BEYOND the War Paradigm

What History Tells Us About How Terror Campaigns End

Jennifer Walkup Jayes | February 8, 2022
### Beyond the War Paradigm

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Introduction

September 2021 marked the two-decade anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent launch of the United States’ “War on Terror.” The U.S. government’s choice to respond to the 9/11 attacks with war represented a departure from both international law and precedent: the U.S. had previously relied on a law enforcement approach to deal with individuals and groups who used terror tactics. Since 9/11, U.S. media, politicians, and security experts have produced a deluge of pro-war content, establishing and further normalizing a paradigm that treats war-making as the natural response to terror attacks.

At the same time, research has shown that government violence against people in the name of counterterrorism, wartime destruction of infrastructure, and long-term U.S. military presence abroad breed ill-will toward the U.S. and broaden support for the same groups that the U.S. post-9/11 wars officially aim to eliminate. Given these circumstances and other human, social and economic costs of waging war, a re-evaluation of the U.S. approach to counterterrorism is a moral and strategic imperative. This paper examines both historical and theoretical alternatives to the war paradigm for counterterrorism, complicating the assumed necessity of military force in ending terror attacks and suggesting potential paths for states to address them without waging wars. The paper also suggests the need for reframing predominant understandings of global security around far more significant threats, including those posed by climate change and healthcare insecurity.

In the broadest sense, terrorism can be understood as “the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or objects of attack for a political motive.” Definitions of terrorism vary quite remarkably. In 2008, the U.S. government used more than 20 separate definitions, some shifting with alarming frequency. The U.S. Department of State alone changed its definition of terrorism seven times between 1982 and 2004. Particularly after 9/11, the ill-defined specter of “terrorism” has been invoked as a rhetorical cudgel, used by governments to discredit opponents and to endorse the use of extraordinary and repressive measures against them. States legitimize their own use of terror tactics by framing them as part of war-making, even when their actions are virtually indistinguishable from those of the “terrorist” enemy. I avoid referring to people as “terrorists” wherever possible, focusing instead on “terrorism” as a tactic and the groups who use that strategy. Since groups who use terror tactics frequently abandon those tactics, transforming into criminal organizations or nonviolent political or religious groups, the immutable label of “terrorist” is not a useful descriptor.

3 Jones and Libicki 2008. 19.
By reviewing a wide range of relevant literature from scholars and think tanks, this paper explores some of the most robust non-military models of counterterrorism and offers examples of their use. It is not a comprehensive list of alternative approaches, nor does it proscribe the use of any particular approach. Using the organization model put forth by Ronald Crelinsten, I separate state-led models of counterterrorism into the categories of: “coercive,” “proactive,” “persuasive,” “defensive,” and “long-term.” 5 These are summarized in the preceding infographic, which outlines 11 counterterrorism paradigms and the implicit assumptions of the states and experts who employ them about the problem of terrorism. Each model approaches the problem of terrorism differently, based on how states postulate the problem and solution, and encourages the use of a particular set of tools. In practice, real-world counterterrorism programs leverage a variety of these models, often simultaneously. Indeed, though the U.S. government has primarily pursued a war paradigm approach, since the September 11, 2001, attacks it has already made use of all of the approaches explored here.

Terrorism’s history can be understood, as David Rapoport posits, in four distinct “waves” beginning in the 1880s, each with unique driving forces and dominant tactics. The first three waves—the “anarchist,” “anticolonial,” and “new left” waves—6 lasted about one generation each before flagging and giving rise to the next. Rapoport identifies the fourth and current wave as being driven by religious identity groups, including Christian identity and militant Islamic groups. Though these waves are made up of organizations, Rapoport notes that most terror groups are outlived by their broader ideological waves. “Normally, organizations disappear before the initial wave associated with them does... Nonetheless, the wave retained sufficient energy to create a generation of successor or new groups. When a wave’s energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears. Resistance, political concessions, and changes in the perceptions of generations are critical factors in explaining the disappearance.”7

Rapoport asserts that until the momentum of the wave has subsided, new groups will continue to emerge. If this is true, targeting any particular group may have little impact on the proliferation of terrorism as a tactic. Yet terrorism is a political phenomenon; the flow of these waves is not unstoppable. Counterterrorism strategies which address the root causes of terrorism, rather than the organizations and people that commit it, are best positioned to end the waves of terrorist violence.

