Civil-military what?!
Factsheet repository

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About the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies
Established in 2019 at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies (CHRHS) is committed to tackling the human rights and humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. CHRHS’s mission is to promote a more just, peaceful, and secure world by furthering a deeper understanding of global human rights and humanitarian challenges and encouraging collaboration between local communities, academics, and practitioners to develop innovative solutions.

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Suggested citation
Abstract

This repository accompanies the report “Civil-military what?! Making sense of conflicting civil-military concepts” (Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence, RI, United States: February 2024). As such, the present document should be read in conjunction with the research report. This repository provides details about the 59 organization-specific civil-military concepts identified in the original research project. Of these, given the availability of information, 32 concepts could be made into factsheets summarizing the main features of the organization-specific civil-military concept. Each factsheet follows a similar template, starting with a summary table including the concept’s name and acronym, custodian organization, archetypal category, perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated function. The factsheets, as much as it has been possible to retrieve from open sources, are comprised of eight main sections: (1) background, (2) definition, (3) overview, (4) principles, (5) core function, (6) structure, (7) particularities, and (8) references.

Keywords: civil-military, relations, coordination, cooperation, interaction, humanitarian, CMR, CIMIC, CMCoord, CMI, civil affairs, factsheet, repository
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>Congo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSA</td>
<td>armed non-state actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU-CIMIC</td>
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<td>Australian Defence Forces Civil-Military Interaction</td>
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<td>BEL-Ci-MEG</td>
<td>Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Engagement</td>
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<td>BEL-CIMIC</td>
<td>Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces</td>
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<td>BRA-AsCiv</td>
<td>Brazilian Army Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>BRA-CIMIC</td>
<td>Brazilian Army Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CAN-CIMIC</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>Civil Affairs Planning Team</td>
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<td>Caritas-RwM</td>
<td>Caritas Internationalis Relations with the Military</td>
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<td>CARE-IwAA</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere Interaction with Armed Actors.</td>
</tr>
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<td>CDEMA</td>
<td>Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGerCIMIC</td>
<td>General CIMIC Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHL-ACAT</td>
<td>Chilean Army Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-CMI</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China Civil-Military Integration</td>
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<td>CHN-CMF</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China Military-Civil Fusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHRHS</td>
<td>Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CKI</td>
<td>Civil Knowledge Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction or Civil-Military Integration (within the USA-CA conceptual framework)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>CNDE</td>
<td>Civil Network Development and Engagement</td>
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<td>COL-CIMIC</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>CIMIC Support Unit</td>
</tr>
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<td>DEU-CIMIC</td>
<td>German Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK-CIMIC</td>
<td>Danish Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNK-CPA</td>
<td>Danish Government Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>EU-CIMIC</td>
<td>European Union Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-CMCO</td>
<td>European Union Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA-CIMIC</td>
<td>French Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>UN-CIMIC at sector headquarters level</td>
</tr>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA-CMR</td>
<td>InterAction Civil-Military Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Interagency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDN-Binter</td>
<td>Indonesian Army Territorial Development</td>
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<td>IDN-DF</td>
<td>Indonesian Government Dual Function</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC-CMI</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee Civil-Military Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEN-CIMIC</td>
<td>Kenyan Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBN-CIMIC</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEX-AsCiv</td>
<td>Mexican Army Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDA</td>
<td>military or civilian defense assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCI-EwAG</td>
<td>Mercy Corps International Engagement with Armed Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF-CMR</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front Civil-Military Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC-ACP</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of the Congo Civil and Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO-CIMIC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO-CMI</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Civil-Military Interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMU</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRF</td>
<td>National Disaster Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA-CIMIC</td>
<td>Nigerian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA-CMA</td>
<td>Nigerian Armed Forces Civil-Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGHOF</td>
<td>non-governmental humanitarian organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR-CIMIC</td>
<td>Norwegian Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOR-SIMIS</td>
<td>Norwegian Government Civil-Military Collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>NRC-CMP</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council Civil-Military Policy</td>
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<td>NRCS</td>
<td>National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
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1. Introduction

This document provides a repository of information about the 59 specific civil-military concepts from 44 different entities that were examined from publicly available sources such as official policy documents, manuals, doctrine papers, websites, and secondary source commentary (see Figure 1 below). The concepts found for this study formed the main data used for analysis in the “Civil-military what?! Making sense of conflicting civil-military concepts” research report (henceforth the Research Report), published by the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, in February 2024. As such, the present factsheet repository should be read in conjunction with the research report.

- **Country & Non-State Armed Group Entities**
- **Overview of Entities Surveyed**
- **Multi Lateral Entities**

This repository document is divided into five sections. First, we outline caveats with the project (Section 2). Then, in Section 3, we present the data gathering process followed in this research project. Section 4 provides detailed information of 31 organization-specific civil-military concepts, which had enough available information to warrant a factsheet. Each factsheet follows a similar template, starting with a summary table including the concept’s name and acronym, custodian organization, archetypal category, perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated function. The factsheets, as much as it has been possible to retrieve from open sources, are comprised of eight main sections: (1) background, (2) definition, (3) overview, (4) principles, (5) core function, (6) structure, (7) particularities, and (8) references. Section 5 discusses the rationale of not creating factsheets for the remaining 27 concepts, for which we could not find enough information to produce a factsheet. Finally, the last section (Section 6) discusses the 15 contexts and entities for which we searched for organization-specific civil-military concepts, but could not find any.
2. Caveats

The organization-specific concepts presented in this repository are categorized following the analytical framework put forward in the Research Report. This analytical framework is intended to organize different organization-specific civil-military concepts into main groupings. With the framework, it is possible to identify which concepts are similar or different and why. To do this, we identified four core parameters present in every civil-military concept: its main perspective, scope, level of applicability, and whether it entails a dedicated function. Based on the variation of these parameters, we identified four overarching archetypes: Civil-Military Relations (CMR), Civil-Military Interaction (CMI), Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord). We can define Civil-Military Relations as the relationship between military and civilian organizations, especially civil society, government bureaucracies, and civilian leadership. As such, CMR is a joint civil-military concept with an internal and external scope, mostly focused on the strategic level and usually without a dedicated function. According to our definition, Civil-Military Interaction entails the routine interaction between civilians and military personnel at all levels, whether conducted between specialized personnel or not. Thus, CMI can be understood as a comprehensive joint civil-military concept applicable to internal and external actors at all levels but with no dedicated function. Finally, both Civil-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination usually have an external scope, focus on the tactical and operational levels, and have dedicated functions. However, CIMIC takes a military perspective, and CMCoord sees the civil-military relationship from a civilian, humanitarian perspective. Please refer to Section 3 of the Research Report for a more detailed explanation of the analytical framework.

Because the concepts presented in this study are categorized using the four abovementioned parameters, they may miss important nuances between them. In other words, civil-military concepts may vary in several other parameters not captured by our framework. By design, our analytical framework is deliberately minimalist, including only basic parameters as a basis for ample comparison.

We also recognize that there could be a disconnect between the official definition of an organization-specific civil-military concept and how the concept is operationalized in practice. This may be particularly common in military doctrine, which, while providing guidance on the use of military capabilities, does not always match existing organizational structures. This may be by design, for example, when certain units and capabilities are only mobilized in case of war or due to organizational constraints, such as insufficient budget, implementation delays, and others. For instance, the 2021 Brazilian Army’s doctrine on civil affairs – i.e. CIMIC, according to our framework – states that “the civil affairs structure is usually composed of the following elements: civil affairs section that makes up the general staffs, starting at brigade level; civil affairs units; civil affairs detachments; civil affairs liaison officers; and civil-military cooperation centers.” However, the Brazilian Army has, as of 2023, only civil affairs sections at brigade and division levels.

Finally, we recognize there might be discrepancies between publicly available information and actual organization practices and internal documentation. For example, according to a publicly

available 2013 directive, the World Food Programme employs the concept of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC). However, in practice, the organization no longer uses the concept of WFP-CMC and, instead, has recently developed the concept of Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI). The policies and guidelines defining this concept, however, are closed to public access. Thus, it remains unclear whether and how WFP-CMC differs from WFP-HMI.

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3. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts

We collected data for the different concepts through a mix of purposive and convenience samples. The concepts were purposefully retrieved from specific organizations or national contexts, which we assessed as relevant for studying civil-military relationships. Namely, we looked into leading countries in their regions in terms of gross domestic product, population size, and military power, seeking geographical, linguistic, and cultural variety. We also investigated major regional and international organizations and international non-government organizations (NGOs). In this study, we excluded sub-national organizations or national NGOs from the sample. In addition, we looked for readily available and convenient sources rather than a systematic review. In particular, we looked into specific repositories of military doctrine and other related documents and reached out to different professional networks for advice and insights.

The search was done through two sets of keywords, one signifying the civil-military nature of concepts and the other specific to the organization or context in each case. As much as possible, we searched for concepts in their original languages, such as English, Dutch, French, Norwegian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, and Ukrainian. We paid utmost attention to official documents that define key concepts, and, in the absence of those, we also explored additional sources, such as journal articles, websites, press releases, secondary sources, and, in some cases, informal interviews with representatives of such organizations. Except for the informal interviews, we only used open-source information.

In total, we searched for organization-specific civil-military concepts from 33 national contexts, nine multilateral organizations, 14 international NGOs, and 240 non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and identified 59 concepts. Of these, 35 concepts were from national governments, including their armed forces; 13 concepts were from international non-governmental organizations; nine concepts were from multilateral organizations; and two were from non-state armed groups. For 31 civil-military concepts, we were able to find sufficient information to produce a factsheet summarizing each concept’s background, definition, principles, core function, structure, and other aspects. However, for 28 civil-military concepts, we only found superficial information and, as such, we provide only a short explanation of its definition and use. As much as possible, we have included these concepts into our analytical framework for robustness. Finally, for seven countries, four multilateral organizations, three NGOs and more than 238 NSAGs, we did not come across readily accessible information through open-source searches concerning potential civil-military concepts. This does not mean that a particular organization in this category does not use any civil-military concept. Still, it does mean that such a concept, if it exists, is not readily available. That said, the sample is by no means representative, and we recognize other concepts may be available in the future.

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4 Including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Federation of the Red Cross, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

5 The search for civil-military concepts used by non-state armed groups was conducted via Geneva Call’s “Their Words” project, a directory of unilateral commitments, agreements, codes of conduct and other internal documents by non-state armed groups (see more at http://theirwords.org).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Civil-military concept</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Archetype</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
<td>AU-CIMIC</td>
<td>CIMIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Australian Armed Forces</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction</td>
<td>AUS-CMI</td>
<td>CIMIC</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
<td>BIAF-CMR</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Brazilian Army</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>BRA-AsCiv</td>
<td>CIMIC</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
<td>Civil-Military Interaction</td>
<td>CARE-CMCoord</td>
<td>CMI</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Caritas Internationale</td>
<td>Relations with the Military</td>
<td>Caritas-RwM</td>
<td>CMI</td>
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<td>Chilean Army</td>
<td>Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration</td>
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<td>EU-CMC</td>
<td>CMR</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
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<td>WFP-CMC</td>
<td>CMCoord</td>
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*Table 1. Overview of factsheets of organization-specific civil-military concepts.*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Archetype</th>
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<td>CMI/CIMIC</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
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<td>Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations</td>
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<td>DEU-CIMIC</td>
<td>CIMIC</td>
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<td>Engagement with Armed Groups</td>
<td>MCI-EwAG</td>
<td>CMI/CMCoord</td>
</tr>
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<td>Movement for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
<td>Civil and Political Affairs</td>
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<td>CMR/CIMIC</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WFP-HMI</td>
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Table 2. Overview of organization-specific civil-military concepts without factsheets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Contexts and entities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Geneva Call's Their Words: the directory of armed groups and de facto authorities (238 groups)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3. Overview of contexts and entities in which no organization-specific civil-military concepts were found.*
4. Factsheets

In total, at the end of this research project, we compiled factsheets for 32 organization-specific civil-military concepts from 27 organizations. These are listed below in alphabetical order. Each factsheet follows a similar template, starting with a summary table including the concept’s name and acronym, custodian organization, archetypal category, perspective, scope, level of applicability, and dedicated function. The factsheets, as much as it has been possible to retrieve from open sources, are comprised of eight main sections: (1) background, (2) definition, (3) overview, (4) principles, (5) core function, (6) structure, (7) particularities, and (8) references.
4.1. African Union Civil-Military Coordination (AU-CIMIC)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Union Civil-Military Coordination (AU-CIMIC)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Custodian organization</td>
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<td>Perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of applicability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated function</td>
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</table>

Table 4. Overview of the AU-CIMIC concept.

4.1.1. Background

Especially after the Cold War, military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination grew, as military forces began to see more frequent use in peace operations or “operations other than war”. The concept of “security” had gone well beyond physical protection; conversely, the security implications of humanitarian action and development became more readily apparent and consequential, as articulated by the concept of “human security”. All this time the impetus and demand increased for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches in international interventions – especially between those mostly in the security business and those mostly in the humanitarian and development business. Civil-military coordination was now something other than incidental to the operations of either military or civilian actors.

4.1.2. Definition

A military function that contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support African Union (AU) Mission objectives.

4.1.3. Overview

AU-CIMIC is a dedicated military function present in African Union peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it takes the military perspective and is largely limited to the operational and tactical levels. The primary focus of AU-CIMIC is intra-mission coordination, next is the coordination with other external civilian actors, such as the host nation government and civil society and international non-governmental organizations.
4.1.4. **Principles**

1. Solid understanding of the civilian effort of the broader strategic, political, and social context and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution.

2. Operational and tactical coordination by AU-CIMIC officers with the police and civilian components should be in support of the mission objectives.

3. Contribute to achieving a mandate driven common end state.

4. Coordination in accordance with humanitarian principles.

5. Planning and implementation of AU-CIMIC activities shall seek synergy in order to minimize duplication of efforts and enable the efficient and effective use of resources.

6. Maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to contribute to achieving the mission objective.

4.1.5. **Core functions**

1. Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing

2. Civil Assistance
   
   a. Support to the Mission
   
   b. Support to the Community

4.1.6. **Structure**

AU-CIMIC staff personnel are present throughout the military chain of command, namely at Force Headquarters (U9), Sector Headquarters (G9) and subordinate units (S9). It is rare to find designated AU-CIMIC officers below the battalion level, but a commander may decide that his or her deputy or executive officer will have AU-CIMIC responsibilities. Regardless of the level of command, every commander has an AU-CIMIC responsibility inherent in his mission. Additionally, some missions deploy CIMIC units and liaison officers either under control of the Force or Sector HQ. At the strategic level, the Peace and Security Department is responsible to develop the relevant AU-CIMIC strategic guidance.
4.1.7. Particularities

In the absence of its own CIMIC policies, the African Union has decided to follow and implement UN’s concepts, guidelines, and policies, as it applies to AU missions. It follows that, until an original framework is developed, AU-CIMIC is very similar to UN-CIMIC, with few exceptions.

4.1.8. References


4.2. Australian Defence Forces Civil-Military Interaction (AUS-CMI)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Jonathan Robinson

**Australian Defence Forces Civil-Military Interaction (AUS-CMI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Custodian organization</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Level of applicability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dedicated function</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Overview of the AUS-CMI concept.

4.2.1. Background

A doctrine from the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) Lessons and Doctrine Directorate released in late 2022 provides an insight to the approach how this organization approaches interaction between civilian and military actors in foreign settings. Titled “ADF Integration Doctrine Civil-Military Interaction 3 Series Operation Edition 1”, the doctrine is made up of five chapters and a glossary covering: introduction to civil-military interaction; fundamentals of civil-military interaction; guiding principles and strategy; civil-military interaction during operations; and legal consideration and cross cutting themes. It was derived from general principles and doctrine contained in other relevant publications, defence manuals, and allied publications and agreements (not specified).

4.2.2. Definition

The ADF’s 2022 doctrine defines AUS-CMI as “communication and activities between civilian and military actors in preparation for, and during, operations, to establish relationships that contribute to their respective missions”. It states that AUS-CMI include “activities, founded in Australian Defence Force communication, planning and coordination, conducted with government agencies as well as international and local non-military actors, in preparation for and in the conduct of Australian Defence Force operations, which mutually increase their respective actions in response to crisis.”
4.2.3. Overview

The paper notes that perspective of AUS-CMI is for “commanders, their staff and personnel interacting with non-military actors at the strategic, operational and tactical levels” but is clearly aimed at the operational and tactical levels as well as that the publication aims to inform them “about the importance of building relationships and engaging with civilian actors; assist with strategic, operational and tactical planning with non-military actors; improve command and coordination during operations with nonmilitary actors; and contribute to Defence education and training on working with non-military actors.” As such, AUS-CMI takes a military perspective and is externally focused. The policy notes dedicate capabilities and functions within ADF i.e. civil-military teams (described below) demonstrating a dedicated function for this concept.

4.2.4. Principles

Specific principles of AUS-CMI are mentioned in the doctrine document in Chapter 3. These focus on 14 principles for effective civil-military interaction and are:

1. Readiness to work with civilian actors.
2. A dedicated preparation period between civilian and military actors builds relationships and creates shared knowledge and experience.
3. Apply knowledge and experience.
4. Understand the civil environment including:
5. Facilitate a tailored response.
6. Interaction at all levels.
7. Striving to achieve a common goal with all actors.
8. Build relationships early.
9. Sustain commitment to the civil-military relationship.
11. Understand progress.
12. Develop and apply a transparent and accountable system to monitor and track the completion of tasks and understand the impact or outcome of activities.
13. Implement a transition and exit strategy.
14. Establish the conditions necessary for transition with relevant civilian actors at the start of the operation.

