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BROWN UNIVERSITY

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Employment:

2018-present, Brown University, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Watson Institute

Education:

Ph.D., Business Economics, Harvard University, 2018
Thesis Title: “*Essays on Economic Behavior and Design*”

A.B., Mathematics-Economics, Brown University, *magna cum laude*, 2013

Research Papers:

“*Daily Labor Supply and Adaptive Reference Points*,” with Linh T. Tô
Forthcoming, *American Economic Review*

Abstract: This paper provides field evidence on how reference points adjust, a degree of freedom in reference-dependence models. To examine this in the context of cabdrivers' daily labor-supply behavior, we ask how the within-day timing of earnings affects decisions. Drivers work less in response to higher accumulated income, with a strong effect for recent earnings that gradually diminishes for earlier earnings. We estimate a structural model in which drivers work towards a reference point that adjusts to deviations from expected earnings with a lag. This dynamic view of reference dependence reconciles the “neoclassical” and “behavioral” theories of daily labor supply.

“*The Public-Housing Allocation Problem: Theory and Evidence from Pittsburgh*”

Abstract: We present a model of public-housing allocation, in which objects that arrive stochastically over time must be matched with applicants on a waiting list. Our framework delivers a strategy-proof, ex-ante efficient and envy-free mechanism which allows applicants to trade off their preferences for different units and waiting times by choosing among a set of waiting lists. A counterfactual change from existing mechanisms, in which applicants receive offers after units become available and can refuse only a limited number of times, to the proposed mechanism improves welfare by a lower bound of \$6,429 per applicant in a sample of Pittsburgh households.

Publications:

“The Design of Public-Housing Policies,” *More Equal by Design: Economic Design Responses to Inequality*, eds. Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym, Oxford University Press.

Abstract: Social programs are a central means for addressing inequality. This chapter proposes to view social programs through the lens of market design, focusing on the case of public-housing assistance. One of the goals of this chapter is to deliver lessons for housing policy that can be gleaned from market design. After presenting relevant features of the market for affordable housing, we highlight various dimensions of inequality. We explore design considerations that pertain to inequality among those who do receive assistance as well as inequality in terms of which households

receive housing assistance. We describe recent research that attempts to address these issues and suggest directions where further research can make progress. The chapter aims to show more broadly that the market for public housing also exemplifies general lessons for market design.

“Matching with Stochastic Arrival,” *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 109: 209–12. May 2019.

Abstract: This paper examines efficiency and fairness properties in a dynamic allocation problem. The model applies to situations in which objects of different types arrive stochastically over time and must be assigned to agents in a queue, such as the allocation of public housing units. The main result demonstrates the impossibility of designing an allocation mechanism in an environment with stochastic arrival that can guarantee resulting assignments that are efficient or fair ex post.

Teaching and Research Fields:

Labor Economics, Public Economics, Behavioral Economics, Market Design

Teaching:

MPA 2040: Statistics for Program Evaluation

Professional Activities:

Presentations Cornell University; University of California, Berkeley; American Economic Association Annual Meeting; 2nd Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good, Cornell University; Behavioral Economics Annual Meeting, Yale School of Management; University of California at San Diego, Rady School of Management; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University, Collier School of Management; Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics: Psychology and Economics; HCEO Conference on Market Design Perspectives on Inequality, University of Chicago; 11th Workshop on Matching in Practice, Paris School of Economics; INFORMS Annual Meeting; 11th World Congress of the Econometric Society; Third Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, University of Chicago; 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Referee Service *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, *American Economic Review*, *Economics of Transition*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *Management Science*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Theoretical Economics*

Honors and Fellowships:

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| 2017 | Roger Martin Award for Excellence in Doctoral Research |
| 2016 | Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fellowship |
| 2014 and 2015 | Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Bok Center, Harvard University |
| 2013 | Samuel C. Lamport Prize |
| 2012 | H. P. Manning Prize |