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6 Rapoport’s first, “anarchist,” wave erupted in Russia in the 1880’s when rebels adopted the use of dynamite to commit “propaganda by the deed” and demonstrate their commitment the rebellion. This culminated in the “Golden Age of Assassinations” and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The second, “anticolonial,” wave came in the 1920’s with revolutionaries fighting against colonial powers for self-governance. The states of Algeria, Ireland, Israel, and Cyprus were founded through this “freedom-fighting.” In the 1970’s, the third, “New Left,” wave reached its height, with militant leftist groups frequently hijacking airplanes and taking hostages. State sponsors including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. operated training camps and networks of support for groups that would fight proxy battles. The third wave declined at in the 1980’s after to significant policing efforts and the end of the Cold War.
**A Historical Understanding of How Terrorism Ends**

Three major studies have been conducted analyzing the demise of terrorist groups throughout history and what state actions contributed to their downfall. These studies, conducted by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, Leonard Weinberg, and Audrey Kurth Cronin, offer insight into the real-world effectiveness of various models of counterterrorism campaigns (displayed in the infographic above). These studies consider terrorist groups to have ended when they cease their use of terrorist tactics. Violent groups rarely end for a single, identifiable reason. Rather, a confluence of factors influences their demise, and these researchers sought to identify the primary causes. We should remember that these analyses do not take place in a laboratory; they are subject to the wild inconsistencies of human history. Moreover, the most commonly used methods of counterterrorism are correlated with the end of more groups, not necessarily because they are more effective, but because states have used them more frequently. Importantly, more recent examples of terror groups are underrepresented in these data because they are most likely to still be active.

According to a comprehensive study of all 648 terrorist groups operating between 1968 and 2006, authored by Seth Jones and Martin Libicki in a 2008 publication by the Rand Corporation, groups most commonly abandon violent tactics when governments legitimize their concerns and accept them into the political process (43 percent). Among groups that do not transition willingly to nonviolence, policing has been the most effective strategy. States have ended 40 percent of groups who resort to violence with a combination of policing and intelligence. In the remaining 17 percent of groups, 10 percent achieved their goals and disbanded, and 7 percent were quelled by a military effort.⁸ Leonard Weinberg’s 2012 analysis of 433 groups active between 1900 and 2006 found an identical distribution of causes of demise.⁹

**Figure 1. How Terrorist Groups End**

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⁸ Jones & Libicki, “Summary,” *How Terrorist Groups End*

In her analysis of selected case studies, most from the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, Kurth Cronin identifies six pathways to demise for terrorist groups, some of which line up with the Rand study: integration into legitimate political processes, capture or killing of the groups’ leadership, achievement of the groups’ objectives, implosion or loss of public support, defeat by brute force, and reorientation toward other forms of violence.\(^\text{10}\) In 2012, Leonard Weinberg offered a similar analysis of case studies in which he categorized terrorist groups as ending in their defeat, success, or transformation into another type of group.\(^\text{11}\) Defeated groups, he noted, may end when they fail to recruit a new generation, lose popularity, or suffer from internal disagreements. These pathways to defeat can be exacerbated by communications and intelligence models of counterterrorism.

Militant groups frequently splinter into new factions which continue to use terrorist tactics.\(^\text{12}\) Weinberg cites British sociologist Colin Campbell’s concept of the “cultic milieu,” noting that if we think of terrorist groups in a similar way, as emerging from an environment that breeds them, then targeting and ending specific groups will not do much good—other groups will keep popping up. The question is then how to change the milieu from which they emerge—or how to prevent terrorism in the first place. This pattern of splintering and re-emergence of new terrorist groups is consistent with Rapoport’s wave theory of modern terrorism and suggests that counterterrorism efforts would do better to target the root causes of terrorism than to focus on the organizations and people that use this tactic to achieve various ends.

Fourth wave terrorist groups—those founded after 1990—and groups waging full-scale insurgencies have been more difficult to eliminate. Most terrorist groups have been relatively short-lived; the median lifespan for organizations in Kurth Cronin’s analysis was 5-9 years.\(^\text{13}\) Fourth wave groups, in comparison, tend to last longer. Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler used a subset of Jones and Libicki’s data to analyze fourth wave groups. They found that, despite the U.S.-led post-9/11 wars, 49.14 percent of groups founded after 1990 were still active, and only 11.34 percent had been ended by military or police force.\(^\text{14}\) Not all terrorist groups constitute insurgencies, waging civil war to overthrow governments. Insurgent groups which use terrorist tactics are generally harder to defeat. Half of the insurgent groups studied by Jones and Libicki were still active in 2008. Among those that had ended, nearly half did so after a negotiated settlement with the government. A quarter of insurgent groups were victorious, and another 19 percent were defeated.

