner appears to underestimate the extent to which Syrian face exploitation in Jordanian workplaces as a result of Jordan’s current policies.
Engaging with international standards for the treatment of refugees, other sources focus on the human rights implications of Jordan’s current refugee policies (Akram, “Jordan: Syrians Blocked, Stranded in Desert”). These materials serve an invaluable function by spreading the word about common abuses perpetrated by Jordan’s security forces. But because they often target Jordan’s security apparatus as the source of rights violations, focus disproportionately on refoulement, and lack context on Jordan’s domestic politics, materials on the rights of Syrian refugees in Jordan are not as helpful for this study as they might seem. While the Jordanian security apparatus has a voice in refugee policy making, it is hardly the only relevant actor. The role of economic considerations in policy formation merits consideration as well.

Katy Montoya’s analysis is one of the strongest examples of this type of literature, moving beyond the report format of human rights organizations and providing a detailed, critical examination of current refugee policy in Jordan.
Chapter 1: Neoliberal Influences on Jordan’s Refugee Policy

To understand how Jordanian citizens perceive their government’s response to Syrian refugees, and how refugee policies fit into larger government strategies, one must first understand how and why Jordanian refugee policies might be considered neoliberal. Jordanian refugee policies do not exist in a vacuum: they echo and support other laws created for similar purposes, and the public responds to them as one component of a larger system. Without understanding these dynamics, one cannot appreciate the resonance of this issue in Jordanian politics or see how the case of Syrian refugee employment fits into larger scholarly discussions about neoliberal migration. Based on a review of general trends in Jordanian labor market policy, the government’s approach to migration since the 1990’s, and the policies it has applied to Syrian refugees in recent years, it is clear that the government has consistently supported business interests by enacting strict regulations while deliberately undermining enforcement. This chapter will address three themes: how strong worker protection policies and weak enforcement became a part of Jordan’s neoliberal policy framework, how Jordan’s migration policies correspond to these larger trends, and finally how the specific policies applied to Syrian refugees fit into this pattern. To explain how and why policies have taken certain forms, this chapter will focus on the government’s perspective; citizens’ voices will come out more strongly in Chapters 2 and 3.

Neoliberalism Across the Labor Market

As Jordanian leaders have shifted towards a neoliberal policy framework over the past two decades, the state has institutionalized a combination of strong worker protection laws and weak enforcement mechanisms as a way of creating favorable labor market conditions for Jordanian business interests. One could easily attribute the same combination of protective laws and weak

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21 This analysis will focus on Syrian refugee employment policy as it existed prior to a shift in January 2016. This change will be discussed in depth in the conclusion of this thesis.
enforcement to a straightforward lack of state capacity: in some cases, states may strive to enforce laws but lack the money or expertise to form effective teams of inspectors. In this case, however, I will argue that Jordanian leaders have incorporated de facto limits on worker protections and deliberately weak enforcement mechanisms directly into the documents governing the Jordanian labor market. They have done so as part of a neoliberal project to create a flexible supply of labor, largely unprotected by the state, that Jordanian enterprises can use to increase their profits. In this sense, Jordan’s effective deregulation of the labor market mimics the more open labor market deregulation that has taken place in other neoliberal states.22

To illustrate this point, this section will review two key documents that have shaped labor market policy in Jordan: the nation’s 1996 labor code and its 2001 free trade agreement with the United States. Though Jordanian authorities did not complete the overhaul of the nation’s 1960 labor code until 1996, they began discussing the possibility of a new code almost immediately after the Jordanian government signed its first agreement with the International Monetary Fund in 1989 (Posusney 288). Negotiations around the new labor code were accompanied by the elimination of some private sector jobs and the creation of qualified industrial zones (QIZs) exempt from a number of labor laws. Meanwhile, the code itself created apparent compromises between labor and the state that effectively curtailed workers’ rights (Posusney 288, Jordan Labour Code Sections 134-5).23 Particularly in the private sector, Posusney also notes that employers regularly violate labor laws “with the tacit compliance of the government” (Posusney 283).

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22 Insert Harvey 70 (card 257) if I want a quote here. I love how I’ve already used my lit review to show how a.) capital accumulation is neoliberal and b.) labor market flexibility fits into that picture → I don’t have to do all the theory here!

23 Specifically, workers cannot strike after a settlement if their concerns are related to the content or implementation of the settlement in any way. Since workers presumably brought up their primary concerns during the negotiation process, and are likely to be concerned largely with implementation in the period after a settlement, this effectively bars most strikes in the post-settlement period.
Though the Free Trade Agreement signed by Jordan and the United States in 2001 appeared to close some of these gaps and reaffirm the Jordanian government’s commitment to labor protections, some have argued that this document actually weakened these protections by creating ambiguity in Jordanian labor law and undercutting enforcement. Like the 1996 labor code, the 2001 US-Jordan FTA emerged in a moment when neoliberalism represented a particularly central aspect of Jordanian policy-making. Upon taking the throne in 2000, King Abdullah II let loose a “flood” of economic reforms that further deregulated and privatized much of the Jordanian economy (Schwedler 2010 550). The agreement itself also reflects the neoliberal tenor of Jordanian and American politics in this period: it contained tariff removal, reinforcements of intellectual property protections, and other measures typical of the United States’ trade agreements during the 1990s and early 2000s (Rosen 62-64). Less typically, the US-Jordan FTA was the first US trade agreement with specific, enforceable language on labor protections. Even the strongest pro-labor clauses in the agreement, however, hold very little substance upon close examination. It is hard to make out how a “sustained or recurring course of…inaction,” for instance, could constitute adequate enforcement of international standards. Weiss also notes the “opaqueness” of this document, claiming that its ambiguity makes the agreement less meaningful and harder to enforce (Weiss 713-6, 718). And lest there be any lingering concern that one party might use these mechanisms to actually enforce the agreement, US and Jordanian trade representatives traded letters immediately after the passage of the FTA agreeing that neither side would initiate the formal dispute settlement process (Rosen 70). “Beneath a façade of progress,” Weiss writes of the free trade agreements of this era that “these agreements may actually decrease the scope of the substantive national commitments to provide labor protections for workers, the strength of those commitments, and their overall enforceability” (Weiss 697). This pattern of
strong protectionist rhetoric and simultaneous pullbacks on effective regulation can be seen in the case of migration policy as well.

Migration, Worker Protections, and Capital Accumulation

Featuring a similar combination of strong laws and weak enforcement, Jordan’s migration policies fit into the same neoliberal, pro-business framework that dominates its labor market policies as a whole. Under Jordanian law, non-citizens generally need work permits to live in Jordan (De Bel Air 2007 5). These permits must be renewed annually, and a worker can be deported and/or fined if found to be lacking proper documentation. Since another piece of legislation was passed in 1996, the law also limits foreign workers to employment in specific industries, including construction, domestic services, cleaning, and agriculture (De Bel Air 2007 5). But according to Ahmed Awad, president of the organization Jordan Labor Watch, enforcement of these laws has been “very weak.” The government likes to play up its inspection and enforcement campaigns, he said, “but on the ground there are no campaigns” (Awad). As a result of this lack of enforcement, even government officials acknowledge that the true number of foreign workers in Jordan dwarfs the number of work permits granted by the Department of Labor (Hazaimeh Dec 2012). Though these numbers are somewhat hazy, due to the illicit nature of undocumented work, some estimate that approximately half of all foreign workers in Jordan lack permits. And while Jordan’s Ministry of Labor periodically organizes the kind of public enforcement campaign that Awad described, it intersperses these campaigns with amnesty periods. In 2012 and 2013, for instance, the government gave Egyptian workers more than five periods to straighten out their legal status. Not coincidentally, the minister of labor confirmed this while speaking with a representative from Egypt’s ministry of foreign affairs; certain interests in Jordan, including Egyptian diplomats, do not wish to see strong enforcement of migration policies in

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24 This law was created in 1984.
Jordan (“[Ministry of] Labor: He Granted Egyptian Labor Five Periods to Resolve Their Migration Status in Past Two Years”).

Business owners in Jordan benefit from a lack of effective government regulation with regards to labor migration, and have used their influence in the Jordanian government to limit enforcement and push for policies that match their interests. Employers profit off of non-citizen workers who do not qualify for the same minimum wage, do not ask for benefits, and are “willing to work longer hours for less pay” (Kawar and Ajluni 10). As Awad noted, they clearly lack an incentive to organize or regulate the labor market. Further, he argued that they have a great deal of power within the government. Over the past twenty years, he said, all but one of the ministers of labor have been from the business sector (Awad). Linda Al-Kalash, director of the Jordanian human rights non-profit Tamkeen Fields for Aid (Tamkeen), said that large-scale farm owners and domestic worker recruitment agencies also have a great deal of influence in Jordanian politics. To demonstrate this point, she described repeated delays in the passage of laws regulating the agricultural sector (Al-Kalash).

Even stronger evidence of employer and private sector pressure in support of deregulation comes from an article in the Jordan Times from April, 2013. The minister of labor had recently decided to stop providing permits to incoming migrant workers, effectively putting an end to the recruitment of farm laborers from abroad. In response, farm owners immediately made their voices heard: not only did they publically assert that the change was not fair to farm owners, as it restricted their labor supply and gave their current workers leverage to push for higher wages, but they also participated in a sit-in outside of Jordan’s parliament. Showcasing the connections and resources available to the private sector, the Amman Chamber of Commerce Chairman send a memo to the Ministry of Labor asking that certain categories of Amman businesses be excluded from the new restrictions. This pressure from the private sector had immediate effects. The prime
minister himself became involved, urging the minister of labor to reconsider. And “in response to farmers’ pressure,” the agriculture minister wrote an official memo to the labor minister in which he asked the minister to continue providing work permits for agricultural workers (Omari). When large employers feel that a regulation might infringe on their profits, they can mobilize considerable political power to defeat it. Yet at times, the semblance of effective regulation may actually be in employers’ best interest.

In the case of migration, the model of strong laws and weak enforcement doubly benefits employers: not only do weak regulations allow them to employ whomever they want under any kind of conditions, but the façade of strong anti-migration legislation also allows them to manipulate workers who cannot access legal status. Practically speaking, strong border control laws open migrants up to exploitation by removing any incentive for employers to maintain decent wages and working conditions; employers can also threaten to deport workers if they encounter any resistance, and workers rarely feel that they have the leverage to fight for their rights (Hiemstra, De Genova 2002 438). This may explain why some migration policies actually tightened in Jordan during the 1990’s, just as neoliberalism was becoming a driving principle in Jordanian leaders’ decision-making and deregulation was occurring in other areas.

As Van Aken shows, the case of Jordanian agriculture provides a good illustration of why Jordanian business owners may have sought more than the straightforward deregulation of migration. By this period, Jordanian farm owners already employed a substantial base of foreign workers to maintain the “intensive” farming techniques pioneered in the Jordan Valley in the 1970’s and 80’s. After a “market crisis” in 1985, however, farmers struggled to maintain profits while employing the large number of workers necessary to employ these techniques (Van Aken). Restrictions on cross-border migration were not the problem for employers in this case; the prevailing wages were. To truly support the financial needs of farm owners during this period, the
state had to do more than simply encourage migration. Rather, it had to ensure a steady supply of sufficiently cheap labor. Though one cannot establish a clear, linear link between farm owners’ needs and government policy, restrictive migration policies ultimately provided farmers with the cheap labor they needed by making foreign workers easier to exploit.

As Jordan has heightened its restrictions on migrants, Egyptians and workers of other nationalities have been caught in the web of illegality that Cámara, De Genova, Hiemstra and other theorists describe. As “docile manpower,” Van Aken writes, they have met modern farm owners’ needs for a large quantity of very cheap labor. Explaining how this relates to policy, Van Aken points to the government’s “indirect encouragement” of illegal migration and the “construction of vulnerability” within the migrant workforce. This is accomplished, he argues, through increased inspection campaigns and laws limiting migrants’ ability to change employers. Finally, he links these changes to the growth of rhetoric in Jordan describing Egyptians as “illegal immigrants” (Van Aken). Researchers from Tamkeen also assert that “the legal rules and practices applied in Jordan contribute to the problems faced by irregular migrant workers instead of limiting irregularity.” Though they do not attribute agency or intent to those who created these laws, they note that labor and migration laws in Jordan “facilitate economic exploitation and trafficking” (Al-Musa and Yacoub 4). They find in the majority of cases under study that migrant workers had lost legal status because their employers had chosen not to renew their paperwork, suggesting that employers make a deliberate choice to subject their workers to illegality.

**The Syrian Case: More of the Same**

Though some details differ in the Syrian case, the Jordanian government has generally extended the neoliberal policy framework described above to its treatment of Syrian refugees working in Jordan. Not only has the state applied many of its existing immigration laws to incoming Syrians, despite the Syrians’ distinct status as asylum seekers, but it has also followed a
similar pattern of non-enforcement and taken additional measures to create widespread “illegality” among the Syrian refugee population. As a result of this legal framework, Syrian refugees have largely occupied the same role as Egyptian economic migrants in the Jordanian economy and have faced parallel forms of exploitation.

Since Syrians began to enter the country en masse in 2012, the Jordanian government has adopted a set of restrictive but ambiguous policies regarding refugee employment and residency. Multiple authors and interviewees have stated that Syrians can obtain permits through the same process as any other migrant worker, though the process is long and the number of permits limited (Su, JRP 195, Amman Employer 1, Amman Employer 3). Some sources add that refugees cannot get permits in sectors set aside for Jordanians, including medical services, haircutting, and over ten more (Su; “Legal Status of Refugees;” Awad). According to the law, Syrian refugees should also receive the lower minimum wage applied to migrant workers (“Migrant Workers in Jordan Are Making Their Voices Heard”). At the same time, Syrians’ differentiated status as refugees affects the legal landscape that they face in Jordan. Most crucially, the Jordanian government cannot openly deport Syrians back to their country of origin. To do so would be a public violation of international law. Second, as noted, a Syrian who took a permit forfeited his or her status as an asylum seeker prior to a policy change in February 2016 (Al-Kalash). Finally, Syrians must also cope with encampment policies that restrict their mobility and often force them into illegality. Though these policies differentiate Syrian refugees’ situation from that of other non-citizens, Jordan’s refugee employment and encampment policies share a common basis in the nation’s neoliberal framework.

