

February 2024

Civil-military what?!

Making sense of conflicting civil-military concepts

Authors

Henrique Garbino

Jonathan Robinson

João Valdetaro

**Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs
Brown University**

and

**Department of War Studies
Swedish Defence University**



About the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies

Established in 2019 at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies (CHRHS) is committed to tackling the human rights and humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. CHRHS's mission is to promote a more just, peaceful, and secure world by furthering a deeper understanding of global human rights and humanitarian challenges and encouraging collaboration between local communities, academics, and practitioners to develop innovative solutions.

About the Swedish Defence University

The Swedish Defence University (SEDU) contributes to national and international security through research and education. SEDU is a highly specialized university focusing on defense, crisis management and security. Founded as an institution for higher military education within the Swedish Armed Forces, the SEDU is an independent higher education institution today that offers education at all academic levels – bachelor's, master's, and doctoral – for civilian students and military officers. The Swedish Defence University educates all officers in the Swedish Armed Forces and is the driver of the academic development of the officer's profession.

About the authors

Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino is a doctoral candidate in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University, where he researches restraint behavior in civil wars, particularly non-state armed group restraint on the use of landmines and other explosive devices. Henrique has a mixed background as an army officer, humanitarian worker, and researcher across the fields of peace operations, civil-military relations, and mine action. E-mail: henrique.garbino@fhs.se

Jonathan Robinson is a global fellow at CHRHS and a contracted humanitarian operations specialist supporting the Civil-Military Humanitarian Response Program at the U.S. Naval War College. Before this, Jonathan spent nearly a decade living and working in the Middle East in various roles focused on aid worker security, conflict analysis, and humanitarian access. This report is written in his CHRHS capacity and during his own time. <https://watson.brown.edu/chrhs/people/jonathan-robinson>

João Maurício Dias Lopes Valdetaro has served as a Combat Engineer Officer in the Brazilian Army since 2003. With nearly a decade as an instructor at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center, his career has predominantly focused on peacekeeping operations. He has undertaken several deployments in instructional and field roles under both the United Nations and the European Union. Currently, he is advancing his studies at the Brazilian Army General Staff College. E-mail: jmvaldetaro@gmail.com.

Acknowledgements

The authors express gratitude to all the researchers and practitioners who played a key role at various stages of this four-year effort, especially Adam Levine and Alexandria Nysten from the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, as well as Daniel Triestman, who helped with the research on the Russian concepts. The authors also benefited from useful feedback and edits from two additional external reviewers, namely Cedric de Coning and Jules Frost. Earlier versions of this study were presented at the V Brazilian Network on Peace Operations' Research Seminar, SEDU's Military Organization and Profession Research Group, and the Brown University and U.S. Naval War College's 2023 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination Research Symposium and Workshop.

Disclaimer

The opinions and views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of any organizations with which they are affiliated or for whom they work, including the US Government, the US Department of Defense, the US Navy, the US Naval War College, the Brazilian Army General Staff College, Netsimco, Saalex, Brown University, and the Swedish Defence University.

Suggested citation

Garbino, Henrique, Jonathan Robinson and João Valdetaro. "Civil-military what?! Making sense of conflicting civil-military concepts", Research Report (Providence, RI, United States: Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, February 2024).

Abstract

The post-Cold War era has ushered in an array of complex challenges, expanding the scope of security agendas for states and multilateral organizations alike. This transformation necessitated regional and international approaches, encompassing multifaceted security threats such as human rights abuses, international terrorism, climate change, migration, pandemics, and cyberattacks. As a result, coordination between civilian and military actors became indispensable. However, this shift brought forth a multitude of civil-military concepts, each tailored to specific entities but resulting in significant confusion due to subtle variations in terminology and interpretation. For instance, the United Nations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization employ various civil-military concepts, often sharing similar terms but conveying distinct meanings. Such conceptual disparities can lead to misunderstandings and hinder effective coordination. This paper introduces an analytical tool that categorizes organization-specific civil-military concepts into archetypes and provides a repository of official concepts and their summaries. The analytical framework is based on four core parameters of each civil-military concept, i.e. the main perspective, the scope, the level of applicability, and whether the concept entails a dedicated function. This resource aims to facilitate a common language for navigating and bridging different civil-military concepts. While essential for national militaries in multinational operations, this guide also benefits civilians engaging with military organizations, providing insights into military approaches to civil-military relations and aiding in identifying interlocutors within military structures. Ultimately, this framework accommodates future developments in civil-military concepts, enabling a contextual understanding within the existing conceptual landscape.

Keywords: civil-military, relations, coordination, cooperation, interaction, humanitarian, CMR, CIMIC, CMCoord, CMI, civil affairs, conceptual analysis

Table of contents

List of abbreviations	4
List of figures and tables	8
1 Introduction	9
2 What's in a (civil-military) name? Terms and definitions	13
2.1 Concept	13
2.2 Civil-military concepts	13
2.3 Organization-specific civil-military concepts	13
2.4 Archetypal civil-military concepts (or archetypes)	14
2.5 Civil-military relationship	14
2.6 Other key terms	14
3 Making sense of different civil-military concepts	15
3.1 Analytical framework	15
3.2 Archetypal concepts	17
3.3 Caveats	23
3.4 Summary	24
4 Mapping organization-specific civil-military concepts	25
4.1 Methods	25
4.2 Key findings	26
5 Testing the utility of the analytical framework	33
5.1 Identifying conceptual gaps within organizations	33
5.2 Foreseeing practical challenges	36
6 Conclusion	38
Appendix: Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts	40
References	55
Endnotes	66

List of abbreviations

ALC	Congo Liberation Army
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AU-CIMIC	African Union Civil-Military Coordination
AU-CIVAFF	African Union Civil Affairs
AUS-CMI	Australian Armed Forces Civil-Military Interaction
BEL-Ci-MEG	Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Engagement
BEL-CIMIC	Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
BIAF-CMR	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces Civil-Military Relations
BRA-AsCiv	Brazilian Army Civil Affairs
BRA-CIMIC	Brazilian Army Civil-Military Cooperation
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAN-CIMIC	Canadian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CARE-IwAA	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere Interaction with Armed Actors
Caritas-RwM	Caritas Internationalis Relations with the Military
CCOE	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CHL-ACAT	Chilean Armed Forces Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration
CHN-CMI	People's Republic of China Civil-Military Integration
CHN-MCF	People's Republic of China Military-Civil Fusion
CHRHS	Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVAFF	Civil Affairs
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
CMI	Civil-Military Interaction
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
COL-CIMIC	Colombian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
DEU-CIMIC	German Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation

DFS	Department of Field Support
DNK-CIMIC	Danish Armed Force Civil-Military Cooperation
DNK-CPA	Danish Government Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
EU-CIMIC	European Union Civil-Military Cooperation
EU-CMCO	European Union Civil-Military Coordination
FRA-CIMIC	French Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
G1	Personnel branch (ground military staff)
G2	Intelligence branch
G3	Operations branch (ground military staff)
G4	Logistics branch (ground military staff)
G5	Plans branch (ground military staff)
G6	Communications branch (ground military staff)
G7	Training branch (ground military staff)
G8	Resource Management branch (ground military staff)
G9	Civil-Military Cooperation branch (ground military staff)
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HN	Host Nation
HQ	headquarters
HR	High-Representative
IA-CMR	InterAction Civil-Military Relations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDN-Binter	Indonesian Army Territorial Development
IDN-DF	Indonesian Government Dual Function
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IRC-CMI	International Rescue Committee Civil-Military Interaction
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework

J9	Civil-Military Cooperation branch (joint military staff)
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Center
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell or Joint Mission Analysis Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JP	joint publication
KEN-CIMIC	Kenyan Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
LBN-CIMIC	Lebanese Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
MCA	military civic action
MCI-EwAG	Mercy Corps International Engagement with Armed Groups
MEX-AsCiv	Mexican Armed Forces Civil Affairs
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MLC-ACP	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo Civil and Political Affairs
NDMU	National Disaster Management Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO-CIMIC	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Civil-Military Cooperation
NATO-CMI	North Atlantic Treaty Organization Civil-Military Interaction
NDRF	National Disaster Response Force
NGA-CIMIC	Nigerian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
NGA-CMA	Nigerian Armed Forces Civil-Military Affairs
NGO	non-governmental organization
NOR-CIMIC	Norwegian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
NOR-SIMIS	Norwegian Government Civil-Military Collaboration
NRC-CMP	Norwegian Refugee Council Civil-Military Policy
NSAG	non-state armed group
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Oxfam-CMCoord	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Civil-Military Coordination
PHL-CMA	Philippine Armed Forces Civil-Military Affairs
PRT-CIMIC	Portuguese Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
PSYOPS	Psychological operations
QIP	quick impact project

RC	Resident Coordinator
RCRC Movement-CMR	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations
RUS-MPC	Russian Federation Government Military-Political Cooperation
SCHR-HMR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response Humanitarian-Military Relations
SCI-CIVMIL	Save the Children International Civil-Military Relations
SCI-CMCoord	Save the Children International Civil-Military Coordination
SCI-CME	Save the Children International Civil-Military Engagement
SEDU	Swedish Defence University
SOP	standards operating procedures
STM	specialized training materials
SWE-CMS	Swedish Government Civil-Military Cooperation
TOR	terms of reference
TUN-CIMIC	Tunisian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
TUR-CIMIC	Turkish Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
UK	United Kingdom
UKR-CIC	Ukrainian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation
UKR-CMA	Ukrainian Government Civil-Military Administration
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UN-CIMIC	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination
UN-CMCoord	United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
UN-CIVAFF	United Nations Civil Affairs
US	United States
USA-CA	US Army Civil Affairs
USAID-CMC	United States Agency for International Development Civilian-Military Cooperation
VEN-UCM	Venezuelan Government Civic-Military Union
WFP	World Food Program
WFP-CMC	World Food Program Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
WFP-HMI	World Food Program Humanitarian-Military Interaction
WVI-CMPE	World Vision International Civil-Military-Police Engagement
ZAF-CMR	South African Government Civil-Military Relations

List of figures and tables

Figure 1	Different civil-military concepts in use by the UN, the EU, and NATO	9
Figure 2	The spectrum of civil-military relationships	18
Figure 3	Overview of countries and organizations surveyed	25
Figure 4	Organization-specific civil-military concepts in the spectrum of civil-military relationships	27
Table 1	Main parameters used in the framework and their possible empirical variation	15
Table 2	Summary of archetypal civil-military concepts	17
Table 3	Necessary and variable conditions for each archetype	26
Table 4	Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts	29
Table A1	Overview of factsheets of organization-specific civil-military concepts	41
Table A2	Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts without factsheets	43
Text box 1	Examples of misunderstandings due to different civil-military concepts	11
Text box 2	Examples of within-organization conceptual analyses	34

1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War arguably symbolized the decline of conventional warfare and ushered in a period of increasingly complex security challenges. In response to this change, states' and multilateral organizations' security agendas expanded in scale and scope. First, peace and security ceased to be primarily a national affair and instead required regional and international approaches. For example, civil wars may quickly spill over neighboring territories, drive significant flows of refugees into different parts of the world, and trigger conflict elsewhere. Second, the notion of what constitutes a security threat has also significantly expanded and incorporated areas such as human rights abuses, international terrorism, food insecurity, climate change, migration, and cyberattacks, to name some.¹

The need for dialogue and coordination between the various actors involved in this emerging complexity also increased. Military forces alone could not resolve conflicts or keep the peace without civilian actors, who bring specific expertise and resources in the field. The coordination or cooperation between these different actors did not come naturally and often required dedicated efforts and specific guidance. It is not surprising that, in reaction to this complexity, a wide array of national, regional, and international institutions created their own concepts to guide the relationship between military and civilian actors. The result of these efforts is a myriad of similar yet slightly differing approaches, each specifically tailored to its parent entity, but often different enough to cause significant misunderstandings and misconceptions when compared to each other.




Figure 1. Different civil-military concepts in use by the UN, the EU, and NATO.

For example, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have at least seven different civil-military concepts currently in use between them (see Figure 1). Admittedly, each concept applies to a different context and has a different meaning, but this is not at all intuitive. For instance, the EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) entails strategic-level policies to facilitate the relationship between EU internal civilian and military government bodies. For the United Nations, the UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) is a military capability focused on UN peacekeeping operations' tactical and operational levels. Finally, the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is a framework

for dialogue and interaction between humanitarian and military actors. Even though these concepts have the same wording, i.e. “civil-military coordination”, they mean different things. Alternatively, some concepts may be worded differently but mean similar things. For example, UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC),² US Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA), and NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC) all entail a military capability dedicated to facilitating interaction with civilian actors with a focus on achieving the military mission.

Regardless of why such conceptual and terminological differences emerge, they can lead to confusion and misunderstandings. To illustrate, consider you are working for a humanitarian non-governmental organization (NGO) in a complex humanitarian emergency alongside a NATO intervention and a UN peacekeeping operation.³ You may need to share information about the humanitarian context and current security threats with a *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination* (UN-CMCoord) officer from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) deployed to the response. This UN-CMCoord officer is a humanitarian aid worker, a civilian like yourself. You may also want to inform UN military peacekeepers about your organization’s planned projects in the area of operations of the UN mission. This time, though, you contact the *Civil-Military Coordination* (UN-CIMIC) branch of the UN mission’s military component. The UN-CIMIC officer is not a civilian, but a military officer. In addition, different NATO troops are present in the country, and you may need to liaise with them through a *Civil-Military Cooperation* (NATO-CIMIC) or a *Civil Affairs* (USA-CA) officer, depending on which military forces they are from. For additional real-world examples of misunderstandings due to different civil-military concepts, see Text box 1 below.

To be clear, this is not a problem only for large multilateral organizations. For this research project, we have identified 59 different official civil-military concepts used by 44 entities, including 35 concepts from 26 national governments, including its armed forces; nine concepts from five multilateral organizations; 13 concepts from 11 non-governmental organizations; and two concepts from two non-state armed groups (NSAG). From all these, key questions arise, such as how do these concepts relate to each other? Are they comparable? And what do they mean beyond their face-value terminological construct?

Indeed, this lack of conceptual clarity has been highlighted in previous literature. For example, the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Australian Council for International Development outlined these distinctions in their *Same Space – Different Mandates* handbook.⁴ Other authors have highlighted these differences when attempting to make sense of specific concepts, such as the “comprehensive approach,”⁵ “civil-military cooperation,”⁶ or the civil-military relations within specific organizations, such as the UN,⁷ the African Union (AU),⁸ the EU,⁹ or NATO.¹⁰ However, to our knowledge, no common guide or language has been developed for the various civil-military concepts used by different organizations.

Thus, this paper aims to help practitioners, analysts, and scholars navigate a broad range of different civil-military concepts in two ways. First, we put forward a novel analytical tool, which establishes a baseline for comparing different civil-military concepts within a typology of four archetypical concepts. Second, we offer a repository of official civil-military concepts, including official guidance documents, manuals, and our own summaries in simple and accessible “factsheets” (see

Appendix). We hope this will allow users to quickly identify broad similarities and differences between specific civil-military concepts and, in effect, create a common language to help navigate and bridge different concepts. Ultimately, our ambition is to increase mutual understanding between civilian and military actors.

Case Study 1: The Brazilian Army in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti¹¹

The Brazilian Army first deployed to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. At that time, the Brazilian Army did not have a consolidated doctrine of civil-military cooperation, that is, a military capability to manage the relationship between the force and civilian actors. Instead, the Brazilian military had been used to employ the so-called military civic actions (MCA), i.e. small-scale projects aimed at alleviating the needs of the local population and promoting civic behavior, such as offering medical care in remote regions of Brazil.

The military component of MINUSTAH, however, followed a standardized military unit and staff structure, which required a civil-military cooperation (i.e. UN-CIMIC) capability at the battalion level (often referred to as G9). Without a clearer frame of reference, many Brazilian Army officers simply believed that MCA was a synonym for UN-CIMIC. This led many to take a simplified and military-led approach to civil-military coordination and cooperation, breaching key UN-CIMIC principles and misusing UN-CIMIC experts.¹² For example, what was then called “CIMIC activities” sometimes included embedding intelligence, psychological operations, and special forces personnel, who capitalized on the access to civilians to pursue their military objectives. This goes against UN-CIMIC principles and risks the trust between the military component and civilian actors.¹³ Further, because MCAs were usually planned and conducted only by military personnel in Brazil, the focus of such activities was often to provide direct unilateral support to affected populations, with little coordination with other civilian actors, including MINUSTAH’s civilian components.

These shortcomings were overcome following the publication and socialization of UN-CIMIC policies¹⁴ and specialized UN-CIMIC pre-deployment training adopted by the Brazilian Army.¹⁵

Case Study 2: Ukrainian Armed Forces during military reform process (2006-2022)¹⁶

Throughout several processes of military reform, the Ukrainian Army has slowly transitioned from Soviet to Western-inspired organization and doctrine. This included adopting the standard NATO-style military staff, with nine key functions, namely personnel (G1), intelligence (G2), operations (G3), logistics (G4), plans (G5), communications (G6), training (G7), resource management (G8), and civil-military cooperation (G9).¹⁷ In practice, however, the role of the G9 officer kept some underlying features of the Soviet-standard political officer.

The traditional Soviet military staff had no dedicated function for dealing with non-military actors. However, down to the company level, the Central Committee of the Communist Party deployed a political officer, who was responsible for troop indoctrination and training, assisting the commander in maintaining troop morale, motivation, and discipline, and advising the commander on nonoperational matters, such as local political structures.¹⁸ As such, the political officer was the closest to CIMIC the Ukrainian Armed Forces had experience with. Consequently, CIMIC officers (G9) were assigned cumulative roles as personnel officers (G1), who, like the Soviet political officer, are often assigned with dealing with troop morale, motivation, and discipline. As such, CIMIC officers were often not included in operations planning and implementation as much as necessary.

Text box 1. Examples of misunderstandings due to different civil-military concepts.

This study is particularly relevant for members of national militaries taking part in multinational coalitions or peace operations. In these missions, militaries must adapt their own national civil-military concepts to the regional and international organizations' conceptual frameworks. Likewise, staff officers are tasked to plan and coordinate the efforts of military contingents from countries and service branches different from their own. As such, they need to recognize how their civil-military concept may differ from or align with others. For civilians, this guide should assist with identifying interlocutors within military organizations and provide insights into military approaches to civil-military relations in each context. Some civilian organizations that have their own civil-military concepts and dedicated personnel dealing with the topic will also benefit from this guide as an additional reference source. Finally, as new concepts are developed in the future, this framework can be used by both civilian and military actors to help provide context for them within the existing civil-military conceptual ecosystem.

This paper proceeds in five sections. The following section defines and clarifies key terms used in this paper. Next, we introduce the analytical framework for categorizing organization-specific civil-military concepts into different archetypes. We then apply the analytical framework to 59 organization-specific civil-military concepts and assess how the suggested archetypes fit real-world concepts. Next, we test the utility of our analytical framework in identifying conceptual gaps within organizations and foreseeing practical challenges when navigating between civil-military concepts. The study concludes with a summary of key findings, policy implications and suggestions for further research. Alongside this research report, we offer readers an extended collection of factsheets summarizing 31 organization-specific civil-military concepts used in this study. These factsheets outline the main features of each concept, where it can be accessed, and how it fits the pre-defined archetypes.

2 What's in a (civil-military) name? Terms and definitions

This study essentially deals with conceptual analysis, identifying and distinguishing different terms as well as analyzing their meanings and understandings. In short, words matter. Thus, before introducing our analytical framework and findings, this section defines various terms used throughout this study. The definitions presented here will inevitably differ from others. Rather than an attempt to concretely set out rigid definitions, this section's main purpose is to guide readers for this study. What follows should be understood as the building blocks for the upcoming sections.