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\(^{10}\) Kurth Cronin. “How Terrorism Ends,” (pp. 9-13). Kurth Cronin selected her cases studies as representative after performin a statistical analysis of 457 organizations active after 1968. Her data was drawn from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge database.

\(^{11}\) Weinberg. The End of Terrorism?

\(^{12}\) Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 35. Jones & Libicki excluded splintered groups from their analysis on the grounds that splinter groups continued to use terrorist tactics. They identified that one third (33.7%) of the groups in their data set split to form new terrorist groups.

\(^{13}\) Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 213.

militarily. Their analysis showed policing to be a far less effective tactic against insurgencies.¹⁵

Groups may contribute to their own downfall by alienating their bases of support. Nationalist groups are especially subject to this pitfall, since they “can achieve prominence and win support among their co-ethnics by attacking members of some enemy group, e.g. Israelis. However, when they stage terror attacks on members of their own national community, e.g. fellow Arabs, fellow Jordanians, that support may wane.”¹⁶ Governments can leverage these sorts of base-defying actions with a communications model of counterterrorism to further diminish support for such groups.

These analyses suggest that, historically speaking, states have been most effective at counterterrorism when they have used models that value integration into the political sphere and policing. Some scholars advocate for “ending the notion of a ‘war on terrorism’” in favor of a criminal justice approach led by local police and intelligence agencies. Kurth Cronin argues for a communications model of counterterrorism, which would diminish the base of support for violent Islamist groups by emphasizing atrocities they have committed against Muslim communities. A state-funded campaign to underscore the differences between organizations operating under the label Al-Qaeda, or now ISIS, would allow governments to “hive off” affiliates who have distinct agendas and reduce the collective power of the larger group.

Without exception, these scholars advocate for abandoning the war paradigm. “Based on our assessment,” Jones and Libicki write, “the U.S. should fundamentally rethink its strategy toward al Qa’ida. U.S. efforts have relied too heavily on military force.”¹⁷ War has rarely if ever been a successful approach for eradicating terrorism.

_Theoretical Alternatives to the War Paradigm; Coercive Counterterrorism_

_The War Model_

The use of the war paradigm in response to the September 11 attacks represented a departure from both international law and precedent, which understood terrorism as largely a problem of criminal justice. When, on September 12, President George W. Bush declared a War on Terrorism, he said that the attacks of the prior day were, “more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.”¹⁸ As would be consistent with any act of war, the U.S. responded with military might, first invading Afghanistan, and then Iraq. This “war

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¹⁶ Weinberg. _The End of Terrorism_, p. 69.
¹⁷ Jones and Libicki, _How Terrorist Groups End_, (p. 105).

paradigm” became central to the U.S.’ response to 9/11. Between 2001 and 2021, the U.S. poured $8 trillion into counterterrorism warfare.19

This approach frames terrorism as a military problem and calls for a military response. Using this approach, governments deploy troops to occupy foreign lands and eliminate terrorist groups. States mobilize resources for the war effort, redirecting domestic infrastructure toward the manufacturing of weapons, supplies, and war vehicles. Young people are encouraged to invest their lives in the struggle, which is portrayed as a threat to the nation, and the government justifies exceptional action in the name of national security.

Terrorism is a tactic, not an army which can be defeated with military force. Even when certain groups are defeated, new groups and people can adopt the tactic of terrorism. U.S. occupation and war making in primarily Muslim countries gave credence to the perception that Islam was under threat and increased the recruiting base for groups who opposed U.S. military presence in the Middle East. As one British intelligence official said, “the notion of a war on terrorism...suggests to Muslims abroad that the U.S. is fighting a war on Muslims. And the response has to be jihad, or holy war. War convinces people to do jihad.”20 The violence and destruction of war amplifies the threat of terrorism, a phenomenon that U.S. government officials and others have called “blowback.” Fighting a ground war in the Middle East has increased the recruiting capacity of militant groups and enmeshed the U.S. in a “long” or “never-ending war” against a constantly morphing enemy.

**The Criminal Justice/Law Enforcement Model**

National and local policing is one of the most effective state approaches to counterterrorism. Historically, it has been responsible for the demise of 40 percent of groups who commit terror attacks.21 After all, violent tactics—bombing, kidnapping, armed attacks, for instance—are generally illegal. A criminal justice approach aims to address terrorism through the civil legal system. Violent plots and crimes are investigated by local police and prosecuted through a court of law. Those convicted are then held in prison or otherwise punished through the legal system. Treating attacks or attempted attacks as ordinary crimes focuses public attention on the acts themselves, and away from the political or ideological motives, in effect de-legitimizing them.