25 Unsurprisingly, given the vagueness and confusion surrounding Jordanian migration and employment law, sources vary on the minimum wage applied to non-citizens. Al-Kalash quoted the figure 150 JD/mo, and Al-Musa and Yacoub state that it is 110 JD/mo for some industries and 150 JD/mo for others, while Kawar and Ajlouni imply that there was no minimum wage at all for non-citizens (Al-Kalash, Kawar and Ajlouni 10-12).
In the Syrian case, as in the case of Egyptians and other economic migrants, Jordan’s employment policies are strict on paper but loosely enforced; as described in previous sections, this policy framework tends to promote conditions of illegality. In an interview with Alice Su, a reporter from AlJazeera America, Al-Kalash argued that enforcement of refugee employment policies is “propaganda” (Su). She also noted that the country lacks a sufficient number of labor inspectors. Interviews also suggested that Syrians commonly work without permits and that enforcement is weak. Private sector employers and workers sometimes described inconsistent waves of enforcement, in which inspectors would stop by quite often for a period—sometimes multiple times per week—and then disappear for months (Mafraq Employer 1, Irbid Employer 1, Amman Worker 4). When the inspectors arrive, according to some accounts, it is relatively easy to evade arrest. One Syrian bakery worker, also interviewed for Su’s article, said that he pretended to be a customer when he sees the police approaching. Others reported that Syrians would simply leave the premises if they saw police coming or anticipated an inspection, then return as soon as the police were gone (Amman Small Business Owner, Amman Worker 9, Irbid Worker 2, Mafraq Employer 1 April 2015, Mafraq Manager 1). One employer in Mafraq, whom I will call “Osama,” even acknowledged that he receives calls from the police before they arrive, alerting him to their upcoming visit. “As you know,” he said, “we have a good network here” (Mafraq Employer 1). Allowing employers to profit from Syrian refugee labor, while depriving refugees

26 I spoke with a total of 13 workers, six employers, two managers, and one small-business owner with no employees specifically about refugee policy enforcement. One manager, one employer, and one worker mentioned these waves of workplace enforcement. No other interviewees from the private sector described the timing of labor inspection campaigns.

27 Of the 22 individuals in the private sector with whom I spoke about refugee policy enforcement, 11 specifically mentioned the effectiveness of police and inspectors’ efforts to catch Syrians who broke the law. Five workers and one employer stated that the police successfully catch Syrians who violate the law without mentioning evasion of arrest. Two workers, one employer, one manager, and one small business owner mentioned evasion of arrest, as described above.
themselves of legal status, this policy framework appears to promote illegality in line with the analysis described in previous sections.

Though Jordanian government’s residency policies concerning refugees do not fit neatly into the same pattern of strong law and weak enforcement, they nevertheless contribute to refugee workers’ overall vulnerability and inability to access legal status. As a general rule, these policies are highly ambiguous, inconsistent, and ad hoc; as a result, the system lacks transparency, fuels frightening rumors, and gives the government a great deal of latitude to handle individual cases as it likes. According to Musa Shteiwi, Director for the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, it is “one of the Jordanian ways” to work off of implicit policies that are neither written down nor publicized (Shteiwi). While there had been no formal change in the kefala system applied to Syrian refugees prior to Spring 2015, for instance, several private sector workers claimed that this policy has evolved over the past few years; neither the precise shape of the original policy, nor its evolution over time, is reflected in public government materials.28 In another “undeclared policy,” the Jordanian government may have begun filtering Syrians at the border based off of their gender and family status (Akram et. al). There are also rumors circulating among the Jordanian population that the government has deported some Syrians back to their home country in violation of international law. While some claim that the government only does this in response to security concerns, others believe that the government does it more broadly to project an image of toughness (Amman Worker 4).

Not only does the confinement of refugees to camps often force people into a state of illegality, but the ambiguousness of Jordan’s current encampment and residency policies tends to

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28 When Zaatari was first created, workers stated, employers could simply pay a fixed price to take whomever they wanted from the camp (Amman Worker 6, Amman Worker 7). Because non-citizens granted permission to work in Jordan are also typically bound to their employer and prohibited from seeking employment elsewhere, the original system bore a strong resemblance to state-promoted human trafficking (Al-Musa and Yacoub 12-13).28 But for the past year or two, Jordanian security has been clamping down on this system (Amman Worker 6, Amman Worker 7).
reinforce this vulnerable condition. As Saul Tobias writes with reference to encampment policies in various parts of Africa, “the prohibition on free movement, external employment, and trade, combined with declining food rations in the camp, compels many camp-dwellers to seek external employment… under conditions of illegality, which greatly advantage native employers” (Tobias 8). The Jordanian government’s inconsistent inspections and use of the kafala system, described above, could easily serve a similar function. Ominous rumors would naturally tend to increase feelings of insecurity among Syrians living and working without documentation outside of the camps, potentially making them less able to assert their rights in the workplace. Tobias’s work shows how ambiguity in refugee policy can contribute to the conversion of refugees into easily-controlled laborers by allowing the government to declare them “illegal” at any time (Tobias 7). Conversely, Awad noted that vague or complicated policies can be harder to implement; this may give the government greater scope to avoid enforcement when this is a desirable strategy. As one might imagine, based on this theory, Syrian refugees in Jordan often describe the same kinds of illegality and exploitation that countless authors have described in the North American and European cases.

A composite of Syrian refugee workers’ stories from local and international news outlets, as well as several stories from interviews, suggest that these refugees have faced the same forms of exploitation as other “illegal” workers around the world. One man said that he could not possibly attain legal status, as it would cost him two months’ rent to pay for a permit; he had already been fined four times for working illegally (Arraf). This example illustrates that refugees are effectively responsible for securing their own legal status, that the burden of penalties falls upon workers rather than employers, and that enforcement efforts serve to remind workers of their vulnerable status rather than effectively prevent them from working. Facing what is arguably one of the most egregious forms of exploitation in Jordan today, other refugees have left the camp
through the kefala system only to find themselves working under slavery conditions on nearby farms in Northern Jordan; according to Al-Kalash, some farm owners require their refugee employees to work in exchange for nothing but a patch of ground on which to pitch a tent. Under Jordanian law, they do not have a clear right to leave or seek employment elsewhere.

Affecting more than just a handful of workers, the phenomenon of refugee illegality has become a structural part of the Jordanian labor market. According to the ILO, over fifty percent of male refugees outside the camp participate in the labor force (Hillesund and Stave 5). Of those who are employed, the ILO found that “nearly all” work without permits and thus in a way considered illegal by the state (“International Study: Syrian Refugees Work Under Harsh Conditions and Pressure the Labor Market”). Mirroring the employment patterns of Egyptians, another group of workers subjected to illegality, Syrians are most likely to work in construction, retail, wholesale trade, or agriculture (Hillesund and Stave 5-6). On average, they work longer hours than Jordanian workers for considerably lower pay. The ILO reported in 2015 that approximately a third of Syrian refugee workers put in more than sixty hours per week; of this number, about half worked more than eighty hours (Hillesund and Stave 73). And where a Jordanian worker might receive 15-20 JD per hour for skilled labor, a Syrian might have no choice to accept 8-10 JD (“Municipal Needs Assessment Report” 51). For the most part, Syrians face low wages and poor conditions in the workplace with few legal protections.

By preventing refugees from working and maintaining legal status at the same time, this policy framework consistently works to the benefit of Jordanian business owners and thus promotes capital accumulation in line with neoliberal principles. Al-Kalash agreed that employers profit from this refugees’ particular vulnerability. First-person interviews with employers also

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29 According to convention in economic literature, the category “labor force participant” includes both those who have jobs and those who are currently seeking work.
provided specific examples of how Jordanian businesses might profit off of Syrian labor. These interviews revealed that there is nuance to this issue: some employers have employed Syrians legally and paid them equitably, whether out of consideration of their hardship, respect for their work ethic, or a desire to attract Syrian workers with particularly valuable skills (Reznick, Arraf, Amman Employer 1, Amman Employer 3). But the statistics above show that this is not the most common story. The experience of Syrian refugees working at a small grouping of shops in Mafraq, only a ten-minute drive from the Syrian border and a twenty-minute drive from Zaatari, may provide a more typical case. Osama, a member of the family that owns the shopping complex, acknowledged that they have made considerable amounts of money as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis, particularly as a result of refugees’ high demand for food. Openly admitting to hiring refugees without permits, he added that the family company employs Syrians both inside Zaatari and at the shopping complex. To explain why he pays refugees in Zaatari less than their Jordanian counterparts, he noted that Jordanians had to pay to transport to the camp but Syrians did not (Mafraq Employer 1). The Syrians in the shopping complex also accepted lower wages than Jordanians, another manager said, because of their need. Due to this differential, he found Syrian refugee employment to be highly beneficial to business owners (Mafraq Manager 1). If one understands neoliberalism as a policy framework that privileges and promotes the accumulation and concentration of capital by private actors, even at the cost of widespread dispossession, Jordan’s response to the Syrian refugee influx is clearly neoliberal.

Despite all this exposition, however, one thing still does not seem to add up: if the Jordanian government has been working towards effective deregulation in the labor market, in line with neoliberal principles, why have Jordanian political leaders bothered to put strong laws on the books to govern migrants and reinforce some forms of enforcement? Complicating the narrative of effective deregulation through lack of enforcement, one could point out that Jordan held generally
laissez-faire migration policies in the 1980’s based on “a free enterprise ideology.” Over the next several decades, however, as De Bel Air states, Jordan began to take at least nominally “drastic” measures to control the “entry, stay, and employment patterns of foreigners” in the form of both stronger policies and some forms of tightened enforcement (De Bel Air 2007 5). At this point, it should be clear that such policies often went unenforced and did not genuinely impinge on business owners’ profits. Further, as noted, strong laws sometimes benefited employers—and thus promote capital accumulation—by rendering migrants more vulnerable. But these considerations, albeit significant, cannot entirely explain why Jordan went such through a dramatic show of heightened regulation and enforcement in the 1990’s and 2000’s. The pageantry of large-scale inspection campaigns, for instance, is not strictly-speaking necessary to deprive “illegal” migrants of their rights; the government could simply fail to recognize “illegal” migrants’ claims on the state, and deport them if they push back against the system. Yet showy, ineffective inspection campaigns have become an established part of Jordanian migration policy as applied to Egyptian economic migrants (“Labour Ministry detains 362 illegal workers,” “Ministry deports 3,150 guest workers in three months,” Amman Worker 4).30 To fully understand this series of events, and reconcile what appears to be a contradiction in the argument above, one must understand not only the internal logic of neoliberalism itself but also the tactics that governments commonly use to legitimate it.

30 These citations represents only a small sample of the data on government enforcement campaigns.
Chapter 2: Public Opinion, State Rhetoric, and the Refugee as Criminal “Other”

As Jordanians have begun to question the basis of their state’s refugee employment policies, some might expect the government to portray Syrian refugees as criminals and aliens. This may seem like an extreme suggestion, given the sympathy that Syrian refugees have garnered in the international media (George-Cosh and Parkinson, Hartocollis), but it is the outcome predicted by much of the existing literature on neoliberal immigration policies and the construction of immigrant illegality. As these sources have shown, governments with neoliberal immigration policies have often responded to popular concerns by redirecting public attention to the faults of immigrants themselves. Some authors have taken this line of analysis a step further: according to Susan Coutin, Nicholas De Genova, and Nancy Hiemstra, for instance, state rhetoric portraying immigrants as criminal and alien has become an crucial, even integral part of the systems and policies that maintain populations of “illegal” immigrants in nations around the world (De Genova 2002 438, Hiemstra 77, Willen). As others have noted, however, the literature on immigrant illegality has been heavily focused on economic migration from the Global South to the Global North. Even at first glance, it is easy to see the potential problem with extending these arguments to the Jordanian case: would most Jordanian citizens really be willing to go so far as to call fellow Muslims and Arabs “criminals” for fleeing a brutal civil war right across the border? Would they perceive refugees’ decision to leave cramped, under-resourced, and generally desolate refugee camps as a criminal act? It is worth asking whether dehumanizing anti-migrant rhetoric has the same resonance when new arrivals speak the same language as native citizens, have the same skin color, share a religious background, and arrive fleeing a conflict of which citizens are also acutely aware. And if this type of rhetoric fails, one might ask, can governments sustain neoliberal immigration policies without it?
Looking beyond the most studied cases in the Global North, this chapter will argue that “otherizing” rhetoric may not always aid the state in its efforts to legitimate neoliberal immigration policies. The Jordanian government has already pushed Syrian refugees into a state of illegality, as described in Chapter 1, thereby adopting some of the same immigration policies as neoliberal states in the Global North. But refugees’ humanitarian situation, combined with shared identities that unite Syrian and Jordanian citizens, seems to have limited the government’s ability to use racializing and criminalizing rhetoric against Syrians to legitimate these policies or distract from larger structural problems in Jordan. In the public view, as the first section of this chapter will show, there appears to be a tension between the perception of refugees as criminals or aliens and the image of brothers and sisters seeking refuge in Jordan because they have no other choice. The second portion of this chapter will explore how this tension affects not only Jordanians’ perception of Syrian refugees themselves, but also their perception of relevant policies and their response to rhetoric about the refugee situation. Because the Jordanian state cannot easily justify its current policies by arguing that Syrian refugees deserve harsh treatment, citizens may be more likely to question—or even push back against—the neoliberal principles on which current immigration policies are based. Finally, consistent with the idea that this strategy cannot win the government much popular support, the third section of this chapter will show that the state has used less racializing, criminalizing rhetoric than one might expect based on other case studies.

**Syrians in Jordan: Criminals or Refugees?**

Despite the links among racialization, criminalization, and neoliberal migration policy documented in other settings, fieldwork suggested that alternate, humanitarian discourses have gained more influence among students and private sector workers in Jordan. Of course, some Jordanians certainly do view Syrian refugees as criminals and outsiders in their country; if one deliberately searches for criminalizing, or “otherizing” language against Syrian refugees in Jordan,
it is not hard to find. One professor from the University of Jordan, for instance, said that refugees often come from Daesh, al-Nusra, or the Syrian regime; that they often live “a more comfortable life in Jordan” than native Jordanians because they exploit the UN’s aid system; and that the government should put refugee camps far out in the desert as a disincentive to Syrians who might want to cross the border (Al-Madi). A man whose family owns a business in Amman described Syrian refugee workers as unreliable cheats and “bad people” (Amman Employer 2). An accountant in Irbid made similar arguments (Irbid Employer 1). In the newspapers, one can also find Jordanian columnists using vaguely criminalizing rhetoric from time to time, even if these articles do not use the words “criminal” or “violator” to discuss refugees (Tadris May 2015, Zubeidi September 2013). But these examples are offset by the majority of Jordanians interviewed, particularly those from the working class, who expressed somewhat more moderate views.

