Making Crisis Inevitable: The Effects of U.S. Counterterrorism Training and Spending in Somalia

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Summary

The United States says its goals in Somalia are to eliminate Al-Shabaab and promote peace. This paper documents how U.S. counterterrorism policies are having the opposite effect and ensuring that the conflict continues in perpetuity.

The author calculates that the United States has reported spending over $2.5 billion on counterterrorism assistance in Somalia since 2007. This total excludes spending on U.S. military or intelligence operations in Somalia, which is undisclosed. Figure 1, below, shows a summary of disclosed spending.

Figure 1. Total disclosed U.S. Security Assistance for AMISOM & Somali Security Forces (2007-2020) (Current USD)

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2 See Appendix A for all figures and data sourcing.
The paper argues that through two specific channels — U.S. counterterrorism spending and U.S. military training of special contingents of the Somali National Army (SNA) — the U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia. This argument is based on interviews with former Somali military commanders, former U.S. government officials, leading former United Nations (UN) experts on Somalia, current U.S. congressional staff, and analyses of available records of U.S. counterterrorism spending in Somalia.

A top-down approach to U.S. military training and assistance in Somalia has favoured the centralized Somali government in Mogadishu, even though Somali politics — and conflict — operates along decentralised local dynamics. By supporting the central government, the U.S. approach thus makes conflict inevitable, particularly as this top-down structure — which is at odds with Somalia’s own internal dynamics — tends to persist even after the U.S. has relinquished formal military training. At the same time, the disproportionate influence of the U.S. guarantees the exclusion of precisely those bottom-up approaches to conflict resolution and reconciliatory politics that have been successful in other parts of the region (in particular, in Somaliland).³

The scale of counterterrorism funding — specifically, Department of State funding for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and for the Somali National Army and its special contingents (particularly Danab) — has had a distorting effect both on international and regional engagements in Somalia, where the Federal Government earns far less in tax receipts per year, in all the years with reliable records, than U.S. disclosed spending alone on counterterrorism in Somalia. Furthermore, the untransparent nature of U.S. counterterrorism spending has made U.S. action in Somalia difficult to understand and justify, even for those tasked with internal oversight of U.S. counterterrorism activities in Somalia.

Given these factors, it is questionable whether U.S. counterterrorism assistance in Somalia should be viewed as spending on peacekeeping or as warfighting. This paper makes the case for the latter.

Background

In the post-Cold War period, U.S. involvement in Somalia has operated under numerous strategic guises — and most intensively since the early 1990s when the Somali state collapsed.⁴ For instance, in 1992, “Operation Restore Hope” began U.S. intervention into Somalia’s civil war. Despite U.S. military withdrawal from Somalia in 1994,⁵ however, the U.S. maintained its counterterrorism involvement in Somalia throughout the 1990s, for example, searching for the suspected Al-Qaeda perpetrators of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam.⁶ This included the protracted hunt for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who was suspected killed by several targeted U.S. operations.

inside Somalia and other Horn of Africa territories,\(^7\) but who was eventually killed in Somalia in 2011.\(^8\)

In the post-9/11 period, Somalia moved nearer the top of the U.S.’ counterterrorism agenda, and U.S. counterterrorism intervention in Somalia became more sustained after the 2006 emergence of Al-Shabaab. The emergence of Al-Shabaab also led to the 2007 creation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a UN approved peace-keeping operation manned by African Union member troops and funded by a variety of donors, the U.S. among them, and the largest being the EU.\(^9\)

Sixteen years since Al-Shabaab’s emergence, the group not only continues to be the main opposition to Somalia’s Federal Government, it is on the rise.\(^10\) There is now analysis that suggests the sustained span of Al-Shabaab’s presence in Somalia should force more consideration that the U.S. might be doing more than merely exacerbating Somalia’s insecurity, and might be an active impediment to stability and conflict resolution in Somalia.\(^11\) If this is the case, there remains a lack of clarity about the mechanisms through which the U.S. has come to assume this position in Somalia. This paper argues that two mechanisms are particularly important for further understanding—U.S. military training in Somalia and U.S. counterterrorism funding in Somalia.

