Training and/or Assistance: The U.S. military, State Department or other agencies trained or assisted this country's security forces in counterterrorism.

U.S. Military Exercises: This country hosted formal U.S. military exercises intended to deter militants, train local forces and/or build strategic partnerships to combat terrorism.

Active 127e Program: U.S. service members could have conducted operations against foreign militants here using military units from this country as surrogates.

Air and Drone Strikes: The U.S. conducted direct air and/or drone strikes against militant targets in this country.
This map shows 85 countries where the United States government carried out counterterrorism operations in 2018, 2019, and/or 2020. U.S. actions were quite varied, ranging from air strikes against militant targets to training foreign military and police forces. These U.S. military operations and other programs run out of civilian departments for military purposes around the world have grown out of President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror” and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The goal of this visual representation of post-9/11 operations is to convey the broad reach of U.S. government activities to fight what it and partner countries call “terrorism” or “violent extremism.”

The map focuses on operations the U.S. explicitly justifies using the language of counterterrorism. According to the Pentagon, counterterrorism encompasses “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.” The map includes counterterrorism operations by the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and other U.S. agencies abroad.

U.S. operations in 2018, 2019, and 2020 are shown in four categories (defined in greater detail in the Appendix):

1. Countries where the U.S. conducted direct air and/or drone strikes against militant groups (seven, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen);

2. Countries where U.S. service members engaged in combat, using force on the ground against militants (eight, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen). Additionally, this category includes four other countries (Cameroon, Libya, Niger, and Tunisia) with active “Section 127e” programs. Section 127e is a U.S. legal authority that allows U.S. special operations forces to plan and control certain missions, remaining in charge of, rather than simply at the side of, the African counterparts they are ostensibly advising and assisting. Thus U.S. service members on the ground in these countries could have used force against militants via surrogates.

3. Countries in which the U.S. conducted formal, named military exercises to prepare for or rehearse scenarios of combating terrorists (41);

4. Countries whose military, police, and/or border patrol forces the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, or others trained and/or assisted to increase their capacity to combat militants (79).

These categories are not comprehensive; the map does not show, for instance, U.S. military bases used for counterterrorism operations, arms sales to foreign governments, or all deployments of U.S. special operations forces. Nor does the map distinguish between different levels of activity. The training/assistance category, for example, includes operations ranging from large scale surveillance operations to donations of software for a border patrol system. The map conveys a bird’s eye view of the scale and scope of what the U.S. calls counterterrorism operations across the globe.

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2 The map does not include activities conducted in the United States itself.

This expansive set of militaristic activities provides insight into current U.S. foreign policy. Despite the Pentagon's assertion that the U.S. is shifting its strategic emphasis away from counterterrorism and towards great power competition with Russia and China, examining U.S. military activity on a country-by-country basis shows that there is yet to be a corresponding drawdown of the counterterror apparatus. If anything, counterterrorism operations have become more widespread in recent years. It is also important to note that the map shows the U.S. is targeting only some types of so-called terrorists and some types of violence, primarily in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, regions with majority non-white populations.

The map raises a number of questions: Why is the United States militarily active in so many countries? Are these operations meeting the stated U.S. goals of reducing violence against Americans and/or other civilians around the world? If not, what could the U.S. be doing instead? What human rights abuses or other negative consequences do these U.S. engagements have for people who live in these countries? What are the financial implications of this vast expanse of activities?

Now, as many Americans are calling for an end to “endless war,” the map is a stark reminder that this war stretches far beyond Afghanistan. If the U.S. is truly to end the post-9/11 wars and related activities around the world, then the U.S. public and its leaders must take a broader view of their reach.

The research team compiled this map using publicly available information, including from a variety of government, academic, and media sources, and input from scholars and experts. The U.S. government publishes only some of this information and it is found scattered across various sources or is not transparently available to or interpretable by the public. The research team used conservative criteria to compile the data; ultimately the map could include far more cases than it does. All data points are documented with at least one government source or at least two credible journalistic sources. Moreover, researchers excluded minor instances of documented training and assistance and unnamed military exercises. The Appendix details methods and sources.