Without exception, interviewees from working-class occupations either expressed no ill will toward refugee workers or directed their anger at specific groups and perceived offenses rather than at refugee workers as a bloc. In Amman, a worker whom I will call “Muhammad” became very heated during our discussion. Most refugees should not work, he insisted, and no refugee should work without government permission. But even as he made these points, he made a distinction between Syrians who arrived with money (and therefore should not work) and refugees who were truly desperate (Amman Worker 9). When I asked a group of young men working at a pastry shop in Irbid whether they thought Syrian refugees were a threat to Jordan, one said “taqreeban,” which translates to “almost” or “approximately.” He continued: “some of them are good, some not.” Two of his co-workers agreed, one adding that “most of them are good” (Irbid Workers 3-6). More hostilely, a supervisor at a business in Amman (“Ahmad”) expressed frustration at the fact that “90 percent” of Syrians worked without permits. Of all the statements
made in my interviews, this comment was the closest approximation of a private sector worker condemning all refugees as criminals—but he still refrained from blanket condemnation of all refugees in the workforce (Amman Worker 1). To the extent that they frame Syrians as desperate refugees, the Jordanians I interviewed do not appear to frame them as calculating criminals; to the extent that they see refugees as members of the same religious and cultural groups, they do not see them as racialized “others.”

Perception of Syrians as a Racial Grouping

Considering the central role of racialization in the maintenance of neoliberal migration policies, at least according to existing literature, Jordanian interviewees appeared less inclined than expected to deploy racialized rhetoric against Syrian refugees in their communities. The evidence in support of this point is suggestive rather than conclusive, but nevertheless merits consideration. First, there are historical and social reasons to believe that Jordanian citizens would be less likely to use racialized language in this context. In the United States, politicians can play off of a history of racial bias against Latinos going back decades, if not centuries (Gerken 30). This is not simply true in the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan. There has been extensive movement across the Syrian-Jordanian border for as long as it has existed, with several large tribal families split between countries, and Jordan has no historical conflict with Syria akin to the fraught history between Syria and Lebanon. Due to this history of peace, open borders, and family ties between the two nations, as well as geographic factors, the Jordanian dialect of Arabic is much closer to the Syrian dialect than to either the Iraqi or the Egyptian. Finally, most Muslims in both Syria and Jordan identify as Sunni. Even with the differences that do exist between the Jordanian
and Syrian people, convincing Jordanians from border provinces to treat Syrians as racial “others” would seem like a potentially challenging undertaking.\(^{31}\)

Evidence from interviews was inconclusive on this point, but generally suggested that Jordanians from host communities are at least likely to see Syrians as “brothers” who share common identities than to view them through a racialized or xenophobic lens. Multiple interviewees used the word “brothers” or “family” to refer to Syrian refugees; even newspaper columns calling for heavier restrictions on refugee mobility refer to Syrians as “brothers” (Al-Zubaidi September 2013). Though this came up most in interviews with employers, perhaps because some employers have reason to advocate for looser, more welcoming refugee policies, interviewees also mentioned Syrians’ shared identities as Muslims and Arabs (Amman Employer 1, Irbid Worker 2, Mafraq Manager 2). According to one employer, for instance, the government should make it easier for Syrians to get work permits because “according to our religion it is necessary to help other Muslims” (Amman Employer 1). In combination with these references to shared identity, it is worth noting the absence of overt racial or xenophobic animosity directed against Syrian refugees during interviews with private sector workers.\(^{32}\)

*Perceptions of Syrian Refugee Criminality*

Consistent with several anthropologists’ comments on immigrants’ “deservingness,” Jordanians’ awareness of Syrian refugees’ vulnerability and humanitarian need have directly counteracted the idea that Syrians are criminals who arrived in Jordanian communities illegally. According to Susan Coutin, Sébastien Chauvin and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, it is possible for migrant groups to make themselves “less illegal” by showing that their own stories correspond to

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\(^{31}\) Of course, stereotypes and perceived differences do exist. Hillesund and Stave note, for example, the varying extent to which Jordanians perceive people of various nationalities to be reliable workers (Hillesund and Stave 111). It should also be noted that ethnic distinctions can exist among communities with many shared cultural and racial identities, and that boundaries among ethnicities can be “porous” (Wimmer 4).

\(^{32}\) Interviewees outside this category did sometimes express sentiments that could be described as xenophobic (Amman Employer 2).

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“prototypes” of deserving migrants. These prototypes take two primary forms: the migrant who is fleeing a desperate humanitarian situation and had no choice but to come to a new country, and the migrant who has fulfilled all the obligations of citizenship for a prolonged period and conducted his or herself as a useful member of society. Clearly, Syrian refugees have a potential claim to legal status and acceptance based on their humanitarian situation. But while Jordanians interviewed for this thesis overwhelmingly described Syrian refugees as hard workers with useful skills, it is much harder to establish whether this trait works in their favor against them. Several interviewees showed considerable trepidation about the idea that refugees might stay in Jordan in the long-term, making Syrians’ conduct as quasi-citizens less significant (Amman Employer 2, Amman Worker 5). In addition, some criticized refugees for taking jobs when they were already receiving aid as victims of a humanitarian crisis. The importance of vulnerability as a legitimating factor is much more clear-cut in this case, and will constitute the basis of this argument.

A substantial subset of interviewees spoke about the humanitarian condition of Syrian refugees, sometimes emphasizing that refugees had a right to come and asserting that the border must stay open. Private sector workers, students, and employers all brought up the “humanitarian” side of the refugee issue, though I never alluded to the situation that refugees themselves face in my questions (Amman Worker 1, Mafraq Employer 1 May 2015, University of Jordan Student 4). One employer said that all people have the right to a “heeya kareema,” which translates roughly to “a dignified, humane life” (Amman Employer 1). Another interviewee, a student called “Faiz,” kept repeating the word “feeling” insistently in English to emphasize how strongly he felt about the “humanitarian situation” that Syrian refugees faced (University of Jordan Student 4). Asked if the Jordanian government should close the border, several interviewees said no on the grounds that they had nowhere else to go. “They are human beings,” one man said in response to this question. “If you put your feet in their shoes, you will feel the pain” (Mafraq Youth). This is a
clear example of migrants’ vulnerability legitimizing their presence and offsetting potential social and economic concerns. At the same time, because the Jordanian government has not officially barred Syrian refugees from crossing the border and entering camps, this result reveals very little about the potential for humanitarian concerns to overcome illegality and the criminalization that often accompanies it. It is also worth noting the relative infrequency of direct references by private sector workers to humanitarian concerns or refugees’ rights.

**Viewing Policy Through a Humanitarian Lens**

Among both workers and students in Jordan, there were some indications that the perception of Syrians as deserving refugee “brothers” has impacted citizens’ ideal policies, response to rhetoric, and views of the current refugee response. Much of this can simply be extrapolated from the results above. The more Jordanian citizens identify with Syrian refugees and understand them as vulnerable and deserving, the more difficult it should become to justify harsh policies that force them into illegality. Nor would one expect politicians to win a clear or easy advantage by tapping into racial or ethnic prejudices if many citizens do not hold such prejudices in the first place. Further, based on the terms in which Syrian workers and students spoke about refugee employment policy, government attempts to scapegoat refugees appear very likely to backfire to some extent. Even if some Jordanians are swayed by these tactics, as some clearly are, others are likely to find this kind of state rhetoric alienating and may reduce their support for state policies.

Clearly illustrating the link between humanitarian discourses and the de-legitimization of harsh refugee policies, some interviewees expressed sympathy for the suffering that Syrians experienced directly as a result of Jordanian government decisions. Some interviewees, for instance, said they did not view refugees’ confinement to camps as an acceptable long-term outcome due to the harsh conditions within them. One unemployed man in East Amman, despite
his opinion that refugees should be prevented from entering Jordanian host communities, acknowledged that “it’s not fair for them to stay in the camp like this” (Amman Man). Another worker said he opposed the stronger restrictions on refugee mobility that the government had recently put in place. The refugees are not animals, he said. They should come to the city (Amman Worker 6). Echoing this point, a student from the University of Jordan said there is no “dignified life” in the refugee camps. She had visited Zaatari the year before with CARE International and had been struck by the cramped quarters and the prevalence of illness. Refugees should stay in the camp if life is good there, she said, but if the government failed to improve the camps, refugees should leave and come to the cities (University of Jordan Student 7). Similarly, some workers expressed understanding of Syrian refugees’ need for work—despite contemporary restrictions that effectively precluded legal employment for most Syrian refugees. Asked if the government should prevent all refugees from working, one worker commented that the poorest, most underserved Syrians should be allowed to find employment (Amman Worker 9). (On a similar note, one employer commented that “they should work because they have to eat” (Amman Employer 3).) Another worker, “Saif,” said that refugee employment “needs to be arranged, but not in this way, where it’s oppressing some people” (Amman Worker 4). Based on their sympathy for Syrians’ situation, none of these interviewees supported maximally restrictive refugee policies. Of course, this smattering of quotes cannot fully capture the ways in which humanitarian sentiments have shaped Jordanians’ views on policy; the sections below will look separately at university students and private sector workers’ views of policy, for a more nuanced view.

*University Students, Humanitarianism, and Refugee Policy*

Because some university students adopted the humanitarian discourse surrounding the “refugee crisis,” sometimes showing solidarity with the government as it coped with the refugee “burden,” they do not want to hear language describing refugees as criminals or see evidence that
the government has been adopting harsh refugee policies. Evidence on these points comes largely from the two university students I interviewed at greatest length, as well as survey data that I gathered from a biology class at the University of Jordan. The first student, from Yarmouk University, I will refer to as “Selma.” The second, from the University of Jordan, I will call “Raghad.” Both Selma and Raghad said that they felt a collective duty to assist refugees. “We must help them,” Raghad said, “because they’re homeless” (University of Jordan Student 5 April 2015). Selma said that the refugee presence puts a “burden” on the people of Jordan, arguing that it was impossible to be a citizen of Jordan, seeing someone in this situation, and give no support (Yarmouk University Student 1).

Based on their perception of the government as a humanitarian actor facing nearly insurmountable challenges, some students expressed solidarity with the state and voiced appreciation for what they viewed as permissive, welcoming refugee policies. Asked what the government has done in response to the refugee influx, Raghad said that the government “gives them care for everything.” She emphasized how hard the government has tried to help both Syrians and Jordanians in the face of mounting financial costs (University of Jordan Student 5 April 2015). Selma expressed very similar views. “The government is doing the best it can,” she said, in the face of budgetary problems. “As Jordanians we are supposed to support the government in this issue.” She strongly emphasized this last point, repeating it before moving on (Yarmouk University Student 1). This solidarity is perhaps linked to the commonalities between what she perceived as Jordanian individuals’ duty to support refugees and the burden that had been placed on the government. Rather than describing herself as allied with the state against some kind of refugee-related threat, however, Selma suggested that she stands with the Jordanian state against an international community that had failed to adequately support Jordan as it struggled under the refugee “burden.” It was “seriously shocking” to hear that the UN might defund some
humanitarian programs, she said, because the international community should be aware of the Jordanian government’s lack of funds (Yarmouk University Student 1).

Showing that Selma and Raghad are not isolated in their views, the average Jordanian student surveyed somewhat agreed with the statement that “the government is trying very hard to manage the refugee crisis and we should all be supportive of its efforts in this area.” It is worth noting that students did not respond as positively to a similar statement about the government’s efforts to reduce unemployment, suggesting that something about the refugee situation—whether its humanitarian dimensions, its external imposition on Jordan, or its illustration of the international community’s failure to back the Jordanian government—generated stronger solidarity. It is also possible that students were more personally impacted by government employment programs and thus more aware of their shortcomings.

Because students were by-and-large unconcerned about the impact of refugee employment on their lives, the humanitarian dimension of this issue was more likely to outweigh their fear of labor market effects. In fact, a lack of strong feelings about refugee employment constituted one of the most significant survey results: the statement “I feel that the issue of Syrian refugee employment is connected to my life” was met with an average response of 3.26, corresponding to “neither agree nor disagree,” with responses concentrated at the median. Similarly, the statement “I am aware of the government’s policy regarding refugee employment and understand it completely” garnered responses clustered around “neither agree nor disagree,” with an average of 2.96. Perhaps most tellingly, only two out of ten distinct statements related to Syrian refugee employment and policy yielded average responses statistically distinct from neutral. Potentially

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33 Due to an error by the researcher, only half of the sample received a survey with this question on it. However, there is no reason to believe that this error introduced bias into the sample, as surveys were distributed randomly.

34 The two exceptions were, as previously noted, the statement “the government should do more to prevent refugee employment” and the statement “the government is trying very hard to manage the refugee crisis and we should all support its efforts.”


explaining these results, students did not view Syrian refugees and university graduates as competitors for the same jobs.\textsuperscript{36}

Illustrating how concern for refugees’ humanitarian needs, solidarity with the government’s humanitarian efforts, and a disconnect with the informal labor market have come together to influence some students’ views of refugee employment, several students noted how glad they were that the government did not require Syrian refugees to obtain work permits. Most generally, survey results indicated that Jordanian youth have slightly negative views of the statement “the government should do more to prevent refugees from working.” More specifically, Raghad very firmly declared that it was \textit{not} forbidden for refugees to work and that they did not need permits to do so. If the government were to pass a new law requiring work permits, she said, that would be a very bad thing; in fact, she described such a policy as an abrogation of the government’s humanitarian responsibilities (University of Jordan Student 5 April 2015).

Similarly, Faiz said that Syrian refugee employment was a “very good” thing and emphasized the humanitarian dimensions of this issue. Oddly specifically, he insisted that Egyptian economic migrants needed work permits but Syrian refugees did not (University of Jordan Student 4).\textsuperscript{37} Of course, both students were misstating the government’s policies as described by both international organizations and actors in the informal economy. But they liked this version of government policy, and the government therefore had little incentive to correct them with campaigns publically

\textsuperscript{35} In this and all subsequent analysis of questions based on the Likert scale, a result will be said to be “negative” or “positive” only if a two-tailed test at alpha =0.1 refutes the hypothesis that the population average is 3 (a neutral response.) If the test fails, the result will be said to be neutral. The same test will also be the basis for claims of statistical significance.