Since it relies on extant legal systems to process terror attacks as crimes, the criminal justice model can be slow, taking years to go through appeals processes. In reaction to the attacks of September 11, a number of Western countries have created special categories of crime for terror attacks (U.S. and Canada in 2001, Australia and

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20 British intelligence official, as cited in Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, (p. 123).
Norway in 2002, Sweden in 2003, UK in 2005). Motive, notoriously difficult to prove or disprove, is often central to criminal justice definitions of terrorism.

For the criminal justice model to reduce violent attacks, courts must be perceived as strong and fair. As Uduak Williams has observed, the model may not be appropriate where this is not the case. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, anti-terror legislation which empowers the police to prosecute cases of terrorism more easily has led to the establishment of separate courts to try terrorism cases. Such courts are frequently less fair in practice than the traditional court system. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Cuba, and parts of Africa, these courts often “deviate from the rule of law and democratic standards and give rise to frequent human rights violations.”

The Japanese government’s elimination of the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult is frequently cited as a successful example of counterterrorism through policing. In 1995, members of the cult released sarin gas into a subway beneath Tokyo, killing 12 and injuring more than 5,000 people. Following the attacks, Japanese police and intelligence officials began aggressively pursuing and arresting those involved. By 1997, Aum Shinrikyo had been eradicated, its leadership arrested, and its finances left in shambles. The cult changed its name to Aleph and ceased its terror activity. Likewise, in Quebec, Canada, increased surveillance by police led to a series of arrests and incarcerations and the 1972 end of certain groups’ use of violent attacks to promote Quebecoïs nationalism.

Proactive Counterterrorism

The Intelligence Model

An intelligence-focused model of counterterrorism uses surveillance and espionage to identify and counter potential threats from terror groups before they emerge. While some degree of intelligence gathering is typically central to any preventive counterterrorism, the intelligence model has serious implications for privacy and civil rights.

Globally, in the 1970s and 1980s intensive surveillance and policing successfully reduced the threat posed by far-left militant groups. During that time period, the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Red Army Faction in Germany both benefited from a transnational network of safe houses and training sites and posed an international threat. Between 1972 and 1975, the JRA, staged attacks on the Tel-Aviv airport, an oil refinery in Singapore, and

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22 Crelinsten, "Perspectives on Counterterrorism.”
24 Kurth Cronin. How Terrorism Ends.
25 Jones & Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End.
French, U.S. and Swedish embassies. The Japanese and German governments responded with extensive surveillance and policing programs that most Americans today would find too intrusive.  

Notably, Japan and Germany were successful in leveraging the intelligence model to eliminate these groups only after they allowed group members to address their grievances through social and political organizing. After this measure, their support bases crumbled. Authorities were able to use intelligence methods to identify and contain the relatively few remaining advocates of violence.

Whereas under a strict criminal justice model investigations are conducted after a crime is committed, the intelligence model grants counterterrorism agencies the right to spy on anyone or everyone who is deemed a possible future terrorist. The use of this model in conjunction with others in the U.S. post-9/11 wars has led to the development of an enormous intelligence apparatus designed to spy on the communications of U.S. citizens and suspected terrorists domestically and abroad. The National Security Agency’s (NSA) broad surveillance of U.S. citizens’ phone calls, texts, emails, and other communications has drawn public criticism from the American Civil Liberties Union and other groups.

**Persuasive Counterterrorism**

*The Communication Model*

_Talking to one’s enemies and their constituencies, though anathema to many governments, can serve an important function in challenging, and perhaps refuting, undesired perceptions whose very existence can be missed in the absence of dialogue and exchange of views._

- Ronald Crelinsten

Acts of terrorism are highly symbolic, sending a message to potential supporters as well as to those targeted. Militants often choose their target because that target represents a community, identity, or ideology beyond itself; the strategic value of terrorism lies more in communication about the act than on the violence itself. Since publicly and privately owned media play critical roles in the transmission of these messages, they can be leveraged to intercept messages and promote counter-narratives that undermine the power of terror groups. This is not to say that news of terror attacks should be suppressed, but that media shapes public sentiments about the desirability of terrorism as a tactic. A particular challenge for governments engaged in communicative counterterrorism is to

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28 Evangelista. “Coping with 9/11.”
31 Crelinsten. “Conceptualising Counterterrorism,” (p. 6).
popularize and promote particular narrative frames without resorting to censorship or other repressive measures.