4.2.5. Core functions

The doctrine also considers methods and activities of AUS-CMI that could be described as core functions of the concept. These are categorized under deliberate and unanticipated AUS-CMI and include and aim to build trust, ensure effective information sharing, and enhance situational understanding and decision-making. They include:
1. **Civil-military cooperation.** Civil-military cooperation enables cooperation between military and civil actors in support of a mission. It is an information-related capability that maximizes the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission. It does so through information exchange and engagement practices during cooperation, coordination, mutual support, and joint planning activities.

2. **Support and response team.** The ADF’s immediate response team, the support and response team (SRT), often works together with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) crisis response team, to rapidly deploy overseas to support Australian diplomatic posts and/or partners in the field. Deployable Joint Force Headquarters maintains an SRT capability, consisting of planners, communications personnel, and other areas of expertise, which deploys as an immediate response team on order from Headquarters Joint Operations Command.

3. **Liaison.** Liaison activities include key leader engagement (KLE), and negotiation and information exchange across and between operational levels. Liaison includes military-military interaction and AUS-CMI.

4. **Key leader engagement.** KLE are ADF engagement activities with influential individuals, organizations, or groups. KLE involves the commander, or their delegate, interacting with senior civilian leaders. Prior to conducting KLE, relationships and connections should be mapped out to identify necessary interaction outcomes. This ensures engagement achieves the desired AUS-CMI effects, with capabilities and functions assigned to achieve them. Dependent on the operational context, KLE should be coordinated and aligned with DFAT and Head of Mission/Head of Post messaging and priorities.

5. **Civil-military operations center.** In the absence of host nation or humanitarian coordination mechanisms, the ADF can establish a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to facilitate interaction between the military, civilian elements, and the local population. It is rare that the military would establish a CMOC because a host nation or the United Nations would have coordinating structures. The ADF will only establish a CMOC where other coordinating authorities are unable to effectively coordinate the response. The primary role of a CMOC is to provide a central coordination center to enable the liaison necessary to coordinate effort and keep civilian actors, particularly non-governmental organizations, informed of the tactical situation. A CMOC supports integration of civilian agencies, the local population, and the military by providing a dedicated meeting place to exchange ideas and information.

4.2.6. **Structure**

The policy notes dedicated capabilities and functions within ADF civil-military teams, especially at the operational and tactical levels, such as embedded liaison officers at the joint headquarters level to other Australian government agencies, a deployable joint force under Headquarters 1st Division that supports civil-military teams such as support and response teams and has a J9 Civil-Military Operations Branch, a maritime trade operations team one to support a link to the commercial maritime industry, an air liaison organization to coordinate air assets and ground staff, an army
civil-military cooperation team of the Australian Army in addition to provincial reconstruction teams, female engagement teams and quick impact project teams. The document also notes a Civil-military operations center can be set up by the ADF if needed. However, the relationships between these entities are not fully depicted in the policy and as such have not been depicted in this factsheet.

4.2.7. Particularities

The doctrine focuses on outcomes of AUS-CMI rather than detailing specific tasks or activities as other concepts do. The policy is also somewhat comprehensive at 80 pages.

4.2.8. References

4.3. Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces Civil-Military Relations (BIAF-CMR)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces Civil-Military Relations (BIAF-CMR)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custodian organization</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Archetype</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Perspective</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Level of applicability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dedicated function</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Overview of the BIAF-CMR concept.

4.3.1. Background

A code of conduct from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)’s armed wing Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) from 2006 provides an insight into non-state armed group’s approach to civil-military relations. On page 12 of their English language second edition “General Staff, General Order Number 1: An Order Promulgating a Code of Conduct Regulating the Affairs of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, Prescribing its Powers, Duties, and Functions, and Other Related Purposes” article 26 outlines the group’s approach to civil-military relations. Eleven points from a – k within this article focus on powers, duties, and responsibilities of the group with regard to civil-military relations. While dated, the document does help provide a rare insight to how a non-state armed group approaches civil-military relations.

4.3.2. Definition

While no clear definition of BIAF-CMR is given in the document, it is clear from the short section that BIAF’s view of civil-military relations is related to actions focused on three areas 1) public affairs activity, 2) conducting actions that promote a positive view of the group from surrounding communities (such as “civic action” and “search and rescue operations” during natural disasters), and 3) act as a coordinating body within BIAF.

4.3.3. Overview

The document implies that the perspective of BIAF-CMR is both intra-group, with seven of the 11 points provided for MILF’s armed wing (points a, b, g, h, i, j, and k) as well as to external civilian actors that differentiate between the “Bangsamoro people” and “the general public” (Points c, d, e, and f). Civil society, international and local non-governmental organizations, as well as the
Philippine government and military are not specifically mentioned in the document. The scope of the document is external. The document is focused on operational- and tactical-level actions rather than strategic guidance. The document also outlines that BIAF-CMR is a dedicated military function and has dedicated personnel.

4.3.4. Principles and Core Functions

The document does not outline any key principles but does outline the following 11 points that are the Civil-Military Relations Department’s powers, duties, and responsibilities under three core activities – public affairs activities, civil assistance, and coordination activities - that could be described as functions. These are:

1. Act as the official spokesman of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces.
2. Handle media affairs involving but not limited to print, broadcast, and television.
3. Serve as the BIAF community relations.
4. Initiate short-, medium-, and long-range programs designed to promote harmony between the BIAF and the Bangsmoro people and the general public.
5. Facilitate civic action programs designed to reach out the less fortunate members of the community.
6. Conduct search and rescue operations in times of emergency situations.
7. Introduce measures designed to promote effective and efficient coordination with other MILF offices and agencies.
8. Promulgate rules and guidelines for effective implementation of its approved plans and programs.
9. Advice the chief of staff on matters concerning media and other related issues.
10. Report to the chief of staff from time to time as the need arises.
11. Perform such other functions as may be directed to by the higher authority.

4.3.5. Structure

The document provides a general outline of the structure of the BIAF-CMR department. The CMR department is one of 12 departments within BIAF. The department reports to the Chief-of-Staff of the General Staff and the Vice-Chief-of-Staff – the highest decision-making bodies of MILF’s armed wing. Each department, including the BIAF-CMR department, has a department head and
deputy who are above the commander of the general headquarters, front commanders, and all foreign trained commanders known as Batch 300. For an overview of this structure see the depiction below:

![Diagram of BIAF-CMR structures](image)

*Figure 3. Unofficial organigram highlighting BIAF-CMR structures.*

### 4.3.6. Particularities

BIAF-CMR blends public affairs and western militaries’ CIMIC concepts and psychological operations to shape a population’s perspective in an area of operation to better support or have a more positive view of forces there. It also differentiates between the general population and the Bangsamoro people as two distinct groups to interact with, thus suggesting a hierarchy between these groups.

### 4.3.7. References

Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces. 2006 “General Staff, General Order Number 1: An Order Promulgating a Code of Conduct Regulating the Affairs of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, Prescribing its Powers, Duties, and Functions, and Other Related Purposes.” Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces.

Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation “Moro Islamic Liberation Front Profile Overview”. Stanford University. Accessed February 24, 2024

[https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-islamic-liberation-front#text_block_20203](https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-islamic-liberation-front#text_block_20203)
4.4. Brazilian Army Civil Affairs

Brazilian Army Civil Affairs (BRA-AsCiv)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Dedicated function</td>
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Table 7. Overview of the BRA-AsCiv concept.

4.4.1. Background

The human dimension is fundamental in the operational environment. There is no combat that does not have an interface with the civilian public. Military operations are increasingly taking place among the population. These conditions highlight the importance of considering all factors of the human dimension for the success of the mission. All levels must be able to interact with the civilian public. It is up to the military commander to determine the objectives to be achieved, the degree of interaction and the depth of engagement between civilians and the military. Generally, military interest in the human dimension of the operational environment is embedded in civil affairs. Due to recent deployments, specially within the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Brazilian Army realized the need to develop Civil Affairs capability within its ranks in order to achieve the most efficient way to interact with non-military actors on the battlespace.

4.4.2. Definition

BRA-AsCiv are a set of activities concerning the relationship of the military component with the civil authorities and the population of the area or territory under the responsibility or jurisdiction of the commander of this organization or force. They comprise the government affairs and civil-military cooperation functions.

4.4.3. Overview

BRA-AsCiv is a dedicated military function present in the Brazilian Army structure. Therefore, it takes the military perspective and is largely limited to the operational and tactical levels. The primary focus of BRA-AsCiv is external coordination with non-military actors on the field, such as NGOs, GOs and IOs, and liaison with local authorities, such as city or state administration.
4.4.4. **Principles**

1. Focus on military objectives.
2. Priority on stabilization activities.
3. Acting as a point of contact with the civil component.
4. Acting in accordance with the principles and success factors of the interagency operations.
5. Economy of effort.
6. Trust.
7. Understanding the civil environment.
8. Acting as an information-related capability.
9. Understanding the goals and objectives of the civilian component.
10. Knowledge of civilian component culture.
11. Communication.
13. Acting according to the fundamentals of public information.
14. Alignment with the operational level.

4.4.5. **Core functions**

1. Government Affairs
   a. Coordination with civil authorities (local administration)
   b. Government, economic, public service and special activities
2. Civil-Military Cooperation
   a. Community action
   b. Coordination with non-military actors (NGOs, GOs and IOs)
4.4.6. Structure

Brazilian Army’s doctrine states that all staff levels will have a Civil Affairs branch (E9) dedicated to plan and assess civil affairs tasks on Land Force Component, Army Corps, Division and Brigade levels. Beside of that, it will deploy Civil Affairs units under the Army Corps level. These units will be able to support Divisions and Brigades depending on each scenario.

![Unofficial organigram highlighting BRA-AsCiv structures.](image)

4.4.7. Particularities

BRA-AsCiv doctrine is quite new. Both manuals used as references for this factsheet were published in 2021 and there were no active CIMIC units as of February 2024.
4.4.8. References


4.5. CARE International Interaction with Armed Actors (CARE-IwAA)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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<td>Level of applicability</td>
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<td>Dedicated function</td>
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</table>

Table 8. Overview of the CARE-IwAA concept.

4.5.1. Background

A policy paper from CARE International from 2022 provides an updated insight to the approach how the organization approaches interacting with military actors. Titled “CARE International Policy on Interactions with Armed Actors”, the policy is an update from previous CARE reports on the topic from 2008, 2009, and 2020. The 2022 policy is made up of six sections on purpose, scope, policy statement, policy details, responsibilities, and a list of superseded and associated policies. The paper helps provide a recent insight to how CARE International approaches civil-military relationships.

4.5.2. Definition

While no specific definition of civil-military interaction is given in CARE’s 2022 policy, the paper makes references to humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) guidance documents from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Interagency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, and the CIMIC Center for Excellence’s Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC) Field Handbook.

4.5.3. Overview

The paper implies that perspective of CARE International’s policy primarily takes a civilian perspective on interacting with the military. The policy applies to all CARE International personnel. The concept’s scope is external, i.e. CARE-IwAA is about the relationship between CARE and external military actors. The policy is clearly aimed at the operational and tactical levels focused on how CARE personnel should conduct certain activities with armed actors such as coordination,
information sharing, humanitarian negotiation, and the use of military assets. The policy notes several dedicated functions connected with implementing the policy such as the CARE International Operations Working Group, the CARE International Safety and Security Coordination groups, CARE Safety and Security Staff and relevant country or regional level CARE staff.

4.5.4. Principles

Specific CARE-IwAA principles and functions are mentioned in CARE’s policy, which outline the organization’s position and practices it will follow when interacting (or not) with armed actors. Its over-riding principle when CARE and its partner interactions with armed actors focuses on the fact that it should be based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, as well as comply with applicable laws, including international and national laws, in addition to donor regulations.

4.5.5. Core functions

The policy considers a range of functions such as:

1. **Assessment of the actor and any potential interaction prior to it occurring**, such as identifying the armed actor in question, assessing the armed actors’ respect for civilian safety, what is the context of any interaction, the anticipated risks or benefits of interacting with the armed actor, short and long-term effects of interactions on perceptions, legal and other binding rules, ability to remain distinct from the armed actor, CARE personnel characteristics, and willingness to compromise.

2. **Coordination** with other bodies, such as the UN, to assist with interacting with armed actors,

3. **Information sharing**, including what may or may not be shared with an armed actor and other coordinating actors,

4. **Joint Operations** and the use of an armed actor’s assets

5. **Funding concerns**, especially monetary and in-kind donations from armed actors.

4.5.6. Structure

The policy does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with civil-military interaction in CARE International. However, the policy lists CARE International Operations Working Group and CARE International Safety and Security Coordination group as the custodian of the policy. Further, CARE staff are encouraged to consult with CARE safety and security staff at the relevant country or regional level over certain aspects of interaction with armed actors (e.g. information sharing) and that ultimately CARE Implementing Presence Leadership have responsibility for
deciding an interaction. Both these factors suggest that CARE-IwAA is folded into typical day to day duties and functions rather than to a dedicated staff member.

4.5.7. Particularities

CARE’s policy includes a section (Annex 2) that provides discussion as to why CARE has designed its approach the way it has using a series of frequently asked questions. This helps add clarity and detail to decision making around the development of CARE’s policy. Another particularity is that CARE utilizes NATO-CIMIC field handbook as a foundational document from which to draw inspiration differing from other humanitarian groups who typically only use UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) concepts. CARE’s concept also covers a wider range of armed actors including private security contractors, private military contractors, and law enforcement.

4.5.8. References


4.6. Caritas Internationalis Relations with the Military (Caritas-RwM)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 9. Overview of the Caritas-RwM concept.

4.6.1. Background

A 2006 policy paper from Caritas Internationalis provides an insight into the approach of how the organization approaches interacting or working with military actors. Titled “Relations with the Military (RwM) Framework”, the concept is described in six sections: Introduction, Caritas Identity, Core Principles, Operational Principles, Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, and a Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) position paper on humanitarian-military relations in the provision of humanitarian assistance. The paper helps provides an, albeit dated, insight to how Caritas Internationalis approaches civil-military relationships.

4.6.2. Definition

While no specific definition of Caritas-RwM is given, the aim of the concept is to “agree on the ground rules for relating to military forces, which ensure that those affected by conflicts continue to receive vital assistance in a way that does not undermine the independent and apolitical nature of humanitarian action...” The document also refers to two specific policy documents to augment Caritas’s framework: the SCHR position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) reference paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies.

4.6.3. Overview

The paper implies that the perspective of the Caritas-RwM is from a civilian perspective about relations with the military, specifically for all Caritas Internationalis member organizations. The paper’s scope is clearly towards external military actors. The policy articulates a strategic-level
justification and influence for the framework, before detailing operational- and tactical-level guidance for the implementation of this framework. The policy does not note any dedicated roles or functions associated with the framework.

4.6.4. Principles & core functions

The document has two sections covering the strategic and operating principles guiding Caritas Internationalis relationship with the military.

In section 3 of the document, Core Principles, three key principles are highlighted before being further expanded. These are:

1. Humanitarians must maintain the lead role for humanitarian action in any situation.
2. Local decision making is often more accurate and realistic that decisions made from the scene.
3. A set of relationships formed over time enable trust and engagement with each other.

Following these principles, several key supporting principles or documents as mentioned that it is stated Caritas also follows, such as following international law, adhering to using the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (also known as the Sphere Standards), the code of conduct of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the “do no harm” approach.

In Section 4 of the document these strategic level principles are translated to the operational level. This focuses on particular how Caritas would interact with military actors in conflict settings and emphasizes the need to maintain relationships and communication with these actors. In particular, seven principles are outlined that are:

1. Keep a distance from the military when it is engaged in humanitarian assistance.
2. Not act under military control.
3. Be sensitive and respectful towards the position of the local church.
4. Minimize contact with the military and individuals involved in human rights violations.
5. Carry out a preliminary assessment to understand roles in a situation.
6. Plan and assess the site where work is to be carried out.
7. Assess the impact of relations with the military.

The operational section also has principles if a context already sees if a military is involved in relief actions and outlines three principles:

1. The military forces should comply with customary international law and in accordance with the Sphere standards and ICRC code of conduct.
2. The military forces should comply with international humanitarian law.
3. Military personnel involved in relief should not bear arms.

While no specific functions are mentioned in the document, it does outline differences between low-risk contexts and high-risk contexts as well as the use of armed escorts and protection.
4.6.5. Structure

Caritas-RwM does not mention any specific roles or dedicated personnel in it. Rather it refers generally to the member organizations of the Caritas Internationalis movement.

4.6.6. Particularities

The concept of Caritas-RwM is notably adapted to fit a broader church organization as well as contains information about the missions and values of Caritas as an organization – rather than just its relations with military actors. This arguably could suggest the document is attempting to market its values to external actors, although it is not specifically mentioned.

4.6.7. References

4.7. Chilean Army Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration (CHL-ACAT)

Custodian organization  Chilean Army

Archetype  Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Perspective  military → civilian

Scope  external

Level of applicability  tactical & operational

Dedicated function  yes

Table 10. Overview of the CHL-ACAT concept.

4.7.1. Background

The Chilean Army is an institution formed by and for the State of Chile and must evolve in parallel with the rest of the institutions of the Armed Forces. It assumes a main role in compliance with current regulations in times of catastrophes, crises and/or armed conflicts, given that its action involves closer contact with those people most affected by those situations. These contexts force the Chilean Army to ensure compliance, respect, especially for human life, be it troops or the civilian population. In order to be capable of interact with civilian actors on the ground, the Chilean Army has developed its own Civil Affairs and Territorial Administration doctrine, that provides them with the tools to act within and without their territory, during peace or war times.

