

## International Assistance Spending Due to War on Terror

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### *Introduction*

Each year since the “war on terror” began, Congress has appropriated money for “international assistance,” primarily to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This money would not have been appropriated or spent had the “war on terror” not happened. There are two types of international assistance, security (in other words, military) assistance, and non-security assistance, typically humanitarian or economic aid. The key agencies involved in administering this aid are the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Most, but not all, security assistance is appropriated to and administered by the DOD. For example, the foreign military financing program is considered security-related assistance, but is administered by the Department of State. Of the assistance not already counted in our research on Pentagon spending for the wars, the sum for international assistance totaled \$66.7 billion by 2011.<sup>1</sup> This paper also discusses some of the money received by the Pentagon because it constitutes and exemplifies what the U.S. government considers “international assistance.”

### *Estimates*

Congress has appropriated a total of \$66.7 billion to the Department of State or USAID since 2001 for activities that are directly the result of the Bush and Obama administration’s wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. This is incremental spending which would not have been spent had the administration not prosecuted wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. As can be seen in Table 1, more than one-quarter of this money was appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Since 2005, an average of \$5.5 billion was appropriated each year. Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service has been tracking this spending based on government documents including appropriations legislation and agency financial reports.<sup>2</sup>

Table 1: Estimated International Assistance Funding Related to War According to Military Operation: Department of State/USAID (in current dollars)

<b>Operation</b>	<b>FY01 &amp; FY02</b>	<b>FY03</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>FY08</b>	<b>FY09</b>	<b>FY10</b>	<b>FY11</b>	<b>Total FY01- 11</b>
Iraq	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	2.7	2.2	3.3	2.3	41.4
Afghanistan & Pakistan	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	2.7	3.1	5.7	4.1	25.1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>66.7</b>

Source: A. Belasco, ‘The cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11,’ Congressional Research Service, RL33110, March 29, 2011. Note that this is by military operation and not by country, though the vast majority of the money indicated would have been for programs in Iraq or Afghanistan.

<sup>1</sup> In 2011 dollars, the total comes to \$74.2 billion.

<sup>2</sup> Belasco, A. “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110, March 29, 2011.

The Department of Defense received \$83 billion for international assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan related to prosecuting wars in those countries through fiscal year 2011. These amounts are displayed according to fiscal year in Table 2.<sup>3</sup>

Taken together, \$150 billion has been spent on international assistance due to war with more than half spent (or will be spent) by the Department of Defense.

Table 2: Estimated International Assistance Funding Related to War: Department of Defense (in billions of current dollars)

Operation	FY01 & FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	Total FY01-11
Iraq		0.9	0.1	6.3	3.7	6.3	4.0	1.3	1.2	2.2	26.0
Afghanistan	0.0	0.2	0.4	1.9	2.2	7.9	3.4	6.4	10.5	12.7	45.6
Pakistan		0.0	3.1*	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.3	2.2	0.9	11.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>83.0</b>

Sources: C. Tarnoff, "Iraq: reconstruction assistance," Congressional Research Service, RL31833, August 7, 2009; C. Tarnoff, "Afghanistan: U.S. foreign assistance," Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 12, 2010; other documents obtained by the author from C. Tarnoff; K.A. Kronstadt, "Direct overt U.S. aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2011", prepared for the Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011; K.A. Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. relations: a summary," Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2011.

\*The number for fiscal year 2004 for Pakistan actually represents any spending between fiscal years 2002 and 2004.

The DOD has played a key role in international assistance aside from the money it was appropriated. The agency has also been key in the oversight of Department of State and USAID reconstruction projects. For example, of the \$18.4 billion appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund in fiscal year 2004, more than \$10 billion was administered by the DOD.

### *How the Money Was Spent*

Tables 3, 4 and 5 break down assistance spending through fiscal year 2010 for Department of State and USAID programs that are specifically in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> With respect to Iraq, nearly three-quarters of the assistance money has been for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and 16 percent for the Economic Support Fund, which is a long-standing international assistance program that funds a variety of development activities. The Economic Support Fund is not intended as military aid, but it is generally considered security aid by government documents such as the Greenbook, which is the USAID publication on assistance. The reason it is often considered security/military aid is because it frees up the budgets of recipient governments to spend more on their militaries, though this may not necessarily be the case for Iraq or Afghanistan. Another 4 percent of money allocated to Iraq was for the International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Program. All other programs, such as refugee and disaster assistance received less than \$1 billion as shown in Table 3.