Under a communications model, governments target deradicalization messaging at members and potential members of terror groups with the goal of reducing new recruits and causing individual defections. Such messaging may promote the value of cross-cultural and inter-ethnic understanding or downplay the perceived legitimacy of terror attacks. It aims to convince members of militant groups that nonviolent tactics would be more legitimate and effective. Two critical beliefs bind members to these groups: the idea that once a person has used violence, there is no possible return to civil society, and the idea that involvement with the group offers the sole opportunity for a sense of purpose, community, identity, importance, or existential meaning. Therefore, scholars argue that counterterrorism messaging should aim to bleed terrorist groups of their members by providing official and public assurances that exit from the group is possible for those who renounce violence, as is acceptance back into society. Such assurances are doomed to fail unless they are taken seriously by those who make them and help bring them to fruition. Offers of amnesty may draw public criticism, particularly when people are not perceived to have been adequately punished for their crimes. A communicative approach to counterterrorism must include the creation of pathways to re-entry for former members of terrorist groups, and meaningful resolution to the material, social, and economic concerns which drive people to violence. The communications model frequently forms one component of counterterrorism campaigns and has rarely, if ever, been primarily or solely responsible for a group abandoning the use of violent tactics.

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Model**

In the early 2010s, U.S. counterterrorism experts began to embrace a new framework: “preventing and countering violent extremism” (P/CVE). This approach, perhaps the most popular among practitioners of counterterrorism, focuses on addressing a broad range of factors which may push individuals to radicalize and to join violent groups. Countering Violent Extremism focuses particularly on the psychology of terrorism and radicalization, using counter-messaging tactics to disrupt individuals’ radicalization. Through CVE programs, governments leverage messaging, engagement and outreach programs, and education initiatives to dissuade would-be extremists from violent action. This approach was not designed to replace militarized approaches to fighting terrorism, but rather to accompany them. Preventing and countering radical extremism strategies are premised on the assumption that terrorism is a product of a psychosocial process known as

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32 Ronald Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid. “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet” as cited in Crelinsten, “Conceptualising Counterterrorism.”

“radicalization,” rather than an interplay between violent actors, the nation-state, and economic or socio-political forces.34

Matthew Schwartz, a researcher at the Global Center for Cooperative Security, has advocated for a recentering of P/CVE around long-term counterterrorism strategies. His adjusted model eschews strategies that focus on anti-radicalization measures and instead emphasizes the ways states and nonstate actors mutually constitute violence. Schwartz notes the conduct of a state, “particularly its role in maintaining and perpetuating power through various levels of coercion, should be understood as a significant factor in driving various forms of conflict and political violence, including violent extremism.” He further notes that,

over the past several decades, a wealth of empirical research has provided insights into trends and general theories regarding factors that increase the risk of political violence. In that regard, there is substantial evidence that violence committed by sovereign states in the form of injustice, inequity, discrimination, and oppression, that is, structural violence, or direct violence in the form of abuse by state security services, foreign invasions, and other forms of state-sanctioned or -perpetuated [sic] physical violence can serve as structural or proximate drivers of escalating political violence and conflict. These dynamics apply in equal measure to those forms of political violence commonly labeled terrorism...35

Schwartz’s analysis is supported by the World Bank’s 2011 World Development report, which found that state violence in the form of invasion, occupation, and repression are central to the rationale of terrorist groups.36 In 2006, the United Nations similarly recognized “human rights for all and the rule of law” as one of the four pillars of the global counter-terrorism strategy.37 Schwartz argues that for a state to effectively counter violent extremist ideology, it must begin by addressing its own part in perpetuating violence. Without this groundwork, counternarratives ring hollow and serve to only bolster the arguments of violent extremists.38

Despite these nods towards a strategy focused on reducing structural and state violence, many governments continue to understand terrorism and violent extremism narrowly, focusing their CVE programs on countering the spread of radical ideas and targeting particular identity groups, especially Islamic groups.

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34 Crelinsten, “Conceptualising Counterterrorism,” (p. 3).
38 Schwartz. “Shifting the PVE Paradigm,” (p. 11).
Defensive Counterterrorism

The Preventive Model

A preventive model of counterterrorism is focused on stopping militant groups from planning and carrying out attacks. Unlike the long-term models explored below, the preventive model does not focus on the “root causes” of the formation of terrorist groups. Preventive counterterrorism calls for “hardening” targets, protecting critical infrastructure, and tracking people, money, and goods, which might be used in violent plots.