4.7.2. Definition

Civil affairs and territorial administration (CHL-ACAT) are the set of activities carried out by a commander and that refers to the relations between the military forces and the civil authorities and the population, within an area of the Chilean territory itself or within an occupied or liberated zone outside international political boundary. It constitutes the primary function of command, which is exercised by the commander within their assigned territory by a higher authority.

4.7.3. Overview

CHL-ACAT is a dedicated military function of the Chilean Army. Its units are activated during a certain situation, such as internal and external conflicts or natural disasters, for a specific period, focusing on external civilian actors. It can be deployed in all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical), covering national, regional, provincial and community tasks as necessary.
4.7.4. *Principles*

1. Humanity.

2. Attention to the needs of the population.

3. Reciprocal responsibilities.

4. Command responsibility.

5. Support for the commander’s mission.


7. Economy of personnel.

8. Centralization.

4.7.5. *Core functions*

1. General Administration

2. Economic Affairs

3. Special Affairs

4. Army Garrison
4.7.6. **Structure**

CHL-ACAT activities should be carried out all over the Chilean army. It starts at the army headquarters (HQ) level reaching the troops deployed on the battlefield. To achieve that, Commanders in all different levels will assign troops to support local authorities and liaise and support civilian actors. Combined Arms Units (Division and Brigades) will receive an ACAT Unit to perform those tasks. Division and Brigade’s HQ will also have a specific staff branch (E5) to plan and assess regarding CHL-ACAT actions.

4.7.7. **References**

4.8. European Union Civil-Military Cooperation (EU-CIMIC)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

**European Union Civil-Military Cooperation (EU-CIMIC)**

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Table 11. Overview of the EU-CIMIC concept.

4.8.1. Background

The development of the European Union Security and Defence Policy, through the addition of the military dimension, a police component, and other civilian aspects, has enhanced the European Union’s (EU) crisis response options. An effective response to a crisis may require the employment of this range of civilian and military instruments in a comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated manner. The increasing potential for EU-led operations in already complex environments and the need to cooperate with the external civil actors operating within the same area underpin the requirement for a CIMIC capability. Cooperation with civilians may be a central part of a military operation, as in the case of humanitarian or rescue tasks, but will vary for different types of operations. The context of EU-CIMIC will also change as the operations develop, ranging from maintaining the commander's freedom of action within the operations area to assisting in shaping the operations area to the mutual benefit of both military and external civil actors. This enables the commander to play more effectively his part in any complex multi-functional operation. Military forces may be partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources, information and even security. Failure to establish and maintain sound cooperation and coordination may have a detrimental impact on any EU-led military operation.

4.8.2. Definition

EU-CIMIC is defined as the coordination and cooperation at all levels – between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors external to the EU, including the local population and authorities, as well as international, national, and nongovernmental organizations and agencies – in support of the achievement of the military mission along with all other military functions.
4.8.3. **Overview**

EU-CIMIC is a military function relevant for ground, maritime and air forces. It is at the same time a joint staff function present in the tactical and operational levels, and a specialists’ role on the field. EU-CIMIC focuses on non-EU civilian actors, such as the host nation government, the local population, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

4.8.4. **Principles**

1. Mission primacy
2. Command direction
3. Economy and balance
4. Concentration
5. Legal obligation and humanitarian considerations
6. Coordinated civil and military CIMIC planning
7. Mutual support
8. Common goals
9. Shared responsibility
10. Transparency
11. Consent
12. Communication
13. Cultural awareness

4.8.5. **Core functions**

1. Civil-Military Liaison
2. Support to the Military Force
3. Support to the Civil Environment
4.8.6. **Structure**

The ultimate responsibility to provide guidelines on EU-CIMIC rests with the European Union Military Staff’s Concepts and Capabilities Directorate. However, the highest-level dedicated CIMIC staff is present only at the Operational Headquarters of EU missions. CIMIC staff is further distributed along the chain of command, as appropriate. EU-CIMIC staff personnel is usually present in the Force Headquarters, Component Commands, and in subordinate units. EU-CIMIC focal points may be assigned in units below battalion level. Furthermore, in operations, one or more CIMIC Groups and CIMIC Centers may be deployed on an ad hoc basis.

![Figure 6. Unofficial organigram highlighting EU-CIMIC structures.](image)

4.8.7. **Particularities**

Within the EU, EU-CIMIC must not be confused with Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO). EU-CIMIC covers the cooperation and coordination, as appropriate, between the EU military force and independent external civil organizations and actors. In contrast, EU-CMCO covers internal EU coordination of the EU’s own civil and military crisis management instruments, executed under the responsibility of the Council. Certainly, in EU-led military operations, EU-
CIMIC will also take into account and possibly play a role in the overall EU coordination of crisis management instruments and EU military forces may be authorized to assist EU civil bodies in the execution of tasks in support of independent organizations or populations.

4.8.8. References

4.9. European Union Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

European Union Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO)

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Table 12. Overview of the EU-CMCO concept.

4.9.1. Background

The EU possesses a unique array of civilian and military instruments for use in response to a crisis. This comprehensive approach to crisis management leads to the need for ensuring within the EU an effective coordination of the whole range of such instruments. This approach will have to take into account the fact that these instruments may be subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes. EU Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis.

4.9.2. Definition

The European Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO) is a culture of coordination in ensuring overall coherence in EU’s response to a crisis. Its aim must be encouraged and ensure the coordination in the actions of relevant EU actors in all phases of the operation. It is based on continued cooperation and shared political objectives and relies to a very large extent of detailed preparations at working level involving relevant Council General Secretariat/Commission services.

4.9.3. Overview

EU-CMCO is a cross-cutting concept applicable to all relevant EU actors, both military and civilian. As such, it takes both a military and a civilian perspective. Although the concept is not restricted to a specific level, it is mostly relevant for within-EU strategic coordination in crisis management. There is no dedicated structure focused on EU-CMCO.
4.9.4. Principles

1. General enhancement of inter-institutional processes.
2. Coordination during the routine phase (early warning, assessment, and control).
3. Consolidation of planning capacities (Comprehensive Planning), i.e. of the civil-military cell.
4. Enhanced coordination in the field – operation management.
5. Institutionalization and improvement of evaluation standards (Lessons Learned).
6. Resource and capability management.
7. EU-CMCO-specific training.
8. Incorporation of EU-CMCO in exercise policy.

4.9.5. Core functions

EU-CMCO is not a dedicated function. Rather, it entails a culture of dialogue and coordination between EU actors.

4.9.6. Structure

EU-CMCO guidelines and policies are ultimately endorsed by the Council of the European Union, but there is no EU-CMCO structure per se. Nonetheless, in the strategic level, some EU actors are particularly relevant in ensuring that EU-CMCO principles are mainstreamed. Crisis Response Coordinating Team is the highest level of multidisciplinary coordination in crisis management. Likewise, under the European External Action Service, the Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Management and Political Affairs directorates are similarly civil-military bodies. In particular, bridging the Civilian and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability divisions, the Joint Support Coordination Cell epitomizes EU-CMCO concept. Furthermore, the European Security and Defense College, together with the European Defense Agency, contribute to EU-CMCO policy analysis as well as training and education.
4.9.7. Particularities

Within the EU, EU-CIMIC must not be confused with Civil-Military Coordination (EU-CMCO). EU-CIMIC covers the cooperation and coordination, as appropriate, between the EU military force and independent external civil organizations and actors. In contrast, EU-CMCO covers internal EU coordination of the EU’s own civil and military crisis management instruments, executed under the responsibility of the Council. While EU-CMCO is primarily concerned with how the EU ensures internal coordination in crisis management, there is also a need to ensure cooperation and to establish coordination modalities as appropriate with other actors external to the EU involved in the theatre. Effective EU-CMCO within the EU is a prerequisite to reach this goal.

4.9.8. References


4.10. French Armed Forces Civil-Military Cooperation (FRA-CIMIC)

Last updated on 3 December 2023, by João Valdetaro.

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*Table 13. Overview of the FRA-CIMIC concept.*

4.10.1. Background

The civilian environment of operations is made up of populations and various civilian actors present in the theater (local authorities, governmental or non-governmental organizations, international organizations). It constitutes an objective reality, both demographic and physical and social, with also a subjective side: the opinion that emanates from it. With asymmetric threats, populations can on the one hand be the stake of the conflicts and on the other hand be part of the field of confrontation. They therefore hold a determining place in the conduct of operations, particularly when their degree of support for the actions of the force, or benevolent neutrality, conditions the success or failure of these operations. The civilian environment can strongly influence the progress of military operations, as they can impact, positively or negatively, this environment. The interactions are potentially numerous and cannot be ignored by military actors. Consistent with NATO doctrine, the French Army doctrine highlight and specify a pragmatic approach of civil-military cooperation, following the changes in operations which the French Armed Forces have been engaged for the last decade. It notably takes into account the concept of Global Approach (GA) in crisis resolution, which places populations at the heart of strategies.

4.10.2. Definition

FRA-CIMIC designates the function intended to promote the integration of the force in its human environment in general and with the local populations in particular, to facilitate the accomplishment of its mission, the restoration of a situation normal security and the management of the crisis by the civil authorities (administration, humanitarian action, economic recovery, etc.). The FRA-CIMIC function plans and implements civil-military cooperation actions. Civil-military cooperation actions aim to establish, maintain, or exploit relations between forces and civilian actors, whether they are part of the population, local authorities, international organizations, or
private actors (NGOs, companies, etc.), to facilitate military operations and consolidate or achieve operational objectives.

4.10.3. Overview

FRA-CIMIC is a dedicated military function present in the French Defense Force structure. Therefore, it takes the military perspective of civil-military relationship and operates on all levels (Strategic, Operational and Tactical). Its focus is on external coordination with external civilian actors. FRA-CIMIC prioritizes its action in the short and medium term, although it is complementary to longer-term programs and sometimes even constitutes the beginning of them. FRA-CIMIC is thus clearly distinguished from development actions.

4.10.4. Principles

The principles guiding the action of civil-military cooperation are of two types:

1. The principles guiding military action and its internal processes.
2. The principles governing relations between the military and civilians.

Principles for military action include:

1. Command responsibility.
2. Economy of means.
3. Operational plasticity.

Principles for relations with civilians are:

1. Understanding of the cultural context.
2. Non-competition.
3. Deconfliction.
4.10.5. Core functions

1. Strengthen military action.

2. Contribute to the coherence of actions in a theater.

3. Accelerate the exit from the crisis.

4. Contribute to the promotion of French influence.

4.10.6. Structure

FRA-CIMIC is available at all levels of responsibility for operational commitments: the political level and the three military levels (strategic, operational, and tactical). Civil-military cooperation also requires specialized personnel with the expertise essential to the preparation, planning and conduct of FRA-CIMIC. These personnel staff FRA-CIMIC cells of the headquarters (J9, G9) and the specialized teams (FRA-CIMIC tactical teams).

**Strategic level.** Within the Center for Preparation and Conduct of Operations, the J9 is responsible for designing and leading national civil-military cooperation at the strategic level according to the objectives set by the political level. As such, it constitutes the head of the chain of civil-military cooperation in operation and is possibly reinforced by FRA-CIMIC experts.

**Operational level.** In its capacity as Force Commander, COMANFOR leads and coordinates civil-military cooperation in the same way as other functions and activities at the theater level. He ensures the perfect integration of the CIMIC into the overall maneuver. COMANFOR has CIMIC expertise held by the J9 of the Force General Staff. The J9 may have a CIMIC Center. This center aims to promote exchanges of information between the Force command and the population, as well as with the various operators and civilian actors. It materializes the desired interface with the civil environment.

**Tactical level.** The CIMIC deployment is configured according to the type of operation carried out and the needs of the theater. The cells and teams are clearly identified and positioned within the component headquarters (G9, command units). The Tactical CIMIC Team constitutes the basic unit and the first link in the chain of civil-military cooperation. As part of actions on perceptions and the operational environment, CIMIC teams are grouped as a priority within Operational Environment Sections with Tactical Military Operations Influence Teams. This organization allows for a synergy of resources dedicated to influence, with a view to facilitating the insertion of the force into its environment.

4.10.7. References

4.11. Indonesian Army Territorial Development (IDN-Binter)

Last updated on 17 February 2024, by João Valdetaro.

**Indonesian Army Territorial Development (IDN-Binter)**

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Table 14. Overview of the IDN-Binter concept.

4.11.1. Background

The evolution and implementation of the Territorial Development (Binter) doctrine by the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI AD) symbolizes a pivotal shift towards fostering integration and cooperation between military forces and civilian populations. This approach, designed to enhance territorial defense and national resilience, has been significantly shaped by Indonesia’s political and social transformations in the post-reform era. Emphasizing the necessity of adapting to these changes, the Binter doctrine has evolved from a focus on maintaining order and security under the New Order regime, where the military exerted considerable influence over national affairs, to a modern framework that prioritizes democratic principles, civil-military collaboration, community development, and the respectful management of security threats in accordance with national and international legal standards. This adaptation reflects a broader effort to ensure that the doctrine remains relevant and effective in meeting the contemporary security challenges faced by Indonesia, while also promoting societal harmony and the well-being of its citizens.

4.11.2. Definition

The Binter doctrine is as a cornerstone for the empowerment of territorial defense capabilities on land and fosters the unity between the Indonesian Army and the civilian population in support of the primary tasks of the TNI AD within the national defense system. This doctrine emphasizes both internal and external roles: internally, it focuses on building and motivating soldiers to exhibit exemplary territorial behavior through a system of rewards and punishments; externally, it aims to inspire and motivate the civilian population through the exemplary actions of TNI AD soldiers, thereby contributing to the creation of a prosperous civil society.
4.11.3. Overview

The Binter doctrine is a dedicated military function, central to the Indonesian Army’s strategy, and designed to strengthen territorial defense and foster unity between the military and civilians, supporting the overarching goals of national defense. It covers strategic, operational and tactical levels and it encapsulates a dual-focus approach (internal and external): internally, it aims to cultivate a strong, positive territorial attitude among soldiers, reinforced by a reward and punishment system; externally, it seeks to influence and engage the civilian population through the exemplary conduct of TNI AD soldiers, promoting a prosperous and civil society. The overarching aim is to serve national defense interests while also addressing the needs and challenges faced by the community, thereby ensuring a harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship between the Indonesian Army and the society it serves.

4.11.4. Principles

The principles of IDN-Binter include flexibility, unity of command, simplicity, equality, integration, territoriality, planned execution, continuity, and clear, understandable objectives aimed at national defense interests and assisting in addressing community difficulties.

4.11.5. Core functions

The functions of Binter in the Indonesian Army are directed towards assisting the government in managing national potential through the development of territorial capabilities, social communication, and military service, including:

1. Preparing national potential as a defense force for land aspects, including territorial defense and its supporting forces for military operations, based on national defense interests.
2. Conducting mandatory basic military training for citizens in accordance with legislation.
3. Empowering the population as a supporting force.
4. Supporting government tasks in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, infrastructure rehabilitation, and addressing issues arising from strikes and communal conflicts.
5. Building, maintaining, improving, and solidifying the unity between the Indonesian Army and the people.

4.11.6. Structure

The Indonesian Army dedicates specific roles and responsibilities across different levels of its organization for the implementation of the IDN-Binter doctrine. These roles are designed to
ensure the effective coordination and execution of territorial operations, emphasizing the importance of collaboration between military units and civilian components. Here’s an overview of the dedicated functions across various levels:

1. **General Command (Panglima TNI).** The ultimate responsibility for the IDN-Binter program rests with the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, who sets the primary policies for IDN-Binter activities in line with national defense tasks. These policies are then delegated to the Chiefs of Staff of each military branch.

2. **Army Headquarters (Mabes TNI AD).** The Army Chief of Staff (Kasad) is tasked with translating the Commander’s policies into actionable strategies for land territory empowerment, supervising IDN-Binter activities, and evaluating their implementation across the Army’s operational units.

3. **Operational Command Level (Kotama).** Commands at this level, such as the Regional Military Commands (Kodam), are responsible for developing capabilities and conducting IDN-Binter operations within their jurisdiction. They coordinate with relevant agencies and other national components to ensure the integrated and smooth execution of IDN-Binter tasks.

4. **Territorial Units (Korem, Kodim, Koramil).** These units carry out IDN-Binter activities directly in the field. Their responsibilities include developing territorial capabilities, organizing routine Binter operations, coordinating with local agencies and communities, and reporting on their activities up the chain of command.

5. **Non-Territorial Units (Satnonkowil).** These units perform limited IDN-Binter activities around their bases, particularly in areas prone to disasters, piracy, smuggling, and other security threats. They work in coordination with territorial units to strengthen the overall defense posture and community resilience.

This structured approach ensures that the Indonesian Army can effectively mobilize and utilize its resources for national defense, emphasizing the critical role of territorial operations in maintaining security and fostering military-civilian cooperation.

4.11.7. References

4.12. **InterAction Civil-Military Relations (IA-CMR)**

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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<td>tactical &amp; operational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dedicated function</td>
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Table 15. Overview of the IA-CMR concept.

4.12.1. **Background**

A guidance paper from Interaction from 2005 provides a dated insight to the approach this organization – a U.S.-based alliance of international NGOs and partners – with civil-military relations. Titled “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations (NGHOs) in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments” the English language report describes an outcome of a meeting convened by the United Stated Institute for Peace. It contains seven sections that outline; recommended guidelines for U.S. Armed Forces with regard to force protection, mission accomplishment; recommended guidelines on the forms of coordination between the U.S. military and NGHOs; procedures for NGHO / military dialogue; procedures for NGHO / military to access assessments for humanitarian needs; procedures for NGHO liaison relationships with combatant commands; and possible organizations that could serve as a bridge between NGHO’s and the U.S. Armed Forces.