2.1 Concept

We define *concept* as an abstract representation of reality, an idea or thought formed from specific contexts. We are aware that some organizations may have more specific definitions of concept. For instance, NATO defines concept as “an agreed notion or idea, normally set out in a document, that provides guidance for different working domains and which may lead to the development of a policy.”¹⁹ For this paper, concepts might, but do not necessarily, provide guidance or aim to develop a policy.

2.2 Civil-military concepts

We are mainly interested in what we call *civil-military concepts*. We understand these concepts as abstract representations of the relationship between civilian and military actors. Because concepts are contextual, some may emphasize or downplay certain aspects of this relationship. We further distinguish civil-military concepts into organization-specific and archetypal concepts.

2.3 Organization-specific civil-military concepts

Organization-specific civil-military concepts are the main interest of this research. While some organizations may have several civil-military concepts, others may have none. In any case, each organization-specific civil-military concept is unique. Even if the term is literally the same, we give them unique identifiers and acronyms. For example, we distinguish the different concepts of civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, depending on their parent organization, such as the Brazilian Army Civil-Military Cooperation (BRA-CIMIC) and the NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC).

Further, some organization-specific civil-military concepts may be operationalized in largely different ways. For instance, one organization may use a specific concept as general guidance or a principle to be followed on different occasions. Another organization may appoint an individual responsible for managing or facilitating civil-military relationships. Even further, some civil-military concepts may amount to a capability with dedicated personnel, funds, knowledge, and experience related to civil-military relationships.

2.4 Archetypal civil-military concepts (or archetypes)

To make sense of the wide range of different organization-specific civil-military concepts, we identified *archetypal civil-military concepts*. In other words, these archetypes represent ideal civil-military concepts and serve the main function of clustering similar organization-specific civil-military concepts. The archetypes are Civil-Military Relations, Civil-Military Interaction, Civil-Military Cooperation, and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination. The logic behind them is presented in Section 3.

Some organization-specific civil-military concepts may use the same term, e.g. civil-military coordination, but are related to different archetypal civil-military concepts. For example, according to our analytical framework, UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) and EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) pertain to different archetypes. Alternatively, some organization-specific civil-military concepts with different terms may relate to the same archetype. For instance, the concepts of US Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA), Philippines Armed Forces Civil-Military Affairs (PHL-CMA), NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC), and UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) all pertain to the same archetype in our framework.

2.5 Civil-military relationship

Throughout this study, we refer to *civil-military relationships* as a generic “chapeau” civil-military concept, which includes all four archetypes. Note that we retain the term “civil-military relations” as a distinct concept, included in our umbrella term civil-military relationships.

2.6 Other key terms

For clarity, we would also like to define other key terms used throughout this paper. First, we have a negative definition of *civilians* as all non-military actors. *Military*, conversely, is defined as of, for, or pertaining to the preparation or the actual conduct of war. Note that this distinction is agnostic to the legal status of combatant or non-combatant in an armed conflict. In other words, for this paper, we include non-state armed groups such as insurgents, militias, and private military and security companies in the concept of “military”. Depending on the context, *police* actors may sit awkwardly between the civilian and military categories, but, for this study, being non-military, it is included in the concept of civilian.²⁰

Thus, we consider civilian and military as separate categories. It may be the case that an organization contains separate military and civilian bodies within it, such as modern UN peacekeeping operations. We follow the UN’s terminology and call such organizations *multidimensional*. When civilian and military are combined in a specific perspective, structure, or organization, we call it *joint*. For example, a joint team should include both military and civilian personnel. We acknowledge that some militaries might use the term *joint* to denote the combination of different branches, such as the army, navy, and air force. For this study, however, we use *combined* for this purpose.

3 Making sense of different civil-military concepts

This section presents the analytical framework for comparing and contrasting different organization-specific civil-military concepts. According to Lukas Milevski, “[...] conceptual distinctions are rarely born out in organizational structure, and this, in turn, means that organizational structures should not and cannot be used for or against particular conceptual distinctions. Otherwise, we can’t share concepts with other analogous organizations [...] or even with our own past or our probable future.”²¹ Thus, our suggested analytical framework offers a baseline built on theoretical priors and not organizational distinctions, thus allowing for structured conceptual comparisons across different organization-specific civil-military concepts.

3.1 Analytical framework

This analytical framework is intended to organize different organization-specific civil-military concepts into main groupings. With the framework, it is possible to identify which concepts are similar or different and why. To do this, we identified four core parameters present in every civil-military concept: its main perspective, scope, level of applicability, and whether it entails a dedicated function (see Table 1 below). Based on the variation of these parameters, we identified four overarching archetypes.

These parameters were identified through an abductive approach. We first analyzed the most consolidated civil-military concepts currently used by four major organizations worldwide: the UN, the EU, NATO, and the US Army. These organizations are arguably leading peace and security actors and have largely spearheaded the conceptual development of civil-military concepts. Combined, these organizations employ nine main civil-military concepts, which are the baseline of our archetypes. We then expanded the sample to include 59 organization-specific civil-military concepts from 44 different organizations and to test and reassess our parameters and archetypes.

	Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function
<i>Possible variation</i>	civilian	internal	tactical	yes
			tactical & operational	
	military	external	operational	
			operational & strategic	
	joint	internal & external	strategic	no
			all levels	

Table 1. Main parameters used in the framework and their possible empirical variation.

3.1.1 Main perspective

The first parameter captures the concept’s *main perspective* on the relationship between civilian and military actors. In other words, the concept may take a civilian, military, or joint perspective. This parameter is not always intuitive from the concept itself and is gauged based on its parent organization, directing principles, and stated purpose. For instance, the policy regulating NATO

Civil-Military Interaction (NATO-CMI) clearly states that the concept “is applicable for NATO military bodies in collective defense, cooperative security, crisis management, collective training and preparation for these, [...] at all military levels.”²² Some civil-military concepts, however, include in their name which perspective is at the forefront, such as the UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), which prioritizes the humanitarian, civilian perspective.

3.1.2 *Scope*

The second parameter looks at the *scope* of each civil-military concept. The scope can be internal, external, or both internal and external. For example, some concepts aim to facilitate the relationship between civilian and military bodies *within* an organization, such as the EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) concept. Other concepts aim exclusively at *external actors*, such as NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC), which focuses on non-NATO civilian actors. Some concepts have both an internal and external scope, such as the UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC). Briefly, UN-CIMIC aims to facilitate the relationship of the UN peacekeeping mission’s military component with the mission’s civilian and police components and civilian actors outside the mission structure. Gauging the scope of every civil-military concept requires a careful study of its guiding documents. The policy regulating NATO-CIMIC and NATO-CMI, for instance, clearly states that “NATO-internal political-military relations [and the] interaction between the military and civilians within NATO HQ, are outside [its] scope.”²³

It is worth noting that the scope depends on how we define the organization. For instance, we understand that UN-CIMIC has an internal and external scope because it deals with the relationship between military peacekeepers and, on the one hand, civilian and police peacekeepers from the same peacekeeping operation (internal) and, on the other hand, external non-military actors (external). In this case, the reference point is the UN peacekeeping operation. Alternatively, the scope would have been only external had the reference been the mission’s military component.

3.1.3 *Level of applicability*

The third parameter delves into the concept’s *level of applicability* regarding decision-making or operations, namely the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.²⁴ Notably, some concepts can be applied across all levels, while others are restricted to one or two levels. For example, EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) is restricted to strategic-level relations between EU civilian and military bodies at the headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, EU Civil-Military Cooperation (EU-CIMIC) focuses on the tactical and operational levels of EU military missions. The level of applicability of any organization-specific civil-military concept is assessed based on the concept’s guiding documents.

3.1.4 Dedicated function

The fourth parameter asks whether the concept entails a *dedicated function* or if it is meant only as guidance. Some official documents clearly state that specific concepts are only meant as guiding principles. Dedicated functions, however, can come in various ways, which are not captured by this parameter. For example, some organizations may appoint a single individual as the focal point to manage the relationship between civilian and military actors as an extra duty. Other organizations may have full-time personnel focused only on civil-military relationships. Even further, the civil-military concept may be operationalized in large-scale capabilities, such as US Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA) brigades constituting thousands of personnel.

3.2 Archetypal concepts

By applying these four parameters to existing civil-military concepts used by the UN, the EU, NATO, and the US Army, we have identified four archetypal civil-military concepts: *Civil-Military Relations* (CMR), *Civil-Military Interaction* (CMI), *Civil-Military Cooperation* (CIMIC), and *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination* (CMCoord). In addition, we also briefly describe the concept of *Comprehensive Approach* (CA) for clarity purposes.

Concept	General definition	Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function
Civil-Military Relations (CMR)	The relationship between military and civilian actors, especially civil society, government bureaucracies, and civilian leadership.	joint	internal & external	strategic	no
Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)	Any interaction between civilian and military actors, whether conducted between specialized civil-military personnel or not.	joint	internal & external	all levels	no
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)	A dedicated military function aimed at facilitating the interface between military commands and civilian actors in support of achieving the military mission objectives and the civilian environment.	military	external	operational & tactical	yes
Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)	Coordination between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.	civilian	external	operational & tactical	yes

Table 2. Summary of archetypal civil-military concepts.

Comprehensive Approach is more inclusive than CMR because it includes civil-civil and military-military relations. CA also has a more external focus, aiming at harmonizing collective efforts

towards the same goal, including military and civilian, and national, regional, and international. We can define *Civil-Military Relations* as the relationship between military and civilian organizations, especially civil society, government bureaucracies, and civilian leadership. As such, CMR is a joint civil-military concept with an internal and external scope, mostly focused on the strategic level and usually without a dedicated function. According to our definition, *Civil-Military Interaction* entails the routine interaction between civilians and military personnel at all levels, whether conducted between specialized personnel or not. Thus, CMI can be understood as a comprehensive joint civil-military concept applicable to internal and external actors at all levels but with no dedicated function. Finally, both *Civil-Military Cooperation* and *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination* usually have an external scope, focus on the tactical and operational levels, and have dedicated functions. However, CIMIC takes a military perspective, and CMCoord sees the civil-military relationship from a civilian, humanitarian perspective (see Table 2 for an overview).

It is worth noting that the actual intensity of the relationship between civilian and military actors can vary significantly across all concepts (Figure 2). The civil-military relationship is better understood as a spectrum ranging from mere co-existence to full integration, passing through cooperation. We understand *co-existence* as the ability of two or more actors to operate in the same area and same period despite fundamental disagreements or the need to maintain distance and a clear separation in order for each entity to fulfil its mandate while upholding its own particular sets of principles. At a minimum, it entails de-conflicting civilian and military activities, such as informing civilians of the time and place of military operations or sharing the location, with military actors, of humanitarian static and mobile that are to be protected under International Humanitarian Law.

Cooperation denotes working or acting together for a common purpose when desirable for both actors. Military escorts to humanitarian convoys and civilian expert support to military interventions are examples of cooperative activities. *Integration* is the combination of civilian and military actors into an integral whole.²⁵ For example, a joint civil-military operations and coordination center, sometimes deployed in disaster relief operations, is an integrated structure. Finally, a common understanding is that, regardless of the level of intensity of the civil-military relationship, coordination is necessary across the spectrum. By *coordination*, we mean the continued dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors aimed at avoiding conflict, competition, and the duplication of efforts, as well as promoting mutual understanding.




Figure 2. The spectrum of civil-military relationships.²⁶

The desired intensity of the civil-military relationship – i.e. co-existence, cooperation, or integration – is conditioned by internal and external factors. While internal factors may include organizations’ mandates, time frames, operating principles, funding arrangements, human resources and other factors, external factors deal with locals’ perceptions, levels of violence, and operational demands. Context-specific analysis is critical to understanding these factors. For instance, as a rule, most humanitarian organizations will avoid cooperation and integration with military actors to maintain their neutrality and independence, especially during armed conflicts. However, in natural disasters, coordination and cooperation between humanitarians and the military is often higher, given the absence of armed threats and a clearer alignment between humanitarian and military goals. While measuring the intensity of this relationship could be a useful addition to our analytical framework, it goes beyond the scope of this paper.²⁷

In what follows, we explain in greater detail the four archetypal civil-military concepts – CMR, CMI, CIMIC, and CMCoord. We start, however, with the concept of Comprehensive Approach, which provides a broad framework for the interaction between various actors, not only limited to civilian and military actors.

3.2.1 Comprehensive Approach (CA)

There is an overall agreement that current complex crises require the broad participation of various actors, i.e. military, civilian, local, national, regional, and international. These efforts should be ideally harmonized under a collective framework. When dealt with by a single government, this need gave rise to concepts such as “joined-up-government”,²⁸ “whole-of-government”,²⁹ “whole-of-nation”,³⁰ “interagency approach”,³¹ “networked security”,³² and “3D concept (diplomacy-development-defense)”.³³ International organizations have preferred the “multidimensional” or “integrated” labels.³⁴ Granted, each concept varies slightly, but they all share the same premise: harmonizing collective efforts towards the same goal. This includes the coordination and cooperation not only between military and civilian actors but also within the different military and civilian actors.

The Comprehensive Approach framework thus includes both internal and external actors but is not limited to the civil-military relationship. In other words, CA deals as much with civil-military relations as it does with civil-civil and military-military relations. We decided to include the CA concept in this guide because, in contrast with CMR, the Comprehensive Approach has been operationalized by different organizations and, in many cases, it provides the conceptual background for other civil-military concepts, such as CMI, CIMIC, and CMCoord.

Several organizations use the concept of Comprehensive Approach, such as the UN,³⁵ the EU,³⁶ and NATO.³⁷ A clear example of the operationalization of the CA concept is the so-called *Integrated Strategic Framework* (ISF), applied “in all conflict and post-conflict countries where the UN has a both a Country Team of UN agencies on the ground [UNCT], and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, political field mission or peacebuilding office”.³⁸ The ISF is a framework agreement mainly between the UNCT and the UN peace operation, but it also includes the host nation’s government and other external partners. It aims to ensure strategic-level coherence among

the various organizations. A comprehensive approach does not entail a dedicated function. It is, rather, a general guidance policy and is usually under the responsibility of senior management structures.³⁹

3.2.2 Civil-Military Relations (CMR)

The concept of Civil-Military Relations describes the relationship between military and civilian organizations as well as individuals. Although the subject can be traced to the classic writings of Sun Tzu⁴⁰ and Carl von Clausewitz,⁴¹ the concept gained traction during the Cold War, following the seminal work of Samuel Huntington⁴² and Morris Janowitz.⁴³ The debate around CMR has been mostly framed within Political Sciences and Sociology and served academic or political discourses. However, the study of Civil-Military Relations also draws upon diverse fields such as law, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, economics, history, and journalism.⁴⁴ The scholarship on CMR is ample and has included topics such as the organization of armed forces,⁴⁵ civilian control,⁴⁶ recruitment policies and practices,⁴⁷ and gender and sexual orientation in the military,⁴⁸ to name a few areas. CMR is often considered to mainly deal with strategic-level issues related to national militaries, epitomized in the study of democratic control of armed forces. However, as scholars criticized traditional understandings of CMR,⁴⁹ the concept's scope extended to operational and tactical questions⁵⁰ and non-state armed actors.⁵¹

As such, Civil-Military Relations is more of a field of study than anything else. However, some organizations use CMR as a functional concept. A notable case is the European Union, which has since 2003 used the concept of EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO).⁵² EU-CMCO is intended to guide the strategic-level relationship between civilian and military actors within the EU structures, such as the Civilian and Military Planning and Conduct Capability branches of the European External Action Service. EU-CMCO does not entail a dedicated function with specific personnel responsible for managing the relationship between civilian and military EU officials. Rather, it offers general guidelines for coordination and cooperation between these actors.

In summary, CMR takes a joint perspective on the relationship between civilian and military actors, with an internal and external scope. It is mainly focused on the strategic level, though it is relevant for all levels. However, CMR is not a functional concept used by many organizations and, as such, often does not entail a dedicated function.

3.2.3 Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)

Civil-military interaction applies to both civilian and military actors. It is the first concept focused mostly on the operational and tactical levels and refers to the inevitable interaction between military and civilian actors in the field. Simply put, CMI aims to mutually increase the effectiveness and efficiency of civilian and military actors and may include communication, planning, and coordination before and during operations.⁵³

According to this definition, most actors will invariably, in one way or another, engage in civil-military interaction when deployed in the field. From the foot soldier and the local aid worker to the force commander and civilian mission leadership, CMI encompasses all interactions between civilian and military actors, regardless of the level, intensity, or purpose of the civil-military relationship. Because it takes such a general form in the field, most organizations have no specific concept for this type of relationship.⁵⁴ Rather, CMI-related tasks are implied in individual terms of reference or adopted as routine work, especially in civilian organizations. Even in organized military structures, CMI does not require dedicated structure and personnel, as it is considered that every soldier should, at a minimum, understand and communicate with non-military actors during operations.

As such, civil-military interaction is relevant to most daily operations, though it concentrates on security, information, logistics, medical support, and routine activities. For example, humanitarian organizations often conduct security checks with military interlocutors before deployment to high-risk areas, and soldiers on patrol might interact with local and international civilians. In most organizations, this routine interaction is not conducted by dedicated staff. Specific communication between specialized civilian and military personnel is also included in the CMI concept. For instance, CMI includes the interaction between a military logistics officer liaising with civil defense actors to coordinate transportation support in the aftermath of a natural disaster or a non-governmental organization reporting unexploded ordnance and requesting its disposal to the local military unit.

In addition, UN multidimensional peace operations have joint, integrated structures, such as joint operations centers (JOC), joint mission analysis centers (JMAC), and joint logistics operations centers (JLOC).⁵⁵ The structures embody the concept of CMI by having civilian, police, and military personnel working side by side. Their core business, however, is not the civil-military relationship per se but another area of specialization, such as operations or logistics.

3.2.4 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Unlike previous concepts, civil-military cooperation takes on a strictly military perspective. Focusing on the operational and tactical levels, CIMIC reflects a detailed and organized military capability involving dedicated personnel, specific doctrine, and clear command and authority lines. The CIMIC function generally aims to facilitate the interface between military and civilian actors, focusing on national government and international humanitarian and development actors in the mission area. CIMIC may also target the civilian components in multidimensional missions to increase the efficiency and synergy between mission components.⁵⁶

Civil-military cooperation is rooted in a solid understanding of civilian efforts, structures, and capabilities and how they relate to the military mission. Further, coordination and cooperation with civilian actors should be based on open and transparent dialogue, even when civilian goals differ from the military mission. As such, adding covert objectives to CIMIC activities, such as elements of intelligence gathering and psychological operations, risks compromising the long-term relationships with civilian actors and, in turn, leads to decreased acceptance, access, and security.⁵⁷

Common CIMIC tasks include establishing and maintaining liaison with civilian actors; identifying and explaining military goals, objectives, and concepts of operations to civilian actors; facilitating concurrent, parallel and, where possible, integrated planning with civilian actors; integrating other military staff branches; and working towards the transition to civilian authorities. These activities fall under three broader CIMIC functions: civil-military liaison and information sharing, support to the military mission, and support to civilian actors.⁵⁸

Civil-military cooperation is a specific staff function in most modern military structures, at least at the operational and tactical levels. Commonly designed as the ninth staff function in Western militaries and multilateral organizations, CIMIC is mostly present in ground (G9) and joint (J9) forces, although the concept and staff function are also relevant in naval and air forces. Dedicated CIMIC officers are usually present, at least at the brigade level. At the battalion level, CIMIC officers occupy a dedicated position or accumulate it with other roles, such as operations officer, public information officer, etc. At the company and platoon levels, CIMIC officers rarely take dedicated positions but function as focal points. This role is usually filled by the company commander or deputy commander and the platoon leader or deputy leader. Specialized CIMIC units and CIMIC centers are most often activated only in operations, but some organizations still maintain such structures in peacetime, such as the US Army 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)⁵⁹ and NATO's Multinational CIMIC Group.⁶⁰

The four organizations analyzed here – the UN, the EU, NATO, and the US Army – have their own CIMIC concepts. Differences between different organizations' concepts of CIMIC, such as NATO-CIMIC and UN-CIMIC, mainly reflect the organizations themselves and not the essential idea behind the concept. For example, NATO-CIMIC reaches the strategic level due to NATO's standing headquarters, in which the CIMIC function is represented at all times. UN-CIMIC, in contrast, is limited to the tactical and operational levels. The UN headquarters in New York does not operate as a traditional general military staff and has no dedicated CIMIC presence. Another difference comes from the very nature of NATO and UN operations. On the one hand, current UN peace operations are multidimensional, that is, they are comprised of civilian, military, and police components. NATO operations, on the other hand, are purely military. The CIMIC concept reflects this difference. While NATO-CIMIC focuses solely on cooperation with external non-military actors, UN-CIMIC also focuses on within-mission coordination. Previous research has looked into the differences between EU-CIMIC and NATO-CIMIC,⁶¹ as well as NATO-CIMIC and US Army Civil Affairs.⁶²

3.2.5 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)

As the name suggests, Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination takes the humanitarian perspective of the civil-military relationship. CMCoord is defined as the “dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies”,⁶³ which aims to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Like CIMIC, CMCoord focuses on the tactical and operational levels. In particular, the main objective of CMCoord is to facilitate the interaction between humanitarian and military actors before, during, and after humanitarian emergencies.