Security measures “harden” targets, making them more difficult to attack. This effectively deters terror attacks on important people, places, and events, but can direct terror activity towards “softer” targets. In the U.S., preventive counterterrorism requires extensive coordination with the private sector, since infrastructure for critical utilities is often privately owned, and many large events—like sporting events and concerts—are privately operated.

A preventive model can also reduce the risk of terror attacks by interrupting the networks of material support for violent groups. Money, food, shelter, training, weapons, travel documents, and the like can be tracked to discover plots in the making, and then intercepted to foil those plots.39

Mitigation Models (After an Attack)

Mitigation-oriented models which can be used to organize the immediate response to a terror attack include natural disaster responses and public health programs.40 Violent attacks leave chaos in their wake: wounded and dead people, destroyed infrastructure, some people fleeing and others arriving quickly to help; they incite uncertainty, fear, panic, and lasting psychological damage. As Moshe Dayan noted, “Terrorist incidents more closely resemble natural disasters than acts of war.”41 Sites of attacks require much the same resources as sites of natural disasters. There is an immediate need for rescue workers, emergency vehicles, transportation routes to hospitals, medical supplies, and the like. In both instances, media coverage may interfere with rescue operations, but can be leveraged to communicate critical information to the public.

The natural disaster approach includes contingency planning, establishing chains of command, making communication plans, stockpiling emergency supplies, and training first responders, all in advance of any attack. Such an approach can be conceived of as “all-hazards” or “all-risks,” as preparations are valuable in a wide range of crises.

39 Crelinsten. “Perspectives on Counterterrorism.”
40 Crelinsten. “Perspectives on Counterterrorism.”
Similarly, the public health model requires the development and maintenance of robust public health systems which are prepared for crisis. Well-equipped healthcare facilities save lives and reduce long-term damage following a violent attack. To mitigate the impact of terror incidents, hospitals need the staff, capacity, and supplies to admit a dramatic influx of patients. A healthy and resilient populace reduces pressure on health systems and allows for increased disaster preparedness. Mental healthcare is a critical component of a public health model. Therapeutic services can help witnesses and survivors cope following a traumatic incident and reduce the likelihood of snowballing violence.

**Long-Term Counterterrorism**

Long-term counterterrorism models focus on eliminating terrorism at the “root causes” by providing people with access to resources and equitable social conditions and eliminating the inclination towards or perceived need for violent action.

For any long-term counterterrorism program, the effects of global climate change pose an obstacle. Increasing natural disasters, growing environmental displacement, and fewer global resources strain governments’ attempts to equitably distribute resources. These changes are likely to increase conflict globally and any long-term counterterrorism strategy is vulnerable to being undermined by them.

**Development Model**

Governments can address the “root causes” of terrorism abroad by funding development work and international aid. Under a development-focused model of long-term counterterrorism, stable governments provide support for “weak” foreign states, preventing conditions under which violent groups tend to flourish. Unequal land distribution, poor environmental management, and private profiteering from the extraction of local resources are strong motivators for the development of militant movements globally, including extremist and religious movements. Effective “trade, foreign aid, and development projects can undercut the ideological fuel that drives terrorist radicalization and recruitment in a world of haves and have-nots.”

However, development projects can mitigate these imbalances, but never truly eliminate them. While extractive capitalism persists as the global norm, equitable distribution of resources is impossible. The current global economic system requires resources to be siphoned from the periphery to feed exponential growth at the core. A development model of counterterrorism proposes to assuage the pressures placed on those “have-nots” just enough to mollify any desire for violent rebellion. Nonetheless, a

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42 Crelinsten. "Conceptualising Counterterrorism."
43 Ibid, (p. 369).
development model of counterterrorism is far less likely to incite violent blowback and thereby intensify conflicts than is a militarized approach

**Human Security/Global Rights Model**

The human security or global rights model of counterterrorism is like the development model but focuses on advancing civil and political rights to communities and individuals without the state as an intermediary. Such an approach reflects the idea that international security is contingent on the security of people's human rights and recognizes that states can be major purveyors of violence and violation, as in the case of war or systemic violence. Foreign and domestic governments, international actors, local organizations, and NGOs can all leverage the global rights model to reduce terrorism.

The model aims to empower disenfranchised groups politically and economically, thereby making terrorism a less compelling tactic for changemaking. Human rights/global security remains a largely theoretical approach to counterterrorism, having never been attempted by a government as the core of a large-scale counterterrorism campaign.