4.12.2. **Definition**

The paper does not provide any specific definition of IA-CMR but does note the guidelines should “facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs.”

4.12.3. **Overview**

The paper provides advice from InterAction, a civilian entity, to both civilian humanitarian groups and the U.S. Armed forces and how these interact. As such, the paper’s scope is for an external audience and its perspective is joint. The paper is largely concerned providing operational level
advice and tactical level procedures, rather than overarching strategic guidance. Finally, the paper does not note any specific dedicated functions or personnel in support of IA-CMR.

4.12.4. Principles

No specific principles are mentioned in the paper, but it does note that the guidelines “should facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations [...] that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments”, and that the ultimate aim of the guidance is “providing essential relief to a population in need”.

4.12.5. Core functions

A multitude of core functions (guidelines and procedures) are mentioned under seven sections within the paper that focus on; force protection, mission accomplishment; forms and procedures of coordination between the U.S. military and NGHOs; and access assessments for humanitarian needs.

4.12.6. Structure

The paper does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with IA-CMR.

4.12.7. Particularities

IA-CMR is a rare concept that stems from a civilian organization but that is also applicable to militaries. The concept is notable as it only focuses on NGHO relations with the U.S. Armed Forces and not with other official militaries. It also does not note relations with non-state armed groups, police, or private security companies.

4.12.8. References


4.13. International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (RCRC Movement-CMR)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

| International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (RCRC Movement-CMR) |
| Custodian organization | International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Council of Delegates |
| Archetype | Civil-Military Relations (CMR) |
| Perspective | civilian → military |
| Scope | external |
| Level of applicability | strategic |
| Dedicated function | no |

Table 16. Overview of the RCRC Movement-CMR concept.

4.13.1. Background

In 2005, the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (henceforth “the Movement”) acknowledged that all components of the Movement frequently found themselves intertwined with military entities during times of armed conflicts, internal unrest, natural calamities, and technological disasters. Even in non-emergency peacetime scenarios, such interactions persisted. In light of this reality, the Council deliberated on the necessity for unified guidance that would offer comprehensive directives to all Movement components – i.e. the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and all the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (NRCS) – regarding their engagement with military bodies, both at national and international levels.

National Societies maintain ongoing communication with military bodies within their respective countries, fostering the exchange of perspectives and information regarding potential areas of collaboration. This includes discussions on operational approaches, the extent of involvement, and the clarification of roles and responsibilities. The overarching goal is to cultivate a shared understanding of mandates while fostering trust and respect. In cases where other Movement components engage with military bodies operating within the National Societies’ territories, they are obligated to keep them duly informed about planned or ongoing activities. To facilitate cooperation, formal agreements or alternative arrangements may be established between the components of the Movement and military bodies. These agreements can encompass various aspects, such as information dissemination, disaster preparedness and response, healthcare, social welfare services, first-aid training, and the facilitation of tracing services.
4.13.2. Definition

The main guiding document (Resolution 7/2005 of the Council of Delegates) does not refer to Civil-Military Relations, but rather the “relationship between the components of the Movement and military bodies, both in the national and international contexts. This relationship can arise in all kinds of situations: non-emergency peacetime, armed conflict, internal strife or other violence, and natural and/or technological disasters. Although a number of examples of interaction between the Movement and the military are explored below, these are not exhaustive.” Ensuing documents refer to “Movement CMR” (e.g. the 2019 progress report on Resolution 7/2005).

4.13.3. Overview

By definition, the Movement CMR concept focuses on the civilian, humanitarian perspective of the RCRC Movement towards external military actors, whether state or non-state. The concept is mostly concerned with strategic-level relationships with the military and, to a lesser degree, with operational and tactical levels. While the Movement CMR concept is mostly used for strategic guidance, there are some dedicated advisors placed in key strategic postings.

4.13.4. Principles

1. Preserve the independence of decision-making and action, in order to ensure adequate access to all people in need of humanitarian assistance.

2. Ensure that relationships with military bodies seek to enhance effective assistance to and protection of the victims of armed conflict and vulnerable people.

3. Consider potential consequences for other components and the positioning of the whole Movement.

4. Ensure that the components of the Movement act and are perceived as acting in accordance with the Fundamental Principles, in particular, independence, neutrality and impartiality.

5. Each component favors a clear distinction between the respective roles of military bodies and humanitarian actors, paying particular attention to perceptions locally and within the wider public.

6. Ensure that their activities do not amount to a contribution to the military effort and are not perceived as such.

7. The more military bodies are perceived as a party to an armed conflict, the more the components of the Movement weigh the intensified need for interaction with those bodies against the consequences of such relations on their observance of the Fundamental Principles.
8. The Movement’s components always take care that their relationship with military bodies does not negatively affect the safety and security of beneficiaries and humanitarian personnel.

4.13.5. **Core functions**

1. Disseminating knowledge of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including provisions on the emblems, the Fundamental Principles, and the mandates and activities of the components of the Movement.

2. Helping military bodies to implement IHL.

3. ICRC work in accordance with its specific mandate and role working with military bodies in disaster-preparedness and response, in accordance with the policies and framework set out at the national level.

4. Health and social welfare services, as well as first-aid training.

5. Tracing services, restoring family links, and ascertaining the fate of missing persons.

4.13.6. **Structure**

The Movement per se does not have a standing CMR structure, and each of its components are different. The IFRC has Civil-Military Relations Coordinators deployed at the strategic level at the headquarters in Geneva and at regional delegations (currently only in Panama and Kuala Lumpur). ICRC does not have specific CMR delegates, but different delegates frequently interact with the military in conflict settings, mainly its Armed and Security Forces Delegates and Protection Delegates, as well as Management functions, such as Heads of Delegation, Sub-Delegation, and Offices. They play a central role in fostering dialogue with militaries, security forces, and law enforcement agencies worldwide. Usually, larger, and better-structured National Societies may have specific CMR functions, such as liaison staff with the national military. Other National Societies may engage with military actors in an ad hoc manner, through joint training and coordination bodies in case of emergencies. Several smaller National Societies, however, are still concerned about engaging with military actors.

4.13.7. **Particularities**

In accordance with Article 26 of the First Geneva Convention, a National Society is empowered to provide support to the medical services of its national armed forces in times of armed conflict. When doing so, personnel from the National Society operate under the authority of the armed forces, while unwaveringly upholding the Fundamental Principles. In this auxiliary role, the primary responsibility of National Societies is to undertake medical activities on behalf of injured and ill military personnel.
4.13.8. References


Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Rescue Committee Civil-Military Interaction (IRC-CMI)</th>
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<td><strong>Dedicated function</strong></td>
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Table 17. Overview of the IRC-CMI concept.

4.14.1. Background

A guideline paper from the International Rescue Committee from 2003 provides a dated insight to the approach of this organization when interacting with armed actors. Titled “Guidelines for Interacting with Military and Belligerent Parties” the English language report was developed in reaction to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994) and the IRC Entry and Exit Criteria report (15 May 2001). In addition, with the paper it notes “By the very nature of the work of the International Rescue Committee, situations will arise where there will be an active presence of military forces and constituent parties to a conflict in the very same operational setting. It is incumbent on the IRC that guidelines governing the relationship with these parties are fully described and the operational limitations of this interaction are clearly stated.”

4.14.2. Definition

While no definition of the concept is specifically highlighted in the paper.

4.14.3. Overview

The paper implies the perspective of the International Rescue Committee is from the organization to its civilian staff about interactions with the military. The scope is stated as external as it aims to inform “IRC’s headquarters staff and field personnel” about interactions with the military. The paper outlines strategic-level principles, such as the four humanitarian principles and Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs in Disaster Relief, as well as provides operational- and tactical-level guidance. Finally, the paper does not note any specific
dedicated functions or personnel in support of IRC-CMI, but the paper is written by the director of humanitarian affairs as notes that IRC’s Senior Management team, IRC Board of Directors, and IRC field staff will be involved with decisions regarding the interaction with military forces. This implies functions are folded into day-to-day functions of the organization and its personnel.

4.14.4. Principles

The paper outlines IRC’s principles that govern its civil-military interaction are in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, and empowerment and focus on Operational independence and exceptional circumstances:

Operational Independence. In determining permissible and impermissible interaction with active military forces and/or representatives of a belligerent party to a conflict, IRC will be guided by the principle of Operational Independence. Although coordination may be appropriate with armed forces and belligerent parties in a conflict zone, a clear separation and deliberate distinction between IRC’s civilian humanitarian ethos and the military’s strategic interests implore us to proceed cautiously. Coordination, not subordination, should be our maxim.

Exceptional Circumstances. It might be appropriate for civilian humanitarian personnel to provide technical advice, information, and expert consultation to the armed forces to insure a cogent and evidence-based humanitarian intervention during exceptional circumstances. Although these circumstances do arise, it must be emphasized that military provision of humanitarian assistance should be time-bound and not open-ended. This activity should be transferred to the responsibility of civilian humanitarian agencies at the earliest possible time. The control and coordination of these activities should also be done under a civilian authority structure.

4.14.5. Core functions

Several core functions are described in IRC’s guidance document under the operational independence section of the report such as

1. IRC is able to directly control, implement, and monitor its project interventions, disposition of its commodities, and end-recipients of its services.

2. Direct evaluation and independent assessment of intended recipients can occur.

3. Coordination, information-sharing, and liaison between IRC and military actors and/or belligerent parties to the conflict will only occur within the context of a coordination center that is generally accepted and recognized by the humanitarian community at large.

The paper does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with civil-military relations in the International Rescue Committee.

4.14.7. References


Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

<table>
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<th>North Atlantic Treaty Organization Civil-Military Cooperation (NATO-CIMIC)</th>
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Table 18. Overview of the NATO-CIMIC concept.

4.15.1. Background

Since the beginning of the century, NATO’s practical cooperation with non-NATO organizations, both local and international, has progressed markedly. Intense experience and cooperation in response to crises have brought NATO and other organizations closer together than ever before. International organizations now invite each other to participate in training and their staffs informally consult each other frequently, both regarding operations and when developing policy and doctrine. Additionally, international organizations place increasing importance on the essential role of domestic government and civil society in stability and in resolving crises. A diverse array of national governments and international organizations now seek to create or enhance a comprehensive approach to crisis management among them.

Alliance military forces engaged in an operation will contribute to resolving that crisis alongside non-military contributions from a diverse array of sources, mostly outside the Alliance. NATO’s engagement in operations has consistently underscored the mutual dependence and synergy between military and non-military contributions to resolving crises. Often, these non-military contributions can best address the underlying causes of a conflict and help to prevent a relapse to instability. Given such an inter-dependent operating environment, communication and interaction are important to achieving a wider comprehensive approach, as is close collaboration as appropriate with interested, reciprocating non-military actors.

4.15.2. Definition

A joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.
4.15.3. Overview

NATO-CIMIC is a military function relevant for ground, maritime and air forces. It is at the same time a joint staff function present in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and a specialists’ role on the field. NATO-CIMIC focuses on non-NATO civilian actors, such as the host nation government, the local population, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. As such, NATO-CMI takes the military perspective and focuses on external civilian actors. The concept entails a military capability with a dedicated structure.

4.15.4. Principles

1. Understand the civil environment.
2. Understand the aims and objectives of all non-military actors.
3. Respect civilian primacy.
4. Act with integrity.
5. Integrate planning with non-military actors.
6. Establish effective relationships and communication with non-military actors.

4.15.5. Core functions

1. Civil-Military Liaison
2. Support to the Force
3. Support to the Civil Actors and their Environment.

4.15.6. Structure

Although the ultimate responsibility to provide guidelines on NATO-CIMIC rests with the NATO International Military Staff, there highest-level dedicated CIMIC staff is present at the Allied Command Operations. NATO-CIMIC staff is further distributed along the chain of command, in the Joint Force Commands, Force Headquarters, Component Commands and in subordinate units. NATO-CIMIC focal points may be assigned in units below battalion level. Furthermore, NATO keeps one Multinational CIMIC Group for specialized rapid deployment in its operations. In operations, one or more CIMIC Groups and CIMIC Centers may be deployed on an ad hoc basis.
Figure 8. Unofficial organigram highlighting NATO-CIMIC structures.

4.15.7. Particularities

Although NATO employs both NATO-CIMIC and NATO-CMI, they are distinct concepts. NATO-CIMIC personnel, however, due to their affinity to the topic, are usually tasked to mainstream CMI directives, provide advice and training on CMI and other related tasks.

4.15.8. References


Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

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Table 19. Overview of the NATO-CMI concept.

4.16.1. Background

Since the beginning of the century, NATO’s practical cooperation with non-NATO organizations, both local and international, has progressed markedly. Intense experience and cooperation in response to crises have brought NATO and other organizations closer together than ever before. International organizations now invite each other to participate in training and their staffs informally consult each other frequently, both regarding operations and when developing policy and doctrine. Additionally, international organizations place increasing importance on the essential role of domestic government and civil society in stability and in resolving crises. A diverse array of national governments and international organizations now seek to create or enhance a comprehensive approach to crisis management among them.

Alliance military forces engaged in an operation will contribute to resolving that crisis alongside non-military contributions from a diverse array of sources, mostly outside the Alliance. NATO’s engagement in operations has consistently underscored the mutual dependence and synergy between military and non-military contributions to resolving crises. Often, it is these non-military contributions that can best address the underlying causes of a conflict and help to prevent a relapse to instability. Given such an inter-dependent operating environment, communication and interaction are important to achieving a wider comprehensive approach, as is close collaboration as appropriate with interested, reciprocating non-military actors.

4.16.2. Definition

NATO Civil-Military Interaction is understood as a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for
them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.

4.16.3. Overview

NATO-CMI is a cross-cutting concept applicable to all military personnel in all levels. It is expected that each and every serviceman will need to interact with non-NATO civilians at some point in a given military operation. As such, NATO-CMI takes the military perspective and focuses on external civilian actors. The concept does not entail a dedicate function.

4.16.4. Principles

1. Understand non-military actors and respect their autonomy in decision-making and so encouraging them to do the same.

2. Engage proactively with all non-military actors involved in the operation. Commanders in particular must maintain continuous and effective communication with their correspondent counterparts at local, regional, national, and international levels.

3. Facilitate interactions based upon mutual respect, knowledge of respective roles, trust, and transparency. Institutional familiarity, credibility and reliability are key.

4. Be able to adapt to evolving and specialized non-military expert advice and factors.

5. Promote local ownership and build local capacity, ensuring timely and smooth transition to local ownership as soon as practical.

6. Ensure internal NATO military coherence and consistent NATO messaging in interacting with non-military actors.

7. Develop and implement a transition plan from the outset to ensure transition to civilian ownership as early as possible when taking on non-military tasks.

8. Promote cooperation, reciprocal information sharing and unity of purpose as a desired method to achieve overall strategic aims, end state and objectives.

9. Operate within the framework of the NATO mission, responsibilities, authorities, and legal obligations.

4.16.5. Core functions

No dedicated function.
4.16.6. *Structure*

Although the ultimate responsibility to provide guidelines on NATO-CMI rests with the NATO International Military Staff, there is no CMI structure per se. Civil-military interaction is carried out by all military personnel at all levels, therefore it is present throughout NATO structure. NATO-CIMIC personnel, however, due to their affinity to the topic, are usually tasked to mainstream CMI directives, provide advice and training on CMI and other related tasks.

4.16.7. *Particularities*

Even though the NATO-CMI concept may seem very broad, it can be sometimes limited to a particular area of interest in order to facilitate a given analysis or the coordination with civilian actors, such as medical CMI or logistics CMI.

4.16.8. *References*


An undated policy from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) provides an insight to the approach of the organization with regard to cooperating with armed actors. Titled “Norwegian Refugee Council Civil-Military Policy” the English language report contains 10 sections on the policy’s objective, its fundamental principles, NRC’s position on military actors, the policy’s application, NRC’s liaison arrangements, information sharing, conduct of staff, use of military assets for military operations, use of military guards and escorts, and NRC and the militarization of aid.

4.17.1. Background

The policy does not specifically define civil-military policy but does note the policy provides “NRC staff with clear guidance on how NRC will seek to uphold a separate identity when interacting with military forces and on how staff shall behave in order to ensure that a clearly separate identity is maintained at all times.”

4.17.2. Definition

The policy informs how NRC civilian staff should interact with armed forces. The concepts scope is thus external and it takes a civilian perspective. The paper is largely concerned with operational- and tactical-level actions and advice for NRC staff rather than providing strategic-level guidance. Finally, the paper does not describe any specific dedicated functions or personnel involved with its civil-military policy. However, it is noted from the author’s experience that NRC does have
dedicated staff involved in civil-military policy. But as this is not mentioned in the policy looked at in this report.

4.17.4. Principles

NRC’s policy follows the four humanitarian principles as a foundation of how NRC interacts with all actors. For its civil-military policy it has three guiding principles that are:

1. NRC recognizes that there is a role for military actors to engage in support of life-saving humanitarian operations only as a last resort (when there is no civilian alternative).

2. Interaction between military and humanitarian actors in these last resort cases should happen according to international guidelines including liaison, information sharing, and the use of armed escorts and military assets.

3. NRC sees no role for international military forces as a relief provider (apart from in the extreme case mentioned above) as military forces do not provide assistance according to humanitarian principles, and their involvement in relief type activities can jeopardize the safety of beneficiaries and civilian relief personnel.

4.17.5. Core functions

Two core functions in its civil-military policy are expanded on in document:

1. Liaison activities that only occur for a specific purpose e.g. Security, Advocacy, Raising Awareness, and Information analysis of ongoing military operations and its humanitarian effects.