Numerous State Department justifications for U.S. budgetary spending and allocations in Somalia state the following as the U.S.’ policy goals in Somalia: “eliminating the terrorist threat in Somalia, preventing its use as a terrorist base, and overcoming the long-term governance challenges exploited by terrorists by supporting the establishment of a functioning central government in Somalia … The continued lack of regional and national reconciliation inside Somalia hinders the ability of Somali leaders to confront terrorism issues or effectively promote economic development in the region. In this regard, the United States continues to support ongoing efforts towards Somali reconciliation.”\(^12\) As such, the U.S. sees itself as a wholly external actor with a supportive role in helping Somalia on at least three fronts: 1) defeating internal terrorist groups in

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\(^8\) Ibid.


Somalia such as Al-Shabaab 2) Eliminating the direct effects of terrorism and 3) Re-establishing internal dynamics of peaceful reconciliation and development in Somalia.

However, far from achieving these goals, in 2016 Somalia witnessed the emergence of a new group claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. The group operated in Puntland, in the Northeast of Somalia—an area where Al-Shabaab’s existence had previously been minimal—and briefly captured the town of Qandala. Additionally, the threat from Al-Shabaab itself remains serious—on the 20th of August 2022, at least 21 people were killed by Al-Shabaab in a 30-hour siege in a hotel in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. In 2019 alone, there were 4,618 reported fatalities inside Somalia, resulting from political violence involving Al-Shabaab. At least 584 of those killed were civilians.

On the question of political reconciliation, in April 2021, forces loyal to then-president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” were engaged in gun battles with opposition candidate loyalists. These played out publicly over days on the streets of Mogadishu, threatening to return Somalia to civil war. The incident demonstrated the extreme tensions that had arisen in Somalia over the course of at least the previous two years due to forthcoming elections. It suggests that, despite the U.S.’ stated ambitions, political stability and reconciliation in Somalia is still a long way off.

It is highly unlikely that continued U.S. training operations and U.S. counterterrorism spending in Somalia, along the same lines as the U.S. has acted in these areas in the past, will serve to produce anything but the continuation of conflict and unrest in Somalia. In the area of military training assistance, which is framed by U.S. training of special contingents of the Somali National Army such as Danab, U.S. involvement actively solidifies a top-down, centralised approach to security on which political conflict in Somalia thrives and is upheld.

Additionally, U.S. spending in Somalia has become an integral part of conflict calculations in Somalia and the wider Horn. Since 2007, this paper estimates that the U.S. has spent in excess of $2.5bn on counterterrorism in Somalia. This $2.5bn figure does not include substantial parts of U.S. operations, including any U.S. government spending on Somalia by the intelligence community, Special Operations Forces, or indeed the U.S.’ own military operations in Somalia for the simple reason that the U.S. fails to disclose these latter spending figures.


18 Through the U.S. State Department’s own published records and corroborating interviews with current and former U.S. officials.

19 Follow-up, Anonymous Congressional source, March 9, 2022.
A Structural Conflict Footprint: U.S. Counterterror Training in Somalia

Through both U.S. military operations, as well as the military training assistance it provides to specialised contingents of the Somali National Army (SNA), the U.S. government has become integral to conflict in Somalia. Separate from its military training assistance to the SNA, the U.S. conducts drone strikes in Somalia — for example, killing 13 suspected Al-Shabaab members on the 17th of August 2022.\textsuperscript{20} U.S. forces based in Somalia have been directly engaged in active ground combat with Al-Shabaab leading to casualties on both sides.\textsuperscript{21}

According to an anonymous U.S. congressional source, the fact that the U.S. fails to report the financial costs of its direct military operations in Somalia, including the costs of U.S. troop maintenance in Somalia, complicates calculating the real total cost of the U.S. presence in Somalia. Furthermore, U.S. engagement in military activities, such as drone strikes, contradicts claimed U.S. policy aspirations of intervention as only "assistance" for Somalia’s benefit, when there is also clear US self-interest in the outcome of these drone strikes.