One component of the human security model is education, recognized by many international human rights programs as a fundamental right and an important vehicle for furthering democratic, pluralistic values. When education fosters an appreciation of human diversity and explores ethnic, cultural, religious, and historical differences, it can be a powerful tool in reducing the hatred and fear of others that underlies violent ideology. Promotion of such education could make militant recruiting and support much more difficult to sustain. Education that provides only a cursory understanding of the world's inequalities and injustices, without a focus on the value of diversity, may exacerbate the problem. When presented with the knowledge of an unfair, rapidly changing world, people sometimes become more entrenched in religious dogma and authoritarianism, which promises some comfort and control. The education approach must be deep, giving students critical thinking skills and the ability to search out and vet new information. Among college-educated people who use terrorism, the majority come from “hard science” fields which place greater importance on understanding issues and facts than on critical thinking skills about society. For instance, Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 plane hijackings, studied engineering and architecture at Cairo University. In contrast, few contemporary individuals who use terror tactics have been trained in disciplines within the humanities. Education in the humanities and social sciences may offer inoculation against violent ideologies, particularly those which target others on the grounds of ethnicity or religion. However, without changes in material conditions, an education model in isolation is unlikely to be sufficient for preventing terrorism.

Crelinsten offers another long-term approach for states to address the problem of groups engaging in violent attacks: the gender model. The gender model posits that an

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imbalanced sex ratio among young adults is a root cause of terrorism. The vast majority of people who commit terror attacks are men. In *Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population*, Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer argue that high male-to-female ratios frequently correlate with domestic and international violence. Particularly in China and India, preference for male children has resulted in “bare branches,” or an excess of unmarried, rootless young men. Where economic opportunity is limited, these men without family ties are a strong recruiting pool for militant groups, who offer a sense of community and purpose. A gender model aims to eliminate practices that result in a high ratio of young men to young women or to provide young men with purpose, stability, and community through public works, employment, and other projects.

**Conflict Resolution Model**

A conflict resolution paradigm understands political violence as an inevitable outgrowth of state or societal denial of fundamental human needs for security, recognition, or equal participation in society. Conflict resolution is generally used by states in cases of inter-ethnic strife; similarities between such conflicts and the violence of groups who use terror tactics may make it a valuable counterterrorism paradigm. Violence in both cases is often motivated by structural inequality and a sense of injustice. Critically, a conflict resolution approach assumes that terrorism is, “rational and instrumental given that it is an intentional and predetermined strategy of violence.” In other words, the conflict resolution model understands terrorism as a tactic of political engagement most frequently used when nonviolent methods have failed. This is supported by the ascension of the Islamic State after the failure of the largely nonviolent Arab Spring.

In her study of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram, international relations researcher Dodeye Uduak Williams advocated for states to take a conflict resolution approach in addressing the violence of these groups. She argued that the complex set of socio-economic grievances which drive both groups and the religious identity factors which motivate Boko Haram cannot be resolved with unilateral force. Negotiations that address grievances have the power to prevent further radicalization in the region. Mediation between ethnic or identitarian groups, while not a resolution itself, can be used to demystify and interrupt the propagation of violent groups’ ideologies.

Given that terrorist groups most commonly end (43 percent according to analyses by Jones and Libicki and Weinberg) when they transition into the traditional political sphere by becoming a political party or movement, the conflict resolution model offers

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46 Williams, “The Role of Conflict Resolution in Counterterrorism in Nigeria,” (p. 80).
such groups a path to legitimacy through negotiation. If a group believes that its goals can be met through entry into the legislative sphere, it may adjust its tactics accordingly. The transition to politics is more likely when the goals of a militant group are narrow or moderate. The broader a group’s aims, the less likely it is to make such a turn. A group like the Islamic State, which seeks to overthrow multiple governments and establish an Islamic caliphate, is unlikely to find its solution in conflict resolution, negotiation, or legislative politics.

A number of prominent militant groups have made the transition to becoming political parties. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which was subsumed under its political branch, Sinn Féin, is a frequently cited example. The PIRA was a militant group formed in the 1960’s in opposition to British and Protestant control over Northern Ireland. Following the British Army’s 1972 killing of 14 protesters, the PIRA carried out two decades of terrorist violence. PIRA members set off bombs at public events, assassinated British political representatives and attempted to kill then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thousands of people on all sides were killed in the violence. Attempts at negotiations failed repeatedly until 1994, all parties agreed to a ceasefire. The negotiations included the British and Irish governments, local political parties, and leaders of paramilitary groups. There were major setbacks, including in 1996 when the PIRA broke the ceasefire. In 1998, after the PIRA agreed to resume its ceasefire and re-enter negotiations, all parties signed the “Good Friday” agreement.