2. Information sharing activities aimed at maintaining NRC’s operational space, and protection of civilians

4.17.6. Structure

The policy does not note any specific dedicated functions or personnel aside from the authority of NRC’s Country Director to authorize various decisions regarding meetings and liaison between NRC and a military actor. However, from the author’s experience, it is known that NRC does have dedicated staff involved in civil-military policy or activity. But as this is not mentioned in the policy, NRC not having a dedicated function will be recorded.
4.17.7. Particularities

The policy has one notable addition compared to other policies. In section 10 of the document, there is a statement for its country offices about “NRC will not request or receive funding from a military actor (including state armies, ministries of defence or hybrid civil-military entities such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams)”, “NRC will not implement projects that require collaboration with military forces (this includes any form of coordination of activities, information sharing or clauses requiring NRC to provide assistance in the aftermath of certain military operations)”, and “NRC will only accept funding from donors that will ensure that NRC can implement activities in accordance with humanitarian principles”. These appear more of an advocacy message than a policy or guidance.

4.17.8. References

4.18. Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Civil-Military Coordination (Oxfam-CMCoord)

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Civil-Military Coordination (Oxfam-CMCoord)

Custodian organization  Oxford Committee for Famine Relief

Archetype  Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)

Perspective  civilian → military

Scope  external

Level of applicability  tactical & operational

Dedicated function  no

Table 21. Overview of the Oxfam-CMCoord concept.

4.18.1. Background

Three papers from Oxfam provides an insight into the approach of Oxfam’s humanitarian activity with military actors. The first from 2012 is titled “Oxfam Policy Compendium Notes on the Provision of Aid by Foreign Military Forces”, the second from 2014 is titled “UN Integrated Missions and Humanitarian Action” and the third from 2019 is titled “Multi-Dimensional Military Missions and Humanitarian Assistance”. These English language papers are typically made up of four sections focused on definitions, background, Oxfam’s position to the type of military mission (foreign military, UN, or multi-dimensional military missions), and actions and recommendations that Oxfam will take in relation to its interaction with a military actor. Despite the fractured nature of the policy notes, the papers do help provide an insight to how Oxfam approaches interaction with military actors.

4.18.2. Definition

The papers do not provide specific definitions of how Oxfam interacts or related to military forces. However, it is stated that its policies draw inspiration from two UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) documents and an Interagency Standing Committee (IASC). The different reports Oxfam’s policies draw from are the UN “Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster”, the UN “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies”, the IASC paper on “Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies”, and the Norwegian Atlantic Committee’s report on “Civil-Military Relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in Comprehensive Approaches”.

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4.18.3. Overview

The papers imply the perspective of Oxfam’s policy paper’s is from a civilian to military perspective. The paper’s scope is external for this audience to understand how Oxfam approaches interaction with an armed actor, what principled humanitarian access is, and how best to respond to humanitarian needs. Oxfam’s policy notes also appear aimed at the operational and tactical levels rather than the strategic level. Aside from these policy notes, no specific roles are mentioned governing Oxfam-CMCoord, suggesting the concept is folded into typical day to day duties of Oxfam staff rather than through dedicated personnel and other resources.

4.18.4. Principles & core functions

Specific principles and core functions are not mentioned in the policies, which instead outline Oxfam’s position and practices it will follow when interacting (or not) with military actors. This typically focuses on:

1. What policies should be followed. The policy notes have a section describing the key policies that Oxfam will follow and recommendations of the policies or reports that military forces should follow.

2. Funding concerns. The policy notes have a section that focuses on how military should not record their activities as overseas development assistance or humanitarian action.

3. Distinction & coordination. The policy notes have a section that focuses on the distinction between humanitarian and military activity. In particular how coordination should be facilitated by OCHA and cannot be directed by military forces, with humanitarian groups remaining operationally independent.

4.18.5. Structure

The paper does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with Oxfam-CMCoord aside from stating that Oxfam will support staff and managers with any interaction with military forces. This suggests that any role of Oxfam-CMCoord is folded into typical day to day duties and functions of Oxfam staff rather than having dedicated personnel for this activity.

4.18.6. Particularities

Notably there were no Oxfam policies found that focused on national armed forces, police units, private security, or non-state armed groups. Oxfam also differs from other entities looked at in this study in the fact that their approach is dislocated across multiple policy notes focused on different types of armed actors. Oxfam’s policy notes are also notably different from other humanitarian group approaches to civil military relations due to their heavy focus on advocating
for what military forces should do in a humanitarian setting rather than governing internal processes. The policy notes attention on what activities Oxfam will *not* do with military forces is also notable, as other humanitarian group approaches tend to describe interactions in a more collaborative in nature (i.e. how they *may* work with military actors).

4.18.7. References

https://www.oxfam.org/en/our-history


Last updated on 17 February 2024, by João Valdetaro.

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<td>Dedicated function</td>
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Table 22. Overview of the PRT-CIMIC concept.

4.19.1. Background

The development of the PRT-CIMIC doctrine in Portugal has been strategically aligned with broader NATO guidelines, reflecting Portugal’s commitment to adhere to NATO’s NATO-CIMIC doctrine and the comprehensive approach. This alignment ensures the effectiveness of military operations through coordinated efforts with civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the local populace. By following the NATO doctrine, Portugal acknowledges the critical importance of working with civilian actors in achieving mission objectives, fostering stability, and facilitating post-conflict reconstruction and development. The evolution of PRT-CIMIC within the Portuguese Armed Forces highlights a progressive adaptation to the changing nature of global security challenges, emphasizing the need for a holistic approach that integrates military capabilities with humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and community engagement. This adherence to NATO standards underscores Portugal’s role in contributing to international peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts, leveraging the principles of cooperation and mutual support to address complex emergencies and conflicts. Consequently, Portugal established the General CIMIC Company, institutionalizing its commitment to the principles of civil-military cooperation and enhancing its capacity to contribute effectively to a wide range of missions and operations under the NATO framework.

4.19.2. Definition

Since Portugal follows the same doctrine as NATO, PRT-CIMIC can be understood as a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO (Portuguese) commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.
4.19.3. **Overview**

PRT-CIMIC, as based on NATO-CIMIC, is a military function relevant for ground, maritime and air forces. It is at the same time a joint staff function present in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and a specialists’ role on the field. PRT-CIMIC focuses on non-NATO civilian actors, such as the host nation government, the local population, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. As such, PRT-CIMIC takes the military perspective and focuses on external civilian actors. The concept entails a military capability with a dedicated structure.

4.19.4. **Principles**

1. Understand the civil environment
2. Understand the aims and objectives of all non-military actors
3. Respect civilian primacy
4. Act with integrity
5. Integrate planning with non-military actors
6. Establish effective relationships and communication with non-military actors

4.19.5. **Core functions**

1. Civil-Military Liaison
2. Support to the Force
3. Support to the Civil Actors and their Environment

4.19.6. **Structure**

The General CIMIC Company (CGerCIMIC) of the Portuguese Army, also referred to as CIMIC Support Unit (CSU), is dedicated to PRT-CIMIC, designed to support the commander’s mission through coordination and cooperation with civilian actors. This includes local civilian populations, their representative authorities, international and national non-governmental organizations, and various agencies.

CGerCIMIC addresses the need for a formal structure capable of operating effectively in environments where civil-military interaction is crucial for the success of operations. It aligns with
the CIMIC doctrine by facilitating the interface between civilian and military efforts, following NATO’s strategic concept that NATO-CIMIC is interdependent and vital for assisting civil authorities as well as providing logistical, medical, and communications support to military operations.

This unit is equipped with a flexible PRT-CIMIC capability, suited for both national and international missions, with a composition reflecting the joint nature of the Portuguese Armed Forces. It demonstrates Portugal’s ability to contribute to CIMIC capabilities within the NATO framework, maintaining readiness and adaptability to respond to a wide range of missions and emergency situations.

CGerCIMIC’s structure ensures effective integration into the military support model for civil protection authorities, highlighting the importance of coordination and cooperation—fundamental pillars of CIMIC. With a Permanent Core, it guarantees constant availability and ongoing support for CIMIC operations, both domestically and on international missions.

4.19.7. References


4.20. Russian Armed Forces Military-Political Cooperation (RUS-MPC)

Last updated on 26 February 2024, by Henrique Garbino

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<tr>
<td><strong>Dedicated function</strong></td>
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*Table 23. Overview of the RUS-MPC concept.*

4.20.1. Background

The development of Russian civil-military doctrines is influenced by historical, geopolitical, and ideological factors shaping the country’s military and foreign policy. Post-Soviet transformation necessitated redefining Russia’s international role, maintaining strategic interests, and adapting to a changing global security environment. Security threats, including NATO’s eastward expansion, regional conflicts, and weapons proliferation, led Russia to establish military-political and military-technical cooperation with like-minded states and organizations.

Economic challenges in the 1990s and early 2000s influenced Russia’s civil-military relations, resulting in a pragmatic approach to military cooperation that prioritized economic expediency and strategic relationships. Russia’s historical and cultural ties with former Soviet states and regional nations contributed to the development of cooperative frameworks, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Domestic politics and ideology, particularly under President Vladimir Putin, emphasized strengthening military capabilities, consolidating power, and asserting global influence, leading to a focus on allied relationships, peacekeeping operations, and countering emerging threats like cyber warfare.

4.20.2. Definition

RUS-MPC refers to the principles and guidelines that shape the country’s military-political and military-technical cooperation with foreign states, international organizations, and regional entities. It is focused on promoting international security, strategic stability, and fostering cooperative relationships among nations.
4.20.3. Overview

RUS-MPC doctrine entails the use of military forces as a political and diplomatic tool, both through military-political and military-technical cooperation. As such, the RUS-MPC takes both a civilian, political perspective and a military perspective on how to employ national armed forces overseas, in order to promote national political objectives. It is not clear whether the concept entails a dedicated function, though particular units of the Russian Armed Forces are put aside for this task.

4.20.4. Principles & core functions

1. Strengthening international security and strategic stability at the global and regional levels based on international law and the UN Charter.

2. Formation and development of allied relations with CSTO and CIS member states, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia.


4. Engaging with international organizations to prevent conflicts and preserve peace, including participation in peacekeeping operations.

5. Maintaining equal relations with interested states and international organizations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

6. Developing a dialogue with interested states on national approaches to countering military dangers and threats arising from large-scale use of information and communication technologies for military-political purposes.

7. Fulfillment of international obligations by the Russian Federation.

4.20.5. Structure

There is no specific structure to the concept of RUS-MPC. However, in order to prepare military personnel to participate in overseas operations under the framework of RUS-MPC, the Russian Armed Forces created the 15th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, which is specifically mandated to take part in peacekeeping and international military cooperation tasks. Its soldiers can be part of peacekeeping contingents by decision of the President of the Russian Federation and in the interests of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the UN, the OSCE, the CSTO, the Russia-NATO Council and, if necessary, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
4.20.6. Particularities

RUS-MPC is akin to other foreign policy concepts, such as the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence’s “defense diplomacy”. Interestingly the RUS-MPC 2007 doctrine lays the main priorities of military-political cooperation. This includes (1) coordinating with Belarus for the development of national armed forces and defense infrastructure; (2) interacting with Abkhazia and South Ossetia to ensure joint defense and security; (3) consolidating efforts with CSTO member states to enhance the collective security system; (4) collaborating with CIS member states for regional and international security as well as peacekeeping activities; (5) coordinating with SCO member states to counter new military threats and establish legal frameworks; and (6) engaging with the UN and other international organizations for peacekeeping operations, arms control agreements, and strengthening international security through the participation of armed forces, troops, and bodies in peacekeeping operations.

4.20.7. References


https://structure.mil.ru/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm
4.21. Save the Children International Civil-Military Coordination (SCI-CMCoord)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 24. Overview of the SCI-CMCoord concept.

4.21.1. Background

A guidance note from Save the Children in 2020 provides an updated insight into the approach of how this organization approaches civil-military coordination. Titled “Save the Children Civil-Military Coordination: COVID-19 Humanitarian Response”, the English language report contains 12 points on outlining Save the Children’s policies and procedures, and how to implement decisions to engage armed actors. It also appears to be an update from its 2017 civil-military strategy also outlined in this study.

4.21.2. Definition

While no specific definition of SCI-CMCoord is given, the guidance note implies that it follows definitions outlined in the Oslo Guidelines and by OCHA’s UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) concept.

4.21.3. Overview

The paper implies that the perspective of Save the Children’s Civil-Military Coordination Guidance is civilian to military (from Save the Children about interactions with the military. The paper’s scope is external about interactions with the military. The paper is in effect a list of instruction to support decision making at the operational and tactical levels. Finally, the paper acknowledged several dedicated functions, such as Save the Children Staff part of the Civil-Military and Armed Non-State Actor (ANSA) Relations Initiative, as well as Save the Children policies and procedures within their internal network (OneNet) as well as a suggestion that each Save the Children Country Office ensures participation in relevant civil-military coordination mechanisms.
4.21.4. Principles and core functions

Save the Children’s engagement with armed actors are based around 12 points related to SCI-CMCoord:

1. Save the Children’s policy and procedures are intended to be context-specific and enable decision-making.

2. Appropriate liaison arrangements should be established to ensure common situational awareness, and to ensure planned activities are not duplicative or contradictory and will not generate potential harm or unintended direct or indirect negative effects.

3. Save the Children’s engagement with armed actors and the provision of humanitarian assistance is based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, and complies with applicable laws including international law, counter-terrorism laws, and sanctions.

4. Save the Children advocacy towards, and/or dialogue with, armed actors may include messaging on the impact of their conduct.

5. SCI should only aim to reach agreements with armed actors that facilitate, secure, and sustain humanitarian access. SCI does not under any circumstance provide financial or material compensation to ANSAs.

6. It is suggested that each Country Office ensures full participation in relevant civil-military coordination mechanism, whether at Government, UN Country Team or OCHA/UN-CMCoord level, or relevant working groups at inter-cluster level.

7. Use of military or civilian defense assets (MCDA). As per the Oslo Guidelines, military assets, the decision to request or accept the use of military assets or armed escorts must be based only on humanitarian criteria and exceptional circumstances.

8. Joint civil-military operations. This mode of working may take place only under extreme circumstances, outside a conflict setting. It may only be possible where the goals are common with agreed protection and support strategies abiding to the humanitarian principles.

4.21.5. Structure

The paper acknowledges several dedicated functions supporting SCI-CMCoord, such as Save the Children staff part of the Civil-Military and ANSA Relations Initiative, that Save the Children policies and procedures within their internal network (OneNet) as well as a suggestion that each Save the Children Country Office ensures participation in relevant civil-military coordination mechanisms. However, despite this, the structure cannot be depicted.
4.21.6. **Particularities**

The guidance paper is more of an amendment of the 2017 strategy covered in the project, and although it notes it is for reacting to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is largely a reminder of Save the Children’s key policies.

4.21.7. **References**

4.22. Save the Children International Civil-Military Relations Strategy (SCI-CIVMIL)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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**Save the Children International Civil-Military Relations (SCI-CIVMIL)**

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Table 25. Overview of the SCI-CIVMIL Concept.

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4.22.1. Background

A strategy paper from Save the Children in 2017 provides an insight into the approach of how this organization approaches civil-military relations. Titled “Civil-Military Relations and Protection of Children” the English language report contains five sections on children and war, Save the Children’s guiding principles, violations of children in fragile contexts, key achievements, and case study interviews. While dated, the strategy paper does help provide an insight to how Save the Children approaches civil-military relations.

4.22.2. Definition

While no specific definition of SCI-CIVMIL strategy is given, the strategy paper notes Save the Children’s need for civil-military relations so that the organization is “clear on how and when we coordinate and the limited circumstances in which we collaborate with key stakeholders, such as national and international forces”

4.22.3. Overview

The paper implies that the perspective of SCI-CIVMIL strategy is from Save the Children for external military audiences as it notes that the goal of the strategy is “for military actors to respect children’s rights in armed conflict and natural disasters.” As such, the strategy’s scope is external, and its perspective is from a civilian to military perspective. The paper is largely concerned with strategic-level messaging with some operational-level best practices highlighted, such as from the case study interviews. Rarely is tactical-level guidance outlined in the document. Finally, the paper does not specifically acknowledge a dedicated function conducting the SCI-CIVMIL strategy but
does note specialized training and guidance roles, such as the establishment of child protection
units focused on military or police actors from Save the Children’s support, as well as numerous
training programs that have been given.

4.22.4. Principles and Core Functions

Save the Children’s strategy is based on the four humanitarian principles of Humanity, Neutrality,
Impartiality and Independence, the latter of which deals with military interaction:

1. Independence. Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic,
military, or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian
action is being implemented.

Only a few core functions are mentioned in the report that are under the umbrella of Save the
Children’s activities goal. This includes for military actors to respect children’s rights in armed
conflict and natural disasters, ensuring that children are protected from abuse and exploitation in
wartime, post-war and in the transition to post-conflict, in fragile contexts and in natural disasters.
Save the Children has also developed existing capacity and skills as well as to escalate provision of
training of staff of peacekeeping missions and military and police forces on child rights and child
protection. Save the Children Sweden has also developed a strategy framework for Child Protection
Programming towards Peacekeeping, Military and Police Forces, and developed a Save the
Children Civil-Military Engagement Strategy and Guidelines. Through these efforts approximately
100,000 military staff, including more than 30,000 peacekeepers and 2,000 trainers have been
trained by Save the Children. In addition, Save the Children has supported the set-up of child
protection units with 12 national armed forces as well as been actively engaged at the global level
on advocacy issues.