Grounded on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence, CMCoord emphasizes the distinction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian action and the avoidance of relying on military actors to deliver humanitarian aid. The main functions of CMCoord are information sharing, task division, and coordinated planning among military forces and humanitarian actors. From a humanitarian perspective, common tasks include establishing a dialogue and sharing information with military forces, negotiating humanitarian access, and monitoring the activities of military forces to ensure a positive humanitarian impact.⁶⁴

In theory, CMCoord is a shared responsibility and does not presuppose strict hierarchical structures or chains of command between humanitarian and military actors. This means that the CMCoord concept applies not only to humanitarians but also to military actors, who are also required to protect and promote humanitarian principles. In practice, however, virtually only civilian, humanitarian organizations deploy CMCoord personnel. Military actors, instead, more often than not combine pre-existing CIMIC capabilities to take on CMCoord-related tasks. That said, CMCoord structures are not always clear, even among most humanitarian organizations. Only a few major humanitarian organizations are equipped with dedicated structures that operationalize CMCoord, notably UN OCHA⁶⁵ and the World Food Program (WFP).⁶⁶

Instead of deploying civil-military coordination experts, other humanitarian organizations often combine this role with pre-existing capabilities. For example, the so-called protection experts are often tasked to liaise with armed actors to ensure civilian protection and access coordinators are mandated to ensure humanitarian access with various state and non-state military forces. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular, deploys Armed Forces Delegates to liaise with armed actors, usually at the operational level, and promote relevant humanitarian norms. These delegates are frequently former senior military personnel with extensive military experience.

3.3 Caveats

Before we present the study's main findings, it is important to address some caveats. The study attempts to categorize and create a common language between different civil-military concepts and hopes to provide an initial foundation for future research. Furthermore, the concepts presented in this study are categorized using the four abovementioned parameters and may miss important nuances between them. In other words, civil-military concepts may vary in several other parameters not captured by our framework. By design, our analytical framework is deliberately minimalist, including only basic parameters as a basis for ample comparison. That said, there can be more fine-grained differences within each archetype, such as whether the concept compounds to, for instance, an established doctrine, a dedicated office at the headquarters level, a military capability, or mere guidelines. Differences between USA-CA, NATO-CIMIC and UN-CIMIC, for example, can be great in practice, even though they all belong to the same archetype in our framework (i.e. CIMIC).

We understand that most of these differences between organization-specific concepts belonging to the same archetype stem from contextual and organizational differences. For instance,

depending on available resources, the archetypal CIMIC concept can be applied differently by different organizations or even by the same organization over time. Some militaries employ CIMIC only for training and planning purposes or when deployed to field missions. In other cases, CIMIC is structured into dedicated personnel and units, even in peacetime. Further, CIMIC may be integrated into military doctrine or be a standalone capability to facilitate the use of force. Ultimately, CIMIC is operationalized differently according to the organization's resources and objectives, but its main principles remain the same. As such, we acknowledge organization-specific differences while sticking to the four main parameters as a minimum base for comparison.

We also recognize that there could be a disconnect between the official definition of an organization-specific civil-military concept and how the concept is operationalized in practice. This may be particularly common in military doctrine, which, while providing guidance on the use of military capabilities, does not always match existing organizational structures. This may be by design, for example, when certain units and capabilities are only mobilized in case of war or due to organizational constraints, such as insufficient budget, implementation delays, and others. For instance, the 2021 Brazilian Army's doctrine on civil affairs – i.e. CIMIC, according to our framework – states that “the civil affairs structure is usually composed of the following elements: civil affairs section that makes up the general staffs, starting at brigade level; civil affairs units; civil affairs detachments; civil affairs liaison officers; and civil-military cooperation centers.”⁶⁷ However, the Brazilian Army has, as of 2023, only civil affairs sections at brigade and division levels.

Furthermore, there might be discrepancies between publicly-available information and actual organization practices and internal documentation. For example, according to a publicly available 2013 directive, the World Food Program employs the concept of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC).⁶⁸ However, in practice, the organization no longer uses the concept of WFP-CMC and, instead, has recently developed the concept of Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI).⁶⁹ The policies and guidelines defining this concept, however, are closed to public access. Thus, it remains unclear whether and how WFP-CMC differs from WFP-HMI.

3.4 Summary

In this section, we describe our analytical framework designed to make sense of competing civil-military concepts. Based on consolidated concepts used by the UN, the EU, NATO, and the US Army, we have identified four core parameters that vary across civil-military concepts: the main perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated structure. Based on these four parameters, we have identified four archetypal concepts: Civil-Military Relations (CMR), Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord). The analytical framework can thus sort different organization-specific civil-military concepts into their archetypal category and provide an initial assessment of how they differ or concur.

4 Mapping organization-specific civil-military concepts

This section aims to assess the conceptual fit of our analytical framework. To do so, we test how organization-specific civil-military concepts fit our four archetypes. By analyzing publicly available official policy documents, manuals, doctrine papers, websites, and secondary sources, we have identified 59 specific civil-military concepts from 44 different entities. Finally, for more than 14 entities, we found no readily-available information from open-source searches regarding potential civil-military concepts. See Figure 3 for an overview and the Appendix for a complete breakdown.




Figure 3. Overview of countries and organizations surveyed.

4.1 Methods

We collected data for the different concepts through a mix of purposive and convenience samples. The concepts were purposefully retrieved from specific organizations or national contexts, which we assessed as relevant for studying civil-military relationships. Namely, we looked into leading countries in their regions in terms of gross domestic product, population size, and military power, seeking geographical, linguistic, and cultural variety. We also looked into major regional and international organizations and international NGOs. In this study, we excluded sub-national organizations or national NGOs from the sample. In addition, we looked for readily available and convenient sources rather than a systematic review. In particular, we looked into specific repositories of military doctrine and other related documents and reached out to different professional networks for advice and insights.

The search was done through two sets of keywords, one signifying the civil-military nature of concepts and the other specific to the organization or context in each case. As much as possible, we searched for concepts in their original languages, such as English, Dutch, French, Norwegian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, and Ukrainian. We paid utmost attention to official documents that define key concepts, and, in the absence of those, we also explored additional

sources, such as journal articles, websites, press releases, secondary sources, and, in some cases, informal interviews with representatives of such organizations. Except for the informal interviews, we only used open-source information.

In total, we searched for organization-specific civil-military concepts from 33 national contexts, nine multilateral organizations, 14 international NGOs,⁷⁰ and 240 NSAGs;⁷¹ and identified 59 concepts. Of these, 35 concepts were from national governments, including their armed forces; 13 concepts were from international non-governmental organizations; nine concepts were from multilateral organizations; and two were from non-state armed groups. For 31 civil-military concepts, we were able to find sufficient information to produce a factsheet summarizing each concept’s background, definition, principles, core function, structure, and other aspects. However, for 28 civil-military concepts, we only found superficial information and, as such, we provide only a short explanation of its definition and use. As much as possible, we have included these concepts into our analytical framework for robustness. Finally, for seven countries, four multilateral organizations, three NGOs and more than 238 NSAGs, we did not come across readily accessible information through open-source searches concerning potential civil-military concepts. This does not mean that a particular organization in this category does not use any civil-military concept. Still, it does mean that such a concept, if it exists, is not readily available. That said, the sample is by no means representative, and we recognize other concepts may be available in the future.

Following the collection of relevant data, we conducted content analysis, i.e. a systematic analysis of the content of relevant documents, to identify patterns, themes, and meanings.⁷² In particular, for each organization-specific concept, we identified the values for each parameter, namely the concept’s main perspective, scope, level of applicability, and whether it entails a dedicated function. Based on our definitions of each archetype present in the previous section, we defined fixed and variable parameter values for each archetypal concept (see Table 3). Next, we matched the organization-specific concept to one or more archetypes.

		main perspective		scope		level of applicability			dedicated function
		military	civilian	internal	external	tactical	operational	strategic	
Civil-Military Relations	CMR	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no
Civil-Military Interaction	CMI	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Civil-Military Cooperation	CIMIC	yes	no	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	CMCoord	no	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes

Necessary conditions
 Variable conditions

Table 3. Fixed and variable parameter values for each archetype.

4.2 Key findings

After analyzing 59 organization-specific concepts, we find that 52 (88%) concepts matched with one of the archetypes. Seven (12%) concepts, for which we did not have enough reliable information for all the parameters, we placed between two categories, pending further clarification in one or more parameter. However, only 17 (29%) perfectly match both the fixed and variable conditions of the archetype. In other words, as expected, most (71%) of the organization-specific concepts studied in this paper differ from ideal types, but not in any of the previously established

fixed conditions. 13 (22%) could be classified as civil-military relations, eight (14%) as civil-military interaction, 23 (39%) as civil-military cooperation, and eight (14%) as humanitarian civil-military coordination. As mentioned previously, for seven (12%) concepts there was not enough information to place them under a clear archetype. Five (8%) concepts were between the CMI and CIMIC archetypes, one (2%) between the CMI and CMCoord archetypes, and one (2%) between the CMR and CIMIC archetypes. This means that, for our sample of organization-specific civil-military concepts, the four archetypes are simultaneously comprehensive and specific enough to include all concepts identified in this study.

We also observed wide variation in the specific terms used. On the one hand, the term *civil-military relations* (or variations thereof) is used to signify three of the four archetypes. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement uses the term (i.e. RCRC Movement-CMR) along the CMR archetype. At the same time, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces’ definition of “civil-military relations” (BIAF-CMR) fits the CIMIC archetype. Further, InterAction’s concept of “civil-military relations” (IA-CMR) matches the CMI archetype.

On the other hand, several other terms are used to represent the relationship between civilian and military actors. At one end of the spectrum, some terms clearly indicate a stronger relationship, such as the Venezuelan concept of *civic-military union* (VEN-UCM) and the Chinese concepts of *civil-military integration* (CHN-CMI) and *military-civil fusion* (CHN-MCF). At the other end of the spectrum, some terms indicate a more neutral stance between civilian and military actors, such as *civil-military affairs* (e.g. PHL-CMA), *civil-military interaction* (e.g. AUS-CMI), and *civil-military coordination*. Somewhere in between, terms such as *civil-military cooperation* (e.g. NATO-CIMIC), *civil-military collaboration* (NOR-SIMIS), and *civil-military engagement* (e.g. BEL-Ci-MEG) indicate some degree of positive relationship between civilian and military actors. However, the level of relationship intensity between civilian and military actors suggested by the term used in the concept does not necessarily overlap with its archetypal definition. Figure 4 illustrates this variation in the spectrum of civil-military relationships.



Figure 4. Organization-specific civil-military concepts in the spectrum of civil-military relationships.

We also see a clear convergence related to the terminology used in concepts under the CIMIC category, i.e. most of the organization-specific concepts in this category are named, with some exceptions, *civil-military cooperation* (e.g. BEL-CIMIC, BRA-CIMIC, EU-CIMIC, NOR-CIMIC) or *civil affairs* (e.g. BRA-AsCiv, CHL-ACAT, MEX-AsCiv), following NATO and the US Army. In contrast, concepts under the CMCoord category tend to diverge from the term *humanitarian civil-military coordination* used by UN OCHA. Instead, they take a variety of terms, such as *engagement with*

armed groups (MCI-EwAG), *civilian-military cooperation* (USAID-CMC), *humanitarian-military interaction* (WFP-HMI), and *civil-military-police engagement* (WVI-CMPE).

Finally, some civil-military terms we identified are too specific and do not constitute – from our understanding – an additional archetypal concept. Rather, they are either variations or components of the archetypes discussed above or not civil-military concepts at all. In the Appendix (section A3), we present and briefly discuss the terms of *Civil Affairs* (as understood by the US Army and UN/AU peace operations), *Civil Affairs Operations and Civil-Military Operations*, *Military Civic Action*, *Civil-Military Liaison*, and *Civil-Military Problematique*. Importantly, we reiterate that our sample is neither comprehensive nor random. As such, this measure of conceptual fit is intended solely to provide face validity and hopefully a foundation for future research. Table 4 below provides an overview of all organization-specific civil-military concepts identified in this study with their assessed value for each of the four parameters.

Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Core parameters				Archetype
			Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function	
African Union	Civil-Military Coordination	AU-CIMIC	military	internal & external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Australian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Interaction	AUS-CMI	military	external	all levels	yes	CIMIC
Belgian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Engagement	BEL-Ci-MEG	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Belgian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	BEL-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces	Civil-Military Relations	BIAF-CMR	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Brazilian Army	Civil Affairs	BRA-AsCiv	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Brazilian Army	Civil-Military Cooperation	BRA-CIMIC	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Canadian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	CAN-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Caritas Internationalis	Relations with the Military	Caritas-RwM	civilian	external	all levels	no	CMI
Chilean Army	Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration	CHL-ACAT	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Colombian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	COL-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes (probably)	CMI/CIMIC
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	Interaction with Armed Actors	CARE-IwAA	civilian	external	tactical & operational	yes	CMCoord
Danish Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	DNK-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Danish Government	Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations	DNK-CPA	joint	internal (at least)	strategic	no (probably)	CMR
European Union	Civil-Military Cooperation	EU-CIMIC	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC

Table 4. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts.⁷³

Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Core parameters				Archetype
			Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function	
European Union	Civil-Military Coordination	EU-CMCO	joint	internal	strategic	no	CMR
French Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	FRA-CIMIC	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
German Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	DEU-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Indonesian Army	Territorial Development	IDN-Binter	military	external	all levels	yes	CIMIC
Indonesian Government	Dual Function	IDN-DF	joint	internal (at least)	all levels (probably)	(unclear)	CMR
InterAction	Civil-Military Relations	IA-CMR	joint	external	tactical & operational	no	CMI
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	Civil-Military Relations	RCRC Movement-CMR	civilian	external	strategic	no	CMR
International Rescue Committee	Civil-Military Interaction	IRC-CMI	civilian	external	all levels	no	CMI
Kenyan Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	KEN-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical (at least)	yes (probably)	CMI/CIMIC
Lebanese Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	LBN-CIMIC	military	external	all levels	yes	CIMIC
Mercy Corps International	Engagement with Armed Groups	MCI-EwAG	civilian	external	tactical & operational (at least)	(unclear)	CMI/CMCoord
Mexican Army	Civil Affairs	MEX-AsCiv	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo	Civil and Political Affairs	MLC-ACP	military	external (at least)	(unclear)	yes	CMR/CIMIC
Nigerian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Affairs	NGA-CMA	military	external	strategic	yes	CMR
Nigerian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	NGA-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes (probably)	CMI/CIMIC

Table 4. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts (continuation).

Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Core parameters				Archetype
			Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function	
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Civil-Military Cooperation	NATO-CIMIC	military	external	all levels	yes	CIMIC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Civil-Military Interaction	NATO-CMI	military	external	all levels	no	CMI
Norwegian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	NOR-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Norwegian Government	Civil-Military Collaboration	NOR-SIMIS	joint	internal	all levels (probably)	no	CMI
Norwegian Refugee Council	Civil-Military Policy	NRC-CMP	civilian	external	tactical & operational	no	CMI
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief	Civil-Military Coordination	Oxfam-CMCoord	civilian	external	tactical & operational	no	CMI
People's Republic of China	Civil-Military Integration	CHN-CMI	joint	internal	strategic	(unclear)	CMR
People's Republic of China	Military-Civil Fusion	CHN-MCF	joint	internal	strategic	(unclear)	CMR
Philippine Armed Forces	Civil-Military Affairs	PHL-CMA	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CIMIC
Portuguese Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	PRT-CIMIC	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Russian Federation Government	Military-Political Cooperation	RUS-MPC	joint	internal	strategic	yes	CMR
Save the Children International	Civil-Military Coordination	SCI-CMCoord	civilian	external	tactical & operational	yes	CMCoord
Save the Children International	Civil-Military Relations	SCI-CIVMIL	civilian	external	operational & strategic	no	CMR
Save the Children International	Civil-Military Engagement	SCI-CME	civilian	external	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CMCoord
South African Government	Civil-Military Relations	ZAF-CMR	joint	internal	strategic	no	CMR

Table 4. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts (continuation).

Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Core parameters				Archetype
			Main perspective	Scope	Level of applicability	Dedicated function	
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response	Humanitarian-Military Relations	SCHR-HMR	civilian	external	strategic	no	CMR
Swedish Government	Civil-Military Cooperation	SWE-CMS	joint	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	no (probably)	CMI
Tunisian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	TUN-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical & operational (at least)	yes (probably)	CMI/CIMIC
Turkish Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	TUR-CIMIC	military	external (at least)	tactical (at least)	yes (probably)	CMI/CIMIC
Ukrainian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	UKR-CIMIC	military	external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
Ukrainian Government	Civil-Military Administration	UKR-CMA	joint	internal	strategic	(unclear)	CMR
United Nations	Civil-Military Coordination	UN-CIMIC	military	internal & external	tactical & operational	yes	CIMIC
United Nations	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	UN-CMCoord	civilian	internal & external	tactical & operational	yes	CMCoord
United States Agency for International Development	Civilian-Military Cooperation	USAID-CMC	civilian	external	all levels	yes	CMCoord
United States Army	Civil Affairs	USA-CA	military	external	all levels	yes	CIMIC
Venezuelan Government	Civic-Military Union	VEN-UCM	joint	internal	strategic	no (probably)	CMR
World Food Program	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	WFP-CMC	civilian	external	tactical & operational	yes	CMCoord
World Food Program	Humanitarian-Military Interaction	WFP-HMI	civilian	external	tactical & operational (at least)	yes	CMCoord
World Vision International	Civil-Military-Police Engagement	WVI-CMPE	civilian	external	tactical & operational	yes	CMCoord

Table 4. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts (continuation).

5 Testing the utility of the analytical framework

In this section, we aim to assess the utility of the suggested analytical framework. In other words, how can this framework produce new and relevant insights? To answer this question, we briefly explore how our analytical framework can help identify conceptual gaps within organizations and foresee potential practical challenges in the case of interaction across organizations. These tests are meant merely as a proof of concept and do not constitute final polished analytical products. Rather, they aim to showcase the utility of our analytical framework and inspire future research.

5.1 Identifying conceptual gaps within organizations

In this study, we identified that large multilateral organizations, such as the UN, the EU, and NATO, have their own civil-military conceptual frameworks comprising more than one concept. For example, we have identified four concepts within the UN system: UN-CIMIC, UN-CMCoord, WFP-CMC, and WFP-HMI. The same may be true for some governments, such as the United States (e.g. USA-CA and USAID-CMC). At least in theory, different concepts used by the same organization should be coherent and, preferably, complementary, though that may not always be the case.