The terms “terrorist/terrorism” and “counterterrorism” are historically specific and often confounding categories. People in government, the media, and others use these words for political and budgetary reasons, but they are cultural constructs, not natural categories for a type of person or action. Each and every case of conflict and preparation for conflict on this map involves a different and often complex mix of government action and insurgency that is best understood in local context. As many observers have noted, the label “War on Terror” is problematic for the ways that it focuses on a particular form of violence — so-called terrorism — without reference to the many different goals of that violence. This label is also problematic because of how government representatives have used it less to focus on the harm done to civilians and more to create a category of enemies who must be opposed with military force. This map and paper do, however, use the terms terrorism and counterterrorism in order to account for the U.S. operations that use this language as justification.

Even though the map is based on the government’s own terminology, the research findings contest official categories by including more in these categories than government sources do. This is especially evident in the combat category. For example, when the Pentagon claims it is “advising and assisting” foreign forces, sometimes in practice this means that U.S. service members operating under the 127e program are directing local surrogates in combat actions like raids on militant compounds (see more on this below). It is also true in other categories. U.S. airstrikes targeting militant groups have taken place not just in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but also in countries like Yemen and Libya, sites of very complex broader conflicts where the actors the U.S. labels and targets as terrorists are among many other parties contributing to the violence. By including more in each category than the government does, this map is at once a call for transparency and an argument that combat is combat, however it is euphemistically glossed, and even a single U.S. airstrike on foreign soil is worth noting and questioning.

The exceptions are the documentation of combat in Mali in 2018, which is included on the map because of one journalistic source only, an article from The Military Times, and the documentation of 127e programs in Cameroon and Tunisia, documented by one article from Politico. See the chart at the end of the Appendix for a more detailed list of sources.
APPENDIX: DETAILED DEFINITIONS, METHODS, AND SOURCES

This Appendix details the definitions, framework, and methods of data collection for each of the map’s categories and lists selected data sources. In some cases, the Appendix also notes operations that were excluded from the map and explains why researchers made this choice.

1. Air and Drone Strikes
The U.S. government has directly targeted people and groups that government officials accuse of being terrorists with air and/or drone strikes. The map documents U.S. strikes in 2018, 2019, and 2020 in seven countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The research team drew on the investigative work of Airwars, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the Long War Journal, and New America. An airstrike emanates from an aircraft and involves “one or more kinetic events that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a single, sometimes cumulative effect for that location.” A drone strike is a specific type of airstrike originating from an “unmanned aerial vehicle.”

This category does not include airstrikes conducted by U.S. allies in the post-9/11 wars, such as France’s airstrike against militants in Mali, despite U.S. support for these strikes through such things as surveillance and aerial refueling.

2. Combat and/or 127e Programs
The U.S. military deploys boots-on-the-ground force against militants in a number of countries, including those that many Americans recognize as at the center of the U.S. post-9/11 wars — Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria — and countries that are more peripheral. The map also documents combat incidents in Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen in 2018-2020. In all eight countries, U.S. forces engaged directly in ground raids and/or fighting against militants.

Government reports have documented some but not all of these incidents of combat. Often, the Pentagon downplays incidents in which U.S. service members and/or contractors use force against foreign militants. Department of Defense statements might specify, for instance, that “U.S. troops did not participate in any direct combat.” It is often hard to discern from second-hand sources whether fighting took place. Thus, in each case, the research team made a decision based on available information, excluding some instances of potential combat and including other instances, independently of the Pentagon’s classification of the incident. All sources researchers used to document this category are listed in the chart at the end of this Appendix.

In some cases, the research team documented combat through government sources testifying to “kinetic action” or “active hostilities.” In other cases, researchers relied on well-described incidents of fighting reported by credible investigative journalists. News of combat often comes to light when a U.S. service member is killed in an exchange of gunfire with militant groups. For instance, the map includes a combat incident documented in early January 2020 by the Military Times and U.S. News and World Report, among other media outlets, in which an Al-Shabaab attack on a U.S. base in Manda Bay, Kenya and the ensuing gun battle led to the deaths of one U.S. serviceman and two contractors as well as four Al-Shabab militants. A similar incident occurred in Somalia in 2018 in which one U.S. soldier was killed and four others wounded.