The U.S. directly matches its military assistance training of special contingents of the SNA to its stated policy goals of achieving tangible security in Somalia. According to a 2020 U.S. government audit of overseas counterterrorism operations by the U.S. Lead Inspector General, the aim of U.S. counterterrorism and training support in Somalia is "to promote stability and security, good governance, and economic growth in Somalia and neighbouring countries."\textsuperscript{22}

This explains why the December 2020 decision of then U.S. President Donald Trump to remove U.S. counterterrorism troops who had been stationed inside Somalia (about 700 in total)\textsuperscript{23} met with the disapproval of top military officials within U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).\textsuperscript{24} Many of these troops were repositioned to U.S. military bases in Kenya and Djibouti, from which they continued to fulfil their original counterterrorism mandates in Somalia, according to General Stephen Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM.\textsuperscript{25} In May 2022, the Biden Administration announced that the U.S. would be

\textsuperscript{21} Zilber, A.; Griffith, K. (2018, June 10). \textit{Special forces soldier, 26, who Trump called a hero after he was killed in attack in Somalia believed to have been carried out by Al-Shabaab militants}. The Daily Mail. \url{https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5826023/Pentagon-identifies-special-forces-soldier-killed-attack-Somalia.html}.
returning a small permanent U.S. military contingent to Somalia to resume full time training.\textsuperscript{26}

Despite nearly 15 years of U.S. presence in or near Somalia, including for counterterrorism training of Somali forces, the 2020 Lead Inspector General’s audit of U.S. counterterrorism in Somalia finds that the U.S. has failed to counter the terrorist threat in Somalia and that Somali forces continue to lack “operational and institutional capacity.”\textsuperscript{27} However, what these operational failings entail and the precise role of the U.S.’ military training of Somali forces in these inadequacies requires better understanding.

There is ample evidence that specialist contingents of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. — in particular, Danab, the Puntland Security Forces (PSF), Waran, and Gaashaan — have regularly been misused by sections of the Somali political elite and the Somali Federal Government. According to interviews with a former Somali military commander, these special SNA contingents are modelled on U.S. Light Ranger Regiments specifically intended for military missions on terrorist targets.\textsuperscript{28} Since U.S. counterterrorism activity has been focused on Somalia, the training of these contingents has been provided by U.S. Special Forces, for whom the U.S. government does not disclose the financial cost. Since at least 2010, training has taken place on known U.S. military bases inside Somalia in Mogadishu and Baledogle,\textsuperscript{29} but also on secret ones like the one currently in Kismaayo.\textsuperscript{30}

These U.S.-trained special contingents have regularly been deployed, against their counterterrorism mandate, for domestic “law enforcement” purposes — for instance, as close personal protection for political elites or as roadblock policing.\textsuperscript{31} In the most troubling cases, they have been used to attack and enforce orders on non-terrorist targets including political opponents.\textsuperscript{32}

Having become aware of this misuse, the U.S. now only focuses its training on Danab,\textsuperscript{33} but the SNA contingents from which AFRICOM now seems to have washed its hands — such as the Puntland Security Forces (PSF) — have not gone away. Trained by

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\textsuperscript{28} Interview with former senior member of Somali security forces, December 10, 2022; corroborated by interview with Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, March 26, 2022.


\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, March 26, 2022.

\textsuperscript{31} According to the paper’s interviews with former senior members of Somali security forces.


\textsuperscript{33} Interview with senior U.S. Somalia researcher, March 15, 2022.
the U.S., the PSF continues to be part of a structure of equipping conflict. For example, in December 2021, the PSF split along political lines that led to rival factions of PSF forces engaging in heavy fighting in the important northern commercial port of Bosaso.\textsuperscript{34} In April 2021, SNA units in Mogadishu split along clan lines in support of then President Farmajo or opposition candidates\textsuperscript{35} causing many to fear the outbreak of full civil war.