To illustrate, we have identified two concepts in use in Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces use “civil-military cooperation” (NOR-CIMIC), representing a military capability aligned with the CIMIC archetype.⁷⁴ In addition, the Norwegian government also employs the concept of “civil-military collaboration” (NOR-SIMIS), which refers to intra-government relations between civilian and military bodies in the context of total defense.⁷⁵ As such, the concepts apply to different entities and contexts. In addition, the Brazilian Armed Forces, however, employ the concepts of “civil affairs” (BRA-AsCiv) and “civil-military cooperation” (BRA-CIMIC), both matching the CIMIC archetype, according to our framework. According to the Brazilian doctrine, BRA-CIMIC is a subcategory of BRA-AsCiv, which also comprises “Government Affairs”.⁷⁶

We posit that our proposed analytical framework can be useful to identify conceptual coherence gaps in organizations’ conceptual frameworks. This may be relevant to highlight potential coordination problems and guide policymakers to fill those gaps. In Text box 2 below, we explore in greater detail how our analytical framework can be applied to the concepts used by the UN, the EU, and NATO.

Example 1: United Nations

We have identified four civil-military concepts within the United Nations System: Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC), Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), and the World Food Program-specific concepts of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC) and Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI). According to information conversations with WFP staff, the organization has discontinued the use of the WFP-CMC concept and currently only uses WFP-HMI. Therefore, in this example, we will only consider WFP-HMI, even though it is uncertain whether and how WFP-CMC differs from WFP-HMI.

According to our analytical framework, UN-CIMIC falls under the CIMIC category. It is a dedicated military function focused on UN peace operations' tactical and operational levels. UN-CIMIC aims to facilitate the interaction between the military and civilian components within the peace operation and between the military component and external civilian actors, such as the local population, the host nation government, and national and international NGOs.⁷⁷ On the other hand, UN-CMCoord and WFP-HMI are both civilian, humanitarian concepts. Like UN-CIMIC, the two concepts entail dedicated functions focused on the tactical and operational levels. However, UN-CMCoord and WFP-HMI differ in their scope. UN-CMCoord entails both internal and external coordination, that is, the coordination between UN actors, such as UN agencies and UN military peacekeepers, and between the UN and external military actors.⁷⁸ Because WFP has no military personnel, WFP-HMI entails only coordination between WFP civilians and external military actors, which may or may not include UN military peacekeepers.⁷⁹

Within the UN System, there are three main conceptual gaps. First, there is no CMR concept. Combined with the fact that the existing UN concepts are restricted to the tactical and operational levels, strategic-level civil-military relations are not formally conceptualized in the UN. This does not necessarily mean that this relationship is not organized or structured. For integrated UN peacekeeping missions, for example, strategic-level civil-military relations are partly organized through documents such as the ISF (discussed above), which sets the objectives and responsibilities of military and civilian actors, both UN and non-UN. At the UN headquarters level, however, we suspect that managing relationships within the UN System and between the UN and State Members often takes precedence over civil-military relations. Even though the UN Department of Peace Operation and the Department of Operational Support are also staffed by seconded active-duty military personnel, the UN does not have a standing military force, which might justify the perceived superfluity of a specific CMR concept.

Second, the UN has no concept of CMI. The interaction between civilian and military actors is only formalized through the dedicated functions of UN-CIMIC, UN-CMCoord, or WFP-HMI, even though civil-military interaction between non-specialized personnel happens daily, not the least in joint, integrated structures in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Again, this does not mean that CMI is in no way structured. These day-to-day civil-military interactions may be organized through individual terms of reference (TORs) and internal standard operating procedures (SOPs). However, when TORs and SOPs fail to cover the basics, an overarching CMI concept could facilitate the interaction between civilian and military actors in the UN System.

Finally, there is no regular civilian, political civil-military concept within the UN System. UN-CIMIC takes on the military perspective, and UN-CMCoord and WFP-HMI the humanitarian. No concept deals with the civilian, political side of civil-military relations at the tactical and operational levels. We expect that some of these aspects are covered by specific TORs and SOPs, especially for job families such as Political Affairs, Rule of Law, and Security Institutions. Nonetheless, we believe that a fully developed civilian, political, civil-military concept would be beneficial to provide tactical and operational level guidance and, much more so, a point of contact to military interlocutors engaging with UN civilian staff.

Text box 2. Examples of within-organization conceptual analyses.

Example 2: European Union

According to our conceptual mapping effort, the European Union has developed two concepts: Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) and Civil-Military Cooperation (EU-CIMIC). On the one hand, EU-CMCO entails the coordination between HQ-level civilian and military departments within the EU. As such, it focuses on the strategic level and is internally oriented. EU-CMCO is not a dedicated function. It provides guidance to facilitate the relations between EU civilian and military actors.⁸⁰ EU-CIMIC, on the other hand, is a dedicated military function focused on the tactical and operational levels, directed only at external civilian actors.⁸¹

As such, we identify three main gaps in the EU's civil-military conceptual framework. First, there is no CMI concept. Especially for the tactical and operational levels, routine civil-military interaction is not covered by an overarching concept or guidance document. EU-CMCO, however, applies to the strategic level and does provide guidance on CMI to non-specialized personnel. EU-CIMIC, on the contrary, is a specialized military function. Similarly to the UN analysis above, we expect many aspects of CMI to be covered in individual TORs and internal SOPs. Still, we believe those are unlikely to cover all non-specialized personnel engaging in civil-military interaction.

Second, the EU has no CMCoord concept, even though the EU is one of the major donors of humanitarian aid. As mentioned above, EU-CIMIC takes the military perspective, although it may be employed in the context of military support to humanitarian action. Similarly, EU-CMCO may also be applied in the context of EU HQ-level humanitarian civil-military coordination, such as possible coordination between European Union Military Staff and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Furthermore, just like CMI, aspects of CMCoord may be covered in specific job descriptions and internal procedures. Moreover, the UN-CMCoord concept is so broad that other organizations, including the European Union, can use it. Nonetheless, the EU might lose the efficiency and standardization benefits of an organization-specific concept.

Finally, similarly to the UN, the EU has no civilian political concept at the tactical and operational levels. EU-CMCO only applies to the strategic level, and EU-CIMIC is a military concept. At the risk of redundancy, we expect specific functions and branches within the EU, such as the Chief of Staff / Horizontal Coordination of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability branch, to coordinate with military actors from a civilian, political perspective. Still, we argue that general guidance at the tactical and operational levels would be useful to all EU civilian personnel. This may be particularly relevant as the EU deploys political missions alongside partner organizations' peace operations, such as the UN and NATO.

Example 3: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In this paper, we have identified two civil-military concepts currently used by NATO: Civil-Military Interaction (NATO-CMI) and Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC). Both concepts take on the military perspective and focus only on external civilian actors. The two concepts apply to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This is because NATO, in contrast with the UN and the EU, has a standing strategic-level headquarters with NATO-CIMIC staff. The main difference between NATO-CMI and NATO-CIMIC is that the latter is a dedicated function, and the former is not.⁸²

Thus, we identify three main gaps in NATO's civil-military conceptual framework. First, similar to the UN, NATO has no concept of CMR. While NATO-CMI may cover some aspects pertaining to CMR, it mostly deals with routine individual-level interactions between civilians and military personnel, leaving strategic and political civil-military considerations aside. This gap is perhaps filled by the comprehensive approach framework in missions and the role exercised by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Secretary-General, and senior NATO military leaders. Second, considering that NATO is a military alliance, it does make sense that there is no civilian, humanitarian civil-military concept.

Text box 2. Examples of within-organization conceptual analyses (continuation).

Nonetheless, NATO has, time and again, been deployed in support of humanitarian assistance, both in conflicts and disaster relief. This is less of a problem because established UN-CMCoord roles and responsibilities can be easily absorbed by the NATO-CIMIC concept. Furthermore, NATO may set up specific coordination bodies to facilitate the interface between NATO and other humanitarian and civil defense actors, such as the standing Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre.⁸³

Finally, NATO's existing civil-military concepts have no internal focus, assuming that there are no internal civil-military relations to be managed within the organization. While it makes sense to argue that NATO is primarily a military alliance, the argument falls short for at least two reasons. First, NATO is still subordinated to a political, civilian authority, the North Atlantic Council. Second, NATO employs civilians at headquarters and in its operations more and more frequently, following a global trend regarding working with the private sector and civilian specialists. Worldwide, NATO employs around 6,000 civilians in different agencies and strategic and regional commands.⁸⁴ Thus, we argue that NATO-CMI and NATO-CIMIC concepts should be expanded to include interaction, coordination, and cooperation with internal NATO civilian personnel.

Text box 2. Examples of within-organization conceptual analyses (continuation).

5.2 Foreseeing practical challenges

Another potential utility of this guide's analytical framework is understanding similarities and differences when moving from one organization's conceptual framework to another. This exercise may be particularly relevant when personnel from a national military deploy to a multilateral mission or when operating alongside partners who employ different concepts, for example, when UN, NATO, and EU missions operate in the same theater of operations.

5.2.1 Strategic guidance

When comparing different multilateral CIMIC concepts, there is a clear gap in their levels of applicability. While UN-CIMIC and EU-CIMIC are valid only at the tactical and operational levels, NATO-CIMIC covers all levels. As discussed above, this is because NATO has a standing strategic-level headquarters, in which the NATO-CIMIC (J9) function is permanently represented. In practice, we expect that NATO-CIMIC personnel from NATO member countries, when deployed to UN or EU missions, might struggle with a lack of strategic guidance.

5.2.2 Differences in scope

Additional challenges may arise due to differences between internal and external-scope concepts. For instance, consider that an individual with a NATO-CIMIC background (which has only an external scope) deploys to a UN peacekeeping operation as an UN-CIMIC officer (which has an internal and external scope). In this case, they may keep the mindset from NATO-CIMIC that the military manages all relationships between the mission and civilian actors outside the mission. As such, this individual may unilaterally liaise with non-military actors without coordinating with the mission's civilian components, treading on their toes and potentially causing misunderstandings and duplication of efforts.

5.2.3 Dedicated function

Individuals migrating from organizations without a dedicated civil-military function to another with a dedicated function might also face challenges, regardless of whether the organization is civilian or military. For instance, they may ignore the value and need of civil-military experts to support their mission and downplay the role of civil-military experts. Moreover, they might unintentionally duplicate the efforts of genuine civil-military experts, leading to confusion among stakeholders.

5.2.4 Civilian entry points

We have shown above that only a few entities have a dedicated function responsible for managing civil-military relations from a civilian perspective. The main examples of those concepts are UN-CMCoord and WFP-HMI. This means that, while only the UN may deploy a civilian focal point responsible for humanitarian civil-military coordination, neither the UN nor the EU has a standardized civilian, political entry point for external or internal military actors. In practice, it means that military CIMIC personnel often do not have a single entry point to liaise with the civilian components of these organizations. This requires CIMIC personnel to constantly identify and map key individuals in different organizations, often in a tiring trial-and-error process and risking duplication of efforts.⁸⁵

6 Conclusion

This study aimed to provide a simplified and accessible guide to help map and make sense of different civil-military concepts. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at providing a common guide to describe this myriad of concepts. We did so in four main steps. First, based on the civil-military concepts in use by the UN, the EU, NATO, and the United States Army, we identified four archetypal concepts, namely Civil-Military Relations (CMR), Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord). Second, we broke these concepts into four core parameters, in which they differ: main perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated function. We then applied these parameters to 59 specific concepts and matched each to one archetypal concept. Finally, we offered some insights on how this analytical framework could be used to identify commonalities and gaps between and within different organizations' civilian-military concepts and help foresee practical challenges when these organizations work together. In addition, as a reference guide, we provide readers with an accompanying document with a repository of factsheets of 31 civil-military concepts from 27 different entities. It is worth noting that this report is the first step in a broader research project, in which we aim to create a repository of organization-specific civil-military concepts and expand the factsheets to include more national (and potentially sub-national) concepts, as well as more concepts used by NGOs and non-state armed groups. We also intend to consolidate the information from the factsheets into a dataset, thus allowing for easier comparisons and analyses.

We hope practitioners find our analytical tool and the factsheets of organization-specific civil-military concepts useful to their daily work bridging civilian and military actors. This study can also be used in several training and education programs, including military, humanitarian, and governmental. Analysts can use this framework to assess inter-organizational conceptual compatibility in comparing, for example, national and supranational concepts. This is particularly relevant in multinational military operations, such as UN, AU, EU, and NATO operations, in which member states and partnering nations deploy alongside and seek interoperability. In addition, this type of analysis can also be useful in the context of humanitarian coordination, where different organizations voluntarily participate in the often UN-led coordination mechanisms, following UN-CMCoord guidelines.

The proposed analytical framework, although not fully developed in this study, can also be applied in several other areas. First, it can serve to structure and align diverse studies within a consistent conceptual framework, fostering the transferability of insights across different organizations. This is particularly valuable in the context of the often-inconsistent use of civil-military concepts in academic literature. Second, the framework may aid in identifying training needs for transitioning between national and multilateral conceptual frameworks, facilitating adaptation, for instance, from US Army Civil Affairs to NATO or UN missions. Third, it enables the assessment of conceptual coherence in alliances, coalitions, and multinational peace operations, allowing comparisons between national and multilateral concepts. Lastly, the framework can be applied to analyze adversary militaries and non-state armed groups, identifying vulnerabilities and entry points. It can also be useful for civilian actors in humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts to tailor engagement strategies with armed actors by pinpointing potential entry points.

It has been outside the scope of this study to explore why such conceptual differences come about in the first place. However, throughout our research, it became clear that interests in conforming to overarching conceptual frameworks vary. For example, militaries have a clear tendency to use the CIMIC concept, keeping the same acronym even in non-English contexts. This may be, we speculate, due to existing incentives to establish interoperability between allies and perhaps the product of military-technical exchanges. However, among humanitarians, there seems to be an opposite effect, in which organizations may actively try to distinguish themselves and coin their own specific concepts.

This insight, and others, have sparked several potential research questions, such as why some organizations develop specific civil-military concepts while others do not? Why do some organizations have multiple civil-military concepts while others have just one? What explains regional variation in civil-military concepts? How do civil-military relations at the strategic level influence the development of tactical- and operational-level concepts? How are civil-military concepts used outside the conceptual frameworks of formal organizations, such as in academia and the media? Furthermore, future research should explore variation within archetypes and include police-focused concepts. Police often sit awkwardly between civilian and military categories, leaning towards one or the other, depending on the circumstances.⁸⁶

If anything, we hope to have sparked some debate and interesting conversations about civil-military relations and their various conceptual ramifications. We remain open to feedback and contributions to the project from experts and organizations to help improve this effort.

Appendix: Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts

Altogether, our study encompassed the exploration of organization-specific civil-military concepts across various entities, including 33 national contexts, nine multilateral organizations, 14 international NGOs, and 240 non-state armed groups (NSAGs), resulting in the identification of 59 distinct concepts. Among these, 35 concepts originated from national governments and their armed forces, 13 from international non-governmental organizations, nine from multilateral organizations, and two from non-state armed groups. Detailed factsheets summarizing background information, definitions, principles, core functions, structures, and other relevant aspects were compiled for 31 civil-military concepts. However, for 28 concepts, only superficial information was available, leading to brief explanations of their definitions and usage. Notably, despite extensive searches, no readily accessible information was found for civil-military concepts in seven countries, four multilateral organizations, three international NGOs, and more than 238 NSAGs, indicating that while such concepts may exist, they are not easily accessible through open-source searches.

This appendix is divided into four sections. First, we present the common structure of the factsheet and a list of all concepts covered by them. Second, we provide a paragraph-long definition of other concepts for which we do not have enough information to produce a full factsheet. Third, we discuss some concepts that we have identified but that do not fit our archetypes and that were thus left out of the analysis. Lastly, we mention the contexts and organizations in which we searched for relevant civil-military concepts but found none.

A1 Factsheets

In total, at the end of this research project, we compiled factsheets for 31 organization-specific civil-military concepts from 27 organizations. These are listed below in alphabetical order and can be found on Brown University's Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies Civil-Military Program website along with this report. The most up-to-date list of factsheets is available at [project's page](#).

Each factsheet follows a similar template, starting with a summary table including the concept's name and acronym, custodian organization, archetypal category, perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated function. The factsheets, as much as it has been possible to retrieve from open sources, are comprised of eight main sections: (1) background, (2) definition, (3) overview, (4) principles, (5) core function, (6) structure, (7) particularities, and (8) references. It is hoped that the number and content of the factsheets will be updated in the future as needed.

#	Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Archetype
1	African Union	Civil-Military Coordination	AU-CIMIC	CIMIC
2	Australian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Interaction	AUS-CMI	CIMIC
3	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces	Civil-Military Relations	BIAF-CMR	CIMIC
4	Brazilian Army	Civil Affairs	BRA-AsCiv	CIMIC
5	Caritas Internationalis	Relations with the Military	Caritas-RwM	CMI
6	Chilean Army	Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration	CHL-ACAT	CIMIC
7	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere	Interaction with Armed Actors	CARE-IwAA	CMCoord
8	European Union	Civil-Military Cooperation	EU-CIMIC	CIMIC
9	European Union	Civil-Military Coordination	EU-CMCO	CMR
10	French Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	FRA-CIMIC	CIMIC
11	Indonesian Army	Territorial Development	IDN-Binter	CIMIC
12	InterAction	Civil-Military Relations	IA-CMR	CMI
13	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	Civil-Military Relations	RCRC Movement-CMR	CMCoord
14	International Rescue Committee	Civil-Military Interaction	IRC-CMI	CMI
15	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Civil-Military Cooperation	NATO-CIMIC	CIMIC
16	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	Civil-Military Interaction	NATO-CMI	CMI
17	Norwegian Refugee Council	Civil-Military Policy	NRC-CMP	CMI
18	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief	Civil-Military Coordination	Oxfam-CMCoord	CMI
19	Portuguese Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	PRT-CIMIC	CIMIC
20	Russian Federation Government	Military-Political Cooperation	RUS-MPC	CMR
21	Save the Children International	Civil-Military Coordination	SCI-CMCoord	CMCoord
22	Save the Children International	Civil-Military Relations	SCI-CIVMIL	CMR
23	South African Government	Civil-Military Relations	ZAF-CMR	CMR
24	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response	Humanitarian-Military Relations	SCHR-HMR	CMR
25	Ukrainian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	UKR-CIMIC	CIMIC
26	United Nations	Civil-Military Coordination	UN-CIMIC	CIMIC
27	United Nations	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	UN-CMCoord	CMCoord
28	United States Agency for International Development	Civilian-Military Cooperation	USAID-CMC	CMCoord
29	United States Army	Civil Affairs	USA-CA	CIMIC
30	World Food Program	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination	WFP-CMC	CMCoord
31	World Vision International	Civil-Military-Police Engagement	WVI-CMPE	CMCoord

Table A1. Overview of factsheets of organization-specific civil-military concepts.

A2 Other organization-specific civil-military concepts

For 28 organization-specific civil-military concepts, we could not find sufficient information to produce a factsheet. In what follows, we offer a paragraph-long explanation of different concepts used by multi-lateral organizations, national governments, non-governmental organizations, and non-state armed groups that were found but not used in the project. These concepts are listed below in Table A2.