<sup>3</sup> Note that Kronstadt presents data for Pakistan according to "security-related assistance" and "economic assistance." I have rearranged his data according to the "050 National Security" and "150 International Assistance" budget accounts to identify those programs administered by the DOD. Security-related programs include, for example, foreign military financing, which is administered by the Department of State.

<sup>4</sup> At the time of publication, data for fiscal year 2011 was still a little less reliable, so these tables only breakdown spending through fiscal year 2010.

With respect to Afghanistan, nearly 60 percent of spending was for the Economic Support Fund, 15 percent was the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program, and 6 percent was on Foreign Military Financing, enabling the government to purchase military equipment. Less than \$1 billion was spent on all other programs. Table 4 displays the breakdowns among programs.

In the case of Pakistan, more than half of Department of State/USAID program funding was allocated to the Economic Support Fund followed by nearly a quarter for Foreign Military Financing. Total spending on Child Survival and Health, disaster assistance, food aid, and development assistance only constituted 14 percent of State/USAID funds, as shown in Table 5.

Table 3: Breakdown of International Affairs spending in Iraq, 2003-2010 (in millions of dollars)<sup>5</sup>

<b>IRAQ</b>	<b>2003-2010</b>
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IRRF)	\$20,874.0
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	4,565.2
Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	1,068.4
Migration & Refugee Assistance (MRA)	643.9
Other USAID Funds	493.7
Democracy Fund	325.0
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	210.0
Nonproliferation, Anti-terror, De-mining (NADR)	108.2
Treasury Department Technical Assistance (IFTA)	15.8
International Military Education & Training Program (IMET)	6.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$28,310.5</b>

Sources: C. Tarnoff, "Iraq: reconstruction assistance," Congressional Research Service, RL31833, August 7, 2009; and other documents provided by C. Tarnoff to author.

Table 4: Breakdown of International Affairs Spending in Afghanistan, 2002-2010 (in millions of dollars)<sup>6</sup>

<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>	<b>2002-2010</b>
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	\$11,009.5
Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	2,854.3
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	1,058.5
Food Aid	978.6
Development Assistance	887.1
Refugee Accounts: MRA/ERMA	603.3
Global Health/Child Survival	486.5
Nonproliferation, Anti-terror, De-mining (NADR)	371.6
Int'l Disaster Assistance (IDA)	346.4
Other	180.7
International Military Education & Training Program (IMET)	8.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$18,784.8</b>

Source: C. Tarnoff, "Afghanistan: U.S. foreign assistance," Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 12, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> In other words, this table displays only that spending which falls under the budget account "150 International Assistance." It does not include Department of Defense programs, the numbers for which are presented in Table 2 and Table 6. These programs are administered by the Departments of State or Agriculture or USAID.

<sup>6</sup> In other words, this table displays only that spending which falls under the budget account "150 International Assistance." It does not include Department of Defense programs, the numbers for which are presented in Table 2 and Table 6. These programs are administered by the Departments of State or Agriculture or USAID.

Table 5: Breakdown of International Affairs Spending in Pakistan, 2002-2010 (in millions of dollars)<sup>7</sup>

<b>PAKISTAN</b>	<b>2002-2010</b>
Economic Support Fund	\$4,785.0
Foreign Military Financing	2,160.0
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	528.0
International Disaster Assistance	388.0
Food Aid	380.0
Development Assistance	286.0
Child Survival and Health	220.0
Migration and Refugee Assistance	144.0
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related	87.0
International Military Education and Training	18.0
Human Rights and Democracy Funds	17.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$9,013.0</b>

Source: K.A. Kronstadt, "Direct overt U.S. aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2011", prepared for the Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011 and K.A. Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. relations: a summary," Congressional Research Service, May 16, 2011.

Spending allocated to the Department of Defense for war-related international assistance supports different programs, primarily to support the military of those countries. As can be seen in Table 6, 80 percent of DOD funding for international assistance in Iraq was for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, 85 percent in Afghanistan was for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, and 84 percent in Pakistan was Coalition Support Funds. The Commanders' Emergency Response Program, the second largest DOD international assistance program in Iraq and Afghanistan, is intended to provide military commanders to provide small grants to villages for reconstruction and relief. The intention of such is to enhance the security environment of U.S. troops, in other words, lessen the hostility of the Iraqis or Afghans.