\textsuperscript{36} On average, students had a neutral response to the statement “After I graduate, I will compete with Syrians for the same jobs.” Further, when provided with a list of nine professional positions and asked to select the ones that Jordanian university graduates and Syrian refugees were most likely to take, students’ top three choices for Jordanian university graduates did not overlap at all with their top three choices for Syrian refugees. (“Homemaker” was ranked first for university students and fourth for Syrian refugees).

\textsuperscript{37} One might speculate that this confusion occurred because the government largely avoids references to nationality in its statements on labor market inspection campaigns. This will be discussed in a subsequent section. Further, these campaigns did largely target Egyptians prior to the beginning of the Syrian refugee influx.
expressing animosity towards refugees or clearly criminalizing their employment. The picture is a little different, however, when it comes to workers in the informal sector who have more directly experienced the impact of Syrian refugee employment on the Jordanian labor market—yet the government still has little reason to racialize, criminalize, or scapegoat refugees to this audience, as will be shown.

*Private Sector Workers and Government Responsibility*

Several Jordanian private sector workers, unwilling to blame refugees for working or leaving the camp, placed responsibility for labor market problems firmly on the government’s shoulders instead; this, of course, is precisely the outcome that racializing, criminalizing, and scapegoating rhetoric is typically meant to avoid. In the clearest instance of this trend, a supervisor called “Ahmad” said that he believed the government should do more to prevent Syrians from working, particularly if they lack proper permits. But when asked whether he became angry when he saw Syrians working, he said no, citing the humanitarian aspects of refugees’ situation. This man was no stranger to the idea that Syrians might be taking Jordanian jobs, or that they were working illegally; he was aware of both criminalizing and humanitarian discourses surrounding Syrian refugee employment, but ultimately leaned towards the latter. I asked him next whether he became angry at the government. This time, he responded with a clear yes; he even agreed that this issue had colored his perception of the government as a whole. When the government got everything set with refugees, he said, he would be happy (Amman Worker 1).

A few other workers shared similar views, avoiding generalizations of refugees as criminals and instead emphasizing the government’s responsibility to find some means of preventing Syrian refugees from causing problems in the labor market. Rather than arguing that all Syrians should be prohibited from working, for instance, Muhammad made a clear exception for refugees in desperate financial straits. Not all refugees who wanted to work should be treated as
criminals, he claimed. But they should all seek permission before working, in his view, and it is essential to distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving (Amman Worker 9). Another worker, “Ratib,” said he was deeply conflicted about the idea of allowing Syrian refugees to work without permits: he wanted Syrians to have opportunities, he said, but he didn’t want to end up at home, washing clothes with his wife. Asked if he was satisfied with the government’s response to the issue of refugee employment, he emphasized Syrians’ shared identity as Muslims and said explicitly he didn’t want the government to cause problems for Syrian refugees. Instead, he said, he wanted the government to find some other means of maintaining control (Irbid Worker 2).

Given this political climate, additional references to the “deviant” behavior of Syrian refugee workers are just as likely to spark new criticisms of government policy as they are to garner support. If a significant portion of observers view the negative impact of Syrian refugee employment as the government’s fault, not the fault of refugees themselves, harping on this issue will not deflect Jordanians from critical examination of their government. This makes refugee workers a highly ineffective scapegoat. In fact, as will be shown in the following section on government messaging and media, references to Syrians’ impact on the labor market are more often heard in critiques of government policy than in statements of approval or solidarity.

**Public Opinion and Government Messaging Strategies**

For the most part, the government’s actual rhetoric and messaging tactics seem to reflect the idea that racializing, criminalizing, and scapegoating Syrians are not widely effective means of legitimizing harsh refugee policies in this context. Strikingly, the government has largely avoided strong blaming statements regarding refugees. To the extent that the government deploys dehumanizing language in its statements about Syrians, it generally refers to them as an aggregate “burden” or “crisis” rather than as a racial grouping (“Jordan preparing three-year plan for refugee crisis,” “Jordan presents refugee burden case as it chairs UNSC meeting”). Nor has the Jordanian
government emphasized the status of Syrian people as a distinct group with particular racial characteristics; the government has also avoided any direct references to the “cultural threat” that Syrian refugees might represent or the perceived threat posed by refugee fertility and population dilution, two common racializing tropes from the US case (Newton 154-155).

Even in cases when criminalizing language would seem natural or expected, the government has not criminalized Syrian refugees extensively in its statements on labor market enforcement campaigns. It is true that the Ministry of Labor consistently uses the word “mukhalif,” meaning “deviant,” “violating,” or “illegal,” to refer to Syrian refugees working without permits in the labor force. At the same time, however, a majority of newspaper articles containing government statements on labor market enforcement campaigns deemphasize Syrian workers’ nationality, whether by burying references to it in the middle of a statement, listing it alongside other nationalities held by “violating” workers, or failing to mention it at all. As noted, much of the anti-migrant rhetoric in the United States case manages to convey racist messages without explicit references to race; the absence of direct references to nationality does not itself indicate an absence of racialization. But Jordan, in contrast with the United States, lacks a history of racial animosity on which politicians might base this kind of messaging strategy. Further, language about “illegal guest workers” in the Jordanian media has been associated with Egyptians at least as much as Syrians. A typical article published in July of 2013, for instance, notes the presence of “approximately eight hundred thousand workers of various nationalities, most of them Egyptian, approximately one hundred and seventy-five thousand of whom work in a way contrary to the law and without work permits.” Though Syrian refugees made up a notable part of Jordan’s

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38 These articles include, but are not limited to: “1,387 illegal workers deported,” “4,024 guest workers found in violation of regulations,” “Labour Ministry detains 362 illegal workers,” “Ministry of Labor: Deportation of 1208 Migrant Workers in Less Than a Month,” Namrouqa 2014, Namrouqa Feb 2015. Note that it is impossible to verify in some cases that the enforcement actions and decisions described in these articles impacted Syrians, but that the timing and content suggest that they did (see Achilli 5).
foreign workforce at this point in time, the article does not refer to Syrians at any point. Other articles exhibit the same tendency, citing Egyptians as the largest group of migrant workers without listing any other nationalities (“60 Days a New Deadline for Workers in Violation,” Namrouqa 2014). Particularly since the Egyptian labor force in Jordan is much longer-standing than its Syrian counterpart, it therefore seems unlikely that most Jordanians would automatically understand the phrase “illegal guest workers” as a coded reference to Syrian refugee workers.

Even when describing “illegal workers” from Syria, government statements for domestic audiences do not assertively link irregular labor to the threat of terrorism or other forms of criminality. For the most part, articles in Jordanian media about labor inspection campaigns are very short and direct; often, they simply state the number of “illegal workers” that the government has rounded up and perhaps some information about the timing of the campaign or the nationalities of the arrested. When they do feature a broader discussion of Syrian refugee employment, such articles include only limited or qualified references to potential Syrian criminality. One article, for instance, quotes Minister of Labor Nidal Katamine as arguing that Syrian labor in Jordan has a “negative impact on society.” While loaded, this is far from a direct claim that Syrian refugees are murderers or rapists. Another article more clearly links refugees to criminality, citing Interior Minister Hussein Majali’s claims that increasing crime rates in host communities can be attributed to the refugee presence. But immediately after making this statement, the minister added that “refugees from 43 countries reside currently in the Kingdom,” as if to deliberately avoid generalization and imply that refugees from these other, much smaller groups might be responsible as well (“Syrians constitute one-fifth of Amman population”). In one particularly notable case, an article describing a large deportation campaign eschewed language about criminality and punishment in favor of a discourse based on civic order. The presence of migrant laborers seeking work on bridges and traffic circles, according to this piece, “constitutes
an uncivilized phenomenon that adversely affects the movement of traffic and puts the workers’ lives at risk of motor accidents” (“Ministry of Labor: Deportation of 1208 Migrant Workers in Less Than a Month.”) Not only does this article lack criminalizing language, but it even frames deportation as a humanitarian measure taken for workers’ own protection. Such messaging seems closely attuned to some native Jordanians’ humanitarian concerns and desire for a more orderly labor market, as described above. It does not, however, fit the mold of racialization, criminalization, and scapegoating seen in other cases. Nor is criminalizing rhetoric against Syrian refugees visible in the context of non-labor issues.

Even in messages about new registration systems and tighter restrictions on refugee mobility, concepts tightly linked to security and criminalization in the United States, most arms of the government appear to have refrained from language emphasizing refugee criminality and terrorism. As always, there are exceptions: quotations directly from security officials and army representatives clearly describe registration through a security lens. But the trick here, as in other cases in this chapter, is to locate other instances when one would expect to find strong criminalizing rhetoric and it is notably muddied or absent. For instance, articles on the state’s iris registration system tend to downplay security concerns and potential refugee criminality (“Authorities to use iris-scanners to register Syrian refugees,” Malkawi July 2014). To the extent that officials cite a direct motivation for creating the program, they generally mention a desire to “streamline” the distribution of aid and services (“Syrians constitute one-fifth of Amman population”). Even when discussing an expansion of the iris registration system to guest workers in addition to refugees, a move clearly designed to give the government better control over a population often subject to illegality, officials have emphasized how humane the process is and avoided references to security or crime. “Iris recognition is a faster, more efficient and civilized method to record biometric information,” the Jordan Times cites a Labor Ministry official as
stating (Goussous) [emphasis added]. While the article references the Ministry of Labor’s intent to reduce illegal labor through this program, it does not include language describing “illegal workers” as criminal in any other sense. In the United States case, by contrast, it is frankly unimaginable that the public discourse surrounding a refugee or immigrant registration program would avoid references to security or criminality.

To see how mild Jordan’s domestic messaging on Syrian refugee criminality really is, at least from a comparative standpoint, it is necessary to examine its more aggressive rhetoric in international forums. When speaking with representatives from the international community, Jordanian officials have emphasized refugees’ potential criminality and terrorism as a means of legitimizing harsh policies and underscoring their need for international assistance. In response to international criticism about turning refugees away at the border, for instance, government spokesman Mohammad Momani explained that “Jordan maintains its open door policy…[but] we do have security concerns, and this group specifically came from the far northeast of Syria, areas that are controlled by Daesh” (Malkawi 17 Jan 2016)\(^\text{39}\) And speaking in advance of the London donors’ refugee conference in February 2016, Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour said that “His Majesty King Abdullah will make it very clear that the Syria crisis is no longer a refugee concern only but a security burden, an issue of sleeper cells, illicit drugs trafficking, terror and radicalism;” he then transitioned immediately into a plea for more aid (“What we have done for refugees is enough”). This language, and the general focus on security in Jordan’s international framing of refugee issues,\(^\text{40}\) slants far more towards criminalization than anything in the governments’ statements for domestic audiences. Very rarely, if at all, do Jordanian officials connect Syrian

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39 Daesh is an Arabic-language term for the Islamic State.
40 See Also: “Kingdom’s shared border with Syria a major security challenge.”
refugees to the Islamic State in their domestic rhetoric.\textsuperscript{41} And concern about “sleeper cells” can hardly be compared to the worry that Syrian laborers might get run over while seeking work in traffic circles. While it is easy to see how international observers might think that Jordan habitually criminalizes Syrian refugees, this is not generally the case.

This gap between international and domestic rhetoric can be seen with regards to scapegoating as well. Though the Jordanian government openly attributes unemployment to the refugee influx when addressing international audiences, generally as part of a plea for more aid, there is less evidence that the government has launched a scapegoating campaign intended for Jordanian citizens. Dr. Ahmed Awad, director of the Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies (“Phenix Center”) and an outspoken critic of the state’s labor market policies, said he did not believe the government had been scapegoating refugees within Jordan. “I didn’t hear any shaming words,” Awad said. “It’s a humanitarian discourse.” For the most part, Awad’s points are reflected in Jordanian media.

While it is possible to find a handful of articles for Jordanian audiences describing Syrian refugees as a source of unemployment, such articles are just as likely to criticize the government as they are to praise it; in fact, the most strident headlines decrying the effects of Syrian refugees consistently incorporate this rhetoric into broader indictments of government regulation and enforcement. Officially, the Ministry of Labor maintains that Syrian refugees contribute to Jordanian unemployment and other problems in the labor market. In articles under the headlines “Around 160,000 Syrians work illegally in Jordan” and “Minister of Labor: Heavy Competition Between Migrants and Jordanians for Jobs,” the Ministry has expounded on this position. But these were the only two government commentaries I found that clearly and firmly lay out the

\textsuperscript{41} While I have not read every article written in Jordanian media on the refugee influx, I have yet to see a claim that refugees often belong to Daesh.
perceived risk associated with Syrian refugee employment for a domestic audience. More frequently, government statements attributing unemployment to Syrian refugees run under quiet, non-alarmist headlines (Hazai meh 2015). “Building livelihood resilience amidst a refugee crisis,” ran one such headline from March, 2014, while another from January, 2015, stated “Ministry updating 10-year employment strategy due to changing market” (“Building Livelihoods Resilience,” Namrouqa Jan 2015) Both articles ultimately describe refugees as a source of unemployment, but the first does not mention unemployment until the fifth sentence and the second describes this effect in extremely indirect terms. “Highlighting the impact of the Syrian crisis on the local labor market,” the second article states, “…the refugee influx affected the northern governorates in particular” (Namrouqa Jan 2015). From the government, at least, one sees few strong, clear statements that Syrians are responsible for unemployment in Jordan.42

At the opposite end of the spectrum stand headlines like “Jordanians Losing Jobs to Syrian Refugees—Study” and “Syrian Refugee Employment Increases the Imbalances that Plague the Jordanian Labor Market,” penned by critics of government refugee policies or reporting on such critics’ complaints (Hazaimeh 2013).43 “Worsening Unemployment…and Increasing Number of Expats,” decries another such headline (Zubeidi Sept 2013). All three of these articles immediately move from statements about refugee employment’s detrimental effects to demands for stronger government action. The first of these articles, for instance, quotes Dr. Ahmed Awad as saying that the number of Syrian refugees working in Jordan “indicates the failure of the authorities’ efforts to curb the impact of Syrian refugees on the local labor sector” (Hazaimeh 2013). In its very first sentence, the second article reports a call from the Phenix Center for stronger efforts to rectify the

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42 This DOES scapegoat migrant workers but doesn’t mention Syrians at all: http://www.alrai.com/article/751150.html
43 See Arabic sources; the second article is from Ad-Dustour October 5 2013, and the translated headline is listed next to the citation.
situation in the labor market and create order. And the third headline belongs to a series of op-eds written by Khaled Zubeidi, in which he writes that a government enforcement campaign in 2013 had “meager” results (Zubeidi Oct 2013) and “did not succeed in lessening Syrian refugee workers’ number or impact” (Zubeidi Sept 2013).