A2.1 National governments

Belgium. The Belgian Armed Forces appear to use at least two civil-military concepts, i.e. “civil-military cooperation” (BEL-CIMIC) and “civil-military engagement” (BEL-Ci-MEG). Although we could not find official documents that define each concept in detail, BEL-CIMIC is likely the national version of NATO-CIMIC. As such, it falls into the CIMIC archetype because it is a dedicated military function and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. Interestingly, the concept of BEL-Ci-MEG seems to include BEL-CIMIC and other military functions. According to social media accounts of the Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Engagement Group, it is “a Belgian military unit based in Heverlee and Lombardsijde. Thanks to our civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and our psychological operations (PSYOPS), we inform the local population during missions abroad. We also offer close cooperation with local aid organizations and authorities. In this way, we support the mission of our military commanding officer in the context of the security and freedom of movement of our troops.”⁸⁷ As such, BEL-Ci-MEG also falls into the CIMIC archetype due to its parameters values for perspective (military), scope (at least external), level of applicability (at least tactical and operational), and dedicated function. However, the BEL-Ci-MEG differs from BEL-CIMIC (and other organization-specific CIMIC concepts) in its wider range of activities towards civilians, such as a psychological operations.

Brazil. In addition to the Brazilian Army’s concept of “civil affairs” (BRA-AsCiv), which has a factsheet of its own, the Army also employs the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (BRA-CIMIC), which forms part of the conceptual framework of BRA-AsCiv. According to its doctrine, “civil affairs” comprises two main functions: “civil-military cooperation” and “government affairs”. While “civil-military cooperation” closely follows the CIMIC archetype, i.e. it refers to the tactical- and operation-level relationships between the military force and non-military actors, “government affairs” refers to military support to civilian governmental functions (akin to the NATO-CIMIC notion of “functional specialist”).⁸⁸ As such BRA-CIMIC also falls under the CIMIC archetype, because it is a dedicated military function and has an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability.

Canada. The Canadian Armed Forces’ concept of CIMIC (CAN-CIMIC) is closely aligned with NATO-CIMIC.⁸⁹ That is, CAN-CIMIC is a dedicated military function and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. However, we could not access official CAN-CIMIC reference documents to specify if the concept has a broader scope or applicability.

#	Organization	Civil-military concept	Acronym	Archetype
1	Belgian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Engagement	BEL-Ci-MEG	CIMIC
2	Belgian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	BEL-CIMIC	CIMIC
3	Brazilian Army	Civil-Military Cooperation	BRA-CIMIC	CIMIC
4	Canadian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	CAN-CIMIC	CIMIC
5	Colombian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	COL-CIMIC	CMI/CIMIC
6	Danish Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	DNK-CIMIC	CIMIC
7	Danish Government	Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations	DNK-CPA	CMR
8	German Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	DEU-CIMIC	CIMIC
9	Indonesian Government	Dual Function	IDN-DF	CMR
10	Kenyan Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	KEN-CIMIC	CMI/CIMIC
11	Lebanese Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	LBN-CIMIC	CIMIC
12	Mercy Corps International	Engagement with Armed Groups	MCI-EwAG	CMI/CMCoord
13	Mexican Armed Forces	Civil Affairs	MEX-AsCiv	CIMIC
14	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo	Civil and Political Affairs	MLC-ACP	CMR/CIMIC
15	Nigerian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Affairs	NGA-CMA	CMR
16	Nigerian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	NGA-CIMIC	CMI/CIMIC
17	Norwegian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	NOR-CIMIC	CIMIC
18	Norwegian Government	Civil-Military Collaboration	NOR-SIMIS	CMI
19	People's Republic of China	Civil-Military Integration	CHN-CMI	CMR
20	People's Republic of China	Military-Civil Fusion	CHN-MCF	CMR
21	Philippine Armed Forces	Civil-Military Affairs	PHL-CMA	CIMIC
22	Save the Children International	Civil-Military Engagement	SCI-CME	CMCoord
23	Swedish Government	Civil-Military Cooperation	SWE-CMS	CMI
24	Tunisian Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	TUN-CIMIC	CMI/CIMIC
25	Turkish Armed Forces	Civil-Military Cooperation	TUR-CIMIC	CMI/CIMIC
26	Ukrainian Government	Civil-Military Administration	UKR-CMA	CMR
27	Venezuelan Government	Civic-Military Union	VEN-UCM	CMR
28	World Food Program	Humanitarian-Military Interaction	WFP-HMI	CMCoord

Table A2. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts without factsheets.

Colombia. The Colombian Armed Forces does not seem to have its own CIMIC doctrine.⁹⁰ However, due to its significant influence from the United States military, which has supported the country in its struggle against internal conflict, the Colombian Armed Forces seems to borrow a lot from the US Army Civil Affairs doctrine.⁹¹ Still, the Colombian Army seems to use the term “civil-military cooperation” (COL-CIMIC) and not “civil affairs”, as showcased by a recurrent “Civil-military cooperation course”.⁹² As such, we consider COL-CIMIC to take the military perspective and to have, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability, thus falling under either the CMI or the CIMIC archetype, depending on whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not.

Denmark. The Danish Armed Forces seem to employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (DNK-CIMIC) consistently with NATO-CIMIC.⁹³ In other words, DNK-CIMIC falls under the CIMIC archetype because it takes a military perspective, entails a dedicated function, and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. In addition to DNK-CIMIC, the Danish government has previously used the concept of “Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations” (DNK-CPA), a concept akin to the “Comprehensive Approach” but with a focus on civil-military relationships.⁹⁴ As such, DNK-CPA falls under the CMR archetype, taking a joint perspective focused on the strategic level. DNK-CPA seems to have, at least, an internal scope intended to synchronize Danish foreign policy and military operations. However, we do not have enough information to assess whether the concept entails a dedicated function or if it has broader scope covering also actors external to the Danish government.

Germany. Both Germany’s civil defense and armed forces appear to use the concept of “civil-military cooperation”.⁹⁵ However, while the German Armed Forces’ civil-military concept (DEU-CIMIC) is likely closely aligned with the NATO-CIMIC concept,⁹⁶ it is not clear how the German civil defense defines the concept. As such, we consider DEU-CIMIC to fall under the CIMIC archetype. The concept takes the military perspective, entails dedicated function, and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-applicability.

Indonesia. In addition to the Indonesian concept of “territorial development” (IDN-Binter), which has a factsheet of its own, we have also identified the concept of “dual function” (*dwifungsi*, IDN-DF). IDN-DF, established by Suharto’s New Order government in Indonesia, justified the military’s permanent role in governance and politics post-Sukarno. It enabled the military, particularly the Army, to hold key governmental positions, including seats in parliament and public service roles. Originating from the Army’s expanded role during martial law in 1957, the concept of “dual function” emerged from a belief in the military’s duty to “save the nation” from political system flaws. It was formalized in the 1960s, entrenching the military’s influence across Indonesian society and government until its gradual abolition following the New Order’s collapse and the onset of the Reform era, marking a significant shift with military and police officers required to resign from service to hold political positions from 2004 onwards.⁹⁷ As such, IDN-DF falls under the CMR category. The concept takes a joint perspective, has, at least, an internal scope, and seems to be applicable to all levels. It is not clear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not, however. While this concept is admittedly outdated, we decided to include it due to its unique nature.

Kenya. The Kenyan Armed Forces have previously used the term “CIMIC” (KEN-CIMIC) in news outlets.⁹⁸ The concept seems to entail externally-oriented activities conducted by the military; however, it is not clear whether the so-called “CIMIC activities” are not conducted, coordinated, or planned by dedicated CIMIC personnel. As such, we consider KEN-CIMIC to fall either under the CMI or CIMIC archetypes, depending on whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not. In addition, the Government of Kenya’s Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU) have produced a number of documents outlining its approach to disaster response, such as a National Disaster Risk Management Policy from 2017.⁹⁹ However, when investigating the NDMU website and this policy, there is no clear reference to a civil-military concept. As such, it has not been included in this study.

Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (LBN-CIMIC), aligned with the CIMIC archetype, as evidenced in the Army’s Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate’s website. The Directorate was established in 2015, and its main missions include coordinating civil-military activities with ministries and donor organizations, liaising with local authorities to address development needs, supervising cooperation during military operations, and managing regional sections in the North, Bekaa, and South. These regional sections focus on identifying local needs, evaluating social environments, proposing development projects, and collaborating with foreign military forces under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).¹⁰⁰ As such, LBN-CIMIC is a dedicated military function, with an external scope, and applicable at all levels.

Mexico. The Mexican Army uses the concept of “civil affairs” (MEX-AsCiv), aligned with the CIMIC archetype, i.e. the concept takes the military perspective, is externally focused, and applicable mostly at the tactical and operational levels. However, it does not always have a dedicated MEX-AsCiv branch or units. Its General Staff Manual states that MEX-AsCiv matters would be a part of its S-1 (personnel) branch, or if the magnitude of the issues requires it, a MEX-AsCiv section may be created. In addition, the manual foresees the creation of specific units to be tasked with a specific area and echelon to support, meaning that it would have a dedicated function to address Civil Affairs matters. The manual indicates that the focus would be on the tactical level, by supporting units on the ground. The main purpose would be to liaise with external non-military actors to support them or use their assets to support the military objective. Although, no structure has ever been activated.

Nigeria. The Nigerian Army utilizes the concept of Civil-Military Affairs (NGA-CMA), which falls under the CMR archetype. The Directorate of Civil-Military Affairs serves “primarily as an interface between the Nigerian Army and the Civil Populace. [...] The Department is also charged with the introducing and transmitting the core elements of effective civil-military relations in areas of human rights, rule of law, negotiations liaison and conflict management”.¹⁰¹ Though NGA-CMA takes a military perspective and entails a dedicated function, it is distinct from CIMIC due to its focus on the strategic level and lack of tactical applicability, thus falling under the CMR archetype. In addition, the Nigerian Armed Forces have engaged in initiatives to improve Civil-Military Cooperation (NGA-CIMIC) and respect for human rights during operations in partnership with the European Union. These efforts aim to address challenges and gaps in civil-military relations, particularly in the context of internal security operations against insurgency and other criminal

activities. The collaboration includes training programs for military and law enforcement agencies on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, reflecting Nigeria's commitment to aligning its CIMIC activities with international best practices. Additionally, the program involves the creation of a civil-military cooperation handbook and the training of experts in CIMIC and human rights. Specific details about a publicly available NGA-CIMIC doctrine or manual for the Nigerian Armed Forces were not widely published or easily accessible in the public domain.¹⁰² Still, we consider NGA-CIMIC to take the military perspective and be, at least externally oriented and applicable at the tactical and operational levels. It remains unclear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not, and, as such, the concept falls under the CMI or CMI archetypes.

Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces, in alignment with the NATO-CIMIC concept, use the concept of "civil-military cooperation" (NOR-CIMIC), representing a military capability falling under the CIMIC archetype.¹⁰³ NOR-CIMIC entails a dedicated function with, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. In addition, the Norwegian government also employs the concept of "civil-military collaboration" (NOR-SIMIS), which refers to intra-government relations between civilian and military bodies in the context of total defense. NOR-SIMIS consists of three aspects: "civilian support to the armed forces, the armed forces' support to civil society and a management element at authority level."¹⁰⁴ NOR-SIMIS takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, does not entail a dedicated function, and seems to be applicable at all levels. As such, it falls under the CMI category.

People's Republic of China. In the Chinese context, Civil-Military Integration (CHN-CMI) and Military-Civil Fusion (CHN-MCF) are strategic-level concepts focused on military and civilian industrial complexes and research and development.¹⁰⁵ It is unclear whether the concepts entail a dedicated function or not. Still, both concepts fall in the CMR archetype. The main logic behind both concepts is to harness the synergies of military and civilian research, development, and production capabilities.¹⁰⁶ According to an early definition, civil-military integration includes "cooperation between government and commercial facilities in research and development [...], manufacturing, and/or maintenance operations; combined production of similar military and commercial items, including components and subsystems, side by side on a single production line or within a single firm or facility, and use of commercial off-the-shelf items directly within military systems".¹⁰⁷ Both concepts are essentially economic and defense strategies largely focused on the dual-use nature of key technologies, infrastructure, and human resources. In theory, this integration should create synergies and benefits both to the civilian and military sides of the relationship. While civil-military integration initially concentrated on military capabilities to support the broader civilian economy, current debates on military-civil fusion center on creating military advantages through civilian-led innovation.¹⁰⁸ As such, the two concepts are best seen in a continuum.¹⁰⁹

Philippines. The Philippine Armed Forces use the term "civil-military affairs" (PHL-CMA) to represent their CIMIC capabilities.¹¹⁰ PHL-CMA entails a dedicated military function with at least an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. This term "civil-military affairs" was perhaps chosen (instead of "civil affairs" or "civil-military cooperation") due to Australia's proximity and military influence since the term was used by the Australia-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) from 1999 to 2000 to represent what we now call CIMIC. The term

seems to have outlived INTERFET and continued to be used in the UN missions in the country, namely the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor from 1999 to 2002 and the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor from 2002 to 2005.¹¹¹

Sweden. The Swedish government, including the Swedish Armed Forces, seems to employ two related concepts, i.e. “civil-military cooperation” (*civil-militär samverkan*, SWE-CMS) and “cooperation between authorities” (*myndighets-samverkan*). However, these concepts do not seem to be well defined. In a 2012 report, the Swedish Defence Research Agency pointed out that “in the absence of clear common definitions of civil-military cooperation and cooperation between authorities, civil authorities often regard cooperation between authorities as a comprehensive concept and civil-military cooperation as part of cooperation between authorities”.¹¹² According to the same report, regular cooperation between authorities often corresponds with the armed forces’ task to use existing abilities and resources to assist other government bodies. It seems like SWE-CMS takes a joint perspective and has at least an internal scope and tactical- and operational applicability. It is unclear whether the concept entails dedicated function and in which levels it operate. As such, SWE-CMS does not clearly fall under any category, but seems to be closer to CMI than to other archetypes.

Tunisia. Recent publications on the Tunisian Armed Forces’ support of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the role of “civil-military cooperation” (TUN-CIMIC) in coordinating the response. In particular, two studies mention CIMIC daily, weekly, and monthly reports, as well as a CIMIC plan.¹¹³ TUN-CIMIC takes a military perspective and has, at least, an external scope and tactical and operational-level applicability. However, it remains unclear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not. As such, TUN-CIMIC may fall under the CMI or the CIMIC archetypes.

Türkiye. The Turkish Armed Forces seem to employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (TUR-CIMIC), as shown in a recent news piece.¹¹⁴ TUR-CIMIC appears to involve military activities towards external civilians; however, it is uncertain whether the activities portrayed as “CIMIC activities” are carried out, organized, or planned by specifically-assigned CIMIC personnel. Therefore, we view TUR-CIMIC as fitting into either the CMI or CIMIC categories, depending on whether the concept includes a dedicated function or not. In addition, Türkiye’s Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is the country’s primary disaster response agency and seems to follow EU standards and concepts.¹¹⁵ Still, not enough information was found in public sources to produce a factsheet about the country’s organization-specific civil-military concepts.

Ukraine. In addition to the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (UKR-CIMIC), used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in 2015, the Ukrainian parliament coined the concept of “civil-military administration” (*viis’kovo-tsyvil’ni administratsii*, UKR-CMA). Civil-military administrations are temporary local government units established in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine in response to the War in Donbas from 2015 to 2022. These administrations were created under the authority of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the Security Service of Ukraine. Civil-military administrations are formed when locally elected governments are unable to exercise their powers, and they continue to function until newly elected local government units assume office. The specific locations and details of civil-military administrations may have changed since 2022 due to

Russia's full-scale invasion, and additional information is required for an update.¹¹⁶ The concept takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, and is applicable at the strategic level (i.e. the province administration level). It is unclear whether UKR-CMA entails a dedicated function or not. As such, UKR-CMA falls under the CMR archetype.

Venezuela. In Venezuela, the concept of “civic-military union” (*unión civil-militar*, VEN-UCM) reflects a unique approach to civil-military relations, emphasizing collaboration between the military and civilian sectors. This concept, which gained prominence in 2002, has been a cornerstone of the country's governance model, especially under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez. It symbolizes the integration of military and civilian efforts in national development and security, highlighting the role of popular support in maintaining this union.¹¹⁷ The creation of the Bolivarian National Militia in 2008 is a manifestation of this concept. This force operates separately from the traditional armed forces and includes civilians recruited to support the government's objectives. The Militia embodies the principle of civic-military union by blurring the lines between civilian and military roles, fostering a sense of shared responsibility for the nation's defense and development. This approach has led to the military being deeply involved in various aspects of Venezuelan society, from social programs to governance, underpinned by the idea of a partnership between the military and the civilian population in pursuit of common goals. Civic-military union and the Bolivarian National Militia reflect Venezuela's distinctive approach to integrating the military into the broader societal and political framework. This model emphasizes the role of the military not just in defense, but also as an active participant in national development and in ensuring internal stability, with the support and involvement of the civilian population.¹¹⁸ We consider VEN-UCM to fall under the CMR archetype. The concept takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, and is applicable at the strategic level. It remains unclear whether VEN-UCM entails a dedicated function or not.

A2.2 Multilateral organizations

World Food Program. According to a publicly available 2013 directive, the World Food Program employs the concept of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC),¹¹⁹ for which we have compiled a factsheet. However, in practice, the organization no longer uses the concept of WFP-CMC and, instead, has recently developed the concept of Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI).¹²⁰ The policies and guidelines defining this concept, however, are closed to public access. It seems clear that WFP-HMI fall under the CMCoord category, i.e. a civilian, humanitarian dedicated function, focused on the coordination between humanitarian and military actors, mainly at the tactical and operational levels. However, it remains unclear whether and how WFP-CMC differs from WFP-HMI.

A2.3 Non-governmental organizations

Mercy Corps International. According to a 2018 report entitled “Playbook: Negotiating Humanitarian Access”, Mercy Corps International, an American-based international NGO, has shown some

institutionalization of humanitarian civil-military coordination in what they label “engagement with armed groups” (MCI-EwAG).¹²¹ MCI-EwAG takes the civilian, humanitarian perspective, is externally-oriented, and focused primarily at the tactical and operational levels. It is unclear whether MCI-EwAG entails a dedicated function or not. As such, the concept falls either under the CMI or CMCoord archetypes.

Save the Children International. In addition to the concepts of “civil-military relations” (SCI-CIVMIL)¹²² and “civil-military coordination” (SCI-CMCoord),¹²³ Save the Children International (SCI) has also used “civil-military engagement” (SCI-CME) in some publications and job descriptions.¹²⁴ At the time of writing, there was no publicly available formal definition of either concept. According to informal conversations, SCI is in the process of updating its policies related to civil-military relationships and should publish a concept note on the topic shortly. Still, SCI-CME seems to be closely aligned with, and perhaps an updated version of, SCI-CMCoord. As such, we consider SCI-CME to fall under the CMCoord archetype.

A2.4 Non-state armed groups

Movement for the Liberation of the Congo. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo’s armed wing, the Congo Liberation Army (ALC), in their statute, prescribes a branch in their organization focused on “Civil and Political Affairs” (*affaires civiles et politiques*, MLC-ACP), similar to standard military staff organizations: “Placed under the chief command of the President, the ALC constitutes the armed wing of the Movement. The General Staff of the ALC is composed of the Commander of the Army, Chief of Staff, the G1 in charge of Personnel, the G2 in charge of Intelligence, the G3 in charge of Operations, the G4 in charge of Logistics, *the G5 in charge of Civil and Political Affairs*. All are appointed and relieved of their post by the Commander-in-Chief of the ALC after a favorable opinion of the Politico-Military Council. The Army Commander, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, namely the President of the MLC, coordinates the activities of the General Staff and the troops. He executes the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief of the ALC”.¹²⁵ As such, MLC-ACP is a dedicated military function focused on the relationship with external civilian and political actors. It is unclear, however, at which level the concept operates. Depending on the level of applicability, the concept could fall under the CMR or the CIMIC archetypes.