The example of the PSF makes it clear that U.S. military training of Somali security forces and AMISOM contingents can have effects much beyond the term of U.S. presence or support.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, despite the current influence of new external actors, such as Turkey and Qatar, throughout the post-9/11 period the U.S. has been the dominant counterterrorism actor in Somalia — and under the Obama Administration, it was effectively the "only player in counterterrorism" in Somalia.\textsuperscript{37} Turkey and Qatar are now providing military training to contingents of the SNA, for example, to Waran, and Gaashaan, which the U.S. no longer trains, but they are following the same centralised, "elite-force," counterterrorism blueprint that the U.S. introduced into Somalia.\textsuperscript{38}

The U.S.'s top-down approach has also justified the persistence of international attention on Al-Shabaab, for instance, rather than on any other component of Somalia's security landscape — in particular, those groups outside of centralised politics and with deeper links to local communities, such as the Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (ASWJ).\textsuperscript{39} The ASWJ is an armed Sufi group active in Galmudug and HirShebelle states in central Somalia that fought successfully against Al-Shabaab. Despite their local origins, and their historical success fighting Al-Shabaab, they have been consistently side-lined by successive central and state governments in Somalia.\textsuperscript{40} Successive efforts to integrate groups like ASWJ have suffered from not appreciating local dynamics and identity. An approach rooted in Somali


\textsuperscript{37} Interview with former senior member of Somali security forces, December 10, 2022.


realities might seek to cooperate with and, over time, integrate such forces by utilizing their community connections and knowledge.

Somalia’s political and security structure is highly determined by local dynamics, which means that the central government has limited influence on events outside the capital, Mogadishu. In Somalia, clan allegiance remains paramount to many Somalis and mobilization of clan groups and networks is an unavoidable fact of Somali politics.41

Yet, despite the U.S. government’s recent attempts to rein in its spending on the Somali National Army and to maintain tight scrutiny of its support for Danab,42 the structure of military training operations continues to problematically preference the centralised Somali federal and state governments, to the preclusion of local groups. This means that “almost nothing” gets spent at the local level.43 It is also why, according to Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, an expert on Somali society and security, “there is no support among the Somali public for these U.S.-trained forces ... in Mogadishu as well as in Puntland.”44 A more nuanced approach that took in local security considerations and reflected local anxieties about federal troops (who may well be from different clans than the district where they are serving) coupled with locally driven political processes would offer a more realistic path to establishing security and peace.

Further, the U.S. government’s top-down approach to counterterrorism has now come to be incorporated into the political motivations and objectives of high-level political operatives in Somalia, who have the greatest access both to the U.S.’ financial resources and to control of U.S.-trained forces.45 The U.S. military’s centralised approach reinforces the tendency among elites in the Somali Federal Government to, themselves, centralise power in opposition to more inclusive, bottom-up politics that aim genuinely to stabilize security in Somalia for the benefit of the wider population.46

One successful example of such bottom-up processes is Somaliland’s peace process that involved multi-year, indigenously funded, peace conferences from the village to regional level across all of Somaliland. Since 1991, Somaliland’s stability has stood in stark contrast to the rest of the region.47 In Somaliland, the process of consolidating central control over security took many years and adopted an incremental approach building trust with local communities and working in parallel with iterative peace and political processes. In Somalia — in contrast — the international and national approaches have been to strengthen the centre, including its security forces, and hope that communities will fall in line. The Somaliland approach over the last thirty years appears to have been much more successful.

42 Verified by interview with former UN Expert, March 10, 2022, and interview with anonymous senior U.S. Somalia researcher, March 15, 2022.
43 Interview with senior U.S. Somalia researcher, March 15, 2022.
44 Interview with Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, March 26, 2022.
To repeat, U.S. military actions have become structurally integral to long conflict and conflict calculations in Somalia, particularly those that are waged at the highest levels of Somali politics and society. This means that long after U.S. troops have truly withdrawn from Somalia, the framework for securitization in Somalia that has been established by the U.S. government’s military activities in Somalia will continue to dominate the top-down, centralised, militarised dynamics, allegiances, and conflicts fought in and around Somalia.