These articles attributing high unemployment to Syrians have contributed to a larger wave of criticism leveled against the government for its failure to impose order on Syrian refugees in the labor market.Spanning the political spectrum, extending even into typically pro-government publications like Al Ra’i, other articles assert that “official efforts [are] unlikely to resolve the problem of illegal workers” (Azzeh Feb 2015) and “the government’s inadequate management of refugee affairs sets off alarm bells (Tadris April 2015).” As I searched for articles in Ad-Dustour, a sidebar on Ad-Dustour’s website persistently repeated complaints made by a local neighborhood committee that foreign workers had been allowed to dominate a vegetable market in Amman. To the extent that refugees’ labor market impact has become a rallying cry for these critics, it hardly seems like something the government would want to emphasize. But no matter what its underlying strategy might be, the literature on neoliberal migration policies suggests that Jordanian government officials could use extensive scapegoating rhetoric in this case, and they have not done so (Hiemstra, Tobias).

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44 Again, this article is from Ad-Dustour October 5 2013, and the translated headline is listed next to the citation.
Chapter 3: Citizens’ Non-Neoliberal Criteria for Refugee Policy

According to a series of polls carried out by the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), widely cited in the international media, as many as 73% of Jordanian citizens want to stop accepting Syrian refugees into their country (“Public Opinion Poll about Some Current Issues” 2013 25, Seeley Oct 2012, Sweis 2013, Tynes). The previous chapter of this thesis painted a largely hopeful picture, arguing that the bulk of Jordanians view Syrian refugees’ humanitarian concerns as legitimate, yet one is left wondering: how can a humanitarian discourse coincide with host communities’ apparent eagerness to turn Syrians away? Perhaps, as this chapter will argue, this paradox arises not from Jordanians’ views but from the narrow, constricting ways in which some observers have formulated questions and portrayed locals’ responses to both neoliberalism and the recent refugee influx. Though the transition to neoliberalism has brought a number of complex changes to Jordan’s economy and society, including substantive changes in the nation’s regulatory regime, the literature on local responses to economic change has focused almost exclusively on shifting patterns of access to space and resources; this focus has led, in turn, to analyses centered on questions of exclusion and competition among Jordan’s various social groupings. Unfortunately, such analyses are not particularly useful in solving the puzzle laid out above: though they might explain why Jordanians would want to keep refugees out of their communities, they cannot capture much else. It is therefore necessary to look outside the framework of “rivalry politics” in order to understand how Jordanians conceptualize and respond to economic policy.

In fact, some Jordanian analysts and private sector workers have not only decried the resource shortages accompanying refugees’ arrival, but have also identified and critiqued the neoliberal components of refugee employment policies that have contributed to deteriorating labor market conditions since 2012. In exploring this critique, this chapter will lay out a possible means
of understanding how Jordanians resolve the potential tension between humanitarianism and exclusionism through their vision for a different, non-neoliberal kind of refugee policy. It will also follow the suggestion of geographers Helga Leitner, Eric Sheppard, Kristin Sziarto, and Jamie Peck that one must delve into the alternate visions of those who contest neoliberalism in order to fully recognize their agency and avoid reducing their actions to reflexive responses to elites’ decisions (Leitner et. al. 11). The chapter will begin with a discussion of how various authors have used the frame of “rivalry politics” to discuss both Jordanian neoliberalism and the Jordanian state’s response to the Syrian refugee influx. As will be shown, this literature has captured real aspects of Jordanian politics but has not delved very far as possible into alternate political imaginings and has potentially delegitimized Jordanians’ economic concerns. In the following section, this chapter will lay out evidence from interviews and a survey of Jordanian media that citizens do not only seek a favorable distribution of resources, but also fundamental changes in their nation’s neoliberal economic order. The chapter will then highlight Jordanian critiques of specific policies to show that citizens are capable of understanding the neoliberal underpinnings of the current system, not only the resulting problems in the labor market, and have been incorporating their observations and analyses into their arguments. In making these last two points, this section will propose a means of understanding public opinion on neoliberal migration policies outside of the “rivalry politics” frame.

The Limits of the “Rivalry Politics” Frame

Whether discussing cosmopolitanism and urbanism in Amman, new challenges to East Bank Jordanians’ rents, or public protests in response to subsidy cuts, the scholarship on public reactions to neoliberalism in Jordan has focused almost exclusively on various sub-groups’ attempts to secure economic and social resources for themselves as the state has implemented neoliberal policies. First and most clearly, articles focused on public protest in Jordan often
sideline neoliberalism and economic concerns or focus heavily on mass reactions to subsidy cuts. These articles naturally emphasize the specific triggers that bring people out into the streets, and a specific cut in benefits is much more likely to turn people out on any given day than an overall critique of national economic policy (Wilson, Al-Khalidi and Pomeroy). The bulk of the scholarship on neoliberalism and “rivalry politics” in Jordan comes not from articles on public protest, however, but rather from the vast literature on East Bank Jordanians’ relationship with their government (Baylouny, Ryan 2014, Posusney, Moore and Peters). The special relationship that East Bank Jordanians once enjoyed with the state has eroded since the onset of neoliberalism in Jordan, as the special economic privileges for this group have diminished. While this shift is certainly important, reductions in East Bank Jordanians’ rents are clearly not the only impact of neoliberalism on Jordan’s social fabric. Finally, though this focus on competition for resources may seem less directly relevant to Ammanites’ relationship with their city, Najib Hourani and Jillian Schwedler study Amman’s urban landscape through a similar “rivalry politics” lens (Hourani, Schwedler 2010).

While it is entirely natural for Jordanians to contest the growing inequality and redistribution of wealth that have accompanied their nation’s shift to neoliberalism, an exclusive focus on this dynamic can ultimately delegitimize Jordanians’ economic concerns by making them seem grasping or tribalistic. Sean Yom and Wael al-Khatib put forward their own version of this point an article on Jordan’s 2011 protests, writing that “many observers dismiss [tribal youths’] demands as purely economic, just more East Bank indignation that King Abdullah’s neoliberal policies have robbed the monarchy’s core supporters of their old privileges like jobs and services…to be sure, many older tribesmen do simply want a bigger piece of the state pie” (Yom

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45 The two authors blur the line between concrete resources and looser notions of access to space and social position, arguing that neoliberalism has led to widespread dislocation and forced marginalized groups to fight for access.
and al-Khatib). On one level, the authors’ tone in this passage appears unnecessarily judgmental. But one could also read their statement as a commentary not on the legitimacy of Jordanian concerns, but rather on the existing literature on “rivalry politics.” In this quotation, after all, they cite both the articles on public protest and the literature on East Bank discontent cited in the paragraph above. And in this sense, they make a valuable point: by playing up tribal divisions, knee-jerk reactions to benefits cuts, and competition for “a bigger piece of the state pie,” articles on “rivalry politics” in Jordan easily veer into portraits of Jordanians as tribalistic, greedy, and reflexive rather than community-minded or critical in their thinking.

Just as authors like Ryan and Baylouny have used the lens of “rivalry politics” to discuss public opinion in Jordan, analysts of the nation’s refugee response have focused heavily on potential competition for resources between Jordanian citizens and newly-arrived Syrians. In highlighting resource competition and inter-community hostilities, however, journalists and researchers have used evidence selectively and potentially misrepresented Jordanian public opinion. A “disturbance” at a UN help desk or a “scuffle” in a town in Northern Jordan can become central pieces of evidence pointing to Jordanian-Syrian tensions (Seeley July 2012). Following the claim that there have been “flashes of popular anger” in response to the economic impact of the refugee influx, another author cites only one example: a protest by Jordanian tomato farmers who wanted, among other things, an increase in border openness (Fahim).46 In painting a dire picture of host community dynamics, authors have also referenced statistics and examples that do not necessarily indicate a hostile view of refugees. When a Jordanian person accurately identifies the severe economic effects of the refugee influx, for instance, it is misleading to portray their statements as though they indicate a negative perception of the refugee community. Further,

46 The author cites statements by government officials and other Jordanians expressing reservations about the refugee presence, but this is the only featured example of popular discontent expressed in the public sphere.
an individual might disagree with the statement “all Syrians should be able to enter Jordan freely” on the grounds that widely-known Syrian terrorists should be turned away. Yet news articles deploy Jordanians’ moderate policy suggestions and assessments of refugees’ economic impact as evidence of hostility against Syrians (Francis, Sweis 2012).

One study published by REACH demonstrates how observers from nonprofits and the mainstream media sometimes force the frame of rivalry politics even when it does not appear to correspond to the data. The study’s authors created a list of four prominent sources of community tension, three of which were clearly based on the “rivalry politics” frame, before even beginning their empirical research (Livelihoods, Employment and Tension in Jordanian Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees 8). They then devote their entire study to the analyses of these tensions, ultimately concluding that competition over resources does, in fact, lead to inter-community hostilities. Everything in the report is premised on the idea that inter-community tension is a key problem that NGOs and government actors must address. Yet in no governorate did more than 25% of surveyed communities report any kind of tension between Syrians and Jordanians; only Irbid surpassed 20% (Evaluating the Effect of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Stability and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities: Preliminary Impact Assessment 9). At no point do the authors step back and note the strikingly high rates of peaceful coexistence in a set of communities undergoing drastic economic, social, and demographic change.

The divergent findings of two polls from 2013 also illustrate the extent to which the frame of “rivalry politics” can edge out authentic Jordanian visions for policy change. As noted, one survey from the fall of 2012 found that 64% of Jordanian citizens wanted to close the border (“Public Opinion Poll about Some Current Issues” 2012 20); the same question posed in the organization’s survey from June 2013 yielded the figure 73% (“Public Opinion Poll about Some Current Issues” 2013 25). Yet a poll from the International Republican Institute (IRI), conducted
in November-December 2013, found that only 43% of Jordanians wanted to close the border to Syrian refugees. The difference can be attributed to one simple fact: the IRI poll gave respondents a third, “middle” option. When Jordanians were allowed to choose between closing the border entirely, limiting the number of entrants, or allowing anyone in, rather than just answering a yes-or-no question, the percentage who supported leaving the border entirely open remained approximately the same. But the number of people who supported turning away all Syrians dropped by over a third, as 32% of Jordanians expressed support for the “middle” route (“IRI Survey of Jordan Public Opinion” 13). Thus, according to the IRI poll, Jordanians seeking full border closure represent a minority of citizens rather than an overwhelming majority. Perhaps there is overlap among the 55% of Jordanians who believe the nation should continue to take at least some refugees, the over 50% of Jordanians who acknowledge Syrians’ contributions to Jordan’s economy and society, the 70% of Jordanians who believe Syrians to be hardworking, and the 53% of Jordanians who “believe that Jordanian employers…exploit Syrian refugees” rather than the other way around (Hillesund and Stave 111-2). Finally, the dilemma posed in the introduction to this chapter appears somewhat resolved: this amended set of statistics appears much more consistent with the humanitarian views laid out in Chapter 2 than the original, more widely known figures cited earlier. As will be shown in the next section, the view that the government should allow Syrian refugees into Jordan on a gradual and heavily-regulated basis fits naturally into a more general vision for a new, non-neoliberal set of regulatory systems in Jordan.

Desire for a New System

Jordanian citizens, including both professional policy analysts and private sector workers, have gone beyond the frame of “rivalry politics” to critique neoliberal policies and articulate a

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47 It should be noted that some Jordanians do believe that Syrian refugees frequently exploit Jordanian citizens (Amman Employer 2).
desire for a different kind of regulatory regime. As revealed by personal interviews, Jordanian media, and policy reports put out by Jordanian advocacy organizations, a substantial portion of Jordanian workers and political analysts assess refugee policies based on a consistent set of criteria for government regulation in the labor market—criteria that defy the principles of governance under neoliberalism by placing emphasis on the state’s responsibility to create order and some degree of equity in the national economy. Even if one takes the term “neoliberalism” to mean support for and application of laissez-faire and market-based policies, disregarding the ways that this policy framework operates in practice, workers’ consistently positive views of state-imposed order would contradict neoliberal ideology. On a deeper level, as shown in the previous chapter, labor market deregulation in Jordan can be understood as neoliberal because it encourages the creation of an easily-exploited pool of labor that business owners can use to turn a profit. In this sense, it fits the definition of neoliberalism as a policy framework that promotes the concentration of capital by elites while appearing to remove the state from the economic sphere. Allowing employers to make sizable profits off of non-citizen labor, illegality fits under the same neoliberal umbrella. This mode of governance stands in stark contrast to a vision of the state as the active manager of a fair economic system that promotes equity and opportunity for the general population. Thus, by emphasizing the government’s responsibility to regulate and create “order” in the labor market, Jordanian workers and political analysts use their own terminology to articulate dissatisfaction with the neoliberal status quo. In this sense, they have moved far beyond the frame of “rivalry politics.”

The prevalence of terms like “order,” “regulation,” and “control” were particularly pronounced in conversations with workers from Jordan’s informal sector, revealing the extent to which these workers seek a change from the deregulation of the neoliberal status quo. Asked how the government should respond to Syrian refugee employment, one worker in Amman whom I
will call “Omar” said that Jordan should make a law like the law in the Gulf countries. When a Jordanian goes to the Gulf, Omar said, the government controls him and sends him back if he causes any trouble (Amman Worker 3). Another worker, “Saif,” reiterated multiple times that “things need to be arranged.” He proposed a system in which refugees were placed in camps temporarily upon arrival, so that they did not flood host communities, but should be given freedom of movement once the government had control of the situation (Amman Worker 4). Asked why the government controlled entry and exit from the Syrian refugee camps, another worker responded that “there must be regulation, order.” He did not give a specific reason why such regulation was necessary, even when prompted, stating only that if there is no order, “there is chaos.” His remarks implied that he considered order, or at least the prevention of chaos, as a societal good in its own right (Mafraq Worker 3).