Various Communist groups. Several Communist groups use the adjective “politico-military” to qualify their doctrines, strategies, and actions.¹²⁶ The concept refers to the integrated and inseparable nature of political and military activities. It emphasizes the fusion of political ideology and military strategy, where armed struggle is seen as an extension of the political struggle. In this context, the politico-military approach entails a comprehensive and coordinated effort to achieve political objectives through armed means. It involves not only the use of force and military tactics but also political mobilization, propaganda, recruitment, and organizational development. The goal is to establish a revolutionary society by combining political ideology with armed resistance, with the belief that military actions should be guided by and serve the political agenda of the group. Because this concept is not clearly defined by any specific group, we decided to leave it out from the conceptual analysis in this study.

A3 Avoiding misunderstandings: other related civil-military terms

This appendix deals with civil-military terms identified during the data collection process, which are too specific and do not constitute – from our understanding – an additional archetypal concept. Rather, the terms discussed below are either variations or components of the archetypes discussed above or not civil-military concepts at all. In what follows, we present and briefly discuss the terms of *Civil Affairs* (as understood by the US Army and UN/AU peace operations), *Civil Affairs Operations and Civil-Military Operations*, *Military Civic Action*, *Civil-Military Action*, *Civil-Military Liaison*, *Civil-Military Affairs*, *Civil-Military Integration and Military-Civil Fusion*, and *Civil-Military Problematique*.

A3.1 US Army Civil Affairs, Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

In the United States military, the civil-military cooperation function – i.e. CIMIC – is termed *Civil Affairs* (USA-CA). USA-CA is defined as designated active component and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. One major distinction between USA-CA and other concepts is the scale and structure of how this capability is organized in the US military. For instance, instead of mainly a staff function (i.e. G9 or J9 branches), the US has multiple dedicated Civil Affairs commands, brigades, battalions and other ad hoc units comprising active duty and reserve personnel.

Another distinction is the emphasis on the military conduction of responsibilities normally performed by civil governments, if necessary. This includes, for example, deploying uniformed personnel as governance specialists to support or even temporarily respond on behalf of the local government.¹²⁷ Compared with other CIMIC concepts, according to NATO-CIMIC doctrine,¹²⁸ this role is exercised by *functional specialists*, who usually have strong civilian expertise, such as in agriculture, engineering, or economics. In UN peace operations, this role falls under the mandate of the civilian component, thus outside the scope of activities of UN-CIMIC personnel.

The concepts of Civil-Military Operations (CMOs) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAOs) stem from the US Civil Affairs doctrine. CMOs are defined “as activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.”¹²⁹ This means that CMOs can be conducted by non-specialized civil-military personnel with the primary objective to support the military mission.

In contrast, CAOs are “actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional speciality skills normally the responsibility of civil government.”¹³⁰ In other words, CAOs can only be conducted by specialized civil-military personnel and are more focused on managing the interaction between the civilian environment and the military operations (e.g. minimizing collateral damage or obstacles to operations) and supporting local governance.

In line with our overarching concepts, CMOs and CAOs fall under the scope of CIMIC and, on some occasions, CMI. They are inherently military-led activities focused on interacting with external civilian actors at the tactical and operational levels. While CMOs can be conducted by non-specialized personnel and sometimes fall under the CMI category, CAOs are only conducted by specialized staff, thus always under the CIMIC category.

A3.2 AU & UN Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs takes a completely different meaning in UN and AU peace operations. In fact, UN/AU Civil Affairs deals not with civil-military relations but with civilian relations between the mission and local civilian actors.¹³¹ The concept is included here for clarification. Civil affairs components are deployed in almost all UN and UA peace missions. They are civilian peacekeepers, usually deployed locally, who serve as the interface between the mission and local authorities and communities. The Civil Affairs function is often present throughout the mission area. It works “to strengthen the social and civic conditions necessary to consolidate peace processes and are a core function of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations”.¹³² Nonetheless, Civil Affairs may be a key resource for CIMIC operators. Due to their close work with local civilian actors, Civil Affairs personnel may serve as a valuable source of information and gatekeepers facilitating contact and liaison with civilians, especially local government authorities and civil society organizations.

A3.3 Military Civic Action

Military Civic Action (MCA) also stems from the US Civil Affairs doctrine, though it is widely used in other contexts, such as Latin American countries.¹³³ In short, MCAs are short-term and small-scale activities intended to promote public perception and increase popular support for the military mission. At the same time, MCAs should address the real needs of the target population and contribute, as much as possible, to longer-term development and other stabilization processes.¹³⁴ In this sense, the MCAs are closely linked to quick impact projects (QIPs).¹³⁵

Although the military plans them, MCAs are often implemented by civilian partners. In this sense, MCAs do not need to be carried out by specialized civil-military cooperation personnel and, as such, can fall under either a CIMIC—if they are implemented by specialized CIMIC personnel—or a CMI framework—in case they are implemented by non-CIMIC personnel, such as regular infantry troops or specialized psychological operations personnel. Under the CIMIC framework, MCAs (and QIPs) are often implemented under the mandate to support civilian actors.¹³⁶

A3.4 Civil-Military Liaison

Civil-Military Liaison is often listed as one of the main functions of CIMIC and CMCoord. This function entails establishing and maintaining “liaison with [relevant] actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, harmonized or integrated planning, and conduct of operations.”¹³⁷ Even though the concept of civil-military liaison is laid out in

specific CIMIC and CMCoord guidance documents, liaison and information sharing are core activities in civil-military relations at all levels for military and civilians alike.

A3.5 Civil-Military Problematique

Also referred to as civil-military challenge, civil-military problem, and civil-military conflict, the civil-military problematique lies at the core of CMR debates. The concept gained relevance in the 1990s and then focused mainly on the issue of civilian control of the armed forces. According to Peter D. Fearon, “[t]he civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we create for protection.”¹³⁸ This paradox can be expanded regarding competing mandates, interests, culture, and resources, to name a few, between military and civilian actors. It can also be explored at different levels of analysis, from individuals to groups and communities to nations and multilateral organizations. In essence, the civil-military problematique refers to inherent contradictions between civilian and military actors and, as such, is present in discussions of civil-military relations at all levels.

A4 Contexts and organizations without relevant concepts

For seven countries, four multilateral organizations, three international NGOs, and 238 non-state armed groups, we could not find any readily- available information through open-source searches on the internet (as discussed in the main body of this report). This does not necessarily mean that the concepts for these entities are not present, but it does mean that information about them is not readily available. In what follows, we list those contexts and organizations with a brief explanation of our search.

A4.1 National governments

Egypt. After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Egypt to make a factsheet and include in this paper.

Finland. Finland does not seem to have a specific civil-military concept. The Finnish military does acknowledge the 9th function (i.e. CIMIC) but does not organize its staff as such. CIMIC personnel have been and are deployed in multilateral operations, such as UN peacekeeping missions, and have thus conformed to the concept of UN-CIMIC.¹³⁹ It is not clear, however, whether the Finnish Armed Forces have institutionalized the concept. Formally, the Finnish government employs the concepts of “coordination of measures” (*yhteensovittaminen; toimintojen yhteensovittaminen*), “cooperation” (*yhteistoiminta, yhteistyö*), “inter-authority cooperation” (*viranomaisyhteistyö*), “mutual assistance between authorities” (*virka-apu*), but none of these are specifically focused on civil-military relations.¹⁴⁰

India. The Indian Armed Forces have a long and strong tradition in UN peacekeeping operations and, accordingly, have experience in UN-CIMIC.¹⁴¹ In addition, the Indian Government's Ministry of Home Affairs National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) was established in 2006. The NDRF is organized along military structures (i.e. battalions) and largely responds domestically but has conducted foreign disaster response in the past, notably in Nepal (2015) and Türkiye (2023). However, despite several policies and documents present on its website,¹⁴² we could not identify any organization-specific civil-military concept.

Ireland. The Irish Armed Forces have previously deployed CIMIC personnel in UN peacekeeping operations¹⁴³ and conducted UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord courses.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, Ireland's civil defense appears to follow EU concepts and standards.¹⁴⁵ However, we could not identify any organization-specific civil-military concept.

Israel. After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Israel to make a factsheet and include in this paper.

Syria. After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Syria to make a factsheet and include in this paper.

United Kingdom. The United Kingdom (UK) military follows directly the NATO-CIMIC and NATO-CIMIC concepts. Indeed, the UK's Ministry of Defense 2006 doctrine on civil-military cooperation¹⁴⁶ was archived after it was replaced by the NATO-CIMIC doctrine in 2018.¹⁴⁷

A4.2 Multilateral organizations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for ASEAN to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for CDEMA to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for OSCE to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Organization of American States (OAS). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for OAS to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

A4.3 Non-governmental organizations

Danish Refugee Council (DRC). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for DRC to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

International Federation of the Red Cross. The IFRC seems to follow the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (Movement-CMR), as evidenced in several documents,¹⁴⁸ see its factsheet for more information.

International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC seems to follow the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (Movement-CMR), as evidenced in several documents,¹⁴⁹ see its factsheet for more information. However, the ICRC employs specific terms in its organizational structure. For example, at the headquarters in Geneva, the “Unit for Relations with Arms Carriers” is responsible for supporting the engagement with state militaries, police forces, non-state armed groups, and armed criminal organizations by providing practitioner expertise from former senior military and law enforcement officers, working as part of the institution’s multi-disciplinary teams. Relatedly, the ICRC deploys delegates with specific job titles, such as “Armed Forces Delegate”, “Non-state Armed Groups Delegate”,¹⁵⁰ and “Police and Security Forces Delegate”,¹⁵¹ who are responsible for facilitating the relationship between ICRC and such actors. We consider that these concepts do not amount to specific concepts, but terminological variations with little conceptual weight. Thus, we decided not to include in this study.

A4.4 Non-state armed groups

In this study, we reviewed codes of conduct, internal statutes, unilateral declarations, and other official documents issued by 240 non-state armed groups, as contained in the repository maintained by the Swiss-based NGO, Geneva Call, “Their Words: the Directory of Armed Groups and de facto Authorities’ Humanitarian Commitments.”¹⁵² However, the overwhelming majority (i.e. 238) of the groups have no clearly defined organization-specific civil-military concepts.

References

- Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Australian Council for International Development. 'Same Space – Different Mandates: A Civil-Military-Police Guide for Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response'. Canberra, Australia: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2023. <https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/ACMC%20SSDM%202%284%29.pdf>.
- Arnö, Sophie. "Civil-Military Relations & Protection of Civilians." Stockholm, Sweden: Save the Children International, 2017.
- Ångström, Jan. 'The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory'. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, no. 2 (May 2013): 224–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014>.
- Bachman, Jerald G., and John D. Blair. "“Citizen Force” or “Career Force”?: Implications for Ideology in the All-Volunteer Army". *Armed Forces & Society* 2, no. 1 (1 October 1975): 81–96. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7500200106>.
- Bakx, Gwendolyn, Jori Kalkman, and Myriame Bollen. 'Civil–Military Interaction Meets Civil–Military Relations: Confronting the Two Literatures in a Reflection on Ambidextrous Civil–Military Practices'. In *The Yin-Yang Military*, edited by Jacqueline Heeren-Bogers, René Moelker, Esmeralda Kleinreesink, Jan Van der Meulen, Joseph Soeters, and Robert Beeres, 69–81. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52433-3_5.
- Bemba, Jean-Pierre, Valentin Senga, Kibonge, Olivier Kamitatu, Jean-Pierre Singo, Hamuli, Dominique Kanku, et al. "Statuts Du Mouvement de Libération Du Congo." Lisala, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, June 30, 1999. http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/cd_mlc_1999_09-28d0edd1d32a444ad3205b5f82476140.pdf.
- Belkin, Aaron. "“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Does the Gay Ban Undermine the Military’s Reputation?" *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 2 (1 January 2008): 276–91. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06294621>.
- Bitzinger, Richard A. 'China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion'. *Asia Policy* 16, no. 1 (2021): 5–24. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2021.0001>.
- Blueprint. "ONSA/EU: Partnering on CIMIC, Human Rights in Military Operations." *Blueprint Newspapers Limited* (blog), September 22, 2014. <https://blueprint.ng/onsaeu-partnering-on-cimic-human-rights-in-military-operations/>.
- Brooks, Risa A. 'Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, no. 1 (11 May 2019): 379–98. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407>.
- Brownson, Connie. 'The Battle for Equivalency: Female US Marines Discuss Sexuality, Physical Fitness, and Military Leadership'. *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 765–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14523957>.

- Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence. *CIMIC Field Handbook*. 4th ed. The Hague, The Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2012.
- . ‘Information Package on Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)’. The Hague, The Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 7 July 2014.
- Christensen, Tom, and Per Læg Reid. ‘The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform’. *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 6 (November 2007): 1059–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00797.x>.
- ‘Civil Military Affairs Brigade (Reserve)’. In *Wikipedia*, 18 May 2021. [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Civil_Military_Affairs_Brigade_\(Reserve\)&oldid=1023761970](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Civil_Military_Affairs_Brigade_(Reserve)&oldid=1023761970).
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton NJ, United States: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Colombia, Ejército Nacional de. ‘Acción cívico militar - Ejército Nacional de Colombia’. Accessed 14 May 2022. <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/accion-civico-militar/>.
- Coning, Cedric de. *The Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations Handbook*. Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2008.
- . ‘The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach’. The Civil-Military Agenda. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2008. http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report-2008-14_The_United_Nations_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf.
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. ‘Soldiers and State-Building: The Approach of the Danish Armed Forces to Reconstruction Support.’ DIIS Report. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30530/2Report2007.pdf>.
- Davidson, Lisa Witzig. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996.
- Day, Wendy MacClinchy. ‘Integrated Strategic Frameworks for Peace Consolidation: A Briefing Note’. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 5, no. 2 (June 2010): 75–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2010.261359924976>.
- De Carvalho, Vinicius Mariano, and Charlotte Bascaule. ‘Brazil in MINUSTAH: Exporting a Domestic Understanding of Civil-Military Relations to a UN Peace Operation’. *Conflict, Security & Development* 23, no. 2 (4 March 2023): 153–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2216154>.
- Dorussen, Han, Erik A Gartzke, and Oliver Westerwinter. ‘Networked International Politics: Complex Interdependence and the Diffusion of Conflict and Peace’. *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 3 (May 2016): 283–91. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316637896>.
- Drent, Margriet. ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-Ordination?’, 2011, 16.

- Efficiency Unit. 'Joined-up Government (April 2009)'. Hong Kong, China: Efficiency Unit, April 2009.
- Egnell, Robert. 'Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations'. Scientific report. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2008.
- . *Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace*. Routledge, 2009.
- Eighmey, John. 'Why Do Youth Enlist?: Identification of Underlying Themes'. *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 2 (1 January 2006): 307–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05281017>.
- European Union. 'Civil Military Co-Ordination (CMCO)'. Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 7 November 2003.
- . 'Civil-Military Co-Ordination (CMCO): Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations'. Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 31 October 2006.
- . 'Civil-Military Co-Ordination: Framework Paper of Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations'. Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 2 May 2006.
- . 'EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) for EU-Led Military Operations'. Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 3 February 2009.
- . "Germany." European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, August 24, 2021. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/germany_en.
- . "Ireland." European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, September 10, 2019. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/ireland_en.
- . 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy'. European Union, June 2016.
- . "Türkiye." European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, June 24, 2022. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/turkiye_en.
- Faria, Fernanda. 'What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU Action Plan and Beyond'. Briefing Note. Brussels, Belgium: European Centre for Development Policy Management, October 2014.
- Feaver, Peter D. 'Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations'. *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (1 April 1998): 407–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9802400305>.
- . 'The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control'. *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–78.

- Folk og Forsvar. 'Leksikon: sivil-militært samarbeid'. Folk og Forsvar, 2023.
<https://folkogforsvar.no/leksikon/sivil-militaert-samarbeid/>.
- Forsström, Anna, Jan Frelin, and Maria Lagerström. "Försvarsmakten Och Civil-Militär Samverkan: Förslag På Studieområden För Samverkansfunktionens Vidareutveckling." Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2012.
<https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3539--SE>.
- Garbino, Henrique Siniciato Terra. 'Quick Impact Projects: The Experience of MINUSTAH's Military Component'. *CCOPAB and Peace Operations: Perspectives, Reflections and Lessons Learned* 1, no. 2015–2016 (2015): 83–111.
- Garbino, Henrique Siniciato Terra, and João Maurício Dias Lopes Valdetaro. 'What Is Civil-Military Coordination? Insights from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti?'. *Pax et Bellum Blog* (blog), 21 January 2018.
<http://www.paxetbellum.org/2018/01/21/civil-military-coordination-insights-united-nations-stabilization-mission-haiti/>.
- Gebhard, Carmen. 'Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation in the Context of the EU's Crisis Management (CMCO versus CIMIC): Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications'. Info Aktuell. Vienna, Austria: National Defense Academy, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, March 2008.
- Geneva Call. "Their Words: Directory of Armed Non-State Actor Humanitarian Commitments," 2022. <http://theirwords.org/>.
- Government of Belgium. "Ci-MEG." LinkedIn. Accessed February 10, 2024.
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/ci-meg/about/>.
- Government of Brazil. 'Ação Cívico-Social (ACISO)'. Caderno de Instrução. Brasília, Brazil: Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Land Operations Command, 2009.
- . 'Assuntos Civis'. Field Manual. Brasília, Brazil: Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Land Operations Command, 2021.
- Government of Canada, National. "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Instructors Presented With New Qualification Badge." The Maple Leaf, June 10, 2022. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2022/06/cimic-psyops-new-qualification-badge.html>.
- Government of Colombia. "Cursos Cooperación Civil Militar y Género - Ejército Nacional de Colombia," 2022. <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/cursos-cooperacion-civil-militar-y-genero/>.
- . "Escuela De Misiones Internacionales Y Acción Integral ESMAI - Ejército Nacional de Colombia," September 3, 2021. <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/escuela-de-misiones-internacionales-y-accion-integral-esmai/>.
- Government of Denmark. "CIMIC-kompagniet melder klar." Forsvaret, January 29, 2008.
<https://www.forsvaret.dk/da/nyhedsarkiv/harstaben/2008/cimic-kompagniet-melder-klar/>.

- Government of Germany. “Multinational CIMIC Command Nienburg.” Accessed February 10, 2024. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/further-fmod-departments/bundeswehr-homeland-defence-command/organisation/multinational-cimic-command-nienburg>.
- Government of India. “Indian Army Celebrates 75th International Day of UN Peacekeepers.” Ministry of Defence, May 29, 2023. <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1928025>.
- . “Order & Circulars.” National Disaster Response Force, February 5, 2024. <https://ndrf.gov.in/order-circulars>.
- Government of Ireland. “Past Missions.” Irish Defence Forces. Accessed February 10, 2024. <https://www.military.ie/en/overseas-deployments/past-missions/past-missions.html>.
- . “UNTSI Course Prospectus 2019.” Curragh, Ireland: UN Training School Ireland, 2019. https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/army/defence-forces-training-centre/the-military-college/un-training-school-ireland/prospectus-2019_.pdf.
- Government of Kenya. “Home.” National Disaster Management Unit. Accessed February 10, 2024. <https://disastermanagement.go.ke/>.
- . “KDF Troops Carry out CIMIC Activities in Garissa.” Ministry of Defence - Kenya, April 2023. <https://mod.go.ke/serve-protect/kdf-troops-carry-out-cimic-activities-in-garissa/>.
- . “National Disaster Risk Management Policy.” Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, National Disaster Management Unit, 2017. <https://repository.kippra.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/559/NATIONAL%20Disaster%20Risk%20Mannagement%20POLICY%20APPROVED.pdf?sequence=1>.
- Government of Lebanon. “The Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate | الجيش الرسمي الموقع اللبناني.” The official website of the Lebanese Army. Accessed February 10, 2024. <https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/civil-%E2%80%93-military-cooperation-directorate>.
- Government of Nigeria. “Directorate of Civil Military Affairs.” *Nigerian Army* (blog). Accessed October 3, 2021. https://army.mil.ng/?page_id=483.
- Government of Norway. ‘Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine [The Armed Forces’ Joint Operational Doctrine]’. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Armed Forces, Defense Staff Norway, 2014.
- Government of the United Kingdom. “Civil-Military Co-Operation.” Joint Doctrine Publication. Shrivenham, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, April 2006.
- Government of Türkiye. “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Activities.” Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of National Defence, Land Forces Command, April 2, 2022. <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/EN/news/news-134.aspx>.