4.22.5. Structure

The paper does not outline any specific structure for SCI-CIVMIL, but the strategy implies a
dedicated function within the organization. For example it mentions the development of several
strategy documents, the establishment of child protection units, as well as numerous training
programs for armed actors. However, despite this, the structure cannot be depicted.

4.22.6. Particularities

The strategy paper is more in line with an advocacy or informational brochure for an external
audience rather than for an internal audience. In addition, the addition of case study interviews is
notably different from other concepts in this study.
4.22.7. References

https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/civil_military_relations_191019_webb.pdf/

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

South African Government Civil-Military Relations (ZAF-CMR)

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Table 26. Overview of the ZAF-CMR concept.

4.23.1. Background


4.23.2. Definition

The paper notes that ZAF-CMR “refer to the distribution of power and influence between the armed services and the civilian authority”.

4.23.3. Overview

The paper implies that ZAF-CMR takes the joint perspective of both the South African Armed Forces and other civilian South African government agencies and departments. As such, the paper’s scope is for an internal government audience rather than external. The paper is largely concerned with strategic-level actions such as definitions, powers, authorities, and provisions rather than providing practical guidance for the operational or tactical levels. Finally, the paper does not note any specific dedicated functions or personnel in support of ZAF-CMR aside from describing
general military command hierarchy (e.g. “the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF” or “the President shall appoint the Chief of the SANDF”).

4.23.4. Principles

Two points within the “Responsibilities of the Government” section of Chapter 3 outline governing responsibilities of sorts for ZAF-CMR:

1. The Interim Constitution, as with other democratic constitutions, seeks to establish stable civil-military relations by subjecting the Defence Force to civilian control. Such control is deemed vital because armed forces typically have a substantial capacity for organized violence.

2. However, the government recognizes that civil-military relations will only be stable if the requisite control is accompanied by the fulfillment of certain responsibilities towards the Defence Force and its members. These responsibilities include the following:

   a. The government will not misuse the SANDF for partisan or repressive purposes.

   b. The government will not interfere in the military chain of command or intrude on operational matters which are the authority of military commanders. However, the government will supervise and exercise control over operations and preparations for operations through the Chief of the SANDF.

   c. The government will take account of the professional views of senior officers in the process of policy formulation and decision-making on defense. This input is assured through the Defence Staff Council, the Council of Defence and the structure of the Department of Defence.

   d. The requirement that soldiers operate within the law presupposes that government acts in a lawful fashion.

   e. The government will request from Parliament sufficient funds to enable the SANDF to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently.

   f. The government will seek to ensure that military personnel are adequately remunerated and will provide the necessary support to retired and demobilized soldiers.

   g. The government will not endanger the lives of military personnel through improper deployment or the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment.
4.23.5. Core functions

Under the “Military Professionalism” section of Chapter 3, several points outline general functions of sorts in ZAF-CMR in line with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.

1. The maintenance of technical, managerial, and organizational skills and resources which enable the armed forces to perform their primary mission and secondary functions efficiently and effectively.

2. Strict adherence to the Constitution, domestic legislation, and international law.

3. Respect for the democratic political process, human rights, and cultural diversity.

4. The operation of the Defence Force according to established policies, procedures, and rules in times of war and peace.

5. A commitment to public service, chiefly in defense of the state and its citizens.

6. Education and training programs within the SANDF are a cardinal means of building and maintaining a high level of professionalism.

4.23.6. Structure

The paper does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with civil-military relations in South Africa aside from outlining general strategic level military hierarchy such as the President is the head of the armed forces and chooses the chief of the armed forces. As such, this has not been depicted.

4.23.7. Particularities

The paper makes specific mention of South Africa’s Military Intelligence in its Civil-Military Relations chapter. Typically in other concepts, specific functions or specialism in the military are specifically called out.

4.23.8. References


Last updated on 7 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 27. Overview of the SCHR-HMR concept.

4.24.1. Background

A paper from the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) from 2010 provides an insight to the approach of this organization with regard to civil-military relations. Titled “SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations” the English language report outlines SCHR’s position on the “actions and strategies of armed forces [that] play an essential role in securing or endangering the scope for humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict, as do the positions, actions, and behavior of the humanitarian actors themselves.” The paper is an update from a 2001 paper titled “humanitarian-military relations in the provision of humanitarian assistance”.

4.24.2. Definition

The paper does not provide any specific definition of HMR.

4.24.3. Overview

The concept’s perspective is civilian, to inform and guide other SCHR members or agencies about interacting with military actors. As such, the paper’s scope is external. The paper is largely concerned with general themes such as key guiding principles or documents related to civilian-military cooperation or interaction. There is little guidance for the tactical and operational levels. This places the document at the strategic level. Finally, the paper does not note any specific dedicated functions or personnel in support of this document.
4.24.4. **Core functions and Principles**

Within the paper there is a section on key principles (section 4.2). This states that SCHR members recognize that the actions of their staff and partners have the potential to influence the safety and perception of other humanitarian organizations. SCHR members therefore take individual responsibility for their humanitarian-military relations and strive for adherence to humanitarian principles as their common standard. The decision-making processes at policy as well as operational level need to be designed to take into account the demands of a principled approach.

SCHR members will be transparent in their decisions on cooperation with military forces and the relative importance of humanitarian principles to their operations, in bilateral as well as public statements. The danger tends to lie not in the diversity of actors, but in a lack of clarity about the positions, roles, and objectives of individual actors.

In addition to public positioning, SCHR members commit to ensuring that the principles of SHCR-HMI are translated into practice and institutionalized at the operational level within their organizations. These should refer closely to the non-binding guidance on issues such as information sharing, use of military assets and armed escorts, and staff behavior.

4.24.5. **Structure**

The paper does not outline any specific structure for entities involved with SCHR’s humanitarian-military relations.

4.24.6. **Particularities**

The paper makes no mention of other types of armed actors such as non-state armed groups, police, or private security companies.

4.24.7. **References**

4.25. Armed Forces of Ukraine Civil-Military Cooperation (UKR-CIMIC)

Last updated on 6 Dec 2023, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 28. Overview of the UKR-CIMIC concept.

4.25.1. Background

An article in the Scientific Journal of the National Academy of National Guard Honor and Law 3(82):22-28 (November 2022) provides an insight into the approach of the Armed Forces of Ukrainian with regard to civil-military cooperation. Titled, “A brief analysis of civil-military cooperation activities at the current state of armed aggression against Ukraine”, the Ukrainian language article outlines a study into how the National Guard of Ukraine approaches civil military cooperation. This includes outlining the specific tasks of the National Guard’s Civil-Military Cooperation Group as well as analyzing these functions. While not a primary source, the article does help provide an insight to how Ukraine approaches civil-military cooperation.

4.25.2. Definition

The article notes that “in accordance with the provisions of the order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 131 dated 02.04.2019, civil-military cooperation is defined as systematic, and the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on interaction with executive authorities, local self-government bodies, public associations, organizations and citizens in the areas of deployment of military units and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the aim of creating a positive public opinion about the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and ensuring favorable conditions for the performance of tasks and functions assigned to them”.

4.25.3. Overview

The perspective of UKR-CIMIC concept describes interactions with civilian entities. (e.g. executive authorities, local self-government bodies, public associations, organizations, and citizens in areas
of deployment). The article also notes that the aim of the Armed Forces of Ukraine civil-military cooperation is to create “a positive public opinion about the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. In this sense, the concept’s scope is external and its perspective is civilian. The concept notes that it is more than the strategic level (i.e. just “governing documents”) and that the concept takes into account the “modern realities on the battlefield” at the operational and tactical levels. Finally, the article notes several dedicated functions to support civil-military cooperation. This includes the order of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine No. 131 dated 02.04.2019 that focuses on civil-military cooperation, Civil-Military doctrine that was developed in 2020 as well as from April 2017, the creation of the civil-military cooperation group within the National Guard of Ukraine’s Information Support Department that later incorporated officers from the Central Security Service at the operational and tactical levels.

4.25.4. Principles

The article notes five key conclusions or principles of UKR-CIMIC:

1. UKR-CIMIC does “considerable public relations work” including “providing contacts for establishing a relationship of interaction” and using different “channels of communication and interaction with interested organizations and individual citizens”.

2. UKR-CIMIC does “significant work […] with volunteer organizations” that focus in two directions. The first encourages civilian volunteers to be able to assist Ukrainian troops with transport, means of communication, medical equipment, spare parts, personal protective equipment etc. And the second direction is the Ukrainian military encouraging communication and coordination with civilian organizations, foundations, and volunteers to distribute humanitarian aid to the populations of Ukraine.

3. UKR-CIMIC aims to inform a civilian population of safety and security issues, as well as encourage cultural and educational work with these populations. For example, joint cultural and sporting events with members of the armed forces and civilians or mine risk education sessions. These activities aim to improve the image of the troops with civilians and restore the trust of population with Ukrainian authorities.

4. UKR-CIMIC supports communicating forensic activities such as search and exchanging of bodies, transport of the war dead, and those missing in action, with the families of the affected soldiers. This also includes social support such as payments to families and bureaucratic support for service personnel and their families.

5. UKR-CIMIC also aims to counter enemy propaganda and mis- and disinformation by presenting official informational messaging from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
4.25.5. Core functions

Several core functions are listed in the article including:

1. Carrying out measures to form a positive public opinion regarding the activities of armed forces of Ukraine, in particular during participation in anti-terrorist operations, during the introduction of a legal regime of emergency or martial law, operations to maintain peace and security and eliminate the consequences of emergency situations.

2. Participation in the analysis of the socio-political, economic, religious, demographic, ecological, sanitary-epidemiological situation and forecasting its impact on the performance of assigned tasks by the military units.

3. Organization of providing troops with information on UKR-CIMIC in the area of their deployment and application.

4. Training of personnel from the local population to work in local self-government bodies, law enforcement agencies, budget institutions in the liberated territory and in international peacekeeping operations; – formation of positive public opinion and provision of favorable conditions for the fulfillment of tasks assigned to them by military units.

5. Ensuring effective interaction between the military command and regional authorities, local self-government bodies, representatives of public, non-governmental, international organizations, and the population of the region.

6. Forecasting possible problems of a humanitarian nature and providing the military command with proposals for their localization and neutralization in the early stages.

4.25.6. Structure

The article notes that several entities are involved with UKR-CIMIC in Ukraine. Within the Armed Forces, UKR-CIMIC is led by units from the Central Military Commission. In parallel to this, specialists from the National Guard of Ukraine Central Security Service also conduct UKR-CIMIC with specialists at the operational and tactical level. The Ukraine’s National Defense University’s Civil-Military Cooperation and Information Support Service provides training, advisory services and coordination between these entities in addition to members of Ukraine’s Central Intelligence Agency. The article also notes that any Ukrainian service personnel of any rank that comes into contact with the local civilian population becomes a specialist in UKR-CIMIC. This structure has been depicted below:
4.25.7. Particularities

The article implies that much of the UKR-CIMIC activities is designed on how a local population views or perceives the military rather than interacts or coordinates with them.

4.25.8. References

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366024563_BRIEF_ANALYSIS_OF_CIVIL-
MILITARY_COOPERATION_ACTIVITIES_AT_THE_CURRENT_STAGE_OF_ARMED _AGGRESSION_AGAINST_UKRAINE

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

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<th>United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC)</th>
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Table 29. Overview of the UN-CIMIC concept.

4.26.1. Background

As a result of World War II, the United Nations, and many international organizations, especially non-governmental began to proliferate in number and in capability, especially after the Cold War. At the same time, military concepts and capabilities for civil-military coordination grew, as military forces began to see more frequent use in peace operations or “operations other than war”. The concept of “security” had gone well beyond physical protection; conversely, the security implications of humanitarian action and development became more readily apparent and consequential, as articulated by the concept of “human security”. All this time the impetus and demand increased for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated approaches in international interventions – especially between those mostly in the security business and those mostly in the humanitarian and development business. Civil-military coordination was now something other than incidental to the operations of either military or civilian actors. As a result of the recommendations of 2001 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (otherwise known as the “Brahimi Report”), the then Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) began the development of a concept for civil-military coordination.

4.26.2. Definition

UN-CIMIC is a military function which contributes to facilitating the interface between the military and civilian components, as well as with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN Mission objectives.
4.26.3. Overview

UN-CIMIC is a dedicated military function present in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it takes the military perspective of civil-military relationships and is largely limited to the operational and tactical levels. The primary focus of UN-CIMIC is intra-mission coordination, next is the coordination with other external civilian actors, such as the host nation government and civil society and international non-governmental organizations.

4.26.4. Principles

1. Solid understanding of the civilian effort of the broader strategic, political, and social context and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution.

2. Operational and tactical coordination by UN-CIMIC officers with the police and civilian components should be in support of the mission objectives.

3. Contribute to achieving a mandate driven common end state.

4. Coordination in accordance with humanitarian principles.

5. Planning and implementation of UN-CIMIC activities shall seek synergy in order to minimize duplication of efforts and enable the efficient and effective use of resources.

6. Maximize and exploit opportunities to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and partners, especially the host nation government, to contribute to achieving the mission objective.

4.26.5. Core functions

1. Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing

2. Civil Assistance
   a. Support to the Mission
   b. Support to the Community


UN-CIMIC staff personnel are present throughout the military chain of command, namely at Force Headquarters (U9), Sector Headquarters (G9) and subordinate units (S9). It is rare to find designated UN-CIMIC officers below the battalion level, but a commander may decide that his or her deputy or executive officer will have UN-CIMIC responsibilities. Regardless of the level of
command, every commander has an UN-CIMIC responsibility inherent in his mission. Additionally, some missions deploy CIMIC units and liaison officers either under control of the Force or Sector HQ. At the strategic level, the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, in coordination with the Office of Military Affairs is responsible to develop the relevant UN-CIMIC strategic guidance.

![Diagram of UN-CIMIC structures](image)

Figure 10. Unofficial organogram highlighting UN-CIMIC structures.

4.26.7. Particularities

Unlike traditional CIMIC concepts in support of the Commander’s intent, UN-CIMIC supports the mandate implementation and overall mission objectives. Therefore, enhanced coordination is needed amongst the components of any UN peace operation as well as with international, bilateral and NGO actors, and with local authorities and parties to the conflict.

4.26.8. References


4.27. **United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)**

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

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Table 30. Overview of the UN-CMCoord concept.

4.27.1. **Background**

Humanitarian civil-military coordination is multi-faceted and evolving. The work ranges from on-site coordination of foreign military assets in disaster relief, to access negotiation in conflict. Since the international disaster response community first created the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) function, it has adapted to the changing environment. CMCoord traditionally coordinated the deployment of foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in disaster response. Governments increasingly deploy military forces as part of their international assistance to a natural disaster response. In addition, national armed forces are often relied upon as first responders in-country. With multidimensional and integrated peace operations, UN-CMCoord became an important interface between the humanitarian community and military components of UN and regional peacekeeping operations.

4.27.2. **Definition**

UN-CMCoord is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

4.27.3. **Overview**

UN-CMCoord is a dedicated civilian function present in disasters and complex emergencies, whether in the preparedness, response, or recovery phases. Therefore, it takes a civilian,
A humanitarian perspective and is largely focused on the operational and tactical levels. The primary focus of UN-CMCoord is facilitating the dialogue between military and humanitarian actors in ensuring a coordinated response.

4.27.4. **Principles**

1. Humanity, Neutrality, and Impartiality
2. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations
3. Perception of Humanitarian Action
4. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination
5. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action
6. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action
7. Security of Humanitarian Personnel
8. Do No Harm
9. Respect for International Legal Instruments
10. Respect for Culture and Custom
11. Consent of Parties to the Conflict
12. Option of Last Resort
13. Avoid Reliance on the Military

4.27.5. **Core functions**

1. Information sharing
2. Task division
3. Planning

4.27.6. **Structure**

UN-CMCoord personnel are present within the structure of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In the country and regional levels, UN-CMCoord and civil-
military liaison officers remain attached to their offices, under the operational guidance from the OCHA Country Director and the Humanitarian Coordinator. The OCHA presence in the country usually maintains its impartial and neutral nature. However, although rare, in integrated peacekeeping operations, the OCHA office may be placed within the mission structure. Due to its cross-cutting nature, at the strategic level, the OCHA main divisions have UN-CMCoord focal points.

![Figure 11. Unofficial organigram highlighting UN-CMCoord structures.](image)

### 4.27.7. Particularities

Other humanitarian organizations have developed parent concepts tailored to their own needs, such as the WFP Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI). Most humanitarian organizations, however, seem not to formally employ a CMCoord concept in their structures and functions, even though they may share many of UN-CMCoord’s principles, functions, and tasks.

### 4.27.8. References


4.28. United States Agency for International Development Civilian-Military Cooperation (USAID-CMC)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 31. Overview of the USAID-CMC concept.

4.28.1. Background

A policy from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) from in 2015 provides an insight into the approach of how this organization approaches civil-military cooperation. Titled “USAID policy on cooperation with the Department of Defense [DoD]”, the English language report is an update of a 2008 policy and covers four areas of purpose, policy statement, guiding principles for USAID cooperation with DoD, and operating principles for USAID cooperation with DoD.

4.28.2. Definition

While no clear definition of USAID-CMC is given, four guiding principles and four operating principles are given that largely revolve around the themes of mutual understanding, communication, collaboration, coordination, cooperation, and liaison.