**Table 6: International Assistance Programs - Department of Defense**

<b>IRAQ</b>	<b>FY2001-FY2010</b>
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)	18,940.3
Iraq Army	261.2
Commanders' Emergency Response Program	3,698.0
Oil Repair	802.0
Iraq Freedom Fund - Business Support	100.0
<b>TOTAL - IRAQ</b>	<b>23,801.5</b>
<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>	
Afghan Security Forces Fund	27,829.2
Commanders' Emergency Response Program	2,639.0
Counternarcotics	1,425.3
Other	997.5
<b>TOTAL - AFGHANISTAN</b>	<b>32,891.0</b>
<b>PAKISTAN</b>	
Counternarcotics Funds	225.0
Coalition Support Funds	8,881.0
Pakistan Frontier Corp Training and Equipment	312.0
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund	1,100.0
<b>TOTAL - PAKISTAN</b>	<b>10,518.0</b>

Sources: C. Tarnoff, "Iraq: reconstruction assistance," Congressional Research Service, RL31833, August 7, 2009; C. Tarnoff, "Afghanistan: U.S. foreign assistance," Congressional Research Service, R40699, August 12, 2010; other documents obtained by

<sup>7</sup> In other words, this table displays only that spending which falls under the budget account "150 International Assistance." It does not include Department of Defense programs, the numbers for which are presented in Table 2 and Table 6. These programs are administered by the Departments of State or Agriculture or USAID.

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the author from C. Tarnoff; K.A. Kronstadt, "Direct overt U.S. aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2011", prepared for the Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011.

The popular notion of international assistance programs is that these programs deliver immediate disaster relief needed, or enhance the well-being of people through economic development. As can be seen from the above discussion, more than half of the allocation is military related Department of Defense spending, while the nature of many State Department and USAID programs is inherently military or "security" related.

For example, reorganizing the programs according to security-related and economic-related as K.A. Kronstadt has done, 68 percent (\$13.3 billion) of international assistance to Pakistan,<sup>8</sup> 48 percent of funding to Iraq, and 72 percent of funding to Afghanistan is security-related. By making these calculations, I am including Foreign Military Financing; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Anti-Terror, De-Mining; and International Military Education and Training, in addition to the Department of Defense programs.

Much of other international assistance has been an effort to address destruction caused by the war. For example, for the majority of months in 2004, 2005 and 2006, electricity production was below the pre-war level.<sup>9</sup> Crude oil production and export, a key indicator of the Iraqi economy because of its economic dependence on raw material extraction (oil) by the end of 2010 still did not exceed pre-war levels.

Moreover, aid to Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan flows back to the United States and other western countries. For example, 40 percent of aid to Afghanistan flows back to western countries in the form of costly western contractors and consultants.<sup>10</sup> This raises the issue of income distribution as the money from U.S. taxpayers flows to other countries and then back to private military contractors.

### ***Examples of Spending***

One example of international assistance spending is the Basrah pediatric facility in Iraq which indicates the difficulty of attempting to re-build a country in the midst of war. USAID was authorized by Congress to build a 50-bed state-of-the-art pediatric facility for \$50 million. Additional funding for the project was provided by Project HOPE, a nonprofit development organization. After deliberations with the Iraqi Ministry of Health, the scope of the project expanded to 94 beds, but no additional U.S. government funding was provided. USAID contracted Bechtel to complete the hospital by the end of 2005. In 2006, Bechtel reported that the completion date had slipped to July 2007 and that the cost had increased to \$98 million due to delays and subcontractor problems.<sup>11</sup> Security posed particular challenges to the project. Bechtel was removed from the project and it was taken over by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The hospital was finally opened in October, 2010 costing \$166 million.

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<sup>8</sup>K.A. Kronstadt, "Direct overt U.S. aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2011", prepared for the Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2011.

<sup>9</sup> M. O'Hanlon and I. Livingston, "Iraq index: tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-Saddam Iraq," Brookings Institute, December 30, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). "Review of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Management of the Basrah Children's Hospital Project," SIGIR 06-026, July 21, 2006.

Because of the large sums of money involved and the use of private contractors, there is ample opportunity for fraud, waste and abuse. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts audits and has found “anomalies” which include duplicate payments and fictitious contractors. By the fourth quarter of 2010, SIGIR opened 53 criminal investigations.<sup>12</sup>

Aside from criminal activities, contracting has been problematic and programs have suffered from bad planning. The Advanced First Responder Network project in Iraq would provide a national command, control and communications system for the Iraqi police, medical and fire personnel. The project has mostly been a failure. U.S. government officials assumed that the network could be constructed on top of the existing fiber-optic and electrical system in Iraq, an assumption that proved unreasonable. Even if the infrastructural shortcomings were resolved, the lack of enough trained personnel would still not result in an effective first responder system.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Assistance Prior to War***

Aside from the fact that the appropriations in our total for international assistance were made specifically because of the war on terror, it should be noted that Iraq and Afghanistan received little to no aid from the U.S. prior to war. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. economic assistance amounted to \$54 million in 2000. The amounts are displayed in Table 7 for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq from 1995 to 2000.