Jordanian politicians and policy analysts have made similar points. Columnist Khaled Al-Zubaidi has lambasted the government for the failure of its efforts to regulate the Syrian refugee influx in multiple articles for the newspaper Ad-Dustour, writing in the fall of 2013 that the government needed to reign in undocumented foreign labor in order to both “organize the labor market to meet the needs of manufacturers and economic sectors” and “provide better opportunities for Jordanian workers” (Al-Zubaidi October 2013). Presenting a similar criticism of the enforcement of refugee policies, Nasreen Al-Kurd wrote in Al-Ra’i that the state’s failures had allowed migrant labor to impact wages and working conditions across the labor market (Al-Kurd January 2014). Dr. Khaled Al-Wazani, author of a report for the organization Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, also emphasized the importance of order in a personal interview. “In the end of the day,” he said, “what I care about is how you regulate their presence.” He returned to this phrase, “regulate their presence,” several times during our conversation (Al-Wazani 2014).
Speaking of the government’s refugee policies, observers made it clear that they held strong regulation and control of the Syrian refugee population to be a basic obligation of the state. Most clearly, the journalist Rania Tadris wrote in April of 2015 that “the government abandoned its responsibility to regulate asylum with the failure of its program to register asylum-seekers” [emphasis added] (Tadris April 2015). She has not limited her critique to the government’s registration program: she has also criticized its encampment policies and its response to pressure on housing markets (Tadris April 2015). Writing for a prominent government-controlled newspaper, citing former government officials to lend legitimacy to her arguments, and hammering her points home through repetition, Tadris merits consideration as a relatively prominent voice on this issue. Nor is she the only commentator to make these points.

For the most part, private sector workers also emphasized the importance of government-imposed order in the labor market. This kind of rhetoric cut across the political spectrum: regardless of the degree to which they saw effective enforcement in the labor market, and their level of tolerance for the presence of Syrians in the workforce, they were apparently uniform in their belief that the maintenance of order and regulation constituted a primary function of government. Saif did not believe that the government’s efforts to enforce refugee policies had been at all effective. He wanted to let any and all Syrians come to Jordan, provide them with the minimum wage, and allow them to integrate. A Palestinian-Jordanian himself, he noted that Jordanians with Palestinian roots might feel more for the new Syrian arrivals (Amman Worker 4). By contrast, one worker from Irbid whom I will call “Ashraf” said that the government was doing an admirable job of enforcing its policies in the labor market. He was not as sympathetic to the Syrians’ situation; if he could change the policy, he said, he would ban Syrian refugee employment altogether (Irbid Worker 1). Clearly, these two workers had vastly different perspectives. Yet both premised their remarks on the notion that the government had a
responsibility to control the refugee influx in order to mitigate its impact on native Jordanians. Saif kept returning to the phrase “things must be arranged,” as noted, and Ashraf said he could tolerate the government’s decision to provide some refugees with work permits because it generally kept things under control.

Even when workers did not say explicitly that they craved order, regulation, or control, most appeared satisfied with government policy to the extent that they perceived order and enforcement in the labor market, and dissatisfied to the extent that they found this order lacking. This is clear from Ashraf’s acceptance of current refugee employment policy, even if he did not fully agree with its content, on the grounds that it was effectively enforced. Hamzah also based his satisfaction with government policy on implementation and enforcement rather than the exact content of the policy itself. Like Ashraf, he said he would prefer a system in which no refugees received permits. But, asked whether he would like the government to change its policy, he just said “it’s good like this.” The government didn’t give too many permits, he said, and so there was no need for change in the regulation itself. By contrast, he expressed strong dissatisfaction when describing the “light” or “lenient” enforcement of existing policies. Asked whether he was happy with the government’s response to the refugee influx, he tilted his head back and clicked his tongue in a classically Jordanian show of dismissal. “It must be stronger,” he said curtly (Mafraq Worker 1).

Showing a similar view of order and organization as the chief criteria for the government’s refugee response, two workers from a carpet shop in East Amman (“Hassan” and “Tariq”) said they were much happier with the government’s refugee response than they had been three years ago because of improvements in camp policing and policy enforcement. They were also pleased to see improvements in refugees’ housing and access to shops, which they said reduced bitterness and tensions between refugees and native Jordanians. In describing these measures, Hassan kept
referring back to the word “order.” Significantly, he did not use this term simply as a synonym for “enforcement;” improved quality of life in the camp, linked to aid and administration rather than policing, also had a place in his vision of proper organization. Summarizing his own points, he said that he was happier because “the government organizes more” (Amman Workers 7,8).

The idea that the government should be responsible for creating order in Jordan’s economy and society should not be treated as automatic, particularly given the nation’s transition to neoliberalism over the past two decades. Rather than treating the maintenance of “order” as basic expectation for government, workers might have emphasized the difficulty of regulation or treated enforcement as a lofty, perhaps unrealistic goal to which the government should aspire. Some students from the University of Jordan and Yarmouk University, for instance, emphasized that the government was “trying” or “doing the best it can” (University of Jordan Student 5 April 2015, University of Jordan Student 11, Yarmouk University Student 1). Like many workers in the informal sector, one student spoke of order and government control as ideals (Yarmouk University Student 1). But, asked about gaps in the government’s refugee response, she referenced the government’s lack of funds and cited ongoing problems as all the more reason to back the struggling government.

Workers from the informal sector whom I interviewed, on the other hand, were less inclined than the students I spoke with to view mere effort as sufficient. Even workers who praised existing enforcement campaigns were quick to note that the government should work even harder (Amman Worker 9, Mafraq Worker 1). There are already many police, Hamzah said, but there should be more. He acknowledged that the government was taking action, but appeared dissatisfied with lingering signs that refugees were working illegally and evading arrest (Mafraq Worker 1). Nor did any workers interviewed describe budget gaps as an excuse for ineffective governance. More specifically, none referred to the refugee “burden,” cited an overall lack of
resources in Jordan, or mentioned the national budget in their discussion of refugee policies. To these workers, the government’s obligation to maintain order was not contingent on the magnitude of the task or the funds required.

Demonstrating the extent to which these critiques of neoliberalism have brought Jordanians outside the realm of “rivalry politics,” several workers put forward the idea that everyone in Jordan could benefit if the government took a more active role in regulating migration and employment. As quoted in a previous chapter, one worker (“Saif”) stated that “it needs to be arranged, but not in this way, where it’s oppressing some people.” In Saif’s vision of fairness, workers would able to access opportunities based on their qualifications and Jordanians would have to compete. To move toward this model, he said, the government should create “a decent minimum wage” for all workers, Jordanian and Syrian alike. Saif’s vision demonstrates that Jordanians do not simply compete for jobs and resources based on national identity, but sometimes harbor hope that the government will be able to take steps for the collective good (Amman Worker 4). Expressing a vastly different vision for government control of migration and employment, Hassan nevertheless made similar points about the potential for government “ordering” that could benefit everyone at once. Three years ago, he said, Syrians hated Jordanians because they were in a bad situation. But now that the government has made camps better and more “organized,” he argued, Syrians are in a better situation, security has improved for Jordanians, and the two communities have been able to move beyond tensions over resources to some extent (Amman Worker 7). This idealism could not be captured by the “rivalry politics” frame described above.

**A Well-Developed Critique**

Jordanian workers’ and analysts’ calls for “order” and “control” are not always vague articulations of some abstract desire; in their critiques of the current economic order and their

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48 One worker did mention the budget, but only to say that Syrian refugees increase the tax base (Amman Worker 6).
demands for change, Jordanians have demonstrated awareness of the gap between state rhetoric and reality and put forward deep, comprehensive analyses of trends in labor market policies. Through this process, Jordanian citizens have identified the specific dynamics that the first chapter of this thesis described as distinctly neoliberal. Jordanian workers and other observers often see through the government’s talk of labor market inspection and enforcement, first recognizing the gap between rhetoric and results, then calling on the government to make a new commitment to “ordering” the labor market. Meanwhile, like the first chapter of this thesis, op-ed writers and policy analysts have linked the problems with current Syrian refugee employment policies to longer-standing issues with Jordan’s migrant labor system. Finally, several prominent Jordanian organizations have compiled comprehensive reports with descriptions of long-term labor market trends; comments on the relationship between loose regulatory environments and private profit; analyses of migrant illegality and exploitation; and, finally, calls for the government to move towards a more active regulatory role. To portray Jordanian citizens merely as tribal groups reacting reflexively to entitlement cuts is not only belittling, as Yom and Khatib point out, but inaccurate as well.

**Identifying a Lack of Enforcement**

Though they differed in their level of satisfaction with the government’s efforts, researchers, politicians, and workers interviewed for this thesis commonly identified the disconnect between labor market policies on the books and actual enforcement on the ground. While researchers at the Economic and Social Council of Jordan and the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies expressed some degree of faith in the government’s intent to regulate (Anani, Shteiwi), linking the lack of enforcement to the difficulties of policy implementation and the state’s inability to deport Syrians, professor Al-Madi from the University of Jordan and Ahmad Awad of the Phenix Center criticized the government for the gap between rhetoric and
actual policy. “They are talking about campaigns,” Awad said, “but on the ground there are no campaigns.” Likewise, Al-Madi stated that “they are talking about it, but they are not doing anything about it.” Both used the word “failure” to describe enforcement efforts in this area (Hazaimeh 2013, Al-Madi).

Less likely to describe this dynamic explicitly, a subset of workers in refugee host communities nevertheless demonstrated awareness of the gap between policy and enforcement and made similar calls for improvement. Interviewees did not often lead with a strong, immediate criticism of the state’s failure to enforce laws and regulations, but about a third of workers ultimately expressed the view that the government could or should do more.49 As noted, nearly every interviewee from the private sector workforce agreed that there are gaps in enforcement.50 A few agreed that enforcement was not perfect, but voiced satisfaction with it in any case. Some Syrians fall out of the system, Ratib said, but the government had control overall (Irbid Worker 2). At the other pole, Omar stated that there was effectively no enforcement of refugee regulations (Amman Worker 3). A strikingly high percentage of workers went through a similar progression over the course of our interview, beginning the discussion with a description of the government’s outward show of enforcement and then coming around to their belief that this enforcement was not effective or sufficient.51 Asked the first time whether there was tight enforcement of refugee employment policies, Hamzah said yes and began to describe the policy as it appears on the books. Asked a similar question at a later point, he described enforcement as “light” or “soft,” said that the police only catch a Syrian without a permit if someone lodges a complaint, and that the

49 I spoke with 13 workers about refugee policy enforcement. Of these, four clearly stated that the government should do more to enforce its policies.
50 Of the 13 workers with whom I spoke about policy enforcement, ten referenced gaps in enforcement of some kind. (Seven explicitly referenced gaps in enforcement; the other three described personal encounters with Syrian refugees outside the camp system who did not have permission to leave.)
51 Of these 11 workers, three fit into this specific pattern. These include Amman Worker 9, Irbid Worker 3, and Mafraq Worker 1.
government needed to take a stronger approach (Mafraq Worker 1). In Irbid, a worker at a pastry shop first listed restrictions on Syrian refugee employment as a component of the government’s refugee response and agreed with his friend that the government worked well in this area. But later, asked what the government should do to help host communities, he brought up permits again. I asked whether the government didn’t do that already. It doesn’t cover everyone, he replied (Irbid Workers 3,4) As shown in the previous section, private sector workers interviewed commonly expressed a desire for government control of the labor market. In expressing this desire, and their anxiety about the current disorder, they often identified this concrete example of what they saw as government failure.

A Long-Term View

Sources ranging from newspaper columnists to restaurant employees have also addressed contemporary refugee policies as part of a longer history of Jordanian migration policy, rather than as unique or isolated responses to an immediate crisis; by framing refugee policies this way, some interviewees and authors have incorporated them into broader, more established streams of criticism directed against the Jordanian government’s economic policies. Though workers did not consistently bring up economic migrants from other countries, they frequently referred to the presence of “Syrian and Egyptian workers” as a single issue and addressed the government’s response to workers of both nationalities in the same breath. In an article outlining the “problem” of migrant labor in Jordan, columnist Khaled Al-Zubaidi wrote in the fall of 2013 that Jordan hosted “about a million foreign workers, most of them Egyptian and Syrian brothers” (Al-Zubaidi September 2013). Omitting the word “refugee” from this analysis, Al-Zubaidi presented migrant labor as an older, ongoing problem that began long before 2011, with the arrival of agricultural workers, guards, and restaurant workers from other countries. As long as the nation hosted this many migrant workers, he wrote, it would never develop economically. In a similar article
published a month later, he addressed the refugee influx more directly but still framed Syrian refugee workers as part of the same issue as economic migration from Egypt and Iraq. As noted previously, journalist Rania Tadris has also drawn connections between Syrian refugee employment and the “chaos” caused by past waves of economic migrants (Tadris May 2015). In public debate, there is a very fine line between the issue of Egyptian economic migration and the issue of Syrian refugee employment. This reflects similarities in the ways government policy has shaped these two migrant groups’ integration into the Jordanian economy.

_Critiques Developed by Local Non-Profits_

Demonstrating the extent to which Jordanian observers have developed comprehensive, nuanced critiques of the current neoliberal systems in the Jordanian labor market, two prominent Jordanian non-profits have put forward series of reports with detailed studies of everything from migrant illegality to deliberately slipshod enforcement of labor market regulations. These organizations, Tamkeen and the Phenix Center, demonstrate that such in-depth critiques of neoliberal trends predate the Syrian civil war: both organizations have been documenting and criticizing neoliberal aspects of labor market policy since well before 2012, and have recently begun to incorporate the Syrian refugee situation into their broader analyses. Though they work closely with international organizations, these non-profits should not automatically be considered vessels for European and American ideas. Ahmed Awad, the director of the Phenix Center, is a native Jordanian; Linda al-Kalash, director of Tamkeen, is from Egypt. And while one might argue that researchers and policy analysts should not be considered “ordinary Jordanians” and should thus be excluded from an analysis of Jordanian public opinion, that would be a mistake for several reasons. First, both Tamkeen and the Phenix Center reports receive extensive coverage in
the Jordanian media. Thus these organizations’ views should not be seen as divorced from those of the general public. Second, it would be problematic to assume that education and expertise on current issues somehow prevent individuals from acting as authentic representatives of their communities’ views. While I spoke with the directors of both organizations, I will focus here on their publications in order to emphasize the existence of public, research-based critiques of neoliberal policies.