**Tracking U.S. Counterterrorism Spending in Somalia**

The precise amount the U.S. has spent on counterterrorism in Somalia is unknown, and likely untraceable. According to a U.S. congressional staffer with long term interests in the Horn of Africa region, even the U.S. government’s own officials do not know the total amount that has, and continues to be, spent on counterterrorism in Somalia, and ‘it would take an act of Congress’ to find out. The congressional staffer further noted that this state of affairs matters to the U.S., because “when we can’t say how much it costs [to be in Somalia], then we can’t change it. It seems cheap. And [there is no need] ... to think of alternative ways to spend the money.”

Current U.S. counterterrorism funding in Somalia operates in large part through the U.S. Departments of State and of Defense (DoD). This cooperation funding for Somalia by the U.S. was enabled through the 2007 creation of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was established by a United Nations and AU mandate to act as a peace keeping and peace enforcement mission bringing together troop contingents from a number of Troop Contributing African Countries (TCCs), but mainly from Uganda. AMISOM was tasked with protecting the Somali Federal Government and helping Somali security forces regain control of Somali territory. In 2022, AMISOM was rebranded as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

**Calculation Method:** The $2.5 billion figure combines both what is formally listed as Peacekeeping (PKO) spending by the U.S. Department of State, which covers U.S. security assistance for AMISOM and security assistance for the Somali security forces, as well as the DoD’s ‘333’ “Train and Equip” spending. The Department of State’s counterterrorism spending in Somalia is in excess of $2.4bn and the DoD’s is over $30m. While the Department of State’s spending goes to funding combined security assistance to both AMISOM and the Somali security forces (this includes support for Danab), the DoD’s “train and equip” spending goes to supporting the Somali National Army. The $2.5 billion excludes past or current U.S. government spending in Somalia on intelligence, drone strikes, upkeep of U.S. Special Forces and military personnel, and other U.S. military operations in Somalia, which are not publicly available. The annual estimates for spending are provided in Appendix A showing total State and Defense department spending. More granular reporting on U.S. spending is not publicly available.

It is also worth noting that while the U.S. government publishes figures for both the counterterrorism spending of the Departments of State and Defense in Somalia

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48 Interview quote with Congressional source, who did not wish to be named, February 8, 2022.
49 Anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.
through its Foreign Assistance.gov website, the reported figures here are often significantly lower and contradictory to the figures given in the Congressional budget reports for the government’s actual spending on counterterrorism in Somalia in numerous fiscal years. For example, while the U.S. Government’s Foreign Assistance website reports peacekeeping (PKO) disbursements by the Department of State totalling $215,717,000 in 2013, the Congressional Budget report for the same fiscal year reports actual PKO spending by the State Department of $228,867,000. For this reason, the paper’s calculations of the Departments of State’s counterterrorism spending in Somalia is computed from the Congressional Budget Justification Reports of the International Affairs Budget Request website of the U.S. Department of State. Additionally, reporting of these figures in the Congressional budget reports themselves are far from easily accessible, with country figures disaggregated under multiple “accounts.” Indeed, even those tasked with official oversight of these figures report finding it increasingly difficult to decipher the U.S. government’s explanations and spending reports on Somalia.

The discrepancies in reported funding, as well as the lack of accessibility to the more accurate Congressional budgetary reports contribute to the poor transparency that surrounds U.S. counterterrorism activity in Somalia. The figures reported in this paper for the DoD’s counterterrorism spending in Somalia are compiled entirely from Foreign Assistance.gov as these are the only publicly available figures. It is worth noting that since 2007, DoD counterterrorism spending in Somalia is reported in only six years. See Figure 2 below for all the figures compiled by this paper.

**Figure 2. Annual recorded U.S. Security Assistance for AMISOM & Somali Security Forces (2007-2020)**

![Figure 2. Annual recorded U.S. Security Assistance for AMISOM & Somali Security Forces (2007-2020)](chart)

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54 Interview with Anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.