Table 7: U.S. Economic Assistance Prior to War on Terror (in millions of current dollars)

Year	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Iraq
1995	\$12.56	\$17.1	\$0.2
1996	16.6	17.2	7.3
1997	32.6	43.9	8.0
1998	8.5	28.3	0.1
1999	35.4	80.5	0.1
2000	54.1	36.8	1.1

Source: USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants.”

### ***Coalition of the Willing***

Spending is also allocated for the “Coalition of the Willing,” those countries which have officially declared support for the war. Pakistan has received more than three-quarters of such funds, around \$12 billion. While the U.S. received greater international support for the war on Afghanistan, it received far less international approval for invading Iraq. It is alleged by critics that countries have been induced to join the “coalition of the willing” by receiving military and economic assistance. For most countries, there was little cost to signing onto to be part of the “coalition.” But was there any real benefit and did this amount to an additional cost to the U.S. of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq?

By combing through government reports and press reports of countries with troops in Iraq, I estimate that a total of forty-six countries were part of the Multinational Force in Iraq.<sup>14</sup> Additional NATO countries have provided support for the war in Afghanistan. Some

<sup>12</sup> Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). “Iraq Reconstruction Funds: Forensic Audits Identifying Fraud, Waste and Abuse, Interim Report #5,” SIGIR 11-005, October 28, 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). “Review of the Advanced First Responder Network,” SIGIR 06-20, July 28, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Includes Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan,

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Middle Eastern countries have also pledged humanitarian or aid contributions for Afghanistan or Iraq, or allowed the U.S. access for military movements. A compilation of countries which had at least three troops in Iraq is presented in Appendix B along with the dates at which the peak number from each country was most recently present in Iraq.

Few countries really participated in any meaningful way with respect to prosecuting the war in Iraq, in spite of the Bush administration's repeated references to the "coalition." The exception to this was the UK, which provided around two-thirds of all non-U.S. troops. Few countries still had troops in Iraq by 2008 and the vast majority of the countries – thirty-six or nearly 80 percent – had fewer than one thousand troops.


While there was little cost to agreeing to be part of the coalition – apart from the UK – there may have also been little benefit, and thus, little cost to the U.S. Based on an analysis of data from the USAID, I estimate that aid to "coalition" countries rose roughly in line with aid to non-coalition countries, so signing on did not necessarily guarantee more aid. In examining patterns of the individual countries, some countries received increased assistance while others received decreases. For example, the United Kingdom, a country that had not received aid since the 1950s for obvious reasons, received as much as \$20 million in 2007. Nevertheless, these small amounts of money to a developed country like the UK would hardly induce participation when clearly its expenses greatly exceeded these amounts and the loss of 179 British soldiers.

Other countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose populations were against the Iraq War, did have costs of involvement off-set by the U.S. Clearly these nations' governments were primarily interested in developing and maintaining positive relations with the United States as they were relatively new members of NATO.

Yet, there are countries such as Uzbekistan where U.S. money has flowed in order to induce cooperation, in this case for the war in Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan began modestly after the break-up of the Soviet Union with funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program beginning in 1993. In 2001, Uzbekistan agreed to assist the war in Afghanistan by allowing U.S. access to the military base in Karshi-Khanabad. Assistance, particularly military, increased significantly. Assistance to Uzbekistan has slowed at least in part because of its well-known and well-documented human rights abuses and turtle-like progress toward institutional reform. It remains a kleptocracy. The jump in aid after 2001, and the subsequent decrease is illustrated in Figure 1. Total assistance to Uzbekistan since 2001 totals nearly half a billion dollars.

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Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan.

**Figure 1: U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Uzbekistan (in millions of current dollars)**

### ***Can the U.S. Expect Re-payment?***

There is another side of counting the costs of war for the U.S. government. The first Persian Gulf War had *military* costs of \$61 billion. But almost 90 percent of those costs, \$54 billion, were off-set by other countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It is possible that significant contributions for reconstruction in Afghanistan or Iraq may off-set U.S. spending.