Analysts at Tamkeen, an organization that primarily advocates for migrant workers’ rights in Jordan, have documented in detail how government decisions on both the state and local level have forced economic migrants into illegality and how this illegality, in turn, benefits exploitative employers. The organization released a scathing critique of Jordan’s migration policies in 2011, for instance, arguing that “the legal rules and practices applied in Jordan contribute to the problems faced by irregular migrant workers instead of limiting irregularity.” Moreover, the report stated, “the provisions facilitate economic exploitation and trafficking.” (Al-Musa and Yacoub 4). In 2012, Tamkeen once again connected the deliberate construction of illegality to the prevalence of exploitative labor practices by laying out in detail the arbitrary detention and deportation to which whistleblowers were subject (“Between a Rock and a Hard Place” 67). Tamkeen analysts have repeatedly railed against deliberate under-enforcement as well, arguing that policies “with no real intention” to correct economic migrants’ status or halt exploitative practices have contributed to exceedingly low workplace standards: “what many people do not realize,” Tamkeen researchers wrote in this report, “is…that the actual effective protection of migrant workers’ rights does not solely come from…the issuance of legislation; fostering sustainable protection for migrant workers’ rights is rooted in the serious implementation of these

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enacted measures” (“Between a Rock and a Hard Place” 2). Linda Al-Kalash, director of Tamkeen, has also linked laxness in Jordan’s labor code to the influence of farm owners and domestic worker recruitment agencies on government policy. Researchers at Tamkeen have even addressed the relationship between racialization and illegality in their analysis. While the organization does not specifically call for an end to the neoliberal order, Tamkeen has demonstrated a keen understanding of the forced illegality and under-enforcement that constitute the neoliberal underpinnings of current migration policies and presented a cohesive argument in favor of reform.

Focused on the perspective of Jordanian private sector workers, the Phenix Center and its director, Ahmed Awad, have deployed evidence from the workplace to illustrate—and criticize—the neoliberal deregulation that Jordanian workers might call a lack of “order” in the labor market. In one report, the organization’s recommendations for improving overall labor market conditions focused on reigning in the “chaos” in the guest worker system (Agricultural Workers: Absence of Basic Rights and Suspicion of “Human Trafficking” 14). Similarly, in 2011, a Phenix Center report assessing Jordan’s adherence to the ILO’s standards for “decent work” linked the “lack of organization” in the guest worker system to a range of problems in the labor market (Decent Work in Jordan 2011 8). It is not hard to hear the parallels between this language and one workers’ statements, cited earlier, that “things must be arranged” and “there must be regulation, order” (Amman Worker 4). Though they sometimes make concessions to employers’ perspectives, as when they cited worker flight as a problem that should be addressed, staff at this organization have also identified the ways in which under-regulation has contributed to exploitation and unjust profits. In their report on labor practices in the agricultural sector, for instance, researchers from

53 The authors of one report explicitly note the dehumanizing aspects of migration policies, describe the equation of nationality with particular economic and social roles, and cite instances of Jordanian children shouting at Egyptian workers that they were going to have them deported (“Between a Rock and a Hard Place” 48.)
the Phenix Center drew connections between unregulated migration and the extremely poor working conditions to which all agricultural workers were subject (*Agricultural Workers: Absence of Basic Rights and Suspicion of “Human Trafficking*). At another point, Phenix Center analysts argued that employers in Jordan have taken advantage of shortcomings in the legal system to move towards the use of forced labor (Malkawi Jan 2015). “They don’t want to work to organize, to regulate the labor market,” Awad said in a personal interview, because the private sector benefits from the lack of regulation (Awad). In particular, the Center argues, the disorder in Jordan’s migrant labor system has fueled native unemployment and employer abuses. In this sense, the organization frames Jordan’s migration policies as one component of larger economic systems. Even if they do not use the same terminology, it is clear that Jordanian analysts and others in the community are fully aware of neoliberal labor market policies and have been actively critiquing them.

Perhaps hoping that the plight of child workers will garner sympathy, or seeking to build on the momentum associated with the World Day Against Child Labor in June, the two organizations have used their most recent reports on the intersection of child labor and Syrian refugee employment as a platform for larger conversations about Jordan’s migration system and labor market. Not only did Tamkeen’s report on child labor call for increased fines for employers and enhancements in the national inspection system, both of which address the proximate causes of child employment, but it also asked the Jordanian government to address the deeper roots of the problem by allowing Syrian refugees to work legally. “If Syrians are permitted to work in a restricted way (limited to certain projects or industries),” the report’s authors wrote, “then their productive capabilities can be used to assist Jordan, without negatively affecting the precarious labour market” The report then connected this suggestion to the link between forced illegality and exploitation, as described in Chapter 1: “Failure to [provide legal work opportunities for Syrians]
could create a job market where wages are driven further down (for both Jordanians and refugees),” the authors continued, “as unscrupulous employers race to exploit the vulnerability of Syrians and Syrian children who are working illegally” (Syrian Refugee Child Labour in Jordan 37-38). This report clearly integrates the issue of Syrian child employment into its larger critique of neoliberal migration policies, as described above.

In its own position paper on child labor in Jordan, The Phenix Center went beyond even the issue of neoliberal migration policy to lambaste the government for allowing economic conditions in Jordan to deteriorate to such an extent that anyone—Syrian or Jordanian—would have to send their child to work. The authors attribute child labor, first and foremost, to “the extreme social inequalities resulting primarily from the implementation of economic policies that…have focused, over the past decades, on the liberalization of the national economy, going too far in the implementation of various financial austerity policies” (Child Labour in Jordan 3) Clearly, the authors are referring to Jordan’s neoliberal reforms. To solve the problem of child labor, the authors then argue, the state must “promote the development of a fair social protection network to secure dignified life for the various poor segments.” They also propose an increase in the national minimum wage and the stronger enforcement of existing labor laws (Child Labour in Jordan 5). In a report nominally addressing child labor in Jordan, the organization has expressed a vision for an entirely transformed system of labor market governance. According to this organization, the solution to the problems caused by Syrian refugee employment does not lie in the reallocation of resources from Syrian families to Jordanian ones; to the contrary, the solution lies in the wholesale reconstruction of Jordan’s economic policies based on non-neoliberal principles.

Work on Jordanians’ rivalry for space and resources is certainly worthwhile, and contributes to broader understanding of this topic. Neoliberal policies exacerbate inequality and
lead to marginalization; it would be absurd to argue otherwise, or to suggest that citizens do not react to these particular changes. But to the extent that commentaries on “rivalry politics” dominate the discussion of Jordanian politics, they inadvertently contribute to orientalist images of Jordanian citizens as “tribal,” “grasping,” or more reflexive than critical in their reactions to economic and social change. This is a particular shame given that Jordanians have, in fact, developed critiques of neoliberal systems that demonstrate both keen political awareness and a desire to promote the public good. Further, these views are politically significant: the Jordanian government has recently moved toward a much more progressive, inclusive set of refugee employment policies, and it possible that Jordanian public opinion played a role in effecting this change.
Conclusion

Over the course of three days in late December, 2015, American and Jordanian migration policies appeared to move in opposite directions. As the United States unveiled a campaign to arrest and deport hundreds of Central American families, some of whom may qualify for refugee status under international law, the Jordanian government announced its intention to systematically integrate thousands of Syrian refugees into the legal labor market (Markon and Nakamura, Herszenhorn et. al.). Given that American politicians vacillate between privileging Central American families as harmless “asylum seekers” and deporting them as “illegal immigrants,” a comparison between the American and Jordanian cases seems highly relevant; as shown, the Jordanian government has also responded to the presence of migrants in the labor force by alternately honoring their claims to legitimacy and forcing them into conditions of illegality. Though geographically distant, the US case and the Jordanian case thus appear to hold similarities. As these policy changes show, however, distinctions between these two cases have been crystalizing as well over the past several months. These differences are consistent with the findings of this thesis, which argued that harsh, neoliberal migration policies backed by racializing and criminalizing rhetoric are less sustainable in the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan than in other contexts.

Given that both the United States and Jordan have pushed refugees and asylum seekers into conditions of illegality, consistent with a neoliberal migration framework, the growing divergence of these cases since early 2015 merits investigation. This year, racializing and criminalizing language directed at both Syrian refugees and Latino immigrants has become a particularly prominent part of American political discourse. But while Jordanian officials have been known to refer to drug smuggling and sleeper cells in their pleas for international support,

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54 See, for example, Davidson, Prior, Sherfinski, and Ye Hee Lee.
perhaps recognizing the political power of such language in wealthy donor nations like the United States, they have largely avoided this kind of vitriol in their domestic statements ("What we have done for refugees is enough"). Perhaps, as suggested in Chapter 2, racializing and criminalizing rhetoric are simply ineffective means of legitimizing harsh refugee policy in Jordan. If this is true, one would also expect the Jordanian government to struggle more with the legitimization and maintenance of neoliberal migration policies. In fact, Jordan’s recent policy shifts support this hypothesis as well.

This thesis has suggested that numerous Jordanian citizens, unwilling to condemn refugees for working and eager for changes in the nation’s neoliberal economic order, would tolerate or even favor a change in policy towards limited legalization and heavy regulation of Syrian refugee employment; in fact, the government has moved closer to this kind of policy over the past few months. Not only has the government recently announced its intention to officially integrate Syrian refugees into the labor force, but it has also accepted the partial legalization of Syrian refugee employment as a condition for approximately $1.7 billion in various forms of international assistance ("Jordan secures $1.7b grants, grant equivalents at London conference," Malkawi 21 Dec 2015). Jordan has been facing international pressure to legalize Syrian refugee employment since at least 2014 (Ajluni and Kawar, Developing a Livelihoods Assessment and Strategy), and the international agreement reached in February, 2016, incorporated this stipulation into Jordan’s aid plan. In accordance with this agreement, Jordan will allocate funds toward job generation programs for both Syrian refugees and host communities over the next two years. These measures could, according to the Compact’s own estimate, lead to the legal employment of 200,000 Syrian refugees ("Jordan secures $1.7b grants, grant equivalents at London conference"). While this is clearly a victory for refugees themselves, the impact of this policy on Jordanian citizens is harder to predict.
In explaining its newest policy shift, the Jordanian government has spoken directly to the popular concerns laid out in previous chapters and thus seems likely to succeed in legitimating this shift in the eyes of native Jordanians. First, and most obviously, the Jordanian government has vowed that opportunities for Syrians will not come at the expense of native Jordanian employment. In line with Jordanian citizens’ express desire for greater government control in the labor market, officials have also placed rhetorical emphasis on regulation and order while explaining the new system. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Labor, for instance, stated that the policy shift is designed to ensure that Syrians work in an “organized fashion.” He also said that the new process through which refugees will obtain permits will “lead to the effective regulation and control of the labor sector” as a whole (Al-Dasouki). Expressing a similar sentiment, the Minister of Planning said that the new policies “contribute to the strengthening of the Ministry of Labour's efforts to regulate the market and address irregularities” (“Al-Nusour: Employment of Syrians Will Not Be at Jordanians’ Expense”). The labor market has declined in recent years, he argued in another statement, not because of Syrian labor per se but “because of Syrian laborers who worked in an illegal and unorganized way” (“The announcement of a new economic stimulus package soon”). This analysis is notably close to the critical analysis of Jordan’s neoliberal migration policy presented in Chapter 1, which argued that the deliberate exclusion of Syrian refugees and other migrants from Jordan’s formal labor market has led to lower standards across the board. Speaking to some Jordanians’ desire for broader systemic change, the ministry of labor has also noted the “imbalances” in the labor market overall and stated that his ministry must work with civil society and other arms of the government to address problems with investment patterns, education, and other larger issues (“Katamine: We will allow Syrian migrant workers to compete.”) At the same time, however, officials have stressed that the
government will reallocate work opportunities from Egyptian laborers to Syrian refugees; this idea suggests an adjustment of the current system more than a substantial break from the status quo.

At this point, it is still unclear how much substantive change will take place as a result of the Jordanian government’s apparent shift in policy. Though its new acquiescence to providing work permits for Syrian refugees certainly represents a drastic shift, one should not expect immediate changes in labor market regulation or enforcement. Like Egyptians and other foreign workers, Syrians will be restricted to 18 relatively low-skilled professions (“Al-Nusour: Employment of Syrians Will Not Be at Jordanians’ Expense”). Even for individual Syrians who are able to obtain permits, legal work opportunities should not be viewed as a panacea. Egyptians have ostensibly been able to obtain permits for decades, and this has not prevented the state from creating a system in which thousands of Egyptians have been pushed into illegality and low-quality jobs.

There is also reason to believe that this deal could represent a deeper entrenchment of certain neoliberal systems in Jordan. Free trade and investment incentives have occupied a central place both in the deal itself and the discussions that preceded it (“Jordan secures $1.7b grants, grant equivalents at London conference,” Malkawi 17 Dec 2015). According to Jordanian researcher Ahmed Awad, as paraphrased in the New York Times, “the plan to legalize the Syrian workers was part of a parallel effort to lure back foreign investment, with the cooperation of Western countries.” (Sweis 2016). Free trade-oriented “enterprise zones” constitute the crucial mechanism through which the deal’s backers hope to both draw investment and create employment. In fact, it appears that a high percentage of the jobs open to Syrian refugees will be in these “enterprise zones (“Jordan secures $1.7b grants, grant equivalents at London conference”). Not only do these zones promote free trade and investment in line with neoliberal principles, but they also closely resemble the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) that have deregulated trade
between Jordan and the US and constituted a centerpiece of Jordanian neoliberalism (Moore).

QIZs have been associated with extreme exploitation and the perpetuation of illegality among migrants from South Asia and other regions (Kernaghan, “Justice for All”). While they promise to move Jordan away from its current neoliberal refugee policy framework, the nation’s new policies do not seriously challenge the nation’s neoliberal systems overall.