55 See Appendix A for all reported figures and data sources relating to this chart.
### U.S. Department of State “PKO” Spending

The poor transparency surrounding the U.S. government’s (USG) spending on counterterrorism in Somalia is heightened by the fact that most of its accounting of spending by the Department of State is given as spending on “Peacekeeping Operations” or “PKO.” Certainly, this accounting is technically accurate for those portions of the State Department’s spending that go to funding just AMISOM’s “peacekeeping” operations. However, and as corroborated in an interview with a U.S. congressional source with access to the USG’s counterterrorism funding in Somalia beyond the public record, the State Department’s PKO spending does not only include spending on AMISOM peacekeeping or peace enforcement assistance. Rather, it also includes direct security assistance spending to the Somali National Army and its special contingents. According to this congressional source, direct spending on security assistance to the Somali National Army, including financial support to Danab special forces, totals over $0.5bn. This figure is included in the total $2.5bn in U.S. counterterrorism assistance reported here.

The Somali National Army (SNA) is not a peacekeeping force. In actuality, the SNA and the Somali National government are engaged in a war with Al-Shabaab. Certainly, for congressional officials overseeing U.S. government spending in Somalia, including to Danab, designating the State Department’s counterterrorism spending in Somalia as “peacekeeping” has contributed to a grave transparency problem.

Further, while AMISOM’s original mandate was a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor and enforce peace among competing warlords and armed groups in Somalia, AMISOM has, almost since the very beginning of its UN mandate, operated under a war paradigm, helping Somali authorities fight for, and capture, territory from Al-Shabaab. Indeed, the fierce fighting since 2007 across Southern Somalia has, for the most part, been led by AMISOM soldiers. This is not traditional peacekeeping.

There has been an upward trend in spending allocated to the Department of State’s ‘PKO’ spending in Somalia, and the Department of State's “PKO” spending in Somalia has been the topmost Official International Development Assistance contribution activity in Somalia in most fiscal years since 2007.

Between 2007 and 2020, U.S. counterterrorism spending in Somalia quadrupled. Between 2015 and 2018, the Department of State’s counterterrorism funding stayed level at around $250m, with a peak in 2016 — an election year in Somalia — at about $273m. Between 2019 and 2022, PKO spending dropped to around $208m. This was the

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56 Anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.
57 Follow-up interview with Anonymous Congressional source, March 22, 2022.
59 Follow-up interview with Anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.
beginning of the recent electoral crisis that presaged the end of the Farmajo government. The current 2022 request, however, is slightly up again at $233m.

**Department of Defense “333” Global Train and Equip Assistance Spending**

Through its “333” Global Train and Equip Assistance, the U.S. Department of Defense has also been responsible for counterterrorism funding into Somalia. It is worth noting that despite the officially listed DoD spending figures, just over $33.6 million (see Figure 1 above), congressional sources state in interviews that the figure for the DOD’s “333” counterterrorism spending in Somalia is closer to $200m since 2015.

According to U.S. official sources tasked with congressional oversight of U.S. foreign assistance spending in Somalia, the DoD’s spending, reported in this paper at just over $33.6m, covers items such as military equipment, including the recent acquisition of six Armored Personnel Carriers for SNA-Danab forces, gas, and boots. This spending also covers the cost of AMISOM helicopters for countries such as Kenya and Uganda, and which after the end of AMISOM operations will be retained by these respective AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). However, these figures do not cover the costs of U.S. special forces who have been responsible for training, and at times accompanying, Somali forces, such as Danab. Moreover, the figures do not include any pre-2007 spending on Somalia carried out by the intelligence community, for example.

As previously noted, this paper’s accumulated figures for U.S. counterterrorism spending in Somalia are not exhaustive. They do not include the cost of the U.S. independent military operations in Somalia. Nor do they include the cost of the upkeep of U.S. forces in Somalia. This is for the simple reason that the U.S. government does not publicly disclose these figures, including at the request of its own congressional staff. According to a congressional source, even the Office of the Inspector General cannot say how much the U.S. spends in total for maintaining forces in Somalia.