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the World Bank, and United Nations Development Group estimated that \$55 billion would be required for Iraqi reconstruction over a four-year period. These organizations must have assumed that the war would quickly end and thus less destruction would take place, and that it would be easier to proceed with reconstruction than it actually has. By 2007, countries (excluding the U.S.) and multilateral organizations pledged \$16.4 billion in grants and loans for Iraqi reconstruction. More than 80 percent of the pledges were made at a donor conference in Madrid in 2003, shortly after the U.S. invasion. The largest pledges came from Japan, the European Union, the UK, Canada, South Korea and United Arab Emirates. However, two-thirds of the pledges were loans. By late 2007, Iraq accepted about 20 percent of the loans, and \$4.8 billion of the grants were made available.<sup>15</sup>

Unlike the first Persian Gulf War, contributions to Iraqi reconstruction are contributions to Iraq. They are not intended to off-set U.S. costs. None of the money the U.S. has expended will be reimbursed through future payments by other countries.

<sup>15</sup> Blanchard, C.M. and C.M. Dale. "Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction," Congressional Research Service, RL32105, December 26, 2007.



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The case of Afghanistan is slightly different because the U.S. has pledged more than it has provided in aid. One-third of total aid pledged to Afghanistan is from the U.S. Other major donors include Japan, the UK and the European Commission. However, the U.S. has only disbursed about half of its pledge.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the figures provided above for international assistance spending should reflect the additional \$5.3 billion if the U.S. is to live up to its commitment.

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
<sup>16</sup> Waldman, M. "Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan," ACBAR Advocacy Series, March 2008.

**Appendix A – About the International Affairs Budget**

International Affairs is a category of the U.S. federal budget and is made up of five sub-categories: (1) international development and humanitarian assistance; (2) international security assistance, which is essentially military assistance to other countries; (3) conduct of foreign affairs which covers diplomatic activities; (4) foreign information and exchange activities for broadcasting to other countries like Cuba and cultural exchange programs; and (5) international financial programs, of which 95 percent was for foreign military sales in fiscal year 2010.

Total spending for International Affairs was \$67.4 billion in fiscal year 2010 and made up less than 2 percent of the total federal budget for that year. The breakdown by sub-category is illustrated in Figure 1. Since 2000, the International Affairs budget has nearly tripled,<sup>17</sup> increasing by \$44.7 billion from \$22.6 billion. Even after controlling for inflation the budget more than doubled with an increase of 132%.

The total accumulated increases since 2000 was \$161.9 billion. Approximately 36 percent of this increase was directly due to the war on terror.



<sup>17</sup> Even after controlling for inflation, the 150 budget more than doubled with an increase of 132% between 2000 and 2010.

**Appendix B: Coalition Troops in Iraq**

Country	Number of Troops at Peak	Latest Date Peak Troop Numbers Were in Iraq
Total (non-U.S.)	70,247	4/12/2003
UK	45,000	4/12/2003
South Korea	3,600	3/16/2005
Italy	3,169	11/3/2004
Poland	2,500	2/10/2005
Ukraine	2,000	4/8/2004
Australia	2,000	4/12/2003
Georgia	2,000	3/21/2008
Netherlands	1,500	3/15/2005
Spain	1,432	4/20/2004
Thailand	900	9/3/2003
Romania	865	2/15/2007
Japan	600	6/26/2006
Denmark	540	8/16/2005
Bulgaria	500	4/30/2005
El Salvador	400	4/12/2003
Honduras	370	4/20/2004
Czech	317	12/3/2003
Dominican Republic	302	4/20/2004
Hungary	300	11/4/2004
Albania	240	9/5/2008
Mongolia	180	3/15/2005
Norway	179	4/9/2004
Philippines	178	11/29/2003
Azerbaijan	151	8/16/2005
Latvia	150	12/3/2003
Portugal	128	4/9/2004
Lithuania	120	8/16/2005
Nicaragua	115	12/3/2003
Slovakia	110	6/20/2004
New Zealand	61	3/17/2004
Estonia	55	12/11/2004
Moldova	50	3/17/2004
Armenia	46	10/9/2007
Tonga	45	12/11/2004
Macedonia	40	10/9/2007
Bosnia Herzegovina	37	2/15/2007
Singapore	33	7/15/2004
Kazakh	30	3/15/2005
Slovenia	4	10/9/2007

Source: This list is according to "MNFI Troops" by Jason DeJoannis downloaded on December 6, 2010 at <http://sites.google.com/site/mnfitroops/home>