In public statements, the U.S. military has said that its role in Africa is limited to conducting “advise and assist” missions with other countries’ security forces. Yet such missions can sometimes involve U.S. service members conducting ground operations via surrogate local forces against foreign militants — raids or fighting that many observers would call combat. According to investigative reporting by Politico, the Military Times, and Yahoo News, “Section 127e” is a U.S. legal authority that allows U.S. special operations forces to plan and control certain missions, remaining in charge of rather than at the side of the African counterparts they are ostensibly advising and

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In other words, rather than U.S. forces assisting these foreign military units with their own counterterror objectives, U.S. service members use them as surrogates: they lead these units, determine their goals, and participate in their raids against people they suspect of terrorist activity. Officially, the Pentagon does not call this “combat,” but unofficially, U.S. government and military officials have admitted that, “If you’re deployed under this combating terrorism authority, 127e, that’s probably combat.”

The map’s combat category thus also includes a subcategory of countries where combat could have occurred via surrogates, noted visually on the map with a gray blast icon rather than an orange blast icon. These countries — Cameroon, Libya, Niger, and Tunisia — had active “127e” programs in 2018 and/or 2019. (Note: Kenya, Mali, and Somalia had both active 127e programs and documented instances of combat, so the map uses an orange blast icon indicating combat definitely occurred for these three countries. For country-by-country details see the chart of sources at the end of this Appendix).

For the sake of clarity, researchers were selective with what to include in the combat category, focusing on the Department of Defense’s use of physical force rather than also including psychological operations like Objective Voice in Mali and Nigeria, intended to “counter violent extremism” by using the media to “encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies.”

3. Military Exercises

Forty-one countries hosted U.S.-led military exercises in 2018-2020 to prepare for or rehearse scenarios of combat against “violent extremist organizations.” The map only includes exercises with a name, such as the annual Flintlock exercises in West Africa, or a formal title, such as the Joint Tactical Casualty Combat Care Information Exchange and Mass Casualty Exercise held with Ugandan forces in Somalia in October 2019. Some of these military exercises are longstanding annual exercises that the U.S. military has expanded to include a counterterrorism focus, while other exercises are of more recent origin.

Military exercises that have counterterrorism as at least one of their goals show the broad post-9/11 footprint of the Department of Defense like no other category on the map (since training/assistance is also carried out by the State Department and others). Military exercises are not just about preparedness, but also about deterrence and/or threat in a potential or actual conflict arena. The Pentagon defines a military exercise as “a military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution that is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation.” However, experts have shown that military exercises accomplish several objectives including but not limited to training. Exercises also establish a U.S. military presence when it is not possible for the military to have a base in that country, reinforce military alliances with partner countries, and display U.S. military might in order to “signal resolve” or threaten militant groups.

This category excludes less formal, unnamed military-to-military trainings, military exercises sponsored or hosted by other countries, exercises held in the U.S., and exercises that could not be documented as having counterterrorism as their aim. Researchers documented the occurrence of the exercises and their objectives with U.S. government websites, or failing that, with at least two credible media sources. In some cases, researchers pieced various sources together to understand the context of the country and/or the specific content of the training, and thereby determine that the exercise was aimed at countering terrorism.

4. Training and Assistance

Seventy-nine countries were targeted by U.S.-led, funded, and directed programs intended to train and/or assist their governments in combatting terrorism. These programs were run by the Department of Defense, State Department, Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and/or other branches of the U.S. government.

The category of “assistance” captures many different types of U.S. activities and operations, including but not limited to training foreign security forces. According to the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy, the main types of U.S. counterterrorism aid include enhancing the abilities of foreign militaries, aircraft surveillance, logistics, command and control, and border and maritime security aid. The total scale of this aid is significant: as an indicator, between FY2002–FY 2016, the U.S. allocated $125 billion to build the capacity of foreign military and police forces to address terrorism. For the sake of clarity in visual representation, researchers used the category of assistance to capture many different types of activities.