4.28.3. Overview

The paper implies that the perspective of USAID’s policy on cooperation with the DoD is produced by USAID, a civilian entity for DoD, a military entity within the US Government as well as for select external civilian partners with USAID’s role serving as a liaison between DoD and the United Nations, international organizations, and non-government organizations. As such, the paper’s scope is external and its perspective civilian. USAID-CMC policies appears aimed at the operational and tactical levels by USAID’s office of civilian-military cooperation in response to natural disasters and complex emergencies. Other global militaries and non-state armed actors are
not mentioned in the document. The policy notes a dedicated function within USAID’s Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation that have personnel working at six different U.S. DoD combatant commands as well as the pentagon.

4.28.4. *Principles*

The document outlines the following four guiding principles as part of civilian-military cooperation:

1. Mutual understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities is the basis for USAID-DoD cooperation.
2. USAID will apply selectively and focus to its engagements with DoD.
3. Cooperation with DoD occurs in different degrees depending on context, and.
4. USAID may serve as a liaison between DoD and USAID’s implementing partners.

The document also outlines the following three operating principles of civilian-military cooperation which are:

1. Collaborative organizational structures and personnel exchanges provide the foundation of effective cooperation at all levels.
2. USAID will cooperate with DoD across the USAID program cycle (policy and strategy development, planning process, program, and project design as well as implementation, evaluation, and monitoring, learning outcomes).
3. USAID cooperates with DoD across may environments, sectors, and issue areas.

4.28.5. *Core functions*

The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation conducts three functions:

2. **Policy development.** USAID develops and maintains policies and strategies regarding civilian-military cooperation between USAID and DoD.
3. **Training.** USAID provides training for both USAID and DoD audiences through instructor led courses, briefings, and exercise.

4. **Coordination.** USAID as the lead federal agency for a U.S. Government response to a disaster provide specialized disaster assistance response team members to coordinate between USAID, DoD and its humanitarian implementing partners.

### 4.28.6. Structure

The Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation is part of the Bureau for Conflict, Prevention and Stabilization that comes under the USAID Administrator. It serves as USAID’s primary point of contact with the DoD. It has employees working at six different U.S. DoD combatant commands as well as the pentagon, and coordinates at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It is on the same level of eight other bureaus (Humanitarian Assistance; Global Health; Development, Democracy, and Innovation; Resilience and Food Security; Policy, Planning, and Learning; Foreign Assistance; Legislative and Public Affairs; and Management) and prioritized above regional focused Bureau’s (such as Africa) and field offices. See the depiction below for more details.

![Unofficial organigram highlighting USAID-CMC structures.](image)

### 4.28.7. Particularities

USAID is the lead agency for managing the U.S. Government’s response to disasters abroad. As part of this role, the agency coordinates the activities of all other U.S. government agencies and departments participating in a given response, such as the Department of Defense. In addition, the agency also coordinates with the humanitarian community or UN agencies (such as the World Food Program) involved in a response who often request support from a U.S. government agency or department, such as transport from U.S. Department of Defense assets. This model is somewhat unique compared to other countries, who typically use the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for the coordination of a response.
4.28.8. References


4.29. United States Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA)

Last updated on 31 March 2024, by João Valdetaro.

United States Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA)

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Table 32. Overview of the USA-CA concept.

4.29.1. Background

The history of Civil Affairs (USA-CA) doctrine in the United States Army is a narrative of adaptation to the changing nature of conflict and the military’s role in relation to civilian society. This journey begins as early as the Revolutionary War, where governance and civil support functions were implicitly undertaken by military forces. During World War II, these activities became more formalized, recognizing the importance of managing civilian populations and infrastructure in occupied territories. The post-war era saw the institutionalization of USA-CA roles, as the Cold War and subsequent conflicts underscored the strategic significance of winning hearts and minds, alongside traditional military objectives.

Over time, USA-CA doctrine has expanded to encompass a wide range of operations, from disaster response to supporting governance and economic development in post-conflict environments. This evolution reflects a broader understanding within the Army of the complex interplay between military operations and civilian dynamics. Today, USA-CA units are integral to the Army’s efforts to stabilize and rebuild societies, demonstrating the critical role that military forces can play in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and the transition to civil governance.

4.29.2. Definition

US Army Civil Affairs (USA-CA) is defined as a designated active component and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations.

In support of Unified Land Operations, USA-CA forces perform Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) that are defined as actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to increase situational understanding; find, disrupt, and defeat threats within the civil component; consolidate gains; and enhance, enable, or provide governance in support of the military objectives across the competition
continuum by enhancing awareness of and managing the interaction with the civil component of
the operational environment in order to enable commanders and policy makers to meet U.S.
government objectives. USA-CA operations involve the application of functional specialty skills
that are normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military
operations. This definition encapsulates the broad scope of USA-CA activities, from facilitating
humanitarian assistance and disaster response to supporting civil administration and governance in
conflict and post-conflict environments. USA-CA operations are integral to achieving strategic
objectives by working within, alongside, or in support of civilian populations and institutions,
thereby ensuring a holistic approach to conflict resolution, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts.

4.29.3. Overview

USA-CA is a dedicated military function present in the US Army. It has its own branch within land
forces capabilities. It takes the military perspective and acts in all levels (strategic, operational and
tactical). The primary focus is to provide and enable commanders with the capabilities to find,
disrupt and defeat threats within the external civil component.

4.29.4. Principles

1. Stability is a framework for Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).
2. CAO focus on consolidation of gains within the Civil Component.
3. CAO empower local civil networks to increase governance capacity and preserve combat
   power.
4. CAO are an Information-Related Capability.
5. A comprehensive, interrelated knowledgebase is an invaluable asset.
6. Regional and cultural understanding are essential to successful CAO.
7. CAO are nested with Unified Action.
8. CA forces are critical and adaptive thinkers.

4.29.5. Core functions

1. Transitional Governance (TG)
2. Civil Knowledge Integration (CKI)
3. Civil Network Development and Engagement (CNDE)
4. Civil-Military Integration (CMI)

![Diagram of Civil Affairs Operations]

**Figure 13.** USA-CA core competencies and missions (source: FM3-57).

### 4.29.6. Structure

CA forces execute TG, CNDE, CKI, and CMI to enhance the understanding of the operational environment, visualization of the battlefield, and decision-making of the commander and staff so that they may accomplish missions and achieve unified action. In the absence of an integrated CA staff, CA forces assigned by echelon will be required to conduct the CAO planning requirements. The following CA elements provide direct input to, or augment, the planning process:

1. Assistant chief of staff, CAO (G-9).

2. Battalion and brigade CAO staff officer (S-9).
3. Civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9).

4. Theater Civil Affairs planning team (CAPT).

5. CAPT.

6. CAO working groups.

7. Security force assistance brigade CAO staff section.

8. CA company staff.

9. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) staff.

10. Civil Affairs Teams (CATs).

4.29.7. Particularities

It is important to understand that US Army Civil Affairs is a branch of the land force which has the capability to conduct a series of different activities as showed before. USA-CA units perform CAO and enable Civil-Military Operations (CMO). The figure below summarizes and illustrates the core functions and logic behind the USA-CA concept.
Figure 14. US Civil Affairs logic chart (source: CCOE CIMIC Handbook)


4.30. World Food Programme Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC)

Last updated on 19 December 2023, by Henrique Garbino.

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Table 33. Overview of the WFP-CMC concept.

4.30.1. Background

In different settings, the interaction between humanitarian and military actors ranges from close cooperation to sheer co-existence. Humanitarian-military dialogue at all levels is essential – and the basis for effective humanitarian action on the ground. As the biggest humanitarian organizations, the World Food Programme (WFP) has developed its parent concept tailored to WFP own needs, based on UN-CMCoord’s principles, functions and tasks. Given the scope of WFP’s activities, there was a need to establish a dedicated civilian function to facilitate civil-military coordination.

4.30.2. Definition

WFP-CMC is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

4.30.3. Overview

WFP-CMC is a dedicated civilian function present in disasters and complex emergencies, whether in the preparedness, response or recovery phases. Therefore, it takes a civilian, humanitarian perspective and is largely focused on the operational and tactical levels. The primary focus of WFP-CMC is facilitating the dialogue between WFP and military actors in ensuring a more efficient humanitarian response.
4.30.4. Principles

1. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality
2. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations
3. Perception of Humanitarian Action
4. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination
5. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action
6. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action
7. Security of Humanitarian Personnel
8. Do No Harm
9. Respect for International Legal Instruments
10. Respect for Culture and Custom
11. Consent of Parties to the Conflict
12. Option of Last Resort
13. Avoid Reliance on the Military

4.30.5. Core functions

1. Information sharing
2. Task division
3. Planning

4.30.6. Structure

WFP-CMC personnel are present within the structure of the World Food Programme. In the country and regional levels, WFP-CMC focal points and liaison officers remain attached to their offices, under the operational guidance from the WFP Regional or Country Offices. Due to its cross-cutting nature, at the strategic level, the main divisions within the World Food Programme have WFP-CMC focal points.
4.30.7. Particularities

Even though the WFP-CMC concept is largely based in the UN-CMCoord and that there is close relationship and frequent exchanges between WFP and OCHA on the topic, the World Food Programme provides its own training and guidelines to civil-military coordination. In addition, WFP seems to have recently changed the term from “civil-military coordination” to “humanitarian-military interaction” (WFP-HMI). However, official policies defining this new concept are not publicly available.

4.30.8. References


4.31. World Vision International Civil-Military-Police Engagement (WVI-CMPE)

Last updated on 6 February 2024, by Jonathan Robinson

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Table 34. Overview of the WVI-CMPE concept.

4.31.1. Background


4.31.2. Definition

While no specific definition is given of WVI-CMPE, World Vision’s policy and Operating Manual use two definitions. The first is OCHA’s definition of civil military coordination (UN-CMCood) that is “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.” The second definition is Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) that is “The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-government organizations and agencies.” However, both the policy and operations manual revolve around the themes of coexistence, coordination, cooperation and curtail presence.
4.31.3. Overview

WVI-CMPE is from a civilian perspective to guide other civilian World Vision staff in their interactions with the military. The scope of the concept is external to guide interactions with military actors. World Vision’s policy and guidance manual are aimed at providing “guidance on the operational aspects” of World Vision’s work, which is in effect the operational and tactical levels. Little strategic level aspects of World Vision’s concept are articulated in the two documents. The paper does note that World Vision has several dedicated personnel at the global headquarters, at the regional office level, and at the country level supporting the implementation of the concept.

4.31.4. Principles

The documents outline four criteria that could be described as operating principles as part of deciding to engage an armed actor using WVI’s civil military police engagement concept. These are aligned with the 4 humanitarian principles and are:

1. *A compelling aim* – a compromise must be necessary to achieve a ‘specific’ outcome with a ‘compelling’ or important purpose that aligns with World Vision’s strategic aims.

2. *Be appropriate, adapted, and adequately informed* – a compromise must be proportionate to the aim and informed by adequate evidence and information, including existing context analysis and assessments as well as new data.

3. *Have minimal negative impact* – the object of the interaction should have the least compromising impact on the HISS principles and operating environment (i.e. all other avenues are exhausted).

4. *Be in line with the four C’s of civ-mil-police engagement* – World Vision engagement should be one of four areas on UNOCHA’s continuum of engagement – cooperation, coordination, coexistence or curtail presence.

4.31.5. Core functions

World Vision’s policy describes nine international processes related to their civil-military-police engagement:

1. **Management Framework.** That World Vision’s civil military police engagement needs to take place in a coordinated fashion and at different levels ranging from the field to the global center.

2. **Establishment of Liaison Arrangements.** That World Vision’s civil military police engagement should establish appropriate mechanisms for liaison with military actors in the event staff share operational space with such groups.
3. **Staff conduct.** That World Vision’s civil-military-police engagement should emphasize the independent and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance.

4. **Mutual Learning Sessions.** That World Vision participates in joint training and mutual learning initiatives at the national, regional, and global levels through UNOCHA, regional inter-governmental organizations and host governments as well as communicate with armed actors about basic humanitarian operational principles.

5. **Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations.** That World Vision will weigh perceived benefits of working with armed actors in disaster relief situations in line with the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief.

6. **Use of Armed Security.** World Vision recognizes that it needs to consult widely with the humanitarian community before making a decision about this exceptional circumstance.

7. **Information Sharing.** World Vision staff should actively sustain open direct and or indirect dialogue with armed actors in all circumstances but always with the clear objective of protecting civilians and enhancing mutual understanding of roles and mandates.

8. **Funding.** How World Vision should approach opportunities to receive ministry or department of defense funding opportunities

9. **Advocacy.** That World Vision avoids any engagement or advocacy that would reduce the ability of the organization to undertake its work or engagement with military actors.

4.31.6. **Structure**

World Vision has a dedicated Civil-Military-Police Engagement point of contact at the global center while in each area of operational a staff member is dedicated to monitoring engagement with armed groups or acts as a dedicated point of contact. This is typically appointed by the National Office and often the World Vision security focal point or the regional security advisor. This structure has been outlined in the below depiction:
4.3.1.7. Particularities

World Vision’s operations manual and policy are quite developed and practical in their application, rather than purely theoretical. It is also one of the few approaches that include police as an armed actor to engage with.

4.3.1.8. References


5. Other organization-specific civil-military concepts

For 27 organization-specific civil-military concepts, we could not find sufficient information to produce a factsheet. In what follows, we offer a paragraph-long explanation of different concepts used by multi-lateral organizations, national governments, non-governmental organizations, and non-state armed groups that were found but not used in the project.

5.1. National governments

**Belgium.** The Belgian Armed Forces appear to use at least two civil-military concepts, i.e. “civil-military cooperation” (BEL-CIMIC) and “civil-military engagement” (BEL-Ci-MEG). Although we could not find official documents that define each concept in detail, BEL-CIMIC is likely the national version of NATO-CIMIC. As such, it falls into the CIMIC archetype because it is a dedicated military function and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. Interestingly, the concept of BEL-Ci-MEG seems to include BEL-CIMIC and other military functions. According to social media accounts of the Belgian Armed Forces Civil-Military Engagement Group, it is “a Belgian military unit based in Heverlee and Lombardsijde. Thanks to our civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and our psychological operations (PSYOPS), we inform the local population during missions abroad. We also offer close cooperation with local aid organizations and authorities. In this way, we support the mission of our military commanding officer in the context of the security and freedom of movement of our troops.” As such, BEL-Ci-MEG also falls into the CIMIC archetype due to its parameters values for perspective (military), scope (at least external), level of applicability (at least tactical and operational), and dedicated function. However, the BEL-Ci-MEG differs from BEL-CIMIC (and other organization-specific CIMIC concepts) in its wider range of activities towards civilians, such as a psychological operation.

**Brazil.** In addition to the Brazilian Army’s concept of “civil affairs” (BRA-AsCiv), which has a factsheet of its own, the Army also employs the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (BRA-CIMIC), which forms part of the conceptual framework of BRA-AsCiv. According to its doctrine, “civil affairs” comprises two main functions: “civil-military cooperation” and “government affairs”. While “civil-military cooperation” closely follows the CIMIC archetype, i.e. it refers to the tactical- and operation-level relationships between the military force and non-military actors, “government affairs” refers to military support to civilian governmental functions (akin to the NATO-CIMIC notion of “functional specialist”). As such BRA-CIMIC also falls under the CIMIC archetype because it is a dedicated military function and has an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability.

**Colombia.** The Colombian Armed Forces does not seem to have its own CIMIC doctrine. However, due to its significant influence from the United States military, which has supported the country in its struggle against internal conflict, the Colombian Armed Forces seems to borrow a lot from the US Army Civil Affairs doctrine. Still, the Colombian Army seems to use the term “civil-military cooperation” (COL-CIMIC) and not “civil affairs”, as showcased by a recurrent “Civil-military cooperation course”. As such, we consider COL-CIMIC to take the military perspective and to have, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability, thus falling under
either the CMI or the CIMIC archetype, depending on whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not.

**Denmark.** The Danish Armed Forces seem to employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (DNK-CIMIC) consistently with NATO-CIMIC. In other words, DNK-CIMIC falls under the CIMIC archetype because it takes a military perspective, entails a dedicated function, and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. In addition to DNK-CIMIC, the Danish government has previously used the concept of “Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations” (DNK-CPA), a concept akin to the “Comprehensive Approach” but with a focus on civil-military relationships. As such, DNK-CPA falls under the CMR archetype, taking a joint perspective focused on the strategic level. DNK-CPA seems to have, at least, an internal scope intended to synchronize Danish foreign policy and military operations. However, we do not have enough information to assess whether the concept entails a dedicated function or if it has broader scope covering also actors external to the Danish government.

**Germany.** Both Germany’s civil defense and armed forces appear to use the concept of “civil-military cooperation”. However, while the German Armed Forces’ civil-military concept (DEU-CIMIC) is likely closely aligned with the NATO-CIMIC concept, it is not clear how the German civil defense defines the concept. As such, we consider DEU-CIMIC to fall under the CIMIC archetype. The concept takes the military perspective, entails dedicated function, and has, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-applicability.

**Indonesia.** In addition to the Indonesian concept of “territorial development” (IDN-Binter), which has a factsheet of its own, we have also identified the concept of “dual function” (dwifungsi, IDN-DF). IDN-DF, established by Suharto’s New Order government in Indonesia, justified the military’s permanent role in governance and politics post-Sukarno. It enabled the military, particularly the Army, to hold key governmental positions, including seats in parliament and public service roles. Originating from the Army’s expanded role during martial law in 1957, the concept of “dual function” emerged from a belief in the military’s duty to “save the nation” from political system flaws. It was formalized in the 1960s, entrenching the military’s influence across Indonesian society and government until its gradual abolition following the New Order’s collapse and the onset of the Reform era, marking a significant shift with military and police officers required to resign from service to hold political positions from 2004 onwards. As such, IDN-DF falls under the CMR category. The concept takes a joint perspective, has, at least, an internal scope, and seems to be applicable to all levels. It is not clear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not, however. While this concept is admittedly outdated, we decided to include it due to its unique nature.