In 2011, after an internal negotiation and pressure from their political base, the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) laid down arms and won major political victories under the umbrella coalition Bildu. Historically, ETA had been the deciding actor among organizations in the Nationalist Left, a coalition which included the political party Batasuna, a worker’s union, a collective working for prisoners’ rights, and a youth wing. Against the protests of ETA leaders, Batasuna determined to conduct a public debate about the structure of the coalition, traveling town-by-town in the region. They held 274 meetings at which over 7,600 activists spoke. At each meeting, party representatives proposed the adoption of the principles which had guided the peace process in Ireland, the functional abandonment of terror tactics in favor of political ones. Through these community meetings, the Nationalist Left’s base resolved to lay down arms. More recently, in 2017, the long-standing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) agreed to lay down arms in exchange for the government’s offer of jobs, roads, and schools to the neglected rural communities that made up their base. FARC became the political party Commons. For militant groups whose aims can feasibly be met without the dissolution of entire governments, history suggests that models of counterterrorism which allow for political transformation would be most valuable.

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51 Weinberg. The End of Terrorism?, (pp. 27-28).
Refining Global Security

In counterterrorism literature, the necessity of eliminating terrorism at all costs is affirmed and re-affirmed, often without due consideration for the destructive capacity of the state itself. Without doubt, the body count of systemic and direct violence perpetrated by the U.S. government in the name of counterterrorism vastly exceeds deaths caused by terror attacks. Between 1995 and 2019, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) calculated that 3,455 U.S. citizens were killed in terror attacks. In contrast, Costs of War data has shown that the U.S. post-9/11 wars have directly killed over 929,000 people.

The reality is that poverty, racism, and other structural inequalities pose far greater threats to human lives than do terror attacks. This suggests the need for a radically reframed understanding of which and how many U.S. resources should be used to combat groups who use terror tactics, given that other societal issues kill a vast amount more people. Domestically, for instance, more than 45,000 U.S. citizens die each year because they do not have health insurance. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the U.S. healthcare infrastructure as woefully under-resourced. During the past two years, over 883,000 people in the U.S. have been killed by the disease. Many of these deaths could have been prevented by increased public health resources and policy changes. At the same time, the rising global climate crisis creates wildfires, floods, storms, and a growing number of climate refugees in the U.S. and worldwide, threatening the lives and well-being of countless people. These threats are far more dangerous to far more people than are violent groups who use terror tactics, and there are feasible policies to address them. This speaks to the political imperative to reframe common U.S. understandings of security to include a fuller recognition of what human security truly entails. Only with this fuller understanding can policymakers generate policies to address terrorism with a greater sense of proportionality.

Conclusion

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the war paradigm has dominated the U.S.’ approach to counterterrorism, all but erasing alternative schema from public consciousness. The resulting two decades of war have killed at least 929,000 people and

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displaced 38 million from their homes.\textsuperscript{58} This paper complicates the assumed necessity of military force in ending terrorism and presents a range of alternative models for addressing this problem.

Historically, groups most frequently abandoned their use of terror tactics when they came to believe that their aims could be met through the traditional political sphere, and they transformed into political parties. Such a transformation can only occur when groups feel that there is a genuine possibility that states will address their grievances, and their goals can be met through the vehicle of the state government. Where groups using terror tactics have broad goals that cannot be addressed through extant political systems, their demise is most likely to come as a result of domestic policing. Military force, however, has rarely been successful in ending campaigns of terror. Robust alternatives to the war paradigm for counterterrorism exist and have been successful around the world. They offer an exit path for the U.S. to truly end its over two-decades-long post-9/11 wars.

Long-term strategies offer the most promising solutions. Those strategies work to ameliorate the economic, social, and civic concerns which drive people to turn to violence as a tactic towards political ends. Current research indicates that terror attacks are frequently a reaction to direct or systemic violence against particular groups of people. In each place and context, further research is needed to more specifically identify the “root causes” of why various groups turn to violent attacks to achieve their objectives. Given the world’s cultural and historical diversity, it is unlikely that a one-size-fits-all solution will work to counter the use of terror tactics by non-state actors. Approaches must be culturally attuned and led by local leaders who understand the needs of their communities and genuinely attempt to respond to them.