The research team relied heavily for this category on the State Department’s 2018 and 2019 “Country Reports on Terrorism,” which describe many countries’ terrorism context and those countries’ efforts to combat it, sometimes with U.S. assistance. The map includes countries where the Country Reports state U.S. training and/or assistance is intended to build that country’s capacity to combat terrorism. Though the Country Reports on Terrorism are often ambiguously worded, in many cases the language indicates a U.S. perception that another country requires U.S. tutelage or mentorship, in which case that country is included on the map. In other cases, the map excludes certain countries, like France or the United Arab Emirates which the U.S. language suggests are seen as equal partners and allies in the fight against terrorism. When the Country Reports on Terrorism use language like “cooperation” or “sharing best practices” about a particular country and there are no specific examples of that country’s officials or security forces participating in U.S.-sponsored training courses or exercises, that country is not included on the map.

Whereas the State Department calls many of its counterterrorism activities “diplomacy” rather than “war,” the line between State Department and Pentagon activity is often blurred. Increasingly, the State Department conducts military-style activity, for example in training local police officers to quickly respond to potential attacks on U.S. embassies in “high threat” countries. The State Department is also operating a growing number of military-style training centers for law-enforcement agencies in many regions. Its programming to fund and assist countries in countering violent extremist focuses on development activities, such as youth peace games, film projects, and online messaging, to prevent “radicalization and recruitment to violence” amongst high-risk populations; such activities are very similar to the Pentagon’s “information operations efforts,” or psychological operations.

Researchers also used the training/assistance category to capture Pentagon operations like surveillance and aerial support for other countries’, like Juniper Micron, which involves airlifting French soldiers and supplies into Mali and flying refueling missions in support of French airpower against militant groups in that country.

The research team also relied on the “Foreign Military Training Report,” a joint report to Congress by the Defense Department and State Department covering fiscal years 2018 and 2019. This report covers training activities by these two departments conducted for other countries’ military and police personnel, including the purpose of these trainings, their locations, and the money spent on them. The map only includes significant in-country trainings focused on counterterrorism. It excludes courses for foreign military personnel that occurred in the U.S. or other regional training centers.

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16 Goodman, Colby and Christina Arabia. (2018.) “Corruption in the Defense Sector: Identifying Key Risks to U.S. Counterterrorism Aid.” Security Assistance Monitor, Center for International Policy. Note: Goodman and Arabia highlight how much of this aid has not met its intended purposes because of corruption in receiving countries’ defense sectors, including through nepotism and favoritism in hiring, bribery and extortion, embezzlement of government funds, and ghost soldiers.


In the absence of other documentation, a few countries are marked as having had training/assistance from the U.S. because they hosted U.S.-led military training exercises (as also noted in the category of that name).²²

Researchers made many detailed decisions for this category, some of which bear mentioning. The first regards scale. Though the map does capture a wide range of assistance, it does not include instances of relatively minor amounts of financial support for counterterror programming, such as a State Department grant of $395,000 for the Organization of American States (including countries in North, South, and Central America and the Caribbean) to launch a new information sharing program called the “Inter-American Network on Counterterrorism.”²³ Including every such case of small-scale funding could possibly mean including most countries in the world. Also not shown on the map are countries that are merely listed in a Department of Defense “area of operations,” without any further evidence that the U.S. actively trained and/or assisted that country’s forces in counterterrorism in 2018–2019. For instance, the map does not include Burundi, even though that country is located in the area of operations of the “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a dynamic operational headquarters, effectively countering violent extremist organizations in East Africa.” This map is intended to be a meaningful documentation of U.S. government activity and thus does not include all such relatively minor mentions in which researchers could find no further documentation of current activities.

²² A number of countries, however, hosted such military exercises but are not categorized as having received U.S. training/assistance because the goal of these exercises was not to train the other country’s forces in counterterrorism but to collaboratively share best practices, signal resolve, or some other objective.

## Sources Used to Document Combat and 127e, By Country and Year

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