Still, the relative ease with which the Jordanian government has begun to shift its refugee policy—and particularly the lack of a strong public backlash—suggest that nations with neoliberal migration policies are not bound to this framework forever, particularly if it was never viewed as entirely legitimate in the first place. With its promise of over a billion dollars in international assistance, the Jordan Compact itself garnered only moderate, qualified criticism. Major newspapers in Jordan, including the Jordan Times, Al-Ra’i, and Al-Dustour, did not run any op-eds or editorials in the following weeks opposing the basic idea that some Syrian refugees should be allowed to work legally. Like the government officials quoted above, columnists and other commentators emphasized the central role that regulation and enforcement must play in the success of the new system. “No job should be taken at the expense of Jordanians,” declared one editorial in the Jordan Times. “Strict regulations, enforcement and inspections could address this problem” (“Strict controls needed”). Another article, voicing some skepticism, noted that implementation of this policy will be difficult because “it means changing the forms of work and control” (Al-Fanik). For the most part, observers appear content to watch with a critical eye and see whether the government can deliver an effective, well-regulated system. One should not overstate the degree to which Jordanians have critiqued neoliberal migration policies: Jordanian citizens have never gone out into the streets to protest the subjection of Syrian refugees to conditions of illegality, and few advocate for the total legalization of all Syrian refugee employment. But it is worth noting that the combination of illegality, criminalization, and
racialization do not always join together to dominate public discussions of migration in neoliberal economies.

This analysis has not overturned any of the general conclusions made by sociologists and geographers about the legitimization of neoliberal systems or citizen-state relationships under neoliberalism. In countless settings, for instance, the tactics of racialization and criminalization continue to play an integral (and successful) role in the maintenance of neoliberal migration policies. Nor has it invalidated any of the literature focused on Jordanians’ responses to subsidy cuts or other neoliberal economic policies. Nevertheless, this thesis shows how the extension of broad theories to new contexts can add complexity and nuance to both the general sociological literature on neoliberalism and the literature on Jordan specifically. The apparent ineffectiveness of racialization and criminalization in this case, for instance, highlights the extent to which neoliberal states cannot simply hand down their policies and rhetoric, but must contend with existing webs of identity and values in local communities. Though there are certainly trends across countries, there is no universal means of legitimating neoliberal policies. Further, an examination of Jordanian public opinion beyond the frame of “rivalry politics,” in line with Lietner, Peck, and Sheppard’s suggestion, reveals the extent to which Jordanian critiques of neoliberalism go deeper than the superficial consequences of specific policies and contain alternate visions for the nation’s future (Lietner et. al. 11). In sum, this case demonstrates the extent to which neoliberal systems are constantly challenged by the assertion of identities, values, and visions developed in a local context.
Appendix A- Fieldwork

Interviews

Though I did not obtain demographic information from every study participant, my data indicates that my sample was split between East Bank Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, with Palestinian Jordanians constituting the majority. Note that my samples of students and employers were evenly split, while the gap was large in my sample of workers; this is somewhat consistent with Palestinians’ higher likelihood of working in the private sector (Baylouny 281). All private sector employers and workers interviewed for this study were male, while the clear majority of student interviewees were female. Striking though this skew may be, it reflects clear trends in Jordanian society: the majority of university students in Jordan are women, but women are more likely to work in government and less likely to work throughout their adult lives (Brown et. al.) The survey sample also contains roughly equal numbers of Palestinian Jordanians and East Bank Jordanians: 62% of survey respondents were of Palestinian origin, while 17% had East Bank roots. Consistent with the demographics of this predominantly female university, about seventy percent of the sample was female.

Interviews Conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>East Bank Heritage</th>
<th>Palestinian Heritage</th>
<th>Unspecified Heritage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The university students I interviewed attend the University of Jordan in Amman and Yarmouk University in Irbid. Private sector employers and workers in this sample held positions
at a total of eleven businesses, including restaurants, confectionaries, a carpet shop, a construction materials supplier, and others, in various parts of Amman and Irbid. As noted, I also had the opportunity to speak with workers and employers at a shopping complex in Mafraq. When I conducted fieldwork at a business where I had identified a contact prior to my visit, I often began the visit with an in-depth interview with the manager or owner, then moved on to a series of shorter conversations with two or three workers selected by the employer. Often, but not in every case, I had the assistance of “language partners” whom I had met through a study abroad program. Interviewees in what I refer to as the “academic/research” category included three economists, two of whom had held positions in the Jordanian government, as well as two political scientists from the University of Jordan and the directors of two non-profits focused on monitoring and improving workplace standards in Jordan. These subjects were all based in Amman.

As noted, all interviews were semi-structured. I did not use the same interview guide with every subject, often tailoring questions based on my knowledge of an interviewee’s background. I completed my interviews in two stages, the first spread out over the month of April and the second spanning the first few weeks of May. During the first stage, I focused my inquiry directly on refugee employment and related policies. During the second stage, I also inquired about encampment policies, asked questions related to the notion of the “demographic threat” as outlined by Curtis Ryan (Ryan 2011 569), and encouraged broader conversations centered on the notion of the “refugee threat” or “refugee danger.” While I do not myself view the term “refugee threat” as a useful means for non-Jordanians to understand events in the region, these discussions gave me a
clearer sense of how Jordanians themselves framed refugee issues and allowed me to see if other refugee-related topics struck more of a chord with interviewees.\textsuperscript{55}

Due to logistical constraints, the nature of my research, and my position as an American undergraduate researcher, my interview data is limited in several significant ways. As one of my research advisors in Jordan strongly advised me against the use of an audio recorder, I lack full transcripts from my interviews. When possible, I compensated for this deficit by typing up my hand-written interview notes immediately after the interview took place. I was also limited by my limited language skills. Throughout this research, I strove to maintain awareness of my position as a white American woman who has worked for several refugee advocacy organizations in the United States. Accordingly, I have tried to steer clear of an over-zealous “save the refugees” mentality that could prevent me from seeing or empathizing with problems affecting native Jordanians. However, it is not possible for me to completely overcome the biases and preconceived ideas that come with my background.

As Syrian refugee employment can be a sensitive topic, I was further constrained by some interviewees’ choice to remain silent on certain issues or present their opinions and experiences based on mainstream discourses or their perceptions of what I wanted to hear. While interview subjects generally spoke very little the impact of the Syrian refugee influx on Palestinian/East Bank identity politics, for instance, they may have felt more strongly about this issue than our conversations suggested. Others may have misrepresented themselves or their business practices to avoid revealing illegal activity. Workplace dynamics may also have skewed my results. In some instances, employers were present as I interviewed workers; in others, the employer selected the workers with whom I spoke. Nevertheless, I was able to gather information on a wide range of

\textsuperscript{55} It is also worth noting that the phrase I used most commonly in Arabic does not directly translate to “refugee threat.” Literally, I asked whether “the presence of Syrian refugees is a danger” or whether “the presence of refugees is a dangerous thing.”
opinions, and interviewees’ reluctance to speak about some issues does not imply that they feigned their apparent engagement with other topics. When interviewees described how their friends had lost their jobs or spoke with bitterness about the failures of government policy, I have no reason to believe they were being insincere.

To interpret the data gathered through these interviews, I divided the interviews into the categories described above—students, workers, employers, and academics/researchers—then coded interviews based on topics and themes addressed. In my coding, I tagged a combination of concrete concepts and categories (such as “assessments of government enforcement campaigns”) and more abstract ones (such as “refugee integration.”) I generally went through two or three rounds of coding for each category of interviewee, first gathering statements together based on the concrete topic discussed and then coding them again based on the themes and common framings that emerged through this process. For instance, I identified “order” as a key concept to tag after looking at a subset of data coded for “assessment of government action with regards to refugee employment” and recognizing “order” and “disorder” as dominant terms within this category.56

Survey

As noted, I also carried out a survey of students in an introductory class at the University of Jordan. I received data from forty respondents, including twenty-five students from Amman and eight from the Northern governorates. Ninety percent of the sample had Jordanian citizenship; 62% were of Palestinian origin, while 17% had East Bank roots. Consistent with the demographics of this predominantly female university, about seventy percent of the sample was female. I wrote and translated the survey myself, with support from staff at my study abroad program. The survey was also fairly long, and included a range of sections with different instructions; students often

56 Through this process, I also identified anticipated themes that did not “stick.” After coding my interview notes for references to East Bank and Palestinian identity, for instance, I discovered that this topic had rarely emerged organically in conversation and that I did not have as much data on it as I had expected based on the literature.
skipped parts or did not follow the instructions precisely. Interestingly, students generally filled out the section ranking sources of unemployment, even if they had not filled out the sections before it. This suggests students were particularly engaged by this topic. I also spotted a printing error in the survey immediately before distributing it, so surveys had a penciled-in correction in the instructions on one section. Some, perhaps two or three, merely had the incorrect piece crossed out. Because the sample size was so limited, results were not frequently statistically significant.

Ethical Considerations

I took a range of measures to avoid harm to my research subjects and maintain awareness of my own position as a student researcher. In almost every case, interviewees signed a consent form outlining the use of interview data. I also required employers to sign a release before I began speaking with their workers. I made all documents available in both English and Arabic. These measures were crucial, particularly in the case of employers and workers, as I did not want to put anyone’s job at risk or get anyone in legal trouble. I also chose not to name any workers, students, or employers in this study, though some granted me permission to identify them.

Appendix B- Terminology

In analyzing my results and putting them in writing, I have chosen to define and use potentially contested terms in fixed ways. Because some of the most common, basic terms used to describe Jordanian identity, economic life, cross-border migration, and neoliberalism all potentially spark confusion and controversy, clarity about usage is essential.

In my discussion of Jordanian identity and sub-groups among Jordanian citizens, I will use the term “East Bank Jordanian” to refer to a permanent resident of Jordan with heritage on the

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57 I received verbal rather than written consent from four of the workers interviewed, but their employers signed releases in all of these cases. Personal risk was also relatively low, as the workers were (or at least claimed to be) Jordanian rather than Syrian or Iraqi.
58 Copies of both Arabic- and English-language consent forms are available upon request.
East Bank of the Jordan River and the term “Palestinian Jordanian” to refer to a permanent resident of Jordan with roots in what is now Israel-Palestine. Thus when I refer to a “Jordanian” individual, I may be referring to a member of either group. Though such usage is very common, I will never use the term “Palestinian” without qualification to refer to a Palestinian Jordanian; a high percentage of Palestinian Jordanians have full Jordanian citizenship, and people in this category often have mixed identities. While Jordanians commonly refer to people with East Bank heritage as “Jordanian Jordanians,” I will avoid this term in my own work. I understand the value of describing individuals’ identity in their own terms, but feel that this term is potentially confusing and loaded with implicit statements about the legitimacy of others’ claims to Jordanian identity.

While one might expect classification to be reasonably clear in this area, since official immigration status is determined by law, the terminology surrounding migration can also be highly confusing, misleading, and controversial. Rather than using the term “guest laborer” or “migrant worker,” which are ambiguous in this context, I will generally class non-citizens as either economic migrants or refugees. My sources, of course, do not always draw this distinction. When Arabic-language sources use the term “’amil wafid,” which literally means “arriving worker,” I will translate this phrase as “migrant laborer” since the usage seems to match best. But readers should note that the term “’amil wafid” does not always refer to a specific immigration status. Because some sources use this term to refer to a loose, hazily defined set of behaviors and characteristics, in some cases even condemning refugees for behaving “as migrant workers,” I will not use it to classify any particular group in my own writing but will devote some attention to an explication of its usage.

Because official designations lack clarity in Jordan, sometimes spark disagreement between the Jordanian government and UNHCR, and may not capture individuals’ realities in any
case, I will not define “refugee” as a person who has been classed as such by a government or international organization. Instead, I will use the term “refugee” to mean a person who has crossed a border due to a well-founded fear of persecution or conditions of generalized violence in a previous country of residence. As I use it, the term can also describe a descendent of such an individual. Though UNHCR does not consistently include any reference to generalized violence in its own definition, omission of this component would potentially lead me to leave out a large faction of the Syrians who have fled their homes since 2011 (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook 13, 415). I will generally not distinguish between asylum seekers and refugees in this thesis, as this distinction creates more confusion than it resolves. In contrast to the term “refugee,” the phrase “economic migrant” will refer to a person who left their country of origin primarily for economic reasons, whether due to severe economic hardship or in pursuit of better economic opportunities.

While words “illegal” and “illegality” can have offensive overtones, they convey a meaning that is not fully covered by the terms “undocumented” and “lack of documentation.” When an individual lacks recognized legal status in their country of residence, can be subjected to deportation or other punitive measures, or cannot access protection from the state, he or she can be described as living in a state of illegality. To say that this person is “undocumented” does not fully capture the marginalization that illegality entails, or the individual’s fraught relationship with the state. As used here, the word “illegality” should always be understood as a condition created by government policies rather than a trait of lawlessness ascribed to an individual or his or her actions. Because the phrase “illegal immigrant” is dehumanizing, and can be used to place

59 The first citation implies that generalized violence is not incorporated into the general definition of “refugee,” while the second includes “serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom” as a basic part of the definition.
60 The Western press commonly refers to members of both groups, and the legal implications of the terms are not always clear. For a full discussion of the various legal categories for migrants/refugees/asylum seekers under Jordanian law and international agreements, see Dallal Steven’s work, “Legal Status, Labelling, and Protection: the Case of Iraqi ‘Refugees’ in Jordan.”
judgment and blame on migrants’ shoulders, one should not casually refer to a person as “illegal.” Whenever the adjective “illegal” appears here, it will be placed in quotation marks to indicate that illegality is a label placed on individuals by others rather than an inherent quality. While others have argued that the word “illegality” should also appear in quotation marks for purposes of respectful scholarship, I trust that readers will understand law—and, conversely, what is deemed illegal—as constructions of the state (De Genova 2002 420). No statement about legality or illegality in this thesis should be considered a moral judgment.
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A note on formatting and transliteration: I wanted to strike a balance between enabling the reader to find these sources online, where they exist in Arabic, and enabling them to see how I used each source in the body of my paper (which is clearly entirely in English). I therefore chose to include the title of each article and the name of the author in Arabic. For cases in which I transliterated or translated a title, headline, or name for an in-text citation, I have included both the original and the translation here.

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Zubaidi, Khaled.

"The situation of Syrian workers in the Jordanian labor market is worsening..."


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"The situation of Syrian workers in the Jordanian labor market is worsening..."


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