- Government of Venezuela. “Génesis de La Unión Cívico-Militar - MPPRE.” Accessed February 4, 2024. <https://mppre.gob.ve/opinion/genesis-de-la-union-civico-militar/>.
- Gruszczak, Artur. ‘Networked Security Governance: Reflections on the E.U.’s Counterterrorism Approach’. *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–23.
- Hagui, M, H Naija, S Dabboussi, F Felhi, R Allani, and M Ferjani. “COVID-19 Tunisian Armed Forces Preparedness and Response Plan: Anticipating the Impact and Lessons Learned.” *International Review of the Armed Forces Medical Services* 94, no. 1 (April 2021): 38–47.
- Hanssen, Måns. ‘Civil-Military Interaction in the European Union: Applying a Comprehensive Approach to CSDP Operations’. Base Data Report. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2010.
- Harisanto, Eddy S. “The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Dwi Fungsi ABRI).” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA277237>.
- Hubko, Oleh. ‘Ukrainian Army Capabilities to Meet North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standards’. Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2019. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1106515.pdf>.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Revised edition. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1981.
- International Committee of the Red Cross. “Work with Us: Armed Forces and Non-State Armed Groups Delegate.” Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, February 4, 2021. <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4439-work-us-armed-forces-and-non-state-armed-groups-delegate>.
- . “Work with Us: Police and Security Forces Delegate.” Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, February 4, 2021. <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4440-work-us-police-and-security-forces-delegate>.
- International Federation of the Red Cross, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. “Movement Civil-Military Relations (CMR) during COVID-19 (C-19): Guidelines and Key Messages.” Geneva, Switzerland: International Federation of the Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d. <https://preparecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Guidelines-and-Key-Messages-1.pdf>.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. ‘NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress’. *The Civil-Military Agenda*. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2008. http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report_2008-15_NATO_Comprehensive_Approach_Crisis_Response_Operations.pdf.
- Janowitz, Morris. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Reissue edition. New York: Free Press, 2017.
- Janowitz, Morris, and Charles C. Moskos. ‘Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978’. *Armed Forces & Society* 5, no. 2 (1 January 1979): 171–218. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7900500201>.

- Joshi, Manoj. 'China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India'. ORF Occasional Paper. New Delhi, India: Observer Research Foundation, January 2022.
- Kania, Elsa B, and Lorand Laskai. 'Myths and Realities of China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy'. *Technology & National Security*. Washington D.C., United States: Center for a New American Security, January 2021.
- Kemal, Levent. "Turkey: Inside the Turkish Military's Slow Earthquake Response." *Middle East Eye*, March 13, 2023, sec. Turkey-Syria Earthquake. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-earthquake-inside-military-response>.
- King, Anthony C. 'Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat'. *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (1 April 2015): 379–87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14532913>.
- Klimburg, Alexander. 'The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower'. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 11 (2011): 171–79.
- Kotowski, Christoph. 'Revolution'. In *Social Sciences Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, edited by Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills, CA, United States: Sage, 1984.
- Korrespondent.net. "Порошенко подписал закон о военно-гражданских администрациях в Донбассе," February 26, 2015. <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3484374-poroshenko-podpysal-zakon-o-voenno-hrazhdanskykh-admynystratsyiakh-v-donbasse>.
- Krawchuk, Fred. 'Combating Terrorism: A Joint Interagency Approach'. Landpower Essay. Institute of Land Warfare, January 2005.
- Levy, Yagil. 'The Right to Fight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Recruitment Policy toward Gays and Lesbians'. *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (1 January 2007): 186–202. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06287616>.
- Mazurkiewicz, Agata. 'Between NATO And UN: EU Strategic Culture and Its Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation'. *Obrona a Strategie (Defence and Strategy)* 18, no. 1 (15 July 2018): 63–78. <https://doi.org/10.3849/1802-7199.18.2018.01.063-078>.
- . 'NATO and EU Approach towards Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations'. *Polityka i Społeczeństwo* 2, no. 12 (2014): 125–40.
- Mercy Corps International. 'Playbook: Negotiating Humanitarian Access'. Portland, OR, United States: Mercy Corps International, November 2018. <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/NegotiatingForHumanitarianAccessPlaybook.pdf>
- Milevski, Lukas. 'Dr. Lukas Milevski – “The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray”'. Podcast. Decisive Point Podcast. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, United States: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 10 January 2022. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/2022/pubs/parameters/dr-lukas-milevski-the-grand-strategic-thought-of-colin-s-gray/>.
- Multinational CIMIC Group. 'Mission - CIMIC GROUP', 2021. https://cimicgroup.org/c_id/163.

- Montgomery, Brian T. 'Defense, Diplomacy and Development - Status, Challenges, and Best Practices'. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, United States: U.S. Army War College, 15 February 2012. <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA561488>.
- Moradi, Bonnie, and Laura Miller. 'Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans toward Gay and Lesbian Service Members'. *Armed Forces & Society* 36, no. 3 (1 April 2010): 397–419. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X09352960>.
- Moskos, Charles C. 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization'. *Armed Forces & Society* 4, no. 1 (October 1977): 41–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103>.
- . 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update'. *Armed Forces & Society* 12, no. 3 (1 April 1986): 377–82. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X8601200303>.
- Mühlich, Stefan, and Nicholas Krohley. 'NATO CIMIC & US Civil Affairs: Doctrinal Review & Comparative Assessment'. Delft, the Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, June 2022.
- Naija, H, M Hagui, B Chatbri, S Slimi, R Allani, and M Ferjani. "Civil-Military Medical Cooperation: The COVID-19 Outbreak Response in Tunisia." *International Review of the Armed Forces Medical Services* 94, no. 1 (April 2021): 24–31.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 'Allied Joint Doctrine'. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standardization Office, February 2017.
- . 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation'. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standardization Office, 9 November 2018.
- . 'Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008'. Press Release. Bucharest, Romania: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 3 April 2008.
- . 'Chicago Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012'. Press Release. Chicago, IL, United States: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 20 May 2012.
- . 'International Staff'. NATO, 19 April 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58110.htm.
- . 'Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon'. Press Release. Lisbon, Portugal: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 20 November 2010.
- . 'NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)'. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standardization Office, 8 November 2018.

- . ‘NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)’. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Military Committee, 12 May 2014.
- . ‘NATO’s Role in Disaster Assistance’. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Civil Emergency Planning, Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, 2001.
- . ‘Riga Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006’. Press Release. Riga, Latvia: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 29 November 2006.
- Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin. ‘Managing the Civil-Military Interface in the EU: Creating an Organisation Fit for Purpose’. *European Integration Online Papers*, 16 August 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1695/2010010>.
- Parco, James E., David A. Levy, and Sarah R. Spears. ‘Transgender Military Personnel in the Post-DADT Repeal Era: A Phenomenological Study’. *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (1 April 2015): 221–42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14530112>.
- Sanastokeskus TSK. “Kokonaisturvallisuuden Sanasto.” Helsinki, Finland: Sanastokeskus TSK, 2017. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Kokonaisturvallisuuden_sanasto.pdf.
- Save the Children International. “Civil-Military Coordination: COVID-19 Humanitarian Response.” Guidance note. Save the Children International, n.d. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/sci_civmil_coordination_covid19_v.1.1-1_en.pdf/
- . “Strategic Advisor, Civil Military Engagement.” Save the Children International, April 5, 2023. <https://www.savethechildren.net/careers/apply/details?jid=280>.
- Schiff, Rebecca L. ‘Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’. *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1 October 1995): 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502200101>.
- . ‘Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy’. *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 318–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X11415491>.
- Sowers, Thomas S. ‘Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relationships’. *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 3 (1 April 2005): 385–409. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0503100304>.
- Stone, Alex. ‘Military-Civil Fusion Terminology: A Reference Guide’. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, United States: Air University, China Aerospace Studies Institute, February 2021.
- teleSUR. “Importancia de unión cívico-militar en defensa de soberanía venezolana.” *teleSUR*, June 24, 2022, sec. Latinoamérica y el Caribe. <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/importancia-union-civico-militar-defensa-venezuela-20200624-0004.html>.

- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. Boulder: LITTL, 1994.
- United Nations, ed. *Civil Affairs Handbook*. New York, United States: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2012.
- . *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook*. 2.0. Geneva, Switzerland: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018.
<https://www.unocha.org/publication/un-cmcoord-field-handbook>.
- . ‘Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)’. DPKO/DFS Policy. New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, October 2010.
- . ‘Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)’. Policy. New York, NY, United States: Department of Peace Operations, 1 January 2022.
- . ‘Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening International Peace and Security in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’. New York, NY, United States: United Nations General Assembly, 7 December 1988.
- . ‘DPKO/DFS Policy Directive: Civil Affairs’. New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 1 April 2008.
- . ‘DPKO/DFS Policy: Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)’. New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 1 October 2017.
- . ‘Letter Dated 25 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. Annex: Peace-Building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach’. New York, NY, United States: United Nations Security Council, 25 January 2001.
- . ‘Role of the Special Representative and Their Deputies’. Field Mission Leadership. Accessed 11 November 2023. <https://www.un.org/globalcall/content/field-mission-leadership>.
- . ‘United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)’. Specialized Training Materials. New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Integrated Training Services, 2014.
- . *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 2008.
- . ‘WFP - Humanitarian Military Interaction (HMI) Officer - Lead for Policy Development’. UN Talent, 2023. <https://untalent.org/jobs/humanitarian-military-interaction-hmi-officer-lead-for-policy-development>.
- . ‘WFP Civil-Military Coordination - Operational Guidance’. Rome, Italy: World Food Program, 10 December 2013.

- United States Government. '95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) - Home Page', 2022. <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>.
- . 'Civil Affairs Civil Information Management'. Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, September 2013.
- . 'Civil Affairs Operations'. Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, October 2011.
- . 'Other Approaches to Civil-Military Integration: The Chinese and Japanese Arms Industries'. Washington D.C., United States: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, March 1995. <https://ota.fas.org/reports/9532.pdf>.
- . 'The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics'. Field Manual. Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 16 July 1984.
- Wendling, Cécile. 'The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective'. IRSEM Reports. Paris, France: Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire, 2010.
- Worsnop, Alec. 'The Rebel and the Politician: Developing a Typology of Insurgent Civil–Military Relations'. *Armed Forces & Society*, 20 August 2023, 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231193152>.

Endnotes

¹ Carmen Gebhard, ‘Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation in the Context of the EU’s Crisis Management (CMCO versus CIMIC): Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications’, *Info Aktuell* (Vienna, Austria: National Defense Academy, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, March 2008).

² Note that, throughout this study, acronym explanations might be repeated in brackets for the sake of clarity.

³ This example is based on a real example experienced by the co-author Jonathan Robinson while working on aid worker security for the Syria crisis response between 2016 and 2019.

⁴ Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) and Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), ‘Same Space – Different Mandates: A Civil-Military-Police Guide for Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict Response’ (Canberra, Australia: Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2023), <https://www.acmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/ACMC%20SSDM%202%284%29.pdf>.

⁵ For example, see Cécile Wendling, ‘The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective’, *IRSEM Reports* (Paris, France: Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire, 2010).

⁶ See, for example, Agata Mazurkiewicz, ‘Between NATO and UN: EU Strategic Culture and Its Approach to Civil-Military Cooperation’, *Obrona a Strategie (Defence and Strategy)* 18, no. 1 (15 July 2018): 63–78, <https://doi.org/10.3849/1802-7199.18.2018.01.063-078>.

⁷ For an analysis of the concept of ‘comprehensive approach’ within the United Nations, see Cedric de Coning, ‘The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach’, *The Civil-Military Agenda* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2008), http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report-2008-14_The_United_Nations_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf.

⁸ For instance, Cedric de Coning, *The Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations Handbook* (Umhlanga Rocks, South Africa: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 2008).

⁹ Existing studies on European Union (EU) concepts include Margriet Drent, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-Ordination?’, 2011, 16; Fernanda Faria, ‘What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU Action Plan and Beyond’, Briefing Note (Brussels, Belgium: European Centre for Development Policy Management, October 2014); Gebhard, ‘Civil-Military Coordination and Cooperation in the Context of the EU’s Crisis Management (CMCO versus CIMIC): Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications’; Måns Hanssen, ‘Civil-Military Interaction in the European Union: Applying a Comprehensive Approach to CSDP Operations’, *Base Data Report* (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2010); Agata Mazurkiewicz, ‘NATO and EU Approach towards Civil-Military Relations in Military Operations’, *Polityka i Społeczeństwo* 2, no. 12 (2014): 125–40; Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, ‘Managing the Civil-Military Interface in the EU: Creating an Organisation Fit for Purpose’, *European Integration Online Papers*, 16 August 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1695/2010010>.

¹⁰ For example, see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress’, *The Civil-Military Agenda* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008), http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report_2008-15_NATO_Comprehensive_Approach_Crisis_Response_Operations.pdf.

¹¹ Insights on this case study build on the authors' experience in MINUSTAH, where João Valdetaro deployed in two tour of duty (2009-2010 and 2015-2016); and Henrique Garbino deployed to one tour (2013-2014).

¹² Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino and João Maurício Dias Lopes Valdetaro, 'What Is Civil-Military Coordination? Insights from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti', *Pax et Bellum Blog* (blog), 21 January 2018, <http://www.paxetbellum.org/2018/01/21/civil-military-coordination-insights-united-nations-stabilization-mission-haiti/>; Vinicius Mariano De Carvalho and Charlotte Bascaule, 'Brazil in MINUSTAH: Exporting a Domestic Understanding of Civil-Military Relations to a UN Peace Operation', *Conflict, Security & Development* 23, no. 2 (4 March 2023): 153–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2216154>.

¹³ United Nations (UN), 'United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)', Specialized Training Materials (New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, Integrated Training Services, 2014), 46–47.

¹⁴ UN, 'Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)', DPKO/DFS Policy (New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, October 2010).

¹⁵ Namely, UN, 'United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)'.

¹⁶ Insights on this case study build on the co-author Henrique Garbino's experience while working in the humanitarian mine action sector in Ukraine in 2018, 2019-2020, and 2022.

¹⁷ See, for example, Oleh Hubko, 'Ukrainian Army Capabilities to Meet North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standards' (Master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, United States, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2019), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1106515.pdf>.

¹⁸ Government of the United States (US), 'The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics', Field Manual (Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 16 July 1984).

¹⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 'NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)' (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standardization Office, 8 November 2018).

²⁰ This decision to categorize police actors as civilians is somewhat common and has been made, for instance, in the *Same Space – Different Mandates* publication (ACMC and ACFID, 'Same Space – Different Mandates').

²¹ Lukas Milevski, 'Dr. Lukas Milevski – "The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray"', Podcast, Decisive Point Podcast (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, United States: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 10 January 2022), <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/2022/pubs/parameters/dr-lukas-milevski-the-grand-strategic-thought-of-colin-s-gray/>.

²² NATO, 'NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMD)' (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Military Committee, 12 May 2014), 3.

²³ NATO, 3.

²⁴ As conceptualized by UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 2008), 66–69;

and NATO, 'Allied Joint Doctrine' (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Standardization Office, February 2017), 1.9-1.11.

²⁵ Note that the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) defines "integration" as the combination under same leadership of the peacekeeping operation and the other UN entities at the country-level, such as the United Nations Development Program, the World Food Program, the United Nations Children's Fund, and others. For more information on the UN DPO definition, see UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 53–57.

²⁶ Based on UN, 'United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)', 43.

²⁷ For an expanded discussion and alternative conceptualization for the relationship between military and humanitarian actors, see Rob Grace, Maria Carinnes Alejandria, Madison Bates, Samuel T. Boland, Alexandria Nylen, Zein Tayyeb and Adam C. Levine., 'Moving humanitarian-military relations forward: a new typology', *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 8, no. 2 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-023-00134-5>.

²⁸ Efficiency Unit, 'Joined-up Government (April 2009)' (Hong Kong, China: Efficiency Unit, April 2009).

²⁹ For example, see Tom Christensen and Per Lægveid, 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform', *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 6 (November 2007): 1059–66, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00797.x>.

³⁰ For instance, Alexander Klimburg, 'The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 11 (2011): 171–79.

³¹ For example, see Lisa Witzig Davidson, *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Fred Krawchuk, 'Combating Terrorism: A Joint Interagency Approach', Landpower Essay (Institute of Land Warfare, January 2005).

³² See, for example, Artur Gruszczak, 'Networked Security Governance: Reflections on the E.U.'s Counterterrorism Approach', *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 1, no. 3 (2008): 1–23; Han Dorussen, Erik A Gartzke, and Oliver Westerwinter, 'Networked International Politics: Complex Interdependence and the Diffusion of Conflict and Peace', *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 3 (May 2016): 283–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316637896>.

³³ For an example, Brian T. Montgomery, 'Defense, Diplomacy and Development - Status, Challenges, and Best Practices' (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, United States: U.S. Army War College, 15 February 2012), <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA561488>.

³⁴ In UN peace operations, "multidimensional" means that the mission is composed of different components, i.e. military, civilian, and police. "Integrated" refers to the linkages between the UN peace operation and other UN agencies present in the mission area. For a greater discussion in what these concepts entail in UN peace operations, see UN, *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook*, 2.0 (Geneva, Switzerland: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018), <https://www.unocha.org/publication/un-cmcoord-field-handbook>.

³⁵ For example, see UN, 'Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening International Peace and Security in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations' (New York, NY, United States: United Nations General Assembly, 7 December 1988); UN, 'Letter Dated 25 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. Annex: Peace-Building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach' (New York, NY, United States: United Nations Security Council, 25 January 2001).

³⁶ See, for example, EU, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ (European Union, June 2016).

³⁷ Although NATO does not have a former comprehensive approach (CA) policy, the concept is referred repeatedly in major statements and documents. See, for instance, NATO, ‘Riga Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006’, Press Release (Riga, Latvia: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 29 November 2006); NATO, ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008’, Press Release (Bucharest, Romania: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 3 April 2008); NATO, ‘Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon’, Press Release (Lisbon, Portugal: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 20 November 2010); NATO, ‘Chicago Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012’, Press Release (Chicago, IL, United States: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, 20 May 2012); NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine’.

³⁸ Wendy MacClinchy Day, ‘Integrated Strategic Frameworks for Peace Consolidation: A Briefing Note’, *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 5, no. 2 (June 2010): 75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2010.261359924976>.

³⁹ Within the UN system, on the one hand, humanitarian actors (including non-UN agencies) in a given context are coordinated by a UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC); on the other hand, UN-led development efforts are coordinated by a Resident Coordinator (RC), who usually leads the UNCT. In the case of complex contexts, in which there are both humanitarian, development, and security efforts by the UN, the organization may deploy a UN integrated mission. In this case, the UN Secretary-General appoints a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) as the main UN representative in the country, ultimately representing the UN peace operation and the UNCT. The SRSG, in turn, often has two deputies. One Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) is focused on the political process, also called DSRSG-Political. Another DSRSG focuses, instead, on the larger humanitarian and development efforts. As such this individual is often “triple-hatted” as DSRSG/RC/HC. UN, ‘Role of the Special Representative and Their Deputies’, Field Mission Leadership, accessed 11 November 2023, <https://www.un.org/globalcall/content/field-mission-leadership>.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: LITTL, 1994).

⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ, United States: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Revised edition (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1981).

⁴³ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Reissue edition (New York: Free Press, 2017).