**Kenya.** The Kenyan Armed Forces have previously used the term “CIMIC” (KEN-CIMIC) in news outlets. The concept seems to entail externally oriented activities conducted by the military; however, it is not clear whether the so-called “CIMIC activities” are not conducted, coordinated, or planned by dedicated CIMIC personnel. As such, we consider KEN-CIMIC to fall either under the CMI or CIMIC archetypes, depending on whether the concept entails a dedicate function or not. In addition, the Government of Kenya’s Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU) have produced a number of
documents outlining its approach to disaster response, such as a National Disaster Risk Management Policy from 2017. However, when investigating the NDMU website and this policy, there is no clear reference to a civil-military concept. As such, it has not been included in this study.

**Lebanon.** The Lebanese Armed Forces employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (LBN-CIMIC), aligned with the CIMIC archetype, as evidenced in the Army’s Civil-Military Cooperation Directorate’s website. The Directorate was established in 2015, and its main missions include coordinating civil-military activities with ministries and donor organizations, liaising with local authorities to address development needs, supervising cooperation during military operations, and managing regional sections in the North, Bekaa, and South. These regional sections focus on identifying local needs, evaluating social environments, proposing development projects, and collaborating with foreign military forces under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As such, LBN-CIMIC is a dedicated military function, with an external scope, and applicable at all levels.

**Mexico.** The Mexican Army uses the concept of “civil affairs” (MEX-AsCiv), aligned with the CIMIC archetype, i.e. the concept takes the military perspective, is externally focused, and applicable mostly at the tactical and operational levels. However, it does not always have a dedicated MEX-AsCiv branch or units. Its General Staff Manual states that MEX-AsCiv matters would be a part of its S-1 (personnel) branch, or if the magnitude of the issues requires it, a MEX-AsCiv section may be created. In addition, the manual foresees the creation of specific units to be tasked with a specific area and echelon to support, meaning that it would have a dedicated function to address Civil Affairs matters. The manual indicates that the focus would be on the tactical level, by supporting units on the ground. The main purpose would be to liaise with external non-military actors to support them or use their assets to support the military objective. Although, no structure has ever been activated.

**Nigeria.** The Nigerian Army utilizes the concept of Civil-Military Affairs (NGA-CMA), which falls under the CMR archetype. The Directorate of Civil-Military Affairs serves “primarily as an interface between the Nigerian Army and the Civil Populace. [...] The Department is also charged with the introducing and transmitting the core elements of effective civil-military relations in areas of human rights, rule of law, negotiations liaison and conflict management”. Though NGA-CMA takes a military perspective and entails a dedicated function, it is distinct from CIMIC due to its focus on the strategic level and lack of tactical applicability, thus falling under the CMR archetype. In addition, the Nigerian Armed Forces have engaged in initiatives to improve Civil-Military Cooperation (NGA-CIMIC) and respect for human rights during operations in partnership with the European Union. These efforts aim to address challenges and gaps in civil-military relations, particularly in the context of internal security operations against insurgency and other criminal activities. The collaboration includes training programs for military and law enforcement agencies on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, reflecting Nigeria’s commitment to aligning its CIMIC activities with international best practices. Additionally, the program involves the creation of a civil-military cooperation handbook and the training of experts in CIMIC and human rights. Specific details about a publicly available NGA-CIMIC doctrine or manual for the Nigerian Armed Forces were not widely published or easily accessible in the public domain. Still, we consider NGA-CIMIC to take the military perspective and be, at least externally
oriented and applicable at the tactical and operational levels. It remains unclear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not, and, as such, the concept falls under the CMI or CMI archetypes.

**Norway.** The Norwegian Armed Forces, in alignment with the NATO-CIMIC concept, use the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (NOR-CIMIC), representing a military capability falling under the CIMIC archetype. NOR-CIMIC entails a dedicated function with, at least, an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. In addition, the Norwegian government also employs the concept of “civil-military collaboration” (NOR-SIMIS), which refers to intergovernmental relations between civilian and military bodies in the context of total defense. NOR-SIMIS consists of three aspects: “civilian support to the armed forces, the armed forces’ support to civil society and a management element at authority level.” NOR-SIMIS takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, does not entail a dedicated function, and seems to be applicable at all levels. As such, it falls under the CMI category.

**People’s Republic of China.** In the Chinese context, Civil-Military Integration (CHN-CMI) and Military-Civil Fusion (CHN-MCF) are strategic-level concepts focused on military and civilian industrial complexes and research and development. It is unclear whether the concepts entail a dedicated function or not. Still, both concepts fall in the CMR archetype. The main logic behind both concepts is to harness the synergies of military and civilian research, development, and production capabilities. According to an early definition, civil-military integration includes “cooperation between government and commercial facilities in research and development […], manufacturing, and/or maintenance operations; combined production of similar military and commercial items, including components and subsystems, side by side on a single production line or within a single firm or facility, and use of commercial off-the-shelf items directly within military systems”. Both concepts are essentially economic and defense strategies largely focused on the dual-use nature of key technologies, infrastructure, and human resources. In theory, this integration should create synergies and benefits both to the civilian and military sides of the relationship. While civil-military integration initially concentrated on military capabilities to support the broader civilian economy, current debates on military-civil fusion center on creating military advantages through civilian-led innovation. As such, the two concepts are best seen in a continuum.

**Philippines.** The Philippine Armed Forces use the term “civil-military affairs” (PHL-CMA) to represent their CIMIC capabilities. PHL-CMA entails a dedicated military function with at least an external scope and tactical- and operational-level applicability. This term “civil-military affairs” was perhaps chosen (instead of “civil affairs” or “civil-military cooperation”) due to Australia’s proximity and military influence since the term was used by the Australia-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) from 1999 to 2000 to represent what we now call CIMIC. The term seems to have outlived INTERFET and continued to be used in the UN missions in the country, namely the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor from 1999 to 2002 and the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor from 2002 to 2005.

**Sweden.** The Swedish government, including the Swedish Armed Forces, seems to employ two related concepts, i.e. “civil-military cooperation” (civil-militär samverkan, SWE-CMS) and “cooperation between authorities” (myndighetssamverkan). However, these concepts do not seem to be well defined. In a 2012 report, the Swedish Defence Research Agency pointed out that “in the
absence of clear common definitions of civil-military cooperation and cooperation between authorities, civil authorities often regard cooperation between authorities as a comprehensive concept and civil-military cooperation as part of cooperation between authorities”. According to the same report, regular cooperation between authorities often corresponds with the armed forces’ task to use existing abilities and resources to assist other government bodies. It seems like SWE-CMS takes a joint perspective and has at least an internal scope and tactical- and operational applicability. It is unclear whether the concept entails dedicated function and in which levels it operates. As such, SWE-CMS does not clearly fall under any category but seems to be closer to CMI than to other archetypes.

**Tunisia.** Recent publications on the Tunisian Armed Forces’ support of the COVID-19 pandemic highlight the role of “civil-military cooperation” (TUN-CIMIC) in coordinating the response. In particular, two studies mention CIMIC daily, weekly, and monthly reports, as well as a CIMIC plan. TUN-CIMIC takes a military perspective and has, at least, an external scope and tactical and operational-level applicability. However, it remains unclear whether the concept entails a dedicated function or not. As such, TUN-CIMIC may fall under the CMI or the CIMIC archetypes.

**Türkiye.** The Turkish Armed Forces seem to employ the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (TUR-CIMIC), as shown in a recent news piece. TUR-CIMIC appears to involve military activities towards external civilians; however, it is uncertain whether the activities portrayed as “CIMIC activities” are carried out, organized, or planned by specifically assigned CIMIC personnel. Therefore, we view TUR-CIMIC as fitting into either the CMI or CIMIC categories, depending on whether the concept includes a dedicated function or not. In addition, Türkiye’s Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) is the country’s primary disaster response agency and seems to follow EU standards and concepts. Still, not enough information was found in public sources to produce a factsheet about the country’s organization-specific civil-military concepts.

**Ukraine.** In addition to the concept of “civil-military cooperation” (UKR-CIMIC), used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in 2015, the Ukrainian parliament coined the concept of “civil-military administration” (viis’kovo-tys’vil’ni administratsii, UKR-CMA). Civil-military administrations are temporary local government units established in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine in response to the War in Donbas from 2015 to 2022. These administrations were created under the authority of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the Security Service of Ukraine. Civil-military administrations are formed when locally elected governments are unable to exercise their powers, and they continue to function until newly elected local government units assume office. The specific locations and details of civil-military administrations may have changed since 2022 due to Russia’s full-scale invasion, and additional information is required for an update. The concept takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, and is applicable at the strategic level (i.e. the province administration level). It is unclear whether UKR-CMA entails a dedicated function or not. As such, UKR-CMA falls under the CMR archetype.

**Venezuela.** In Venezuela, the concept of “civic-military union” (unión civil-militar, VEN-UCM) reflects a unique approach to civil-military relations, emphasizing collaboration between the military and civilian sectors. This concept, which gained prominence in 2002, has been a cornerstone of the country’s governance model, especially under the leadership of President Hugo
Chávez. It symbolizes the integration of military and civilian efforts in national development and security, highlighting the role of popular support in maintaining this union. The creation of the Bolivarian National Militia in 2008 is a manifestation of this concept. This force operates separately from the traditional armed forces and includes civilians recruited to support the government’s objectives. The Militia embodies the principle of civic-military union by blurring the lines between civilian and military roles, fostering a sense of shared responsibility for the nation’s defense and development. This approach has led to the military being deeply involved in various aspects of Venezuelan society, from social programs to governance, underpinned by the idea of a partnership between the military and the civilian population in pursuit of common goals. Civic-military union and the Bolivarian National Militia reflect Venezuela’s distinctive approach to integrating the military into the broader societal and political framework. This model emphasizes the role of the military not just in defense, but also as an active participant in national development and in ensuring internal stability, with the support and involvement of the civilian population. We consider VEN-UCM to fall under the CMR archetype. The concept takes a joint perspective, has an internal scope, and is applicable at the strategic level. It remains unclear whether VEN-UCM entails a dedicated function or not.

5.2. Multilateral organizations

World Food Program. According to a publicly available 2013 directive, the World Food Program employs the concept of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (WFP-CMC), for which we have compiled a factsheet. However, in practice, the organization no longer uses the concept of WFP-CMC and, instead, has recently developed the concept of Humanitarian-Military Interaction (WFP-HMI). The policies and guidelines defining this concept, however, are closed to public access. It seems clear that WFP-HMI fall under the CMCoord category, i.e. a civilian, humanitarian dedicated function, focused on the coordination between humanitarian and military actors, mainly at the tactical and operational levels. However, it remains unclear whether WFP-CMC differs from WFP-HMI.

5.3. Non-governmental organizations

Mercy Corps International. According to a 2018 report entitled “Playbook: Negotiating Humanitarian Access”, Mercy Corps International, an American-based international NGO, has shown some institutionalization of humanitarian civil-military coordination in what they label “engagement with armed groups” (MCI-EwAG). MCI-EwAG takes the civilian, humanitarian perspective, is externally oriented, and focused primarily at the tactical and operational levels. It is unclear whether MCI-EwAG entails a dedicated function or not. As such, the concept falls either under the CMI or CMCoord archetypes.

Save the Children International. In addition to the concepts of “civil-military relations” (SCI-CIVMIL) and “civil-military coordination” (SCI-CMCoord), Save the Children International (SCI) has also used “civil-military engagement” (SCI-CME) in some publications and job descriptions. At the
time of writing, there was no publicly available formal definition of either concept. According to informal conversations, SCI is in the process of updating its policies related to civil-military relationships and should publish a concept note on the topic shortly. Still, SCI-CME seems to be closely aligned with, and perhaps an updated version of, SCI-CMCoord. As such, we consider SCI-CME to fall under the CMCoord archetype.

5.4. Non-state armed groups

*Movement for the Liberation of the Congo.* The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo’s armed wing, the Congo Liberation Army (ALC), in their statute, prescribes a branch in their organization focused on “Civil and Political Affairs” (*affaires civiles et politiques*, MLC-ACP), similar to standard military staff organizations: “Placed under the chief command of the President, the ALC constitutes the armed wing of the Movement. The General Staff of the ALC is composed of the Commander of the Army, Chief of Staff, the G1 in charge of Personnel, the G2 in charge of Intelligence, the G3 in charge of Operations, the G4 in charge of Logistics, the G5 in charge of Civil and Political Affairs. All are appointed and relieved of their post by the Commander-in-Chief of the ALC after a favorable opinion of the Politico-Military Council. The Army Commander, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, namely the President of the MLC, coordinates the activities of the General Staff and the troops. He executes the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief of the ALC.” As such, MLC-ACP is a dedicated military function focused on the relationship with external civilian and political actors. It is unclear, however, at which level the concept operates. Depending on the level of applicability, the concept could fall under the CMR or the CIMIC archetypes.

*Various Communist groups.* Several Communist groups use the adjective “politeo-military” to qualify their doctrines, strategies, and actions. The concept refers to the integrated and inseparable nature of political and military activities. It emphasizes the fusion of political ideology and military strategy, where armed struggle is seen as an extension of the political struggle. In this context, the politico-military approach entails a comprehensive and coordinated effort to achieve political objectives through armed means. It involves not only the use of force and military tactics but also political mobilization, propaganda, recruitment, and organizational development. The goal is to establish a revolutionary society by combining political ideology with armed resistance, with the belief that military actions should be guided by and serve the political agenda of the group. Because this concept is not clearly defined by any specific group, we decided to leave it out from the conceptual analysis in this study.
6. Contexts and organizations without relevant concepts

For seven countries, four multilateral organizations, three international NGOs, and 238 non-state armed groups, we could not find any readily-available information through open-source searches on the internet (as discussed in the main body of this report). This does not necessarily mean that the concepts for these entities are not present, but it does mean that information about them is not readily available. In what follows, we list those contexts and organizations with a brief explanation of our search.

6.1. National governments

**Egypt.** After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Egypt to make a factsheet and include in this paper.

**Finland.** Finland does not seem to have a specific civil-military concept. The Finnish military does acknowledge the 9th function (i.e. CIMIC) but does not organize its staff as such. CIMIC personnel have been and are deployed in multilateral operations, such as UN peacekeeping missions, and have thus conformed to the concept of UN-CIMIC. It is not clear, however, whether the Finnish Armed Forces have institutionalized the concept. Formally, the Finnish government employs the concepts of “coordination of measures” (yhteensövitettäminen; toimintojen yhteensövitettäminen), “cooperation” (yhteistoiminta, yhteistyö), “inter-authority cooperation” (viranomaistyö), “mutual assistance between authorities” (virka-apu), but none of these are specifically focused on civil-military relations.

**India.** The Indian Armed Forces have a long and strong tradition in UN peacekeeping operations and, accordingly, have experience in UN-CIMIC. In addition, the Indian Government’s Ministry of Home Affairs National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) was established in 2006. The NDRF is organized along military structures (i.e. battalions) and largely responds domestically but has conducted foreign disaster response in the past, notably in Nepal (2015) and Türkiye (2023). However, despite several policies and documents present on its website, we could not identify any organization-specific civil-military concept.

**Ireland.** The Irish Armed Forces have previously deployed CIMIC personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and conducted UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord courses. Likewise, Ireland’s civil defense appears to follow EU concepts and standards. However, we could not identify any organization-specific civil-military concept.

**Israel.** After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Israel to make a factsheet and include in this paper.

**Syria.** After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for Syria to make a factsheet and include in this paper.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom (UK) military follows directly the NATO-CIMIC and NATO-CIMIC concepts. Indeed, the UK’s Ministry of Defense 2006 doctrine on civil-military cooperation was archived after it was replaced by the NATO-CIMIC doctrine in 2018.

6.2. Multilateral organizations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for ASEAN to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for CDEMA to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for OSCE to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

Organization of American States (OAS). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for OAS to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

6.3. Non-governmental organizations

Danish Refugee Council (DRC). After online searches, we could not find enough publicly available information about any civil-military concept for DRC to make a fact sheet and include in this paper.

International Federation of the Red Cross. The IFRC seems to follow the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (Movement-CMR), as evidenced in several documents; see its factsheet for more information.

International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC seems to follow the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Civil-Military Relations (Movement-CMR), as evidenced in several documents; see its factsheet for more information. However, the ICRC employs specific terms in its organizational structure. For example, at the headquarters in Geneva, the “Unit for Relations with Arms Carriers” is responsible for supporting the engagement with state militaries, police forces, non-state armed groups, and armed criminal organizations by providing practitioner expertise from former senior military and law enforcement officers, working as part of the institution’s multi-disciplinary teams. Relatedly, the ICRC deploys delegates with specific job titles, such as “Armed Forces Delegate”, “Non-state Armed Groups Delegate”, and “Police and Security Forces Delegate”, who are responsible for facilitating the relationship between ICRC and such actors. We consider that these concepts do not amount to specific concepts, but terminological variations with little conceptual weight. Thus, we decided not to include in this study.
6.4. Non-state armed groups

In this study, we reviewed codes of conduct, internal statutes, unilateral declarations, and other official documents issued by 240 non-state armed groups, as contained in the repository maintained by the Swiss-based NGO, Geneva Call, “Their Words: the Directory of Armed Groups and de facto Authorities’ Humanitarian Commitments.” However, the overwhelming majority (i.e. 238) of the groups have no clearly defined organization-specific civil-military concepts.