This highly untransparent model of U.S. spending and financial allocation towards counterterrorism in Somalia is compounded by the U.S.’ use of subcontractors.

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67 Follow up with anonymous congressional source, March 22, 2022.


69 Follow-up with Congressional source, March 22, 2022.

70 Follow-up with Congressional source, March 22, 2022.

71 Follow-up with anonymous Congressional source, March 9, 2022.

72 Interview with anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.

73 Interview with anonymous Congressional source, February 8, 2022.

For example, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense fund subcontractors such as Bancroft Global Development and Pacific Architects & Engineers (PAE),\(^75\) to conduct basic training of Danab forces before they undergo DoD training.\(^76\) However, according to a highly experienced U.S. researcher on Somalia, trying to understand and track how much money is moving into Somalia has become nearly impossible, particularly as the number of subcontracting cases that indirectly funnel U.S. funds into Somalia has grown.\(^77\)

This has meant, for example, that while the U.S. has claimed not to pay the salaries of Somali forces, up until very recently the U.S. has nonetheless used these subcontractors to pay stipends to vast numbers of SNA units.\(^78\) This was verified in an interview with a former UN expert, who confirmed that between 2015 and 2017, for example, the U.S. was paying $100 per month stipends, through third-party contractors, in 3 monthly cycles, to between an estimated 3,000 and 5,000 Lower Shabelle troops of the Somali National Army.\(^79\)

By 2018, U.S. authorities shut down stipendiary payments to SNA units due to the gross corruption arising from the use of third-party subcontractors. However, the U.S. continues to use subcontractors to pay stipends to Danab forces—this is not included in this paper’s totals because it is alongside the reported $0.5bn (part of the overall $2.5bn) that is allocated to the SNA and Danab forces through the Department of State’s security assistance spending.\(^80\)

To Somalia, these figures are significant. In 2019 for instance, the Somali government earned just under $173.3m in tax revenues.\(^81\) In almost any given year since 2007, even the reported U.S. government counterterrorism spending in Somalia is well in excess of how much the Somali government earns in tax revenues.

See Figure 3 below for an illustration.

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\(^75\) USAspending.gov. PAE Government Services, Inc. https://www.usaspending.gov/recipient/fd602973-d119-7ced-a3e7-11ecce5a9318-c/latest ; https://www.pae.com
\(^77\) Interview with anonymous high-level researcher, February 15, 2022.
\(^78\) Interview with anonymous high-level researcher, February 15, 2022.
\(^79\) Interview with former UN expert who did not wish to be named, March 10, 2022.
\(^80\) Interview with anonymous high-level researcher, February 15, 2022.
Beyond the $0.5bn that the Department of State has spent on security assistance to the Somali National Army and Danab since 2007, much of the remainder of the U.S.’ $2.5bn counterterrorism spending in Somalia goes to supporting AMISOM troop contingents, rather than the Somali government and its army directly. However, part of this paper’s argument is that AMISOM (now ATMIS) are fulfilling a war-fighting role that the Somali government is not having to pay for by itself.

Further, according to Somalia analyst Matt Brydon, “if the U.S. was not spending what it is spending in Somalia, no one else would. It is fair to say that EU money [for example] is also dependent on the U.S. as a rider.”

Indeed, there are wider regional dynamics that surround U.S. counterterror spending in Somalia that mean that what the U.S. allocates to counterterrorism spending in Somalia itself is neither the only budget through which the U.S. funds counterterrorism activities in Somalia, nor is it the only mechanism that defines the U.S. government’s involvement in Somalia’s conflict dynamics.

For example, the conflict in Somalia is a major component of the U.S. government’s justification for its equally difficult-to-trace counterterrorism spending in countries like Kenya and Ethiopia. To illustrate, in numerous Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations in Ethiopia, the State Department notes the following or similar — “increase of funding between FY 2008 and FY 2009 to support programmes in the Peace and Security Objective reflect increased national security threats posed by domestic insurgents, Eritrea, and extremists from Somalia, requiring a significant increase in

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83 Interview with Matt Brydon, Director Sahan Research, December 1, 2022.
foreign assistance for this strategic partner of the United States.”