⁴⁴ For a recent review of the Civil-Military Relations academic field, see Risa A. Brooks, ‘Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield’, *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, no. 1 (11 May 2019): 379–98, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407>.

⁴⁵ For example, see Charles C. Moskos, ‘From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization’, *Armed Forces & Society* 4, no. 1 (October 1977): 41–50, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103>; Charles C. Moskos, ‘Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update’, *Armed Forces & Society* 12, no. 3 (1 April 1986): 377–82, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X8601200303>.

⁴⁶ For instance, see Rebecca L. Schiff, ‘Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’, *Armed Forces & Society* 22, no. 1 (1 October 1995): 7–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502200101>; Rebecca L. Schiff, ‘Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy’, *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 318–39, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X11415491>; Thomas S. Sowers, ‘Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relationships’, *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 3 (1 April 2005): 385–409, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0503100304>; Peter D. Feaver, ‘Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 3 (1 April 1998): 407–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9802400305>.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Yagil Levy, ‘The Right to Fight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Recruitment Policy toward Gays and Lesbians’, *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (1 January 2007): 186–202, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06287616>; John Eighmey, ‘Why Do Youth Enlist?: Identification of Underlying Themes’, *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 2 (1 January 2006): 307–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05281017>; Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, ‘Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978’, *Armed Forces & Society* 5, no. 2 (1 January 1979): 171–218, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7900500201>; Jerald G. Bachman and John D. Blair, ‘“Citizen Force” or “Career Force”?: Implications for Ideology in the All-Volunteer Army’, *Armed Forces & Society* 2, no. 1 (1 October 1975): 81–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7500200106>.

⁴⁸ For example, Aaron Belkin, ‘“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Does the Gay Ban Undermine the Military’s Reputation?’, *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 2 (1 January 2008): 276–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X06294621>; Connie Brownson, ‘The Battle for Equivalency: Female US Marines Discuss Sexuality, Physical Fitness, and Military Leadership’, *Armed Forces & Society* 40, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 765–88, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14523957>; Anthony C. King, ‘Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat’, *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (1 April 2015): 379–87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14532913>; Levy, ‘The Right to Fight’; Bonnie Moradi and Laura Miller, ‘Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans toward Gay and Lesbian Service Members’, *Armed Forces & Society* 36, no. 3 (1 April 2010): 397–419, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X09352960>; James E. Parco, David A. Levy, and Sarah R. Spears, ‘Transgender Military Personnel in the Post-DADT Repeal Era: A Phenomenological Study’, *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 2 (1 April 2015): 221–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14530112>.

⁴⁹ For a critique on the traditional understanding of civil-military relations, see Jan Ångström, ‘The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory’, *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, no. 2 (May 2013): 224–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014>.

⁵⁰ For instance, Robert Egnell, *Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace* (Routledge, 2009); Robert Egnell, ‘Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations’, Scientific report (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2008); Gwendolyn Bakx, Jori Kalkman, and Myriame Bollen, ‘Civil–Military Interaction Meets Civil–Military Relations: Confronting the Two Literatures in a Reflection on Ambidextrous Civil–Military Practices’, in *The Yin-Yang Military*, ed. Jacqueline Heeren-Bogers et al. (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 69–81, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52433-3_5; Bakx, Kalkman, and Bollen.

⁵¹ See, for example, Alec Worsnop, ‘The Rebel and the Politician: Developing a Typology of Insurgent Civil–Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 20 August 2023, 1–37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231193152>.

⁵² EU, ‘Civil Military Co-Ordination (CMCO)’ (Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 7 November 2003); EU, ‘Civil-Military Co-Ordination (CMCO): Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations’ (Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 31 October 2006); EU, ‘Civil-Military Co-Ordination: Framework Paper of Possible Solutions for the Management of EU Crisis Management Operations’ (Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 2 May 2006).

⁵³ Based on NATO, ‘NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)’; CCOE, ‘Information Package on Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)’ (The Hague, The Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 7 July 2014).

⁵⁴ A clear exception is the NATO-CMI concept.

⁵⁵ UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 66–74.

⁵⁶ Based on UN, ‘Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)’, October 2010; NATO, ‘NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)’.

⁵⁷ UN, ‘United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)’, 46–47.

⁵⁸ Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), *CIMIC Field Handbook*, 4th ed. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2012).

⁵⁹ US, ‘95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) - Home Page’, 2022, <https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html>.

⁶⁰ Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG), ‘Mission - CIMIC GROUP’, 2021, https://cimicgroup.org/c_id/163.

⁶¹ Mazurkiewicz, ‘Between NATO And UN’.

⁶² Stefan Mühlich and Nicholas Krohley, ‘NATO CIMIC & US Civil Affairs: Doctrinal Review & Comparative Assessment’ (Delft, the Netherlands: Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, June 2022).

⁶³ UN, *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook*, 8.

⁶⁴ UN, 55–79.

⁶⁵ UN, *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook*.

⁶⁶ UN, ‘WFP Civil-Military Coordination - Operational Guidance’ (Rome, Italy: World Food Program, 10 December 2013).

⁶⁷ Government of Brazil (GOB), ‘Assuntos Civis’, Field Manual (Brasília, Brazil: Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Land Operations Command, 2021), 3–1.

⁶⁸ UN, ‘WFP Civil-Military Coordination - Operational Guidance’.

⁶⁹ See, for example, this job description: UN, ‘WFP - Humanitarian Military Interaction (HMI) Officer - Lead for Policy Development’, UN Talent, 2023, <https://untalent.org/jobs/humanitarian-military-interaction-hmi-officer-lead-for-policy-development>.

⁷⁰ Including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Federation of the Red Cross, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

⁷¹ The search for civil-military concepts used by non-state armed groups was conducted via Geneva Call’s ‘Their Words’ project, a directory of unilateral commitments, agreements, codes of conduct and other internal documents by non-state armed groups (see more at <http://theirwords.org>).

⁷² Lindsay Prior, 'Content Analysis', in *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Patricia Leavy (New York, NY, United States: Oxford University Press, 2014), 359–379.

⁷³ Based on Christoph Kotowski, 'Revolution', in *Social Sciences Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, ed. Giovanni Sartori (Beverly Hills, CA, United States: Sage, 1984), 422.

⁷⁴ Government of Norway, 'Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine [The Armed Forces' Joint Operational Doctrine]' (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Armed Forces, Defense Staff Norway, 2014).

⁷⁵ Folk og Forsvar, 'Leksikon: sivil-militært samarbeid', Folk og Forsvar, 2023, <https://folkogforsvar.no/leksikon/sivil-militaert-samarbeid/>.

⁷⁶ GOB, 'Assuntos Civis'.

⁷⁷ UN, 'Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)', Policy (New York, NY, United States: Department of Peace Operations, 1 January 2022).

⁷⁸ UN, *Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Field Handbook*.

⁷⁹ UN, 'WFP Civil-Military Coordination - Operational Guidance'.

⁸⁰ EU, 'Civil Military Co-Ordination (CMCO)'.

⁸¹ EU, 'EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) for EU-Led Military Operations' (Brussels, Belgium: European Union, Council of the European Union, 3 February 2009).

⁸² NATO, 'NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)'.

⁸³ NATO, 'NATO's Role in Disaster Assistance' (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Civil Emergency Planning, Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, 2001).

⁸⁴ NATO, 'International Staff', NATO, 19 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58110.htm.

⁸⁵ This challenge may be partially addressed through the establishment of standing civil-military coordination platforms to facilitate effectively and appropriately the interaction between military and civilians.

⁸⁶ Notably, the only organization-specific civil-military concept that explicitly includes police as a separate category is the World Vision International Civil-Military-Police Engagement (WVI-CMPE).

⁸⁷ Government of Belgium, 'Ci-MEG', LinkedIn, accessed 10 February 2024, <https://www.linkedin.com/company/ci-meg/about/>.

⁸⁸ GOB, "Assuntos Civis," Field Manual (Brasília, Brazil: Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Land Operations Command, 2021).

⁸⁹ Government of Canada, "Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Instructors Presented With New Qualification Badge," *The Maple Leaf*, June 10, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2022/06/cimic-psyops-new-qualification-badge.html>.

⁹⁰ Informal conversation with a Colombian Army Officer, instructor at the Colombian Army's International Missions and Integrated Action School.

-
- ⁹¹ See Government of Colombia (GOC), “Escuela De Misiones Internacionales y Acción Integral (ESMAI) - Ejército Nacional de Colombia,” September 3, 2021, <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/escuela-de-misiones-internacionales-y-accion-integral-esmai/>.
- ⁹² GOC, “Cursos Cooperación Civil Militar y Género - Ejército Nacional de Colombia,” 2022, <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/cursos-cooperacion-civil-militar-y-genero/>.
- ⁹³ Government of Denmark, “CIMIC-kompagniet melder klar,” Forsvaret, January 29, 2008, <https://www.forsvaret.dk/da/nyhedsarkiv/harstaben/2008/cimic-kompagniet-melder-klar/>.
- ⁹⁴ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Soldiers and State-Building: The Approach of the Danish Armed Forces to Reconstruction Support,” DIIS Report (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/30530/2Report2007.pdf>.
- ⁹⁵ EU, “Germany,” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, August 24, 2021, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/germany_en.
- ⁹⁶ Government of Germany, “Multinational CIMIC Command Nienburg,” accessed February 10, 2024, <https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/further-fmod-departments/bundeswehr-homeland-defence-command/organisation/multinational-cimic-command-nienburg>.
- ⁹⁷ Eddy S. Harisanto, “The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Dwi Fungsi ABRI)” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, United States, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA277237>.
- ⁹⁸ For example, see Government of Kenya (GOK), “KDF Troops Carry out CIMIC Activities in Garissa,” Ministry of Defence - Kenya, April 2023, <https://mod.go.ke/serve-protect/kdf-troops-carry-out-cimic-activities-in-garissa/>.
- ⁹⁹ GOK, “National Disaster Risk Management Policy” (Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, National Disaster Management Unit, 2017), <https://repository.kippra.or.ke/bitstream/handle/123456789/559/NATIONAL%20Disaster%20Risk%20Mannagement%20POLICY%20APPROVED.pdf?sequence=1>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Government of Lebanon, “The Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate | اللبناني للجيش الرسمي الموقع,” The official website of the Lebanese Army, accessed February 10, 2024, <https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/civil-%E2%80%93-military-cooperation-directorate>.
- ¹⁰¹ Nigerian Army, ‘Directorate of Civil Military Affairs’, *Nigerian Army* (blog), accessed 3 October 2021, https://army.mil.ng/?page_id=483.
- ¹⁰² Blueprint, “ONSA/EU: Partnering on CIMIC, Human Rights in Military Operations,” *Blueprint Newspapers Limited* (blog), September 22, 2014, <https://blueprint.ng/onsaeu-partnering-on-cimic-human-rights-in-military-operations/>.
- ¹⁰³ Government of Norway, ‘Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine [The Armed Forces’ Joint Operational Doctrine]’ (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Armed Forces, Defense Staff Norway, 2014).
- ¹⁰⁴ Folk og Forsvar, ‘Leksikon: sivil-militært samarbeid’, Folk og Forsvar, 2023, <https://folkogforsvar.no/leksikon/sivil-militaert-samarbeid/>.
- ¹⁰⁵ For a broader discussion on the Chinese terminology around military-civil fusion, see Alex Stone, ‘Military-Civil Fusion Terminology: A Reference Guide’ (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, United States: Air University, China Aerospace Studies Institute, February 2021).

-
- ¹⁰⁶ Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion’, *Asia Policy* 16, no. 1 (2021): 5–24, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2021.0001>.
- ¹⁰⁷ US, ‘Other Approaches to Civil-Military Integration: The Chinese and Japanese Arms Industries’ (Washington D.C., United States: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, March 1995), 3, <https://ota.fas.org/reports/9532.pdf>.
- ¹⁰⁸ Bitzinger, ‘China’s Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion?’.
- ¹⁰⁹ Elsa B Kania and Lorand Laskai, ‘Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy’, *Technology & National Security* (Washington D.C., United States: Center for a New American Security, January 2021); Manoj Joshi, ‘China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, the US Response, and Implications for India’, ORF Occasional Paper (New Dheli, India: Observer Research Foundation, January 2022).
- ¹¹⁰ ‘Civil Military Affairs Brigade (Reserve)’, in *Wikipedia*, 18 May 2021, [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Civil_Military_Affairs_Brigade_\(Reserve\)&oldid=1023761970](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Civil_Military_Affairs_Brigade_(Reserve)&oldid=1023761970).
- ¹¹¹ Coning, *The Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations Handbook*.
- ¹¹² Anna Forsström, Jan Frelin, and Maria Lagerström, “Försvarsmakten Och Civil-Militär Samverkan: Förslag På Studieområden För Samverkansfunktionens Vidareutveckling” (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2012), <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--3539--SE>.
- ¹¹³ M Hagui et al., “COVID-19 Tunisian Armed Forces Preparedness and Response Plan: Anticipating the Impact and Lessons Learned,” *International Review of the Armed Forces Medical Services* 94, no. 1 (April 2021): 38–47; H Naija et al., “Civil-Military Medical Cooperation: The COVID-19 Outbreak Response in Tunisia,” *International Review of the Armed Forces Medical Services* 94, no. 1 (April 2021): 24–31.
- ¹¹⁴ Government of Türkiye, “Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Activities,” Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of National Defence, Land Forces Command, April 2, 2022, <https://www.kkk.tsk.tr/EN/news/news-134.aspx>.
- ¹¹⁵ EU, “Türkiye,” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, June 24, 2022, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/turkiye_en; Levent Kemal, “Turkey: Inside the Turkish Military’s Slow Earthquake Response,” *Middle East Eye*, March 13, 2023, sec. Turkey-Syria Earthquake, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-earthquake-inside-military-response>.
- ¹¹⁶ Korrespondent.net, “Порошенко подписал закон о военно-гражданских администрациях в Донбассе,” February 26, 2015, <https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3484374-poroshenko-podpysal-zakon-o-voenno-hrazhdanskykh-admynstratsyiakh-v-donbasse>.
- ¹¹⁷ Government of Venezuela, “Génesis de La Unión Cívico-Militar - MPPRE,” accessed February 4, 2024, <https://mppre.gob.ve/opinion/genesis-de-la-union-civico-militar/>.
- ¹¹⁸ teleSUR, “Importancia de unión cívico-militar en defensa de soberanía venezolana,” *teleSUR*, June 24, 2022, sec. Latinoamérica y el Caribe, <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/importancia-union-civico-militar-defensa-venezuela-20200624-0004.html>.
- ¹¹⁹ UN, ‘WFP Civil-Military Coordination - Operational Guidance’.
- ¹²⁰ See, for example, this job description: UN, ‘WFP - Humanitarian Military Interaction (HMI) Officer - Lead for Policy Development’, UN Talent, 2023, <https://untalent.org/jobs/humanitarian-military-interaction-hmi-officer-lead-for-policy-development>.

¹²¹ Mercy Corps International, “Playbook: Negotiating Humanitarian Access” (Portland, OR, United States: Mercy Corps International, November 2018). <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/NegotiatingForHumanitarianAccessPlaybook.pdf>

¹²² Sophie Arnö, “Civil-Military Relations & Protection of Civilians” (Stockholm, Sweden: Save the Children International, 2017).

¹²³ Save the Children International (SCI), “Civil-Military Coordination: COVID-19 Humanitarian Response,” Guidance note (Save the Children International, n.d.).

¹²⁴ SCI, “Strategic Advisor, Civil Military Engagement,” Save the Children International, April 5, 2023, <https://www.savethechildren.net/careers/apply/details?jid=280>.

¹²⁵ Jean-Pierre Bemba et al., “Statuts Du Mouvement de Libération Du Congo” (Lisala, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, June 30, 1999), http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/cd_mlc_1999_09-28d0edd1d32a444ad3205b5f82476140.pdf.

¹²⁶ Geneva Call (GC), “Their Words: Directory of Armed Non-State Actor Humanitarian Commitments,” 2022, <http://theirwords.org/>.

¹²⁷ US, ‘Civil Affairs Operations’ (Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, October 2011).

¹²⁸ NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation’ (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Standardization Office, 9 November 2018).

¹²⁹ US, ‘Civil Affairs Operations’, 1–2.

¹³⁰ US, 1–2.

¹³¹ UN, ed., *Civil Affairs Handbook* (New York, United States: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2012).

¹³² See, for example, UN, ‘DPKO/DFS Policy Directive: Civil Affairs’ (New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 1 April 2008); UN, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 22.

¹³³ See, for example, GOB, ‘Ação Cívico-Social (ACISO)’, Caderno de Instrução (Brasília, Brazil: Ministry of Defense, Brazilian Army, Land Operations Command, 2009); Ejército Nacional de Colombia, ‘Acción cívico militar - Ejército Nacional de Colombia’, accessed 14 May 2022, <https://www.ejercito.mil.co/accion-civico-militar/>.

¹³⁴ US, ‘Civil Affairs Civil Information Management’ (Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army, Headquarters, September 2013).

¹³⁵ UN, ‘DPKO/DFS Policy: Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)’ (New York, United States: Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, 1 October 2017).

¹³⁶ For a practitioner’s perspective, see Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino, ‘Quick Impact Projects: The Experience of MINUSTAH’s Military Component’, *CCOPAB and Peace Operations: Perspectives, Reflections and Lessons Learned* 1, no. 2015–2016 (2015): 83–111.

¹³⁷ NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation’, 2–3.

¹³⁸ Peter D. Feaver, ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’, *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 150.

¹³⁹ Conversation with Finnish active duty and veteran military officers.

¹⁴⁰ Sanastokeskus TSK, “Kokonaisturvallisuuden Sanasto” (Helsinki, Finland: Sanastokeskus TSK, 2017), https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Kokonaisturvallisuuden_sanasto.pdf.

¹⁴¹ For instance, see Government of India, “Indian Army Celebrates 75th International Day of UN Peacekeepers,” Ministry of Defence, May 29, 2023, <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1928025>.

¹⁴² Government of India, “Order & Circulars,” National Disaster Response Force, February 5, 2024, <https://ndrf.gov.in/order-circulars>.

¹⁴³ Government of Ireland, “Past Missions,” Irish Defence Forces, accessed February 10, 2024, <https://www.military.ie/en/overseas-deployments/past-missions/past-missions.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Government of Ireland, “UNTSI Course Prospectus 2019” (Curragh, Ireland: UN Training School Ireland, 2019), https://www.military.ie/en/who-we-are/army/defence-forces-training-centre/the-military-college/un-training-school-ireland/prospectus-2019_.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ EU, “Ireland,” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, September 10, 2019, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/national-disaster-management-system/ireland_en.

¹⁴⁶ Government of the United Kingdom, “Civil-Military Co-Operation,” Joint Doctrine Publication (Shrivenham, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, April 2006).

¹⁴⁷ See:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/757583/archive_doctrine_nato_cimic_ajp_3_4_9.pdf

¹⁴⁸ See, for example, IFRC and ICRC, “Movement Civil-Military Relations (CMR) during COVID-19 (C-19): Guidelines and Key Messages” (Geneva, Switzerland: International Federation of the Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.), <https://preparecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Guidelines-and-Key-Messages-1.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ See, for example, IFRC and ICRC, “Movement Civil-Military Relations (CMR) during COVID-19 (C-19): Guidelines and Key Messages” (Geneva, Switzerland: International Federation of the Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.), <https://preparecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/EN-Guidelines-and-Key-Messages-1.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ ICRC, “Work with Us: Armed Forces and Non-State Armed Groups Delegate” (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, February 4, 2021), <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4439-work-us-armed-forces-and-non-state-armed-groups-delegate>.

¹⁵¹ ICRC, “Work with Us: Police and Security Forces Delegate” (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, February 4, 2021), <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4440-work-us-police-and-security-forces-delegate>.

¹⁵² GC, “Their Words: Directory of Armed Non-State Actor Humanitarian Commitments,” 2022, <http://theirwords.org/>.