This was the justification for increasing Peace and Security Objective funding in Ethiopia from an estimated $2,663,000 in FY 2008 to a requested $7,600,000 in FY 2009. Indeed, since the very early 2000s, the U.S. Department of State has regularly justified its foreign assistance contributions to Ethiopia, in particular, as an “important partner ... that has provided outstanding cooperation in the war on terrorism,” especially in countering “threats emanating from [countries such as]... Somalia.” In other words, the U.S. spends on, and acts in Somalia not only directly with the centralised Somali government and Army and AMISOM, but also through its activities, actions, and relationships with neighbouring country governments, such as Ethiopia.

Conclusion

In sum, this paper has examined two pathways through which U.S. counterterrorism perpetuates conflict in Somalia. Through its training of special contingents of the Somali National Army, the U.S. operates a top-down structure that favours the centralized politics of the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu. However, this is a politics that is at odds with the localised organization and dynamics of Somali society. The U.S. approach, therefore, fosters discord between centralised actors in Mogadishu and local groups within the wider society. Once trained by the U.S., many Somali Army contingents are returned, better-trained, to the structure of political conflict and discord that U.S. activities have, themselves, helped to secure, leaving groups like Al-Shabaab operational. As such, U.S. military training in Somalia makes the potential for conflict inevitable. Additionally, those localised, bottom-up, peace-building processes that have proven successful in other parts of the region, such as in Somaliland — continue to be hindered by U.S. activities.

Second, as a result of its counterterrorism spending, U.S. activities in Somalia remain untransparent even to the U.S.’ own government officials with an interest in understanding and justifying U.S. action in Somalia. The lack of transparency that surrounds U.S. counterterror spending in and on Somalia suggests that through Departments of State and Defense spending, the U.S. has become an integral actor in the war in Somalia and is not merely an external “peacekeeper.” This is compounded by the sheer scale of U.S. spending, which dwarfs tax revenue raised by the Somali Federal Government. The U.S.’ approach to the war against Al-Shabaab has become dominant not just because of the influence of U.S. activity, but also because the weight of its financial contribution crowds out other approaches to achieving security and peace in Somalia.


## Appendix A
Data sources for calculations of U.S. spending in support of AMISOM and Somali Security forces 2007-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Dept.</th>
<th>Value recorded as actual expenditure in CBJ</th>
<th>Location of record in Congressional Budget Justification (all accessed August 31 2022)</th>
<th>CBJ Page number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Congressional Budget Justification, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SUMMARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$250,000,000.00</td>
<td><a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/252735.pdf">Congressional Budget Justification FOREIGN ASSISTANCE SUMMARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2017</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$253,500,000.00</td>
<td><a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Supplementary-Tables-%E2%80%93-Foreign-Operations.pdf">Congressional Budget Justification DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, and RELATED PROGRAMS SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2020</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$222,500,000.00</td>
<td><a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FY21-Supplementary-Tables-FINAL.pdf">Congressional Budget Justification DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, and RELATED PROGRAMS SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, Fiscal Year 2021</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total State**: $2,466,436,000.00

**DOD**

Disbursements recorded as spent by DOD on ForeignAssistance.gov (all accessed on August 31 2022). No spending listed before 2015.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$11,006,877.00</td>
<td><a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2015/disbursements/0">ForeignAssistance.gov</a></td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>$145,000.00</td>
<td><a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2016/disbursements/0">ForeignAssistance.gov</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Link</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$185,078.00</td>
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<td>2018</td>
<td>$264,156.00</td>
<td><a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2018/disbursements/0">https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2018/disbursements/0</a></td>
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<td>2019</td>
<td>$18,051,991.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$3,970,618.00</td>
<td><a href="https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2020/disbursements/0">https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/somalia/2020/disbursements/0</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL DOD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,500,059,720.00</